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2ABSTRACT
The thesis examines the political history of Nepal from 1830,
covering the decline and fall of Bhimsen Thapa, the factional struggles
$
which ended with Jang Bahadur Kunwar (later Rana)'s emergence as premier 
in 1846, and Jang1s final securing of his own position when he assumed 
the joint roles of prime minister and maharaja in 1857. The relationship 
between king, political elite (bharadar'i) , army and peasantry is analysed, 
with special prominence given to the religious aspects of Hindu kingship, 
and also to the role of prominent Chetri families and of the Brahman 
Mishras, Pandes and Paudyals who provided the rajgurus (royal preceptors). 
Special attention is also paid to the role of the British Residency in 
internal politics and to rank-and-file protest in the army, which although 
largely manipulated by elite patrons showed signs of potential autonomy. 
Jang's assumption of power is discussed in detail, emphasising the 
importance of his alliance with guru Vijay Raj Pande. The main features 
of the new regime are outlined, including the relationship between maharaja 
and monarch (maharajadhtraj), the composition of the new bharadar'i and 
Jang’s dependence on it and on the army, changes to the administrative 
system, the significance of the Mutukt A'in (Law Code) of 1854, land revenue 
policy and relations with the British. Jang's policies were partly the 
natural continuation of lines already emerging, but he nevertheless made 
significant changes leading to a more centralised administration, the 
growth of a sense of national identity, and the shift towards de facto 
private ownership of land which continued under his successors. Nepal 
remained essentially in the tradition of Hindu kingship, but with the 
secular functions of the king transferred to the maharaja. Jang's
3regime was 'autocratic* but he acknowledged in principle an obligation 
to the governed, and had in practice to conciliate key sectors of the 
public, limitations which correspond to those recognised in classical 
Hindu political theory. Appendices give details of Jang's family history 
and translations of letters written by him from Paris in 1850.
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L CHAPTER ONE
KING AND STATE IN PRE-RANA NEPAL
The Kingdom of Nepal
The integration of the former 'Princely States' into independent 
India and Pakistan extinguished Hindu monarchy as a living political 
form throughout almost all of South Asia. One sole exemplar survived, 
however, in the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal, which had never been brought 
into the British Indian empire. The country today is still officially 
styled a Hindu kingdom, and the present king is the tenth-generation 
descendant of Prithvi Narayan Shah, whose conquest of the Kathmandu 
Valley in 1769 marked the beginning of Nepal's history as a unified 
state. Nowadays, as in Prithvi's time, it is in the royal palace 
that power principally resides. Over much of the intervening period 
effective power was held by a minister ruling in the king's name.
Jang Bahadur Kunwar {later Rana) attained this post in 1846 and succeeded 
in making it the hereditary possession of his family. From 1857 onwards 
Jang and his successors combined the titles of Maharaja and Prime 
Minister, and the Rana family continued to rule the country until the 
'revolution' of 1950/51 put the reins back into the hands of the Shah 
dynasty. Throughout the Rana ascendancy the royal family nevertheless 
retained their formal superiority, keeping the title of Maharajadhiraj 
in an arrangement paralleled in a number of Hindu states, most notably 
in the Maratha svavajya and in Vijaynagar. The purpose of this study is 
to examine Nepali politics in the crucial years leading up to and 
following Jang Bahadur's assumption of power, looking at the relationship 
between the constituent elements of the state in comparison with the 
pattern elsewhere in the subcontinent and with the model of Hindu polity
1 i
found in the canonical texts. The principal focus will be on kingship 
itself, and on the problem of maintaining central control over an 
extended territory. The present chapter will outline the structure of 
the state as it had evolved by 1830 and consider the chief actors on the
political stage. Chapters Two to Five will present a detailed,
chronological account of events from 1830 to 1847, when the deposition 
of King Rajendra marked the consolidation of Jang's power, and Chapter Six
will look more thematically at the nature of the new regime, as well as
covering the principal political events down to 1857. The concluding 
chapter returns to some of the general issues raised in the first, 
seeing how the characteristics of Nepal as a Hindu monarchy were 
continued or modified under Jang's predominance.
The idea that Nepal is to some extent a microcosm of the whole
subcontinent was encapsulated at the beginning of this century in
1
Sylvain Levi's famous dictum, 'Le N^pal est l'Inde qui se fait'. The 
progressive Hinduisation of an ethnically and culturally diverse 
population by the dominant Indo-Nepalese, and the conflicting trends 
towards amalgamation and disintegration of smaller political units 
within the Himalayan foothills can both aid our understanding of what 
happened on a larger scale throughout South Asia generally. There is 
the crucial distinguishing feature in the Nepali case that unity ~ and 
independence - have been maintained throughout the modern period, but 
this in itself raises the interesting issue of how far a different outcome 
resulted from the geographical factors of smaller size and peripheral 
location, and how far from superior political skill. Recent work on 
South Asian political systems has tended to downgrade the notion of a
12
strong centre imposing its will on local interests and suggest instead
a model of ritual authority more or less voluntarily accepted or of
empire itself emerging from the shifting pattern of alliances between
2
local lords of the land. It is not impossible to detect traces of
both these patterns within the Nepali microcosm, but we have to reckon
with central control which proved itself solid and durable, and it will
be seen that some of the more traditional ways of looking at Indian
empires fit the Nepali data better than those for which they were
originally devised. This emerges particularly strongly in the question
of land ownership which will be taken up shortly.
Despite such potentially illuminating parallels and contrasts,
Nepali history has tended to remain a relatively isolated study, not
forming part of the main current of South Asian historiography, although
anthropologists adopting an historical perspective have made useful
attempts to fit Nepal into the wider framework of Hindu polity, most
significant being the work of Richard Burghart on the relationship
between Hindu ascetics and the state, and that of Andras HOfer on the
3
codification of the caste hierarchy in the 1854 Legal Code. Amongst
historians in the stricter sense considerable attention has been given
to Nepal's relations with British India and with China and Tibet, whilst
scholars writing in Nepali have concentrated on straightforward narrative
history and on the publication of indigenous material to supplement the
British records which remain the most important source for political
4
events after the establishment of the British Residency in 1816. For 
economic life, and in particular the land tenure system, there is the 
indispensable work of Mahesh Chandra Regmi, based almost entirely on
1 3
Nepal government records. Ludwig Stiller's studies of the unification 
process and of the twenty years following the 1814-16 war with British 
India, highlight the inter-relationship between land, army and royal 
authority which will be developed further here, whilst his publication 
of many of the key British documents for the period 1840-1847 has 
greatly eased the task of future historians. Valuable work on the 
institutions of Nepal under Jang Bahadur has been produced by Kumar and 
Adhikari, whilst Edwards has highlighted the existence of both 
'traditional' and 'modern1 elements in the Rana bureaucracy. Jain has 
analysed Jang's rise and early years in a book which is marred by 
eccentric and dogmatic judgments, but which does have the merit of 
trying to look critically at the sources. The analysis offered below 
relies on all of these writers, whilst seeking to provide a fuller 
account of the factional politics of the 1830s and to fit Nepali 
developments into a wider South Asian pattern.^
With the exception of the relatively small area which was to be 
ceded to her in 1860 in return for assistance in suppressing the Sepoy 
Revolt, Nepal's borders in 1830 were as they remain today. Stretching 
for some 520 miles along the southern flank of the Himalayas, the 
kingdom decends in uneven steps from the snow-covered peaks to the 
Gangetic plain. The northern border in its eastern section actually 
follows the crest line, whilst further west it runs slightly to the north 
of the main Himalayan range, taking in the southern fringe of the arid 
Tibetan plateau. South of the mountains are 'the hills' (pahad), a 
confusion of interrupted ridges and spurs which are the cultural and 
political as well as the geographic heart of the country. The limit of
14
this region is marked’ by the Mahabharat range, beyond which lie the 
valleys of the 'inner Tarai', and then the low Siwalik or Chure hills, 
last barrier before the plains. Nepali territory generally extends
into the low country a depth of between ten and thirty miles, Until 
two decades ago the prevalence of a particularly virulent form of malaria 
rendered this region —  the Tarai proper —  uninhabitable through much of 
the year to all but the local tribesmen who had acquired some degree of 
immunity. However, where the jungle had been cleared the land was 
worked during the cold season, generally by peasants brought in from 
India, and the fertile soil made the region vital to the Nepali economy 
as it still is today.
Virtually the whole of Nepal falls within the catchment area of three 
great river systems —  the Karnali in the west, the Gandaki in the centre, 
and the Kosi in the east, each with its many different branches and 
tributaries. From their sources in Tibet they flow through deep gorges 
across the line of the Himalays, then traverse the hills and plain to 
merge eventually with the Ganges. Within the hills they shape the 
agricultural pattern, the valley floors providing good rice-growing land, 
whilst the slopes above must be used for 'dry' crops such as maize.
Until the British managed to open an alternative route through 
Sikkim towards the end of the last century, the passes through the 
Himalayas formed by the Trisuli (a branch of the Gandaki) and the Sunkosi 
rivers were major routes for trade between India and Tibet. Situated in 
the hills between the Gandaki and Kosi basins, the Nepal Valley, which 
gave its name to the whole country and which contains the capital, 
Kathmandu, was a natural halting point for traders travelling between 
the plains and one or other of the passes. This commercial importance,
15
together with the valley's great fertility, enabled its Newar inhabitants 
to develop a complex urban civilisation. Outside the valley, however, 
the area of their control was limited, both because the difficulties 
of communication in the hills naturally favoured local autonomy, and 
because from the fifteenth century onwards the Newars were themselves 
divided, Kathmandu and the neighbouring towns of Patan and Bhaktapur each 
forming the capital of its own little kingdom.
Within the hills unification of substantial parts of Nepal had been 
achieved twice before Prithvi Narayan Shah: in the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries the 'Malla Empire' had covered the Karnali basin 
and large areas of south-western Tibet, whilst the Sen kingdom established 
in the early sixteenth century briefly united the southern hills from Palpa 
eastwards.^ By the eighteenth century, however, this unity had long 
been lost. The ba'is'i (twenty-two) kingdoms of the Karnali region 
continued to recognise the formal precedence of the king of Jumla, in 
whose territory the Mallas had had their capital, but were in practice 
completely independent. The Gandaki basin was divided amongst the 
caub'is'L (twenty-four) states, and it was by separation from one of these, 
Lamjung, that Prithvi Narayan's ancestral kingdom of Gorkha had been 
founded in 1559. South and east of the Kathmandu Valley were the 
kingdoms of Makwanpur, Bijaypur and Chaudandi, ruled by branches of the 
Sen family, whilst much of the hills was controlled by non-Hinduised 
Kiranti tribesmen.
Prithvi Narayan came to the throne of Gorkha in 1743 and embarked 
the following year on the first of the military campaigns which were to 
lead to the conquest of the Kathmandu Valley twenty-four years later.
The emergence of a united Nepal thus took place at a time when Mughal
1 6
successor states were being consoligated in India, proper, piost n.otgbly
7
by drstwhile Mughal viceroys and by Sikhs and Margthas. Nepal had 
always been beyond the periphery of even the most tenuous Mughal 
control, but the example of what others were achieving as that control 
loosened must have impressed Prithvi. He received no military backing 
from Mughal sources or indeed from anywhere outside the hills, and this 
total reliance on the resources of his own region set him apart from a 
ruler such as Martanda Varma, first king of united Travgncore, who also 
fought his way to supremacy over his fellow chieftains but who had 
obtained initial support from the Viceroy of the Carnatic and later
g
employed mercenaries from the east coast. Prithvi did, however, follow
the pattern of applying updated military technology to local conflicts,
. . 9obtaining firearms on a journey to Banaras. It is also significant that,
as will be seen below, he, and possibly even his predecessors on the
Gorkha throne, regarded the Mughal emperor as a potential source of
legitimisation.
In Nepal's case, the conquest of the Valley was only the beginning 
of a period of rapid Gorkha expansion, which carried the borders of the 
new kingdom to the Tista in the east and the Satiej in the west. The 
ultimate prize of control of the Himalayan chain as far as Kashmir might 
well have been attained had not an aggressive policy towards Tibet over 
terms of trade and control of the border passes provoked a punitive Chinese 
invasion of Nepal in 1792. Hostilities were concluded on terms which 
involved nominal Nepali submission but imposed no hardship on them other 
than the surrender of their recent Tibetan gains. However, the withdrawal 
of forces from the far west in the face of the emergency halted the 
momentum of expansion, and when the advance was resumed in the 1800s their
17
path was blocked by Ranjit Singh's kingdom of the Panjab. A further
blow followed in 1814, when Nepal became involved with the British over
rival claims to the Tarai. Terms imposed after her defeat in 1816
deprived her of Kumaon, Garhwal and the section of Sikkim she had
previously occupied, between them comprising about one-third of her
pre-war territory.
Even within Nepal's restricted boundaries the population was a
complex amalgam of highly diverse elements. The Mutuki Ain (Legal Code)
of 1854 attempted to arrange all the different groups in one country-wide
hierarchy, and this structure, which corresponds in broad outline with
social reality even today, is set out in simplified form in Table I
(on following page).
In pre-unification Gorkha, as in the other former statelets of the
Karnali and Gandaki basins, two principal elements could be identified:
the Parbatiyas, or 1Indo-Nepalese1, divided into castes and speaking the
Indo-Aryan language known in the nineteenth century as khas kura (1 the
10
language of the Khas1) or Parbatiya, and today as Nepali; and Magar and
Gurung tribesmen, only partially Hinduised and speaking Tibeto-Burman
languages. The main divisions within the Indo-Nepalese caste system,
as it had evolved in the eighteenth century were: Brahmans who claimed
to have come originally from the old imperial city of Kanyakubja (modern
Kanauj) on the Ganges; Thakuris, who included the ruling dynasty of
Gorkha and of the other hill principalities and who proclaimed themselves
the descendants of Rajput refugees from Muslim invaders on the plains;
Khas, who were in the main a continuation of the people of that name who
had lived in the Himalayas since ancient times, and finally a number of
11
occupational, untouchable castes. The Indo-Nepalese had brought the
1 8
TABLE 1 : THE CASTE HIERARCHY IN THE MULUKI AIN
* = the position (status of the caste within the group is not precisely 
determined 
E = ethnic group
1. Caste group of the "Wearers of the holy cord" (tagadhavZ)
Upadhyaya Brahman
Rajput (Thakuri) ("warrior")
Jaisi Brahman
Chetri (Ksatri) ("warrior")
Dew Bhaju (Newar Brahmans) E 
Indian Brahman
Ascetic sects (Bannyasi, etc.)
"lower" Jaisi 
Various Newar castes *E
2 . Caste group of the "Non-enslavable Alcohol-drinkers" (namas'Znya matwaZ'L) 
Magar *E 
Gurung *E 
Sunuwar *E
Some other Newar castes *E
3. Caste group of the "Enslavable Alcohol-drinkers" (masinya matwaZ'L)
Bhote *E ("Tibetanids" and some "Tibetanoids")
Cepang *E 
Kumal * (potters)
Hayu *E 
Tharu *E
Gharti * (descendants of freed slaves)
4. Impure, but "touchable" castes (pant nacatnya choi- ahttQ haZnunaparnya) 
Kasai (Newar butchers) E
Kusle (Newar musicians) E 
Hindu Dhobi (Newar washermen) E 
Kulu (Newar tanners) E 
Musulman *
Mlecch * (European)
5. Untouchable castes (pant nacaZnya ohoi ohito haZnupavnya)
Kami (blacksmiths) ) ^
, . , . . , of equal status
Sarkr (tanners, shoemakers )
Kadara (stemming from unions between Kami and Sarki)
Damai (tailors and musicians)
Gaine (minstrels)
Badi (musicians)
Pore (Newar skinners and fishermen) E 
Cyame (Newar scavengers) E
19
Magars and Gurungs within the caste framework by granting them a position
below the twice-born Khas but above the impure castes, corresponding with
the category of sat Sudra found in some parts of India. Classed together
with these were also castes of Khas origin whose ancestors had not been
12
granted, or who had lost, the right to wear the sacred cord.
Within this whole structure the Khas, who since Jang Bahadur’s time
have been officially known as Chetris (i.e. ksatriyas), were the key
element. The original Khas tribesmen are believed to have been a branch
of the Aryan migration into the subcontinent distinct from the Vedic
Aryans but subsequently Hinduised. From Kumaon and Garhwal they moved
east into Nepal, where they were the founders of the 'Malla Empire’.
It was probably this strong political position which enabled them to
secure integration with Brahmin and Rajput newcomers on more favourable
terms than their fellows who remained in Kumaon, where the caste structure
13
is broadly similar to that of Nepal. Though both hierarchies show a
clear opposition between high-status immigrant and low-status Khas, the 
degree of subordination is much less in Nepal than in India. Intermarriage 
between immigrant and Khas in Kumaon is infrequent and frowned upon, 
whereas in Nepal it has been tolerated for as far back as we have any 
knowledge, subject only to the normal rule of hypergamy. The offspring 
of unions between Brahman men and Chetris women, or between either 
Brahmin or Chetri males and Magar or Gurung females, are themselves 
regarded as chetris.- Before the eighteenth century some Magars may 
have been accepted into the Khas ranks on the strength of cultural 
assimilation alone; this process would have been a replication of that 
by which the original Khas had been granted the right to wear the sacred
s o
cord by the bai.S'i and caub'Ls'L rulers. Finally, of course, it may be 
assumed that, while immigration from India during the medieval period 
did take place, many Brahman and Thakuri must have been basically of Khas 
extraction.
The unification of Nepal brought a number of new ethnic groups under 
Gorkha rule, in particular the Newars of the Kathmandu Valley and the 
Kiranti (Limbus and Rai) of the eastern hills. The Newars possessed an 
elaborate caste structure of their own and these different castes were 
incorporated into the Indo-Nepalese scheme at different levels. The 
Kiranti came to be accepted into the same general category as the Magars 
and Gurungs —  pure, but not twice-born —  though the question of their 
status may not have been consciously considered at first: unlike the
western tribes they were not intimately associated with the Nepal state, 
having submitted to Prithvi Narayan in return for considerable internal 
autonomy, in particular the retention of their kip at system of communal 
tenure. Neither Newars nor Kirantis were admitted into the army in 
pre-Rana times —  indeed the ban on Newar recruitment was not to be 
rescinded until the overthrow of the Rana regime in 1951. A number of 
Newars held administrative posts during the nineteenth century and the 
role of a few such individuals was to be very important under Jang 
Bahadur. Newars also provided almost the entire commercial class. 
Nevertheless their position remained very much that of a conquered people.
The political structure of uniiied Nepal was essentially that of 
Gorkha translated to Kathmandu, though Prithvi Narayan was careful to 
present himself as continuing the principal ritual functions of his Newar 
precedessors on his new throne. Gorkha forces had entered Kathmandu
% ±
whilst the inhabitants were celebrating the festival of Indra Jatra,
during which the king received t'ilak from the Kumari Devi, or 'Living
Goddess', who was regarded as the earthly embodiment of Taleju, the
istadevata of the Newar monarchs. Prithvi Narayan at once ascended
the platform erected for the ceremony and received the Kumari's recognition,
whilst the defeated ruler, Jay Prakash Malla, was in flight to the
14
neighbouring city of Patan. Thereafter the authority of Prithvi and
his successors rested on Hindu notions of monarchy as they had evolved 
in both the Indo-Nepalese and the Newar traditions, as well as on the 
prestige which military conquest had conferred upon the dynasty, and upon 
the crucial fact that land was entirely within the king's gift. These 
factors are to some extent interlocking, especially the second and third, 
but for ease of analysis these religious, military and economic aspects 
of royal power will be examined in turn.
Kingship as a ReligiousInstitution
Much ink has flowed on the question of the religious nature of Hindu
monarchy, in particular since Louis Dumont advanced his thesis that the
spiritual predominance of the Brahman resulted in the 'secularising' of 
15
royal power. Dumont's view has been heavily criticised in subsequent
anthropological and Indological writings, and there has been a renewed 
emphasis on the 'magico-religious1 aspect of kingship; in this process 
critics have sometimes overlooked the fact that Dumont himself did not 
deny that this aspect continued to play an important role. Differences 
of emphasis are possible because, as Ronald Inden has pointed out,
Indian kingship is neither fully divine (as in Japan or ancient Egypt),
22
nor fully immanent (as in China or medieval Europe), but a mixture of
the two, a situation mirrored by the symbolic, cyclical alternation
between the two states found in royal rituals and particularly the
16
installation ceremony as described in early medieval texts. The form
of the ceremony used by the Shah dynasty in Nepal —  most recently for
King Birendra's coronation in 1975 —  is essentially that laid down in
the eighth-century Vtsnudharmottara, the text on which Inden's analysis
principally relies; it is interesting that he ascribes its compilation
to Brahmans associated with the Kashmiri Karkota dynasty, which ruled
briefly from Kanyakubja, claimed as their original home by Nepali Brahmans.
Whilst it may be debated how far ordinary Nepalis in the period we
are considering thought consciously of their king as rainmaker, guarantor
of the cosmic order, bride of the earth and so on, as Vedic texts and the
mixed Vedic-Puranic royal rituals suggested him to be, belief . in the
divine or quasi-divine nature of the king1s person remains strong among
many of his subjects even today. It is a commonplace of the tourist
handbooks that he is an avatar of Visnu, and this belief, expounded in
Manusmrdti- and attested for many parts of India since the early centuries
of the Christian era, is known to date back in the Newar royal tradition
17
to at least the reign of Jayasthiti Malla in the fourteenth century.
On the Gorkha side the seventeenth-century King Rama Shah is referred to
as visnuko ams ('a portion of Vishnu1) in a nineteenth-century vamsaval'L
18
(chronicle) which doubless represents an older tradition, and the title 
'Narnarayan' ('the human Narayan1) was included in the Gorkha king's 
prasastd. It has been argued by Gerald Toff in that the Newar king was 
not a full avatar in the sense the Krishna had been, or that the Khmer
S3
19
rulers of South-east Asia were believed to be by their subjects.
This is perhaps also the case with the Shah kings of unified Nepal,
as is arguably attested by the very expression V'Csnuko ams. However a
petition from a courtier to King Rajendra, probably dating from the
1830s, could assert without qualification, 'Your Majesty is an avatar of 
, 20
God . The term was in any case one which came readily to mind in royal
contexts throughout Hindu India; indeed in Darbhanga district, immediately
south of the Nepal border, a Maithili bard celebrating famine relief
efforts by the British government in 1873/4 could even describe the
21
'Company' as having 'become an avatar of part of the deity'. Popular
belief in Nepal continues today to see the king as something more than
human. Clear evidence of this is provided by the widespread conviction
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that just seeing the king wipes out the beholder's sins of that day.
Another demonstration is provided by the peasant farmers of Janakpur
district (in the Nepal Tarai) asserting that the king shines with one
half of the fiery energy of the sun (identified with the supreme soul),
while Brahmans and ascetics embody a much lesser proportion of divine 
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energy.
It must be admitted, however, that the king is at the same time 
dependent on the Brahmans for the assumption of his superhuman status, 
since Brahman priests must officiate at his installation ceremony and at 
other royal rituals. Additionally, consistent with the practice of the 
hill principalities which had been amalgamated to form the new kingdom, 
Prithvi Narayan and his successors followed the classical Hindu pattern 
of reinforcing their legitimacy through extensive lands grants to Brahmans.
In Vedic times the most essential feature of king-Brahman inter­
dependence had been what Heesterman terms 'the marriage-like bond between
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the king and...his purohita'. The purohit's role continued to be
emphasised in the Arthasastra and the dharmasastra texts, but his importance
was waning by the medieval period. In Gorkha and subsequently in unified
Nepal, much greater importance attached to the post of rajguru. The
guru's relationship to the king was formally established by the latter's
receiving from him either the gayatri mantra, a specific verse of the
Rtgveda which was given to every twice-born boy when invested with the
sacred cord at his upanayan, or alternatively a diksa mantra, which was
in principle conferable at any time. Before 1800 the functions of gayatrd
and diksa guru were sometimes combined by a single individual, but largely
because of the very considerable secular influence which went with the
posts, care was afterwards taken to ensure that they went to members of
two different families. After the establishment of the Rana regime both
roles were entrusted to a single family —  the Pandes —  but by now the
king himself had lost effective power, so there was no longer the same
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need to balance one guru family against another.
The importance of the rajguru has to be understood against the
background of the heightened emphasis given to the guru-sisya relationship
in sectarian Hinduism, and in particular in the tantric tradition which
had long been of great influence in Nepal. The expression ddksa
('initiation') frequently occurs in Vedic texts, but later came to refer
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pre-eminently to tantric initiation. In no other Hindu state does the
institution of rajguru seem to have played the critical role it often did 
in Nepal, with the possible exception of the Chola monarchy in South India.
25
inscriptions show that the gurus there wielded great influence in religious
matters, but it is less clear how important they were in the secular 
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sphere. It is worth noting, however, that in Bengal and elsewhere,
the role of the purohit as royal adviser seems to have been superseded by
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a dharmadhyaksa or dharmadhikaranika, and that these can probably be 
equated with the Nepali dharmadhikar ('righteousness officer1 or 
'enforcer of morals'), who was normally drawn from a family which also 
provided rajgurus. By the mid-nineteenth century the dharmadh'ikar was 
responsible for supervising the expiation of offences against caste, but
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he had earlier enjoyed a wide jurisdiction over criminal cases generally.
While the relationship with Brahmans was the key religious buttress
to the king's position, non-Brahman elements played a supporting role.
The Newar kings of Kathmandu had been closely associated with the goddess
Taleju, in whose cult non-Brahmans officiated. As we have already seen,
Prithvi Narayan continued the custom of receiving tiiak —  and thus
reconfirmation of his royal power, from the Kirnari Devi-, the human Taleju.
The Shah kings did not take over all the other aspects of their
predecessors1 special relationship with Taleju, but they had their own
personal deity (istadevata) in Gorakhnath (from whom 'Gorkha' derives)
and patronised Gorakhnath's devotees, the Kanphata Yogis. Members of
this sect had long been closely associated with many of the ruling
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families in central and western Nepal.
Although both actual practice in certain parts of India and also a 
a number of dharmasastra texts suggest that ksatriya status was not 
essential for a Hindu king, it was none the less certainly to be preferred. 
Kings whose sudra ancestry was beyond doubt might seek to remedy the
26
situation through the hivanya garbha ('golden womb') ceremony, in which,
with Brahmanical assistance, they underwent symbolical rebirth as members
of the ksatriya vavna. Martanda Varma of Trevancore was one who took 
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this course. The Shah dynasty, on the other hand, had no such
difficulties, since, in common with the ruling families of many of the
hill states incorporated into the new kingdom, they had long claimed
descent from Rajput refugees fleeing into the Himalayas to escape the
Muslim invader. There is no reason to doubt that some refugees did
enter the hills in this way, and it has been plausibly suggested that the
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break-up of the 'Malla Empire' was triggered by their arrival. However,
the pedigrees advanced by the numerous hill chieftains have rightly 
attracted considerable scepticism: in many cases they will have been 
fabrications by court bards to flatter rulers of simple Khas extraction.
The specific claim of the Shah dynasty, who see themselves as the 
descendants of a fourteenth-century prince of Mewar, the premier Rajput
state, has been carefully analysed by Leelanteswar Baral, and shown to be
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almost certainly false. Prom the point of view of the position of the
monarchy in the nineteenth century, however, this is really irrelevant: 
what is important is that the claim was generally accepted in Nepal and 
also by the Gorakhpur Rajputs with whom the Nepali royal family inter­
married. According to the famous story related by Brian Hodgson, the 
Shah family's pretensions were rejected by the Mewar court itself when 
an envoy from a seventeenth-century king of Gorkha had to confess that 
he himself had a Brahman name although he was of the ksatriya order, and thus
revealed that caste matters were not regulated in the hills as in the 
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plains. Hodgson also stressed frequently in his correspondence that
27
the marriage of King Rana Bahadur to a Brahman girl at the end of the
eighteenth century had left an indelible stain on the Shah escutcheon as
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far as the more pakka Indian Rajputs were concerned. Direct evidence
of the Mewar attitude in the nineteenth century suggests rather that even
if they were worried about the dynasty's subsequent behaviour, they were
inclined to accept that the two families were connected. A letter from
the Udaypur ruler to King Rajendra of Nepal in 1838 referred to him as a
3 6
member of his own family. In 1861 Prince Birendra, son of Rajendra
by his junior queen, applied to Maharana Sarup Singh to be allowed to
visit Udaypur and be given maintenance at his court. Birendra, who had
been in exile in India with his mother and brother since 1846, described
the Maharana as his 'paternal uncle1. In a letter to the Governor-General's
Agent for Rajputana, through whom the correspondence was being conducted,
Sarup Singh expressed willingness to invite the prince 'as the boy is a 
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relative of his'. The project fell through only because of the death
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of the Maharana shortly afterwards.
In addition to emphasising their status as ksatri-yas by descent, the
39
Nepali kings also sought to play the ksatriya role as champions of dharma.
In the Di-bya JJpades, the political testament which he dictated shortly
before his death, Prithvi Narayan stressed his view of Nepal as asal
Hindustan —  a real Hindustan, in contrast to India proper which had fallen
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under Muslim domination. Long after the Mughal power had crumbled into
dust, official Nepali documents continued to refer to India as Mughlana —  
the land the Mughals had polluted. Internally, whilst the non-Hinduised 
elements of the population were by and large left free to continue their 
existing customs, efforts were made to prohibit cow slaughter and more
generally to curb practices particularly repugnant to orthodox Hinduism.
Caste regulations , particularly in regard to commensality and sexual
relations, were enforced as strictly as possible; after the establishment
of the Rana regime these rules were incorporated in the Muluk.'i Adn
('National Code') of 1854.
Yet despite the assertively Hindu nature of the monarchy, reinforcement
for the king's legitimacy could sometimes actually be sought from the mteccha
power to the south. The prasastd (formal titles) of the Shah kings
contained the Persian words bahaduF samsev gang ('brave with the sword in
war'), granted to Prithvi Narayan Shah by the Mughal emperor, Shah
Alam II, or by a local north Indian ruler claiming to act in the emperor's
name. In his 1770 letter soliciting this title, Prithvi described
himself as 'the zam'indav of Gorkha1, and applied for appointment as a 
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Mughal jagdrdar. A nineteenth-century chronicle claims that as far
back as the seventeenth century, envoys of King Rama Shah of Gorkha had,
on the Rana of Udaypur's advice, sought authority from an earlier emperor
for an alteration in the pTasastd, which was at that time purely 
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Sanskritic. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Rana
Maharajas' ready acceptance of British titles might be regarded as a 
continuation and extension of this tradition.
The Military Factor
Even where all other factors making for legitimacy are missing, 
capacity as a military leader may be sufficient to secure the allegiance 
of one's followers. This was especially true of Prithvi Narayan's 
situation when he was still only the ruler of one amongst fifty hill
29
principalities. The social and political structure was similar throughout
the ba.'is'l and caubi-S'L kingdoms, so that individuals would as willingly
work for one ruler as another. Ludwig Stiller sees the secret of
Prithvi's success in a greater degree of concern for the people that he,
and to some extent his predecessors at Gorkha, evinced in comparison with
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the Rajput rulers of other hill states. This may well be true, but it
was specifically Prithvi's military abilities and the fact that he was 
successful which bound his followers to him. Other members of his family 
were also effective commanders, notably his second son Bahadur Shah, but 
this was not the case with his successors on the throne. Either the 
simple fact of their being minors at the time of accession or their lack 
of aptitude resulted in command of the army in the field always going to 
someone other than the king himself. Prithvi's own exploits had been 
sufficient to allow his direct descendants a kind of reflected glory, and 
this is part of the reason for the general loyalty of the army during the 
years of internal crisis which are the main focus of this study. But the 
fact that it was the family rather than the individual who attracted the 
army's traditional loyalty, made it easier for them to accept the transfer 
of the throne from King Rajendra to King Surendra engineered by Jang 
Bahadur in 1846-7.
The senior officers of the army were drawn from the king's own Rajput 
relatives and from a number of Khas families, most of whom had been 
associated with the Shah dynasty through several generations. The 
composition of this elite will be examined more closely below, but here 
it is important to note that although a particular commander might well 
enjoy patron-client ties with soldiers under him, as well as influence
30
over them on the strength of his personal qualities, the way in which
the army was recruited and paid worked to strengthen the direct link
between soldier and monarch. Up until the end of the eighteenth century,
a large proportion of Nepal’s military force was made up of irregulars
raised and maintained by officers known as imwaos, who were generally
Rajputs. Under Prithvi Narayan1s grandson, Rana Bahadur, however, this
system was discontinued and the troops raised and paid centrally, as was
44
already the case with the regular battalions. A small number of local
battalions continued to be maintained in the hills, under officers of 
varying ranks, but they were of minimal importance in the overall balance. 
The political importance of the regular army was enhanced after the 
Anglo-Gorkha war when it was largely concentrated at the capital. Direct 
control by the king —  or his representative —  was thus facilitated.
Since payment of the military from the most senior officer to private 
individual was predominantly by assignment of land revenue, this whole 
aspect of royal power can best be further considered in the context of 
land assignment generally.
Land and Central Control
The confident assertion by early European observers that the South
Asian ruler was the owner of the soil is now generally seen as a gross
over-simplification, stemming both from preconceptions of 'oriental
despotism1 and from the assumption that there had to be an 'owner' in the
Western sense and that therefore if neither the jag-irdar nor the cultivator
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fitted the bill, the king was logically bound to do so. In fact the
indigenous concept of property in land, as it had developed by the early
31
medieval period, was one of concurrent rights held by a number of
parties, rather than exclusive ownership by one individual, the situation
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thus resembling that seen by Bloch in feudal Europe. Although the
Muslim invasions brought certain changes in the concept of land rights,
the picture painted by Habib for the Mughal period is basically the 
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same. Against this background, the frequent insistence by Mahesh
Chandra Regmi, the foremost authority on Nepali land tenure, on the
doctrine of state ownership is initially a little disquieting. However,
there is evidence to show that the balance of rights between king,
cultivator and intermediary in Nepal was indeed more firmly tilted in
the royal favour in Nepal than elsewhere in South Asia. The gagi-v grant
to an ordinary soldier, for example, was not only a transfer of the
revenue right but also entitled the beneficiary to dispossess the cultivator
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unless the latter1s tenure was in a special protected category.
Stress on the king's predominant right had in any case long been one 
important strand in the Rindu tradition, and the speed and completeness 
of the Gorkha conquest doubtless reinforced the notion in the Himalayan 
context.
Conscious awareness of the king's proprietorship as a distinguishing 
feature of the Nepali system is shown in Jang Bahadurko fielat-t latra, an 
account of Jang Bahadur's 1850 visit to Britain written by a member of his 
party:
The sovereign cannot confiscate anybody's property, 
punish anyone, resort to violence or insult, nor 
hand out and cancel appointments at his own pleasure, 
as if he were absolute master of his own resources.
His wealth in fact comes from the earnings from 
agriculture of the nobility, the military and the 
common people, who give up one half as the king1s 
share.^9
Notwithstanding the inaccuracy over the percentage of British national
income taken in taxation (the figure is in fact the proportion of the
crop traditionally claimed by the ruler in the hills), the author is
correct in making an implicit contrast with the state 'ownership1 of
land in Nepal. In a slightly earlier Nepali account of Britain, the
IngZisvajyaprabandhavcmsavaZZ, it is stated explicitly that land in
Britain was mostly held by individual members of the aristocracy as 
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bunyad'i bZrta, BunyadZ means real, or absolute, and bZrta is the name
of one type of Nepali land tenure under which, contrary to the usual
practice, the king did grant outright possession.
Bt-vta grants were intended especially for Brahmans and ascetics,
gifts to whom had to be unconditional for the royal giver to earn full
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merit for his action. Grants of this type had long been a feature of
Hindu royal practice, and it has been argued that it was a major cause of
the 1feudalisation1 of North India which developed during the early 
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centuries A D . Land could also be gifted for the support of a temple
or shrine, tenure of this type being known in Nepal as guthi but virtually 
equivalent to bZrta in its effect on the landholding structure. In 
addition to grants for religious purposes, bZrta could also be bestowed 
on favoured courtiers, particularly to military commanders who had rendered 
exceptionally valuable service. Prithvi Narayan not only made grants of 
this sort to his own followers, but also frequently confirmed the bi-vta 
rights granted by rulers of the pre-unification states. This was 
especially important for the Newar inhabitants of the Kathmandu Valley 
towns, who were allowed to retain their sona bZrta or Zhumbu landSj 
regarded as their own property in contrast to the royal domain of the
3 3
former Newar sovereigns. Land in this last category was subject to
taxation, but was not assignable as jagiv to state employees. This
exemption also applied to the kdpat lands held communally by the Kirantis,
and Brian Hodgson, British Resident at Kathmandu during the 1830s, classed
these together with b'Crta as private land, opposing them jointly to the
sarkavi (government) lands which were assignable and which he believed
comprised three-quarters of the total agricultural land in the Valley
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and nine-tenths in the hills.
On sarkari, land —  the term is a useful one, though was probably
Hodgson's own rather than one actually used by the Nepali revenue
administrators —  the king's subjects held land purely on sufferance,
either as tenants in return for rent, or as jagirdars to whom the revenue
from a particular area or areas was assigned for as long as their
apointments lasted. Jagdvs were the normal method of remuneration both
for the key figures in the administration and for rank-and-file soldiers.
There is a distinction, though, in that whereas more senior personnel
were in effect local rulers, collecting taxes of all kinds and exercising
criminal jurisdiction, the ordinary soldiers, if not cultivating his jag-ir
himself, was entitled only to a share of the main rice crop and, in some
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circumstances, to a levy on the other produce. On land not assigned
to jagi-rdars the cultivators had to pay their rent, whether in kind or 
(as became more common as the nineteenth century progressed) in cash, to 
the state. Collection from land in this category was carried out either 
directly by an official of the central government or by tax-farmers.
The entire system, similar in many ways to that of Mughal India, 
involved a high degree of administrative decentralisation, since a
3 4
jagdrdar or tax-farmer would have wide powers over the inhabitants
of the lands granted to him. The building up of a strong central
bureaucracy was a task which had to wait till the establishment of the
Rana regime. Nevertheless the pre-Rana system was designed in such a
way that overall central control could readily be maintained. Every
jagdrdai* or tax-farmer was liable to have his appointment or contract
cancelled, and thus his land rights terminated, at the annual review of
appointments (pajand), a vivid symbol of the universal dependence on
royal patronage. The pajand system applied to the entire army, and since
the bulk of this was concentrated at Kathmandu it was possible for the
king, if he chose, to conduct it in person. Those individuals who were
not confirmed in their positions for the ensuing year were known as
'offTroll' (dh.ak.ve) , and the British Residency calculated in 1837 that
there were enough trained dhakres available to triple the standing army
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of about 18,000, if the resources were made available to pay for them.
Colonel Kirkpatrick, who visited Nepal in 1793 and later produced 
the Western world's first book-length account of the country, wrote that 
umvaos (see above p.30) retained in service had their land assignments
changed frequently so that they would not build up a potentially dangerous
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power base. This would have involved great administrative difficulties
if applied to all jagdrdars, but even after the umrao system was ended it 
seems to have been continued for the more senior appointees; the practice
was a standard Mughal one which had also been adopted in Hindu states on
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the plains. A different method of securing the same result was to
grant the jagdvdav a large number of small plots in different parts of the 
country. This system is most fully illustrated by the record of revenue
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assignments for 1852/3, six years after Jang Bahadur came to power, but
was clearly established well before then: during Hodgson's time in
Kathmandu soldiers belonging to the kampu, the regiments stationed at
the capital, would typically be assigned fields in three different 
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locations. Such an arrangement complicated the jagirdarr8 task in
realising the proceeds from his land, but a number of mechanisms were
available to cope with this problem. Senior gagi-vdavs with large areas
under their control could employ local agents, whilst ordinary soldiers
might arrange with a suitably located colleague for them to superintend
each other's plots, or they could rely on the regimental accountants to
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collect the rent for them. There also emerged a class of brokers who
bought the gagi.vdavs 1 t-irgas (the certificates entitling them to the rent
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from specified lands) at a discount.
In contrast to the situation with a g'agir, a permanent relationship
to a particular locality could result where a senior Gorkha officer had
been made a birta grant which passed to his descendants, or where a
conquered hill chieftain had been allowed to retain his ancestral position
in return for a block tribute payment. An example of the former category
was the grant in about 1772 of the revenues of Dhulikhel, a town just
beyond the eastern rim of the Kathmandu Valley, to Ram Krishna Kunwar,
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the great-grandfather of Jang Bahadur. This land appears to have
remained in the family until Jang Bahadur became the master of all of 
Nepal, and the Kunwars were virtually the squires of Dhulikhel. The 
connection is attested by documents in which members of the family 
intercede with the king on the inhabitants' behalf, and by the institution 
in the town of a festival in honour of Jang's father, Bal Narsingh Kunwar
3 6
(this festival is probably the one which is still held today but now
6 2
known as the 'Bhagwati Jatra1). The relationship with the family is
remembered in Dhulikhel itself, albeit in distorted fashion, in the
form of the local belief that the town was the ma'ite ghav (woman's
paternal home) of Jang's mother, and that Jang's own glorious future was
presaged when he was discovered asleep in nearby fields with a king cobra
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standing guard over him. Dhulikhel, however, was not sufficiently
large a fief to present any threat to the central government, especially 
with the bulk of the Gorkha army stationed at Kathmandu, only twenty-five 
miles away.
The erstwhile independent hill rajas might have posed a more serious 
threat, but the central government was always careful to maintain its
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right of regulation, replacing one ruler with another where necessary.
The largest of them, Palpa, was absorbed within the Nepali polity early in 
the nineteenth century, and none of the others subsequently tried to 
assert their independence even after Nepal's decisive defeat in the 1814-16 
war. Often surrounded by directly administered areas, and aware of the 
size and solidarity of the Gorkha army, they had little choice but to 
remain loyal.
It was strong support from outside Nepali territory that any bid for 
local separatism really required to become effective in the face of the 
forces working in favour of the centre. During the 1814-16 war this was 
supplied, and British success in the critical campaigns in Kumaon and 
Gadhwal was in turn assisted by discontent amongst chieftains and people 
alike with the recently imposed Gorkhali supremacy. The war itself had 
been opposed by the commanders of the forces in the west, and in 1815
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there appeared the possibility that one of these, Bam Shah, might be 
set up as sovereign of Doti, in the far west of Nepal's present-day 
territory, if his attempts to persuade Kathmandu to accept a settlement 
should be unsuccessful. However, after their chastening experience of 
mountain warfare, the British were reluctant to enter such an open-ended 
commitment, whilst Bam Shah himself regarded the project only as a last 
resort and soon abandoned the idea.^~* What the East India Company wanted 
from Nepal after the war was a clearly demarcated border and a reasonable 
degree of confidence that the Nepalis would not violate it. Given a 
central government prepared to meet those conditions, as Kathmandu always 
was except for a brief period of acute internal instability at the end of 
the 1830s, they had no wish to encourage separatism.
The 1 Bearers of the Burden1
Although the nature of Hindu kingship, the structure of the Nepali
state and the attitude of British India combined to place the king in a
position of great potential strength, he nevertheless had to reckon with
the views of his principal followers. In pre-unification Gorkha a
number of families had come to constitute an hereditary elite around the
Shah dynasty, and this structure persisted after the transfer of the
court to Kathmandu. These were conventionally said to number thirty-six,
although no complete list has been preserved, and within the group
special prominence belonged in theory to six particular families, supposed
to have assisted Prithvi Narayan's ancestor, Drabya Shah, take control of 
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Gorkha in 1559. Both the wider and the narrower group were referred to
as thavghav ('the houses with the names', or 'the names in the household').
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Those actually holding office under the king were known as bhavadavs
(literally, "bearers of the burden"), and in the nineteenth century, if
not before, this expression came to denote the elite as a whole, both
those currently in office and those out of public employment (dhakre).
The bhavadavi in this wider sense was reinforced by a number of families
from the former ba'Csd and oaub'ts'i kingdoms, whose language, culture and
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social structure were similar to those of Gorkha. At the same time,
the term tharghar, though never completely losing its fuller meaning, 
began more usually to refer to members of the inner group of six in their 
capacity as land survey officials, which they retained while no longer 
enjoying any political predominance. Bharadai’, and the collective noun 
bhoLTCcdaTi,, will therefore be used throughout this study to refer to 
members of the political elite, though it should be remembered that the 
expression may bear a narrower meaning in some of the original sources.
Whilst in Kathmandu in 1793 on an abortive mission to establish
closer political and commercial links with Nepal, Kirkpatrick was struck
by the importance of the bhavadard, and stressed that this rested on their
family connection with the ruling dynasty rather than on the wealth or
number of supporters that they possessed as individuals. His description
of their role is a perceptive one which helps understand much of the
country's later history:
...the leading members of this body, whether actually 
employed or not, appear to possess such a high 
authority in the state, as renders it nearly impossible 
for the executive government, in whatever hands that may 
be, to pursue any measures of an important nature, in 
opposition to their advice. I have even been assured 
that the throne of the Prince himself would be no longer 
secure, should the principal Thurghurs concur in
3 9
thinking that his general conduct tended to endanger 
the sovereignty, which they profess themselves bound, 
as far as rests with them, to transmit unimpaired to 
the distant posterity of its founder, and the 
interests of which they do not allow to be determined 
by the partial views, or temporary policy of the 
temporary ruling individual.
Under the traditional system at Gorkha, as throughout the oaubist
and bai-S'i, the most important bhavadav, effectively a chief minister, had
been the cauntava, who was a close relative of the king. After
unification this post declined in importance, while the word itself came
to be used in a wider sense as a kind of surname for collateral members of
the royal family. These retained their status as bharadars even when not
holding any specific administrative responsibility. Their Thakuri caste
and relationship with the king entitled them in their own eyes to special
consideration and their resentment at subordination to those they considered
their inferiors was an important factor in nineteenth-century politics.
Object of this resentment and the largest element in the bhai'adav'L
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were the Khas, who provided the bulk of army officers. The families
and individuals most important in 1830 will be treated in detail in the
next chapter, but some general points are relevant here. Khas family
names appear usually to derive either from titles of functionaries
associated with the medieval Malla Empire, or from place names in western 
70Nepal. All those bearing a particular name are commonly spoken of as
belonging to a particular thar, and that word is therefore often rendered
into English as 'clan1. Strictly, however, this is inaccurate, since
the unit of (putative) common descent is rather the kul ('lineage'), a
number of which make up a particular that. All members of a kul are bound
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together by the worship of a patron deity (kuldevata). Jang Bahadur,
4 0
for example, belonged to the Khandka kul of the Kunwar thar. Whilst
members of a single kul would be aware of the fact and retain some residual
sense of solidarity, individual families within it could be political rivals,
The same applied a fortiori, to the 'members' of a thar, who shared nothing
but a common name. With a particularly common thar, failure to remember
these fundamentals can cause confusion: writers referring to the family
of Bhimsen Thapa, effective ruler of Nepal from 1806 to 1837, are not
always aware that another family within his Bhagale Thapa' kul was also
politically important, or that the name was borne by many Khas, and also
by Magars, with no connection to Bhimsen at all.
The more prominent lineages often possessed origin legends and a
genealogy going back to their founder. Those of Prithvi Narayan’s
minister Kalu Pande and of Bhimsen Thapa claimed Brahman ancestry, and
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at least in the first case the claim may well have been correct. By
far the best known is that of Jang Bahadur, who, like the Shah dynasty, 
claimed descent from the Rana family of Mewar. The story was clearly
elaborated after he came to power in 1846, but the lineaments may well
74have existed beforehand. With a general presumption that the older a
family's connection with the Gorkha throne the greater consideration it 
deserved, the temptation to manufacture a useful past was clear, and the
vamsavali material on the early history of Gorkha has to be regarded with
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caution for this reason.
Jealous of their own standing and constant rivals for power, the 
different Khas families struggled as families, or even as individuals, 
not as a caste. Not that the Chetris, as the prominent families must 
have styled themselves long before the change of name was given legal
4 1
force by Jang Bahadur, were unaware of their caste status, but as they
formed a clear majority of the political elite they had no need to
assert themselves as a group.76
A number of bhavadavs are specifically identified as Magars in a
list of prominent personalities at the Nepali Court prepared by the
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British Residency in 1816. One of those mentioned, Abhiman Singh
Rana, is frequently identified as such in Nepali sources, so there can
be no doubt that the Residency was accurately reporting local information.
However, a Residency Report of the 1830s asserts that although Magars
and Gurungs then made up about half of the privates and non-commissioned
officers, they were not found among the officers (meaning probably the
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rank of subedar and upwards). The explanation is probably that men
such as Abhiman Singh belonged to families which had been granted the
right to wear the sacred thread before the caste line hardened, but
retained their Magar name and were commonly still regarded as such.
This hypothesis is supported by Kirkpatrick's reference to the thavghars
including families from 'the Khus and Manguv tribes of the Chetree class'
(italics supplied); the Rana family included amongst the six senior
79tharghars were presumably 'Magars' of this category. A similar
explanation must apply to the occasional 'Gurung' found amongst the 
bharadavd, the most prominent being Kaji Nar Singh Gurung, a leading 
figure at the turn of the century. Such individuals can be classed 
with the Khas for practical purposes, but their ethnicity may have 
strengthened their personal hold on the Magar and Gurung troops under 
them.
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The Brahman section of the bharadari. was considerably smaller.
If the traditional account is to be trusted, hill Brahmans had in
earlier times played a significant military role, since two of them,
Ganesh Pande and Bhagirath Pant, minister and general respectively to
Drabya Shah, fought in the battles which established Gorkha as an
80independent kingdom in the sixteenth century. Prithvi Narayan Shah
two centuries later had at least one prominent Brahman officer in his
army, viz., Sardar Kalu Pande, a descendant of Ganesh. However, a
passage in Prithvi's Ddvya Upades suggests that by this time fighting was
not thought appropriate work for Brahmans, whilst in the nineteenth
century Hodgson noted Nepali Brahmans1 lack of enthusiasm for it in
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comparison with their counterparts on the plains. Given the
militarised nature of Nepali government this virtually ensured that the 
highest positions would be in non-Brahman hands. However, the rajguru 
and puvoh'i'b families were very much part of the elite, wielding considerable 
influence both because of their special relationship to the king, and, 
in the case of the two guru families with strong plains connections, 
because of their expertise as intermediaries with the British. The gurus 
were by far the most important Brahman element, but at a lower level of 
influence other Brahman specialists also found a position in the bharadar-i. 
Kulananda and Hira Lai Jha, probably father and son, were representatives
of this category in post-war Nepal, enjoying political consideration as
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revenue-farmers of the Tarai, of which they were themselves natives.
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As with the Khas, it is misleading to talk of a 'Brahman party1, 
since they pursued family or individual interests rather than caste ones. 
This is particularly true of the guru families, who were bitter rivals of 
one another and who often aligned with different Khas factions.
The normal lack of a strong personality on the throne after Prithvi
Narayan ensured that factionalism among the bharadard was given extended
scope. The accession of Rana Bahadur Shah as a minor in 1777 produced a
struggle for power between his uncle, Bahadur Shah, and his mother,
Rajendra Laksmi, in which Prithvi Narayan's old commanders generally
supported the former and the queen, like her husband Pratap Shah before
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her, relied more on newer, non-Gorkha adherents. The issue was
decided in Bahadur Shah's favour by the queen's death in 1785, but he 
was weakened by the failure of his forward policy towards Tibet and by 
his promotion of an alliance with the British, whom Nepal had tried to 
keep at arm's length since the Company's ill-conceived intervention in 
favour of the last Newar king of Kathmandu in 1767. Shortly after the 
British envoy, Colonel Kirkpartick, had left Kathmandu, Bahadur Shah was 
dismissed and imprisoned by his nephew. Rana Bahadur did not, however, 
remain long in charge of the government. In 1799, five years after
taking power into his own hands, he abdicated in favour of Girvana Yuddha,
his two-year-old son by a hypogamous (and thus, under Hindu law, irregular) 
marriage with a Brahman widow. His intention in renouncing the throne 
was to devote himself to prayers and offerings for the mother, who had 
contracted smallpox, and also to ensure that the boy should not be set 
aside despite the circumstances of his birth. Rana Bahadur was 
successful in the latter aim, managing to have almost all the bharadars 
subscribe to a document recognising his son as king, but when his Brahman 
wife died shortly afterwards, he instituted violent reprisals against the 
Brahmans and the temples of the gods, who he thought had betrayed him,
and he also attempted to re-assert control of the government. He was
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resisted by his son's ministers, although these were men he had himself
originally selected, and was compelled to withdraw in 1800 to Banaras
in East India Company territory. In a tortuous series of negotiations
and intrigues he and his advisers managed to out-manoeuvre both the
British and his Nepali opponents: the 1801 Commercial Treaty, which
the latter parties had concluded and which provided for the exclusion of
Rana Bahadur from power, proved unworkable because of dissension within
the government at Kathmandu. The British Resident appointed under the
agreement withdrew after only a few months, and the ex-king was able to
return home in triumph in 1804. For two years he held no formal position
in the administration, and the cauntavas and kajts ruled in the name of his
infant son. In February 1806, however, Rana Bahadur was appointed
85mukht-iyav ('manager1 or 'executive') to the king. Less than a month
later he was assassinated by his half-brother, Sher Bahadur.
At this point one of Rana Bahadur's closest confidants, the Khas
bhavadav Bhimsen Thapa, then around thirty years old, took charge of the
situation, and executed many of his political opponents on grounds of
their real or supposed involvement in the assassination plot. Tripura
Sundari, youngest of Rana Bahadur's five consorts, and probably a relative
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of Bhimsen1s, was declared Queen Regent. It is not certain whether
Bhimsen himself was appointed mukht'Lyav at once, which would have been
formal recognition of his dc facto predominance over the other bharadars,
but such recognition was afforded at the latest in 1811 when he became
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the first Nepali to acquire the title of janaral (i.e. general).
Three years later Bhimsen led Nepal into the disastrous war with the 
British, yet his power, after seeming to totter for a short while, survived
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intact. The death of King Girvana Yuddhaaf ew mohths after the
conclusion of peace meant that Bhimsen was once again minister for an
infant king, the two-year-old Rajendra Bikram Shah. His position rested 
on backing from the Queen Regent, on support (or at least acquiescence) 
from leading bhavadavs, many of whom were linked in marriage with his 
family, and on his popularity with the army. With the death of Lalit 
Tripura in 1832, Bhimsen's supremacy came under increasing challenge, 
leading to his fall and to the period of frantic political struggle which 
was to issue in Jang Bahadur's emergence, and which forms the subject of 
the greater part of this study.
State, Caste and Nation
It is possible to paint a picture of the political process in South
Asia which has no room for the concept of nation-state as a source of
legitimacy and focus of loyalty. Kingdoms and empires are then seen 
only as temporary patterns in a constantly shifting mosaic of lesser 
units, and alliances and rivalries among the latter are conducted without 
respect for the boundaries. There does exist an ideal order contrasted 
with the everyday political struggle, but it is a universal one, 
transcending individual states, and visualised in the classical Hindu 
tradition as the establishment of vavnasrama under a cakr>avar>t'Ln (world 
emperor) , or in the Muslim tradition as the undivided mi-'lat-'L-i.slam.
There is a clear parallel with the medieval European concept of 
Christendom, contrasted with the later European order of territorial 
nation-states. This is a model implicit in much work on the region,
but elaborated in a particularly sophisticated form in Wink's recent study
. 88 , . . of the Maratha svaragya. It is a picture which can to some extent be
applied to Nepal.
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The full reality, however, is more complex, and South Asian history
also encompasses something nearer to nationalism in the modern European
sense. Wink allows this for the Marathas, perhaps somewhat reluctantly,
to account for facts such as the doctrine of maharastra dhavma promulgated
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by Sivaji's guvu, Ramdas. The reference by British observers to a
Maratha national spirit are paralleled by comments on a similar spirit
in Nepal. It is in fact arguable that, more than other units in South
Asia in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, Nepal was a nation-state
in embryo, with a distinct identity rooted in territorial and cultural
factors. The development of this identity through the nineteenth and
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twentieth centuries has been explored by Burghart and will be looked at 
in more detail in the final sections of this study. For the moment, 
however, it will suffice to identify two factors operating from a very 
early date.
The first of these is the conception held by the political elite of
the state which Prithvi Narayan had created as an entity to be protected
and preserved independently of allegiance to any individual. This is
the conception seen very clearly in the passage from Kirkpatrick quoted
on p.38. When talking of the kingdom in this sense, the Nepali word
used was not vagyct, but dhumga, literally meaning ’stone1. Mahesh Regmi
has pointed out that the use of this word, common from Prithvi's time
onwards, signifies a contrast with the pre-unification system, in which
the concept of the state, as opposed to the personal bond between king
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and follower, had not yet emerged. This connotation is well brought
out by Rana Bahadur's use of the expression just before he was cut down 
by his half-brother, Sher Bahadur. Accusing Sher of having acted against
4 7
him during his (Rana Bahadur's) exile in Banaras, he told him that although
he had forgiven him for his offence against him personally, he still had to
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answer those present for his crimes against the dhumga.
The second factor lies in a sense of Parbatiya identity anchored
around the Khas, whose central position in the Parbatiya caste structure
has already been described and who had given their name to the language
(khaskura) spoken by all Parbatiyas. This basic reality was not altered
by the Khas themselves progressively rejecting their old name in favour
of 'Chetri.', nor by the disdain which Brahman or Thakuri might at times
express. In particular, solidarity between hill Brahman and Chetri
was enhanced by the fact of many Chetri lineages claiming Brahman
ancestry. The hill Brahmans were looked down upon by their counterparts
in the plains, who to this day will often refuse to allow them the title
brahman but refer to them instead only by the Nepali form bahun. Within
the hills, however, it was the plainsman who was the inferior, as was
made clear by the lower ranking of Tarai Brahmans in the hierarchy
enshrined in the 1854 Mutukd A%n. In this respect the Ain was faithfully
reflecting a well-established view: the Shah dynasty had accepted the
Misra family of Banaras as hereditary gurus in the seventeenth century,
but never admitted them to commensality as they did their purohits, the 
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hill Aryals. Whilst many groups in the hills sought to raise their
status by claiming plains origin in the distant past, it was also 
necessary to be fully 'naturalised' in the new environment.
Other ethnic groups in the hills were excluded from the Parbatiya 
identity, whilst the impure Parbatiya castes could not share it in the 
full sense. The whole history of the system had, however, been one of
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the acculturation and integration of tribal groups into the overall
hierarchy, and although by the time of unification the situation was
less fluid than it had been earlier, some flexibility remained. And
all who lived in the hills were, if not Parbatiyas, at least 'Pahadis'
('hillmen'), with a shared sense of separateness from the plains. As
the nineteenth century progressed, groups such as the Rai and Limbu
were to start on the path along which Magar and Gurung had already gone.
More radically excluded from the nation in embryo were two non-tribal
groups —  the Newars of the Kathmandu Valley and the people of the Tarai.
94The position of both, especially the latter, remains problematic today.
In the Newar case there is a special irony, given that 'Nepal' is itself
a Newari word, deriving indeed from the same root as 'Newar'. Throughout
the period this study deals with, the word was used only in its original
sense referring to the Kathmandu Valley: the Parbatiya elite spoke of
95ruling Nepal whilst identifying themselves as Gorkhalis. With the
Tarai, the problem was of course that the area was geographically and 
culturally part of the North Indian plain. The boundary between Nepal 
and East India Company was purely arbitrary.
Despite these difficulties, the hill base was sufficiently large 
to allow the overall process to continue, and, paradoxically, it was 
assisted in the long run by Nepal's defeat at the hands of British India. 
The ending of Gorkha expansion and the loss of Gadhwal and Kumaon was 
a devastating psychological blow, and competition amongst the elite for 
land assignments may have been intensified now that the supply of land 
was finite. However, the British decision to restore to Nepal the 
eastern Tarai, originally annexed under the Treaty of Segauli, ensured
that the country was not economically crippled. A western border
on the Mahakali aided integration, because it excluded areas where the
position of the Khas was much more depressed V'is-h-V'Ls immigrants from
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the plains than in Nepal proper. And although the slogan of ganga
samdh {'the frontier on the Ganges') would long retain an emotional 
appeal, the restriction of Nepal territory on the plains to the Tarai 
allowed the 'Pahadi' domination to remain unchallenged. A slow 
consolidation was possible, and this was the backcloth to the more 
dramatic political events of the 1830s and 1840s.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE FALL OF BHIMSEN THAPA: 1830-1838
Introduction
Through the 1830s the forces ranged against Bhimsen in the royal 
family and the bhavadar-i grew in strength culminating in his arrest in 
the summer of 1837. Within a few months he was released and at one 
point seemed to have a chance of regaining at least part of his former 
power. By mid-1838, however, it was clear that there was to be no real 
recovery, and the focus of attention was thereafter upon Bhimsen's old 
enemy, Ranjang Pande. An emotionally committed observer of the 
unfolding struggle, and to a degree a participant, was Brian Houghton 
Hodgson, the British Resident. The Residency was not the real source 
of political developments, but it was inevitably seen as a potential 
ally by discontented factions. The involvement of an external power 
in internal dissension had long been a feature of political life in 
South Asia, and was all the more present as a possibility in Nepali 
minds because Prithvi Narayan's conquests had relied to a considerable 
extent on winning over elements within the political units he aimed to 
absorb. Seeking British aid could none the less be a two-edged sword, 
for suspicion of them as a common enemy could unite sentiment against a 
faction backed by them, as had happened both after Kirkpatrick's visit 
to Kathmandu in 1793 and after Damodar Pande and his colleagues reached 
agreement with them in 1801. This counter-effect was to become very 
evident as British involvement grew more open and explicit. Up to the 
end of the thirties, however, the British were avowedly pursuing a policy 
of non-interference and both the direct effect of Hodgson's actions and 
the reaction to them were limited. Their main significance is that they
provide a useful window through which the historian can observe the 
Nepali political system functioning. In the post-war years that system 
seemed to possess a stability amounting almost to rigidity, but Bhimsen's 
fall was to illustrate that it depended on an equilibrium which could 
easily be disturbed.
The Political Stage in 1830
Whilst Bhimsen Thapa was beyond question the most powerful individual
in Nepal, he depended for his position on his ability to conciliate other
actors. Foremost amongst these was the Oueen Regent, Lalit Tripura
Sundari, who held possession of the royal seal which had to be affixed
to all decrees (Zal mohavs) . A famous verse of the Sukvan'Lt'isastva, a
treatise on political science probably composed in a Maratha state
during the first half of the nineteenth century, declares that 'the
document signed and sealed by the king is the king and not the king
1
himself', and this principle applied very clearly in Nepal; the
standard procedure in 1816, probably retained throughout the Regency, was
for 200-300 blank sheets of paper to be stamped with the seal in advance
2
and then filled out with whatever Bhimsen wanted. As was seen in the 
previous chapter, Lalit Tripura may well have been a relative of Bhimsen's 
in any case, as a child-widow when appointed Regent in 1806 she must have 
been greatly under his influence, and in later years she was rumoured to 
have become his lover.
Central as the link to Tripura certainly was, Ludwig Stiller has 
rightly pointed out that it did not give Bhimsen completely unfettered 
power and that he relied also on his ability to balance conflicting
6 1
interests within the bhctvadavi. It was therefore something of an
exaggeration when the Resident, Brian Hodgson, wrote that Bhimsen and
his family 'monopolised all the loaves and fishes' to the exclusion of
'ancient families...who, by the constitution of this state, are entitled
4
to share its counsels and exercise its highest offices'. It is true
that the minister and his relatives were the highest-paid jagirdavs, but
important positions were also held by members of other families, in
particular by men who had themselves, like Bhimsen, accompanied ex-King
Rana Bahadur during his exile in Banaras, or whose close relatives had
done so. Prominent this category was Dalbhanjan Pande, who was
continuously in office as a kajd (a post ranking below cauntava in the
traditional hierarchy) from 1816, if not earlier, until after Bhimsen's 
5
fall. Dalbhanjan's uncle, Ranajit, who died some years before 1830, 
had remained in Kathmandu during the crucial years 1800-1804, but had 
joined the faction working for Rana Bahadur's return and subsequently 
become a close collaborator of Bhimsen's and been designated mikt 
(principal) kajd.^ Ranajit's son, Birkeshar, was normally employed as 
a captain or kajd and two of his sons had married daughters of Bhimsen, 
as had one of their cousins. Even before Bhimsen rose to prominence,
Birkeshar's sister had already been married to his brother, Nain Singh
7
Thapa. The members of this branch of the Pandes, known as 'Gora1 
('fair') Pandes because of their descent from Ranaj it' s light-complexioned 
father, Tularam, formed an important buttress to Bhimsen1s position.
Bhimsen's relations with the 'Kala1 ('black') Pandes, distant 
cousins of his 'Gora' allies, were much less happy. These were the 
sons and grandsons of Damodar Pande, staunchest of Rana Bahadur's
0 2
opponents in the government which ruled Nepal during his exile,/Who had
been executed and his lands confiscated when the ex-king, with Bhimsen
at his side, regained power. The Kala Pandes' hunger for revenge
against Bhimsen was to become a crucial factor in Nepali, politics
in the mid-thirties, yet before then they had not been languishing in
8
obscure penury, as Hodgson's highly-coloured reports often suggest.
Their leader, Ranjang Pande, appears to have served continuously in the
army through the post-war period with a possible gap in 1830-18317'and
his brothers Karbir and Ranadal were also frequently employed. However,
according to the Nepali historian Baburam Acharya (writing, as he
frequently did, without citing any source), Bhimsen himself was reluctant
to give Ranjang any post at all, but was persuaded to do so by his own
9
brother, Ranbir Singh Thapa.
Another favoured family was the Basnets, in particular the sons and
nephews of Kirtiman Singh Basnet whose patronage in 1799 may have obtained
10
for Bhimsen his original appointment to Rana Bahadur's personal staff.
Kirtiman Singh was one of the ministers who opposed the ex-king's
attempt to reassert political control in 1799-1800, but he was himself
assassinated shortly after Rana Bahadur reached Banaras. Subsequently,
Kirtiman's brother, Bhaktawar, who was also prominent in the Kathmandu
government, became a supporter of Rana Bahadur's return. In later
years one son, Kulman Singh, was continuously appointed as a Uaj'L,
whilst another, Prasad Singh, was also always in office. Here, too,
there was a marriage connection, though not a recent one: Kirtiman and
11
Bhaktawar were Bhimsen's third cousins once removed. However, the
fact that Bhimsen addressed Bhaktawar in a letter from Banaras as kaneha
6 3
1 2
baba ('youngest paternal uncle'), suggests a closer relationship, and
it is perhaps possible that Bhimsen's father had become a brother of
Bhaktawar by adoption.
Also of major importance in 1830 was a branch of the Thapas only
distantly related to Bhimsen: the common ancestor was eleven generations
13
back according to the Thapa VamsaVaH-. The best known of these is
Amar Singh Thapa who led Nepal's armies to the Satiej, but was later
defeated (though not dishonourably) by the British forces under Ochterloney
in the first campaign of the Anglo-Gorkha war. Amar Singh, who died in
1816, was poltically opposed to Bhimsen, and had argued strenuously
against his hard-line policy towards the British which had led to the war.
None the less, Amar Singh's sons all served in high positions throughout
Bhimsen's post-war years of power, and the eldest, Ranadhoj, was
particularly prominent.
Less influential than any of the above, but intimately associated
with Bhimsen was the Kunwar family to which Jang Bahadur belonged.
Jang's father, Bal Nar.singh, had at the age of seventeen been one of the
party which accompanied Rana Bahadur to Banaras. Like Bhimsen himself,
he may have owed his position to the patronage of Kaji Kirtiman Singh
Basnet, since both his father and grandfather had been closely associated
in military campaigns with Kirtiman Singh's uncle, Abhiman Singh Basnet.
There is also a remote possibility that there was a long-standing friendship
between Balnar and Bhimsen's families, since the Kunwar origin legend
has the first of their ancestors to enter the hills marry the daughter of
a ’Baghale Kshetri’, and it was to the Bagale Thapa but that Bhimsen's 
14
family belonged; Balnar might therefore have joined the Banaras party
6 4
on Bhimsen's recommendation. In any case, the connection between the
two was strengthened in 1806 when Balnar cut down Rana Bahadur's
assassin at the scene of his crime. He was rewarded with a kajiship
(he had previously held the lower position of sardar), which may have
15
been made hereditary in his family. One source claims that his brothers
were made kaji-s at the same time, and Stiller's survey of senior posts
from 1816 shows both Balnar and his brother Revant continuously in office 
16
m  that grade. Balnar married Ganesh Kumari, daughter of Bhimsen's
brother Nain Singh and of the 'Gora' Pande girl, already mentioned.
All the families so far discussed were, like Bhimsen's own, Khas
(Chetri). However, among the party at Banaras had also been the cauntara
(royal collateral) Pran Shah. Described in a British report of 1816 as
'a great favourite of Bhimsen's', he continuously held the post of
principal cauntara (as against merely bearing the word as an honorary
title) until his death in 1827 when his place was taken by his son, Fateh
Jang. Other members of the cauntara family, notably Pran's brother,
Pushkar, were employed in various ranks in the army, and normally posted 
17
to the far west. Good as the personal relationship between Bhimsen and
Pran Shah may have been, the cauntaras in general naturally resented their 
subordination to a Khas minister, since they were themselves Thakuris, 
and it was safest to keep them at a distance.
Another important factor Bhimsen had to reckon with was the Brahman 
rajgurus, whose role was briefly discussed in the previous chapter.
The term rajguru strictly speaking denoted one who had become either 
gayatrt or d-iksa guru to the king or a close relative, but it was also 
used to refer to any male member of a family from which the guru in the
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narrower sense actually came, or, more specifically, to refer to the 
senior member of such a family; it is this second sense which the 
expression ’the Rajguru1 in British sources normally carried. In 1830, 
however, two different families, the Paudyals and the Mishras, were 
involved.
The Paudyals were hill Brahmans, originally from the former statelet 
18
of Tanahu, west of Gorkha, but had lived at times in India. There one
of them had assisted in finding a bride for Prithvi Narayan, and they
were thus brought into association with the Nepali royal court. As
d'Cksa guru to Prithvi Narayan's son and successor, the unmilitary Pratap
Shah, Brajnath Paudel was an opponent of the king's brother Bahadur Shah,
and of the older Gorkha commanders who supported him. He was
consequently expelled from the country when Bahadur Shah took joint
19
charge of the country on Pratap's death in 1777. Brajnath's eldest
son, Rangnath, was brought up in India, but when Rana Bahadur reached
Banaras in 1800, Rangnath offered his services to him, assisted in
negotiations with the British, and finally returned with him to
Kathmandu. The alliance was a natural one, given that Damodar Pande,
Rana Bahadur's strongest opponent amongst the bharadari,, had been a
20
supporter of Bahadur Shah. Rangnath became personal guru to the Queen
Regent, Lalit Tripura, and later to King Rajendra's senior Rani.
Rangnath's .eldest son, Jivnath, became Rajendra's own gayatrv guru. 
Rangnath also had three younger brothers, the eldest of whom, Krishna 
Ram (known as 'mahLZa ('second senior') guru1) was particularly influential 
and who, like Rangnath, had negotiated with the British before the 1814- 
1816 war.
The other family, the Mishras, were Banaras Brahmans who had been
hereditary gurus to the Gorkha royal family since the early seventeenth
century, but whose members were away from Kathmandu for much of Bhimsen's
time in power. Gajraj Mishra had been involved in the 1801-1804
negotiations, but had sided against Rana Bahadur and in favour of
Damodar Pande and alliance with the British. He withdrew to India when
Rana Bahadur was about to resume power, but was recalled to the Nepali
darbar in the closing stages of the 1814-1816 war, when his services
were required in peace negotiations. After a year in Kathmandu, during
which he vied with Rangnath for influence and both considered attempting
to oust Bhimsen, he died in India in 1817 while on a complimentary
21
mission to the Governor-General. Mishra involvement in Nepali
affairs seems then to have ceased for a number of years, since a list of
22bharadars for 1824 makes no mention of the family. In October 1835,
however, the name of Gajraj's cousin, Krishna Ram Mishra, occurs amongst
23
the counter-signatures to an important ZaZ mohar. He appears to have
been appointed diZksa guru to King Rajendra at about this time, and from
then until 1840 he was frequently to be a close political adviser to the
king, and to act as an ally of the Kala Pande leader, Ranjang, to whom
24
he was also personal guru. The guru-s'Lsya relationship between
Mishras and Kala Pandes may well have been long-standing; in any case, 
Gajraj Mishra had been together with Damodar Pande amongst the supporters 
Bahadur Shah in the last decades of the previous century.
Members of both guru families had much in common: they were
civilians not soldiers, while they were orientated towards the Indian 
plains and their outlook thus differed from that of many Nepali
notables who knew only their own mountains. Their Indian connections
also made them ready collaborators with the British on certain
occasions —  sometimes from conviction, sometimes from the wish for a
comfortable retirement at Banaras under Bast India Company patronage.
The final element in the political equation which Bhimsen had to
balance was the army, which under his stewardship had increased in 1831
to 15,000 from the 1816 total of 10,000. Further increases were made
during the political struggles of the 1830s, so that by the time of
25
Bhimsen's fall the standing army numbered around 18,000. This was
in excess of what the country could readily afford, but it would have
been politically dangerous to restrict the opportunities for military
employment. Expansion of the army was a means of averting discontent,
and it also gave Bhimsen wide opportunities for the exercise of patronage
after the war he raised the proportion of the army kept at Kathmandu —
these regiments were collectively styled the kampu —  so as to be able to
carry out personally as much as possible of the military pajarvi (annual
reappointment or dismissal of serving soldiers and enlistment of fresh 
2 6
troops). Another large concentration of troops was at Palpa in the
central hills, where the governor was always a close relative of
Bhimsen1s. Such measures undoubtedly earned him popularity amongst the
army, but Hodgson was certainly right to maintain that its loyalty was to
the sovereign rather than to the general: he repeatedly stressed this
point in correspondence during the 1830s and, in an 1839 report, would be
able to cite as confirmation of his opinion his own witnessing of Bhimsen
after his arrest in 1837, 'guarded with every sign of hearty acquiesence'
27
by 'a battalion of his own previously personal troops'. Successful
6 8
management of the army might help Bhimsen maintain royal acquiescence/ 
but it could not take the place of the latter.
The Campaign against Bhimsen and the Emergence of Ranjang (1837-1838)
Bhimsen Thapa!s 'decline and fall1 is usually reckoned as starting
28
from the death of Queen Regent Lalit Tripura Sundari on 25 March 1832.
Even before this, jealousies within his own family would have given him
some cause for anxiety: his brothers, Ranbir, who was employed within
the royal palace, and Bhaktawar Singh, Governor of Palpa, had been
29
disaffected for some time. The queen's death, however, opened up
opportunities for all who harboured resentment against Bhimsen, whether
inside or outside his family. The crucial question was now whether King
Rajendra, who had technically come of age on his eighteenth birthday the
previous year, would now want to take back into his own hands some or
all of the authority which his minister had for so long exercised.
Rajendra himself, a timid and indecisive man, and perhaps, as some alleged,
deliberately brought up by Bhimsen to be so, was uncertain whether and how
far to advance, but several of those around him wished ardently for him to
take action. Foremost among them was his Senior Rani, Samrajya Laksmi
Devi, daughter of a Gorakhpur zemindar. A year or so younger than the
king, she and the Junior Rani, Rajyalakshmi Devi, had both been married
30
to him on a single day in 1824. She considered Bhimsen's power a
derogation from the royal family1s proper dignity and she appears to have
believed the story than Bhimsen had murdered Rajendra's parents in 1816
to ensure that the throne again passed to a minor; both deaths were in
31fact almost certainly natural.
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Immediately following Lalit Tripura's death Samrajya took possession
of the royal seal,and probably aimed to oust Bhimsen with the aid of his
32
brother Ranbir who coveted the post of mukht'Lyar himself. Bhimsen was
able to thwart this move, presumably as Rajendra would not back up his
wife, and Ranbir had to retire from Kathmandu for some time. The
struggle against Bhimsen was to become a longer-term matter of palace
intrigue rather than a quick coup. It was soon joined by cauntara
Pushkar Shah and the mahita guru, Krishna Ram Paudyal —  the main
'players of the royal game' as Hodgson was to describe them in December 
33
1833. Rangnath Paudyal and the two younger brothers were also involved.
Pushkar Shah had been called to Kathmandu from his posting in Doti (far
western Nepal) after Lalit Tripura's death, allegedly because King
34
Rajendra himself wanted him as a counter to Bhimsen; but it was
probably Samrajya who prompted the move, especially since Pushkar had
35
connections with her parents' family. Rangnath also had a special
link with the queen as her personal guru. Nevertheless there was a
division between Samrajya, who still wanted to move swiftly against
Bhimsen, and the others, who favoured a more cautious strategy, taking
no dramatic steps themselves but hoping to gain advantage from the
increasing dissension within the Thapa family. They hoped in particular
to weaken Bhimsen by pushing forward Ranbir, who the British Resident
described in October 1833 as the only man in Kathmandu daring openly to 
36oppose Bhimsen.
Attempting to interpret this struggle was Brian Hodgson, who had 
taken over as Resident from Herbert Maddock in December 1832, having
7 0
previously served in Kathmandu in a subordinate capacity in 1820-1822, and
from 1824 onwards. Relations between Nepal and British India had been
peaceful since the end of the war when the Nepalis were forced to accept
the Residency as part of the terms of settlement. But though Nepal
under Bhimsen1s administration had scrupulously observed the treaty, she
had sought also to preserve as much as possible of the isolationist
policy which from the days of Prithvi Narayan Shah she had regarded as
essential for the maintenance of her independence. Hodgson was concerned
at her failure to remove tariffs and other barriers to large-scale trade
with India, at her growing military strength and at a general atmosphere
of hostility towards the 'Firingis1 which still prevailed. He is
unlikely to have been familiar with the poetry of Yadunath Pokhrel, but a
poem written by the latter in praise of Bhimsen in the 1820s gives a
good idea of the ruling sentiments, with its picture of the English
37
quivering in fear at the sight of N e p a l i  military preparations. He
was torn, however, between his recognition that Bhimsen had the ability 
to keep hotter heads in check, and a belief that he deliberately 
preserved his countrymen's prejudices so that he himself could pose to 
both Nepalis and British as an indispensable bulwark against the other 
side. On the more pessimistic reading of Bhimsen's policy, to which 
Hodgson was to become increasingly inclined, he went on to reason that 
Bhimsen, if under extreme political pressure, might himself unleash the 
forces which he had previously fostered but kept under control, or that 
in any case, his less able successors would be unable to restrain the 
military machine as effectively as he himself had done.
7 1
Hodgson1s concerns were very much personal ones. In the time of
Warren Hastings, the East India Company had entertained visions of
lucrative trade through Nepal into Tibet, exporting English broadcloth
and metals into Tibet in return for wood, gold, musk and borax. It was
this prospect which had led the Company to despatch Captain Kinloch's
woefully inadequate force into the hills in an effort to support the
last Newar king of Kathmandu against the Gorkhas, who it was feared,
would ruin any prospects for commerce. Similar motivation lay behind
the 1791 commerce treaty, and, to a lesser extent, also behind Lord
Wellesley's unsuccessful attempt to take advantage of the quarrel between
Rana Bahadur and his opponents. By the outbreak of the Anglo-Gorkha
war, however, trade had become much less of a consideration, both because
it was now realised that the Kathmandu route was less important economically
than had earlier been supposed, and because with opium and cotton exports
now financing the China purchases and with the Company's monopoly status
under challenge, its enthusiasm for promoting trans-Himalayan trade was
38
now inevitably reduced. In contrast to Calcutta, Hodgson argued
that the Kathmandu-Lhasa-Peking route could be used to supply China
direct with Canadian furs and English cotton goods now being marketed
there by the Russians, as well as remaining convinced that there was a
39
large market in Tibet for English woollen goods. Both his enthusiasm
over this prospect and his apprehensions over possible Nepali military 
adventures were generally regarded with little interest by the Governor- 
General, but they coloured his reports from Kathmandu and fuelled his 
enthusiasm for an activist role in Nepali politics.
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Hodgson's ability to evaluate the political scene was, of course,
dependent on the structure of the Residency itself and on its range of
contacts with the Nepalis. The Residency had a normal complement of
three senior European staff - the Resident, his assistant, and a surgeon.
After 1831 the small secretariat serving them consisted of the 'English
Office', with a Head Writer and Under-writer (usually both Indian),
supported by a daftri (clerical assistant) and four peons, and the
'Persian office' with a Head and Assistant Munshi (secretary/interpreter),
who were always Indian, together with a locally-employed Devanagri writer.
The Head Munshi was the key member of the secretariat both because Persian
was the language of formal written communication between the Nepali and
Indian governments, and because he could be sent to the Darbar on the
Resident's behalf. More often than not, however, it was the Nepalis who
came to the Residency. The most regular messenger was the Darbar's own
Head Munshi, a post held throughout 1830-1846 by the Newar Laksmi Das,
who may have been recruited into Rana Bahadur's service in Banaras and have
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enjoyed a special friendship with Bal Narsingh Kunwar. Das conducted
business either with his opposite number, or directly with the Resident 
himself, though on certain occasions he might be accompanied, or replaced 
by one or more bhavadavs. While Bhimsen was fully in control he tried 
as far as possible to keep a monopoly of contact with the Residency, and 
any bharadaF used as an intermediary would be, like Lakshmi Das himself, 
a trusted adherent; this was the role in which Bal. Narsingh came to the 
Residency's notice. Subsequently the range of representatives widened,
varying with the state of parties within the Darbar. In addition to
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such day-to-day contacts, the Resident himself during Bhimsen's heyday
made two ceremonial visits to the Darbar each year, and two were made
by the minister in return. Again the pattern changed as the political
situation became more fluid, and the Resident was in later years to be
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summoned more frequently to the Darbar to meet the king himself.
In addition to these official contacts there were the informal ones.
When the Residency was first established, Bhimsen took care to isolate
its employees from the local population. These precautions were,
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however, gradually relaxed from the late twenties onwards, and since 
the Resident had an escort of over one hundred Indian troops, as well 
as numerous servants and camp-followers, possible channels of communication 
were plentiful. It thus became easier for Bhimsen's opponents to send 
covert messages to the Residency and for the Resident to collect sensitive 
information. As Acting Resident in 1831 he was already 'regularly 
maintaining a secret intercourse with a member of the Raja's household',43 
and throughout the 1830s a number of his letters to government consisted 
almost entirely of translations of 'secret intelligence' received; 
these are always clearly marked as such in the letters themselves by the 
use of quotation marks, but most modern writers on the period fail to 
distinguish between such passages and those when Hodgson was writing in 
his own person. As he was aware that the Nepalis might be doing some 
spying on their own account, Hodgson sometimes wrote and despatched 
particularly sensitive letters without letting his own clerical staff 
see them, and as a general rule he did not name his informants in 
correspondence with Calcutta; none the less, a despatch of December 1833
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clearly implied that someone in the section of the Darbar handling
confidential Persian correspondence was providing information, while
in 1840 he named the brother-in-law of the head of that department as 
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a contact. In 1839 he gave the name of Moti Singh, a jemadar in
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Rangnath Paudyal's personal escort. Overall, Hodgson was able to
obtain a great deal of information, and in negotiations in the years
1837-1840 was sometimes able to disconcert the Nepali side with
revelations of what he knew. However there must have been a danger that
some of his sources deliberately planted a biased version of events.
Attempts to make the Residency more than just an observer of the
political scene had in fact been made just after it was established, at
a time when Bhimsen Thapa's position was under some challenge in the
aftermath of the war and he was not yet able to assert an exclusive
right of communication with the British. Shortly after King Girvana
Yuddha's death in November 1816, Gajraj Mishra had unsuccessfully sought
Resident Gardner's backing for what he claimed was the wish of the widow
for her son, the three-year-old Rajendra, to be entrusted to his
(Mishra's) protection rather than that of Rangnath Paudyal, who was
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allegedly being supported by Queen Regent Lalit Tripura Sundari. The
following March Lalit Tripura herself and Rangnath (who was her personal
guru) sent a message to the Residency suggesting obliquely that she
wished to oust Bhimsen in favour of Rangnath. The Resident reported to
Calcutta that he would give a clear refusal if a direct request was made,
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but m  the event no further approach seems to have been made. Such
abortive overtures might not be a very promising precedent, but sixteen
7 5
years later Bhimsen's opponents were to make strenuous attempts to enlist
Brian Hodgson. They did not succeed in establishing any formal
alliance, but the cumulative efforts do appear to have influenced
Hodgson's attitude towards Bhimsen and also to some extent his actions.
Before 1832 Hodgson shared the view of Edward Gardner, first
Resident at Kathmandu, that Bhimsen's predominance was a factor in
favour of peace rather than the reverse, and that Nepal's isolationist
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and hostile attitudes would break down naturally over time. Reporting
Lalit Tripura's death to Calcutta in April 1832, Resident Maddock, 
who had only been in the country a month and must have relied wholly on 
Hodgson's views, forecast that Bhimsen's position might now be weakened, 
and commented that the British could not count on enjoying much longer 
'the good effects produced by [Bhimsen's] influence on the foreign 
relations and internal Government of Nepaul'. The same tone was 
maintained in Maddock's final letter to Calcutta, written as he prepared 
to hand over to Hodgson after a brief eight months' tenure, and there
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is no reason to suppose that Hodgson did not still endorse this view.
In the following January, however, the first indirect approach to
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the Residency was made by Queen Samrajya, and in February Hodgson
wrote an analysis of the political situation which, while still
admitting that Bhimsen's 'talent and energy constitute our best stay',
painted him as a usurper of his sovereign's rights and suggested that the
5
accusation against him of murdering Rajendra's parents was well founded. 
The immediate stimulus for the letter had been a visit from Bhimsen's 
nephew and Jang Bahadur's uncle, Mathbar Singh Thapa, to request that the
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Residency's munshi should always see Bhimsen at the Darbar rather than 
trouble the king himself. None the less, Hodgson was clearly 
echoing the 'royal party's' propaganda.
In June 1833 Hodgson initiated a series of small-scale negotiations 
with Bhimsen over various restrictions affecting the Residency, in 
particular the searching of the Resident's baggage in transit and the 
obstacles placed in the way of Indian merchants at Kathmandu when they 
wished to invoke their right as British subjects to seek Residency 
assistance. In informing Calcutta of these, Hodgson also reported a 
long conversation with 'one who knows [Bhimsen] as well as he hates him' 
and who alleged that, beset with political difficulties and realising 
he could not safely resign lest he be brought to account for his earlier 
crimes, Bhimsen was considering war as the only way out. Towards the 
end of the negotiations themselves, when the major point of free access 
to the Residency for the merchants had already been conceded, a delegation 
consisting of Bal Narsingh Kunwar and 'Krishna Ram, the Raj Purohit*, 
arrived to carry forward discussions; the former was well known as an 
adherent of Bhimsen's, while the latter was a 'royalist'. The arrival 
of such a combination illustrated that the king had been steeled to 
insist on Bhimsen's no longer monopolising the conduct of foreign affairs. 
The interview passed off successfuly, but at the end of it the Raj 
Purohit ('royal priest') drew Hodgson aside and whispered in his ear. 
Hodgson did not report what was actually said, but interpreted the 
incident as an attempt to create the impression that he himself was 
siding with the king against Bhimsen. He consequently called back the
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court scribes who had accompanied the delegation and instructed them
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to tell the minister that he disapproved of the Raj Purohit's action.
Since Hodgson later referred to Rangnath Paudyal's having tried to
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trick him into partisanship, it seems that the 'Purohit' was an
accomplice of the Paudyals, and he is possibly to be identified with
Krishna Ram Paudyal, if it is assumed that 'Purohit' is simply a mistake
on Hodgson's part for 'Guru'. It is, however, known that the main
purohit family, the Aryals, were regarded as pro-British, at least in 
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1840.
Although Hodgson rejected such crude overtures, and was eager to 
emphasise to Calcutta that he had done so, his sentiments continued to 
swing against Bhimsen, and in a private letter to the Governor-General 
the following month he announced that 'at the bottom of Bhimsen's 
profound character I have at last discerned as I conceive, an intense 
hatred of u s '. He now believed that Bhimsen would not actually resort 
to violence against the king to protect his position, but was sure the 
minister had earlier contemplated doing so, both because this had been 
'the talk of the city' and because Rajendra when ill the previous year 
had allegedly declined to be treated by the Court Physician on the 
grounds that this man had poisoned his parents on Bhimsen's instructions 
in 1816.55
Two months later, however, in a demi-official letter to the Foreign 
Secretary, Hodgson was taking a completely contrary line, declaring that 
all was well 'and so it may possibly continue to be provid&d we can but 
keep Bhim Sen at the helm' (emphasis in the original). The stimulus
for this change of heart had been a conversation with the minister at 
the Darbar the previous evening. In general conversation one of 
Hodgson's European subordinates had praised the bravery and patriotism 
of Amar Singh Thapa, the principal Nepali commander in the west during 
the 1814-1816 war and a political opponent of Bhimsen's (see p.63 above).
He had referred specifically to an intercepted letter of Amar Singh's, 
published in Prinsep's history of the war. This had led Bhimsen, when 
later talking to Hodgson out of the others' hearing, to say that he 
hoped the Resident did not believe those other parts of the intercepted 
correspondence in which Amar Singh and his colleagues had put the whole 
blame for the war on Bhimsen personally. Hodgson made a suitably 
soothing reply and Bhimsen went on to say how difficult a job he had 
found it to make his restless countrymen preserve the peace since 1816, 
and that some of those around the king were now trying to make him into 
'your enemy and mine'. He promised that if he should ever find that his 
own advice was rejected and Nepal made ready for war against the British, 
he would give the Resident three or four months' advance warning of the 
attack. Although Hodgson had himself in earlier letters denounced 
Bhimsen's tactic of trying to convince the British he was personally 
indispensable to the maintenance of peace, this direct and unsolicited 
approach by the minister had an overwhelming effect. Hodgson's letter 
went on to praise 'the perfectly satisfactory manner in which every 
object of the alliance with Nepal has been accomplished under the interally 
vigorous and just and externally pacific administration of Bhim Sen', 
and concluded:
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We shall probably see that to afford every 
reasonable countenance and support to Bhim 
Sen, in the possible event of his soliciting 
it, would be a measure as consonant to justice 
and to the interests of the Maharaja of Nepal 
as to policy and our own interests.^
This sudden change of attitude well illustrates how justified was Lord
Auckland's later comment: 'Mr. Hodgson writes so strongly from slight
impressions that I have always looked at his communications with 
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slight reserve1. The Resident's judgment was now swayed by the
minister's comments just as it had been by those of his opponents. But
as well as Hodgson's general impressionability, there is perhaps also 
evidence here, as elsewhere in his correspondence, of an obsessive 
fascination with Bhimsen's personality, oscillating between repulsion 
and attraction.
Whatever the reason behind Hodgson's sudden conversion, it was not
to be a lasting one. By mid-October he was writing that the king
planned to learn from Bhimsen for another year or so, and then take
over from him, and that the change would be to everyone's advantage
58
including that of the British. At the pajam Bhimsen was indeed
confirmed in office, though only after a delay of three weeks caused 
by dissension within his own family. Within a few days of the 
reappointment Hodgson was again writing angrily to Calcutta denouncing 
him for feeding the king a distorted version of recent events in 
Gwalior and wondering whether it would be advisable to press for direct
access to the king to counteract the anti-British propaganda he was
. . 59
receiving.
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The belief that great things could be achieved if one could only 
establish regular and direct communication with the king was to be an 
abiding conviction of Hodgson's for several years to come. He was 
influenced in the first place by the favourable accounts of Rajendra's 
character brought to him by the 'king's men1, among whom Rangnath 
and Krishna Ram Baudyal were in 1833 and early 1834 the Resident's 
main contacts, but his thinking was also based on the theory that the 
sovereign as such had a vested interest in peace and stability, whereas 
any military leader must always pander to the army's warlike and 
xenophobic prejudices in order to retain its support.
Hodgson had initial doubts on whether actually to press for access
because he now again feared that Bhimsen might resort to violence if
he felt he was being pushed into a corner.^ in January 1834, however,
he decided that it was after all safe to act and in a series of
discussions with Nepali representatives, asked that his munshi should be
admitted directly into the king's presence rather than having to deliver
his messages to the minister. By the end of the month he believed
that Rangnath's influence at court would be sufficient to carry the 
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point. Subsequently, however, Rangnath told him forcefully that
Bhimsen was still successfully maintaining the illusion that he alone 
was able to 'manage' the British, and that until the Resident took a firm 
line with him no progress could be made. Hodgson did not know at this 
stage that a letter was already on the way from Calcutta ordering him 
not to press the issue further and warning him to stay neutral between 
factions. Consequently he summoned the khajanc'i (treasurer) Umakant
Upadhyaya, a trusted lieutenant and representative of Bhimsen's, and 
spoke much more strongly to him than he had done hitherto. He asked 
why the king was still regarded as a minor where relations with the 
British were concerned, when he was now directly involved in other 
affairs of state. He hinted that the British, who had occupied the 
entire Tarai at the end of the war and then returned most of it, might 
revoke the 'gift' if Nepal continued hostile behaviour such as needlessly 
expanding her army and charging high tariffs on Indian goods in violation 
of the 1792 treaty.^2 Hodgson had explicitly told Rangnath in January 
that he could not take sides in the internal power struggle and had 
informed Calcutta in January that Rangnath understood this was so.
Yet by now virtually allowing Rangnath to direct his negotiating tactics 
he was giving the Brahman a very different signal.
After he had received his government's orders Hodgson could not 
apply further pressure, but, whether or not as a result of the treatment 
Umakant had received, Bhimsen decided a more conciliatory line was now 
called for. By May Hodgson was reporting that all he had asked for
in January had been 'gradually and voluntarily conceded1 (emphasis in
• ■ „  6 3  original) .
Two months later, without himself taking any initiative and thereby 
risking a further rebuke from Calcutta, Hodgson was presented with an 
opportunity to reopen the trade issue. A Nepali revenue contractor 
who was selling timber across the border into India had complained to 
Kathmandu that the Collector of Morsibad was levying a 10 per cent duty 
rather than the traditional 2ijper cent and Hodgson was asked by the Nepali
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authorities to provide an explanation. By July he had ascertained
that the increase was purely the result of an accidental omission
from a schedule of goods carrying the reduced .-.rate,! the British had
maintained the concessionary rate for Nepali imports ever since 1792
when both Nepal and British India had agreed not to levy more than
2i per cent on each others' goods. By complaining about this increase
on a single item, the Nepalis opened themselves to the counter-question
of why they themselves had never implemented the treaty but continued
to impose a high tariff on aZZ Indian goods. Hodgson pressed the
point over the next two months, and though he now had theoretical access
to the king the latter left the negotiations in Bhimsen1s hands. The
minister did not refuse outright to recognise the treaty, but kept
raising various reasons why it was difficult for the Nepalis to implement
it at once, ranging from a loss of face that it would entail for the
king to alleged objections from one of the gurus. In September Hodgson
appealed to Calcutta to strengthen his hand with a memorandum direct from
the Foreign Secretary to the king, so that Bhimsen should not think
Hodgson was exceeding his instructions. He made it clear that he saw
the trade issue not just on its own merits but as a tool for weakening
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BhimsenIs political position. In reply he was told bluntly that
'it is of no concern to the British Government whether the Raja rules
the minister or the minister rules the Raja1, and that he should simply
allow the Nepalis to say freely whether they wished to regard the treaty 
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as valid or not. Presented with this choice Bhimsen affirmed in
November that Nepal no longer recognised the treaty. Yet despite this, 
on 1 December a proposal was submitted by Nepal for a new agreement
embodying duties above the 1792 rates but equal to only half of what
Nepal herself was now levying. Calcutta was so surprised by this
change of tone that Hodgson was at first suspected of ignoring
instructions and applying undue pressure, but the Governor-General
later accepted that there had been a genuine change of heart, and
0 0
negotiation on details began early in 1835.
The conciliatory Nepali move may have simply been motivated by
fear that the British would now put up all duties on their side to
10 per cent, but may also have resulted from internal political
manoeuvring. Towards the end of 1834 a new approach was made to Hodgson
by the 1 king1s men1. The Paudyal brothers seem to have receded
temporarily into the background, and a 'Jit Man Singh' sought a secret
0 V
meeting with Hodgson. This was presumably Jit Man Singh Basnet, son
of the assassinated Kirtiman Singh Basnet who thirty years earlier had
obtained for Bhimsen his initial appointment to Ran Bahadur's entourage
(see p. 62 above). Jitman had himself probably been appointed a Kaji
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for the first time that year, whilst his cousins, Kulman and Prasad 
Singh had been in prominent positions since the 1820s. The approach was 
rebuffed, since Hodgson was avoiding any outright alliance with Bhimsen's 
opponents, but the episode is significant as the first sign of open 
disaffection amongst Bhimsen's principal Khas allies; hitherto, only 
Brahmans and oauntaras seem to have been involved. Hodgson's letter 
reporting the incident refers to the 'Raja's party' as now being weak, 
and some unrest in the army connected with quarrels within the Thapa 
family may have heightened the opposition's fear of possible violence. 
However, the 1 December proposal for the new trade agreement was brought
to Hodgson by the cauntava Fateh Jang, son of Bhimsen's old ally Pran
Shah, but himself probably now sympathetic to his uncle Pushkar Shah,
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a leading opponent of Bhimsen's. It is therefore possible that the
king had been persuaded to bypass Bhimsen and make a proposal direct to
the Resident as an indirect method of reducing the minister's influence.
Since, however, all proposals brought by anyone to the Residency were
theoretically in the king's name, and he himself could not or would not
come forward personally, it is difficult to attribute responsibility
for different initiatives with certainty.
In November what could be seen as an open move against Bhimsen Was
made, but by a man who as yet had little standing. Ranjang Pande, son
of Bhimsen's old adversary Damodar, had returned to Kathmandu during
the monsoon, seemingly after a long absence; he had not actually been
in some kind of private retreat, as Residency reports sometimes imply,
but almost certainly serving with an army unit in the hills. His anti-
Bhimsen sentiments were well known, but he was not at first taken very
seriously: the Assistant Resident Archibald Campbell described three
years later how he was 'hooted in the streets and pronounced a madman
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by all the descent [sie] and prudently selfish men of the place1.
Towards the end of the year, however, he petitioned the king for
restitution of his father's property and honours, which had been forfeited
on his execution in 1804. Although the petition was not actually
granted, the king received him kindly and from then on Ranjang was an
important ally of those already working against Bhimsen, and in
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particular of Senior Queen Samrajya Lakshmi Devi.
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Whether as a consequence of the Ranjang incident or not, Bhimsen's
attitude towards the Residency now became increasingly conciliatory.
There were various signs of courtesy towards Hodgson, such as the
construction for him of a bungalow in the hills above the Valley, and
an invitation to accompany Bhimsen's nephew and staunch supporter in
internal family quarrels, Mathbar Singh, on a hunting expedition in the
Tarai. In March 1835 a draft of the new commercial treaty was agreed
in Kathmandu and forwarded to Calcutta for approval; although the
agreement was vetoed by the Customs Department because it introduced
complications in a structure they were trying to simplify, this was
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hardly Bhimsen's fault. Then in early May a formal request was made
to the Residency for Mathbar Singh to be allowed to visit Europe 'in
order to gratify his own curiosity and that of the Darbar respecting the
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reported wonders of the Western world'. Hodgson enthusiastically
recommended his government to grant the request, seeing it as an
opportunity to win Nepali confidence and break down the isolationist
mentality. He must have been aware than Bhimsen probably intended the
exercise to reconcile the British to the continued domination of the
Thapa family in Nepal, this being precisely the motive which Archibald
Campbell suggested in his diary entry recording Bhimsen's informal
broaching of the idea at the end of April. He will also have known,
as this is noted in the same source, that Bhimsen was currently believed
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to be pressing the king to abdicate in favour of his six-year-old son.
Yet despite all the earlier rhetoric about 'usurpation of sovereignty',
Hodgson now seemed to view the continuation of Thapa power with equanimity
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and described Mathbar as Bhimsen's 'probable successor in the Ministry'.
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Once again, reservations were soon to return. After the proposed
visit had been sanctioned by the Governor-General, the Resident began
to be worried by rumours in Kathmandu that the mission was intended to
extract some specific concession —  possibly an extreme demand such as
the return of Kumaon or the removal of the Residency, or alternatively,
some lesser quid pro quo in return for a departure from Nepal's
isolationist stance. Hodgson suggested that in the second case it
might be worthwhile considering returning to Nepal the remainder of
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the Tarai, should she show good faith after Mathbar's return. Even
whilst still relatively well disposed to the Thapas Hodgson was unhappy
at the idea of any substantial negotiations taking place during Mathbar1s
trip and this attitude was reinforced by the quarrels within the Darbar
shortly before his scheduled departure. Senior Queen Samrajya Laksmi
Devi and other opponents of Bhimsen had allegedly been resisting a demand
that Mathbar should be granted plenary negotiating powers, and insisting
that he should do no more than hand over complimentary letters from the
king to the Governor-General, the President of the Board of Control and 
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William IV. The drafts of these letters were shown to Hodgson before
the mission set off and he insisted on their amendment to remove hints
that some favour was expected, telling Bhimsen that there had better be
no mission at all rather than one not confined strictly to complimentary
purposes. At this point the minister and his nephew decided that there
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was no point in going further than Calcutta. The project thus
turned simply into a formal embassy to the Governor-General, and although 
Mathbar and his escorting regiment were given a splendid reception, his
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hosts, in accordance with Hodgson's wishes, discussed no substantive 
matters with him. The result was seen as a major blow to Thapa 
prestige.
Hodgson's action, while not tantamount to pushing a man overboard,
had been a distinct refusal to throw him a lifeline. He had been
determined not to do anything that could be interpreted as political
countenance for the Thapas, even though realising that Mathbar and
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Bhimsen might have been willing to make concessions in return. This
determination, however, was evidently weaker in the spring of 1835 than
it was to become as the year progressed. Partly, of course, Hodgson's
attitude changed because the mission was revealed to have other objects
than fact-finding and confidence-building. However, it perhaps also
reflected the success of Bhimsen's opponents in convincing the Residency
that the king saw any negotiations between Mathbar and the British as
against his interests.
After Mathbar's return in March 1836 a renewed chill settled on
Bhimsen's relations with the Residency whilst the internal political
struggle continued. In October Ranjang Pande accused Mathbar Singh of
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cohabitation with his elder brother's widow. It had, in fact, long
been a general custom amongst many Nepal communities, including the
Khas, for a woman who did not commit sati to be taken as a concubine by
her brother-in-law. However, in July 1836 a lal mohar had prohibited
the practice on pain of draconian penalties — castration in the case of
most castes, including the Khas, though punishments of this type could
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probably be waived in practice. The Rajgurus whose advice on
legislation of this type must have been crucial, were opposed to Bhimsen
and the measure may have been introduced at this time specifically to
embarrass Mathbar. However, though the opposition were strong enough
to bring the prosecution, they were not in a position to carry it to a
conclusion. The enquiry was dropped, but Mathbar left Kathmandu for
his home near Gorkha, and was shortly afterwards appointed governor of
that district. Ranjang was assigned the command of troops in eastern
Nepal which Mathbar had hitherto held, but Bhimsen himself was confirmed
8 2
in office despite some expectation that he would be ousted.
At this critical juncture the Darbar submitted a request to
Hodgson that Rajguru Ram Krishna Mishra be allowed to succeed to the
Banaras gag’iv granted in 1792 to his cousin Gajraj in recognition of
his services in negotiating the commercial treaty of that year. On
Gajraj1s death in 1817 the gag'iv had been continued in turn to his two
widows, the second of whom had recently died. In recommending Calcutta
to grant the request, Hodgson emphasised the traditional friendship of
the Mishra family for the British government and the opportuneness in
the present political circumstances of favouring a man than whom the
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king had now 'no more sincere and valuable adviser'. Krishna Ram
Mishra had probably come up to Kathmandu from Banaras in 1834 or 1835,
possibly on the request of his sisya Ranjang Pande, and in November 1835
his signature followed that of two cauntaPCZS and preceded Rangnath Paudyal1
in the list of witnesses of a tat mohav renewing Bhimsen's powers and
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granting him the title of 'Commander-in-Chief1. The list is probably
in order of precedence and suggests that he rather than Rangnath was now 
the principle guru, which would explain why Hodgson from now on uses 
the title of 'Rajguru1 to refer to him alone. This did not mean that
Rangnath was completely out of favour, for he was currently on the
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king's behalf attempting to reduce the size of inflated jagivs,
and although rivalry between the guru families was long standing,
the two were probably working together up until Bhimsen's fall.
Another significant development in 1836 was the appointment as a
colonel of Prasad Singh Basnet who had served as a kaji before 1820,
but subsequently served in the lower rank of captain.86 The title of
colonel had until this year been reserved for Bhimsen's blood relatives.
Prasad's 1836 salary of 18,000 rupees was greater than that enjoyed by
any other bharadavs except for the cauntavas, who were, of course, of
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royal blood, and for members of Bhimsen's own family. As Prasad's
cousin Jitman had been involved in intrigue against the minister in
1834 (see above, p.83), the colonelcy may have been seen by Bhimsen as
necessary to conciliate a potentially dangerous adversary.
At the pajani- early in 1837 Bhimsen himself was yet again confirmed
in office, but the king acted against his supporters and rewarded his
enemies. Mathbar Singh Thapa and Balnar Singh Kunwar were amongst
several who lost their posts, while a number of important offices went
to relatives of Ranjang Pande. Bhimsen managed to cling to power for
a few more months. Resident Hodgson's letters for Calcutta complained
of his intransigence on a range of minor matters, and developed the theme
that all the consideration Bhimsen had appear to show to the British in
1834-1835 was simply a ruse to try to gain their support in his struggle
for political survival. He suggested that the raising of two new
regiments from the proceeds of Rangnath's economy drive was a sinister 
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development. During April he was anxious that Bhimsen might yet
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succeed in retaining power indefinitely, but the following month he
reported enthusiastically that a change was anticipated: Rangnath
was aiming to be appointed in his place and to manage the troops, who
might be unhappy with a Brahman retrencher as their commander, by
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making Ranjang Pande his 'war minister'. He stressed that neither
the opposition nor Bhimsen was seeking to involve the Residency, and
said somewhat disingenuously that Rangnath had retired into privacy
after his abortive approach to Gardiner in 1817: in fact, Rangnath had
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solicited Hodgson's own support in 1833-1834.
Over the next two months investigation of Bhimsen's conduct of
various branches of the administration —  notably the mint and the law
courts —  went ahead, but in a long commentary on the situation written
for Lord Auckland in June, Hodgson again seemed unsure that Bhimsen
would actually be dismissed: he wrote of the possible need for a
'reckoning1 with Nepal 'if the change come not soon or come without
improvement', and for a letter from the Governor-General, hinting it was
time for the king to take full control, to be sent to him, 'if the change
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seem to tremble in the balance'. Just after this Krishna Ram Mishra
urged the Resident not to blame the king for foreign policy moves just
because he was now taking direct charge of the internal side of the
administration. Mishra was apparently anxious over developments such
as the reopening of a border dispute with Sikkim which the British had
already adjudicated; Hodgson had in fact anyway interpreted that as an
attempt by Bhimsen to start a diversionary foreign quarrel and had asked
Calcutta not to make any move on the issue until the political situation 
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cleared. Hodgson assured Mishra he would not put the blame in the
9 1
wrong place, but made his own delicate attempt to assist a trembling 
change:
I...hinted to him that should matters continue on 
their present footing after3 the Punjunni my 
Government will not probably enquire too nicely 
with whom in reality originate proceedings 
professing to carry the name and authority of 
the Darbar.93 (Emphasis in original.)
In early July a new pajani did indeed get under way. It did not
affect Bhimsen directly, but the king personally reviewed the appointment
of all officers in the army, thus taking into his own hand the
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patronage which Bhimsen had previously exercised. His prestige was
further reduced by an order attending the direct attendance on their
senior officers by army personnel. Bhimsen's final dismissal now seemed
very near, but the manner in which it actually came was totally unexpected. 
On 24 July the seven-month-old son of Queen Samrajya died after taking 
medicine prescribed by one of the court physicians. It was claimed that 
the death was murder carried out on instructions from Bhimsen and his 
relatives, all of whom — including even his estranged brother Ranbir — 
were immediately seized and imprisoned. Ranjang Pande who had helped 
make the actual arrests was at once nominated as minister.
Whether the child's death was murder and whether Bhimsen was really 
involved cannot be known for certain. Hodgson was initially convinced 
that the story was true, but, like King Rajendra himself, he doubted 
whether it could be proved. The story he was told, presumably in the 
first instance by Krishna Ram Mishra, was that the physician had aimed 
to kill Samrajya, the most virulent of Bhimsen's opponents, and had 
initially requested her to take the medicine herself so that the sick
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child should get the benefit of it through her milk. On her refusal
to do this he gave it direct to the child, when the medicine was noticed
to be of an unusual colour. Under initial interrogation he had admitted
that the preparation did contain poisonous ingredients but claimed he had
administered it in mistake for another potion he also had with him. It
was only under torture that he confessed the Thapas had ordered him to 
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kill the queen.
Hodgson was informed unofficially of what had happened by a message
from Krishna Ram Mishra on the evening of the 27th. He attempted to let
Mishra: know that he did not want the matter officially referred to him
but —  the guru himself claimed —  the message reached him too late for
him to be able to prevent Hodgson being called to the Darbar. On his
arrival all other bharadars were asked to withdraw and he found himself
alone with the king, Ranjang Pande, Rangnath Paudyal, Fateh Jang,
Dalbhanjan Pande and Mishra. Despite Ranjang's theoretical new status
as minister it was Rangnath, apart from the king himself, who did most
of the talking. Both Brahman and monarch evidently wanted Hodgson to
recommend a course of action. He replied in general terms on the need
for thorough investigation and for 'justice tempered with mercy', but he
also hinted, without fully committing himself, that the British government
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might be prepared to take the prisoners into custody m  India.
Believing it was dangerous to keep the Thapas in Nepal, even in prison,
but that a new round of political bloodshed should be avoided, Hodgson
had already written to the Foreign Secretary asking whether such an offer 
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should be made. The Indian government were to reply that they could
keep the prisoners in custody —  as against offering asylum —  only if the
93
king was satisfied with the proofs of their guilt. The offer was 
not taken up.
In the aftermath of Bhimsen's arrest the two senior rajgurus, Krishna
Ram Mishra and Rangnath Paudyal, emerged as the mainstay of competing
factions. Mishra supported Ranjang Pande1s claim to the premiership,
whilst Rangnath, who had been in line for the job before the dramatic
events of 24 July, was backed both by Senior Queen Samrajya and by the 
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Junior Queen. Samrajya s desertion of Ranjang is surprising
considering their close association in working against Bhimsen in the
past, and the partnership they were to form again, but it must be
remembered that Rangnath was her own guru as well as being blessed,
according to Hodgson, 'with a tongue fitted to draw womens' hearts out 
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of their bosoms'. Samrajya was brought to share the general feeling of
much of the bharadari- that it was unwise for someone as untried as
Ranjang to attain the premiership so precipitately. With the queen's
support Rangnath soon had the better of it: although he had been nominated
as premier, Ranjang was probably never actually invested, whilst Rangnath,
who was not even nominated for the post until December, was from the start
recognised as the leading bharadar.
Hodgson had since before the crisis regarded Mishra as especially
reliable and trustwothy, as in some way above the factional struggles and
merely trying to serve the king's best interests: hence his surprising
description of him in June as 'wholly unconnected with politics'.
In the days following Bhimsen's arrest he told Calcutta that the guru
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was the only person he could safely speak with. It might be true
that Mishra, as he himself claimed, had been offered the premiership by
9 4
the king and had declined, but this did not in fact make him non-partisan,
and Hodgson himself virtually became a fellow partisan once he realised
that Rangnath was not only trying to establish a Bhimsen-like monopoly
of relations with the Residency, but also to secure Bhimsen's release
from prison as a counter-weight to the Pandes. Hodgson was of course
concerned to block anyone who might thwart his wishes for direct dealing
with the king, and he was astute enough to realise that Ranjang Pande,
once in power, might try to do the same as Rangnath was now attempting.
But by, for instance, using Mishra as a channel through which 'to
denounce Rangnath's impudence', the Resident was, in the circumstances
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of August 1837, doing Ranjang's and Mishra's work for them.
On 1 September, Hodgson had an opportunity to impress his views on 
King Rajendra in person, when Mishra called him back for an audience at 
the palace from the hill bungalow where he had gone to recover from a 
severe bout of illness. At Hodgson's own request Mishra himself attended 
the interview, but no fourth person was present. Rajendra said that he
was being urged by some of his advisers to release the Thapas, but
himself thought this would be unsafe and wanted the Resident's advice. 
Hodgson recommended that they should remain in prison. The king went on 
to ask about the intentions behind Mathbar Singh's Calcutta mission. 
Hodgson now felt sure that Rajendra had obtained information from former 
Thapa adherents which confirmed his own view of Bhimsen's ulterior motives 
at that time. He all but directly told the king that there had been a
Thapa plot against him and that, as the British had thwarted it, they
were now owed some consideration in return. He was finally asked for
95
general advice and told Rajendra he should retain overall direction of
the administration in his own hands and should deal directly with the 
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Residency.
This interview for a few days seemed to tilt the balance against
Rangnath and in favour of Mishra, and Hodgson hoped that the latter would
be appointed as the regular liaison between the king and the Residency.
However, by late September, to the disgust of both Mishra and the
Resident, the pendulum had swung right back the other way. Hodgson now
feared the king had 'no character or a bad one' and that he was under the
bad influence of Samrajya and Rangnath, and of a 'Paramhans' (ascetic)
who was beguiling him with tales of an anti-British alliance forming on
the plains. The Residency had been totally unable to get any of its
routine business attended to, and Hodgson asked the Governor-General to
write directly to the king demanding improvement and hinting at possible
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punishment if it was not forthcoming. Ten days later the Resident
thought he saw signs of improvement, and he even suggested that his
severe illness had made the tone of his earlier letter unduly pessimistic,
but when Krishna Ram Mishra was sent by the king to solicit British
permission for the Nepali annexation of Sikkim and Bhutan, Hodgson 
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despaired again. In mid-November he wrote that Rajendra might
conceivably be allowing each party to have its head in turn until he was
ready to assert full control himself, but that he was more probably
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simply deluded with dreams of repeating his ancestors1 conquests.
After this relations would continue to have their ups and downs, but 
Hodgson's hopes in King Rajendra were now effectively ended.
9 6
On 5 December, Hodgson left Kathmandu to seek medical treatment in
Calcutta, a few days after delivering a mild and friendly letter from
the Governor-General to Rajendra. Neither Lord Auckland nor the members
of his council had thought the situation called for the hard language
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Hodgson had demanded in September. The day after the Resident's
departure Bhimsen and the other Thapas were released and Rangnath
nominated as premier with all Bhimsen's former powers and command of one
of his former personal regiments. Hodgson's faith in Mishra and Ranjang
had survived his disillusionment with the king, and Assistant Resident
Campbell, who faithfully reflected his superior's views on Nepali politics,
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was indignant at this apparent end to Ranjang's hopes. In the event,
however, even though Bhimsen was received publicly by the king and his
confiscated property partly restored, Ranjang and Mishra retained some
standing at court, the king clearly trying to maintain a balance between
factions. In January several of Ranjang's relations were given senior
positions, while the Thapas were trying to strengthen their hand with
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fruitless appeals to Campbell for support.
A crucial element in Rangnath Paudyal's success so far had been his
retention of Samrajya's support, even after he had begun pressing for the
release of the alleged murderer of her child. Besides his own personal
influence,he had been assisted by Samrajya's father, Prabhu Shah, whom
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Jang Bahadur's uncle, Balram, may have bribed on Bhimsen's behalf.
Early in 1838, however, the queen reverted to her earlier sentiments and 
began strongly supporting Ranjang once more. In February she left the 
royal palace to take up residence at Pashupatinath (Nepal1s principal 
Hindu temple, three miles east of Kathmandu). This was probably a means
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of putting pressure on her husband to favour Ranjang —  she employed
similar tactics on several other occasions ~  although Hodgson, on his
return from Calcutta, was inclined to believe she genuinely felt herself
in danger from the Junior Queen, Lakshmi Devi, and Bhimsen, whose
112reappointment as premier Lakshmi was now advocating.
The political situation continued unstable with Rangnath facing
increasing difficulties. As many had anticipated, he had trouble in
managing the army, both as a Brahman and because of the pay-cuts
he was having to impose. Insubordination amongst the regiments increased —
allegedly instigated by Bhimsen —  and Ranjang, offered the premiership if
he would carry the economy measures throughy refused to accept on these
conditions. Rangnath's embarrassment was heightened when two lakhs of
rupees —  proceeds of the many bribes he had been taking —  were seized on
the road whilst he was having them secretly conveyed to Banaras. The
day-to-day business of the Residency was, however, being carried forward,
the king conducting a certain amount himself and also using the services
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of the cauntara Fateh Jang and Guru Pradad.
Hodgson was perplexed by a flurry of Nepali diplomatic activity now 
under way, involving both states outside India and British dependent 
allies within it. In March Bhimsen's nephew, Mathbar Singh, had set 
off on a journey to Lahore —  it was unclear whether as. an official Nepali 
envoy or not —  without applying for a passport at the Residency. Meanwhile, 
envoys who had reached Lahore earlier were sending back stories of Ranjit 
Singh, the Panjab ruler, expressing support for the Thapas. These may 
well have been fabrications, but the news greatly boosted Bhimsen's 
confidence, whilst Hodgson thought that King Rajendra had become distinctly
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uneasy. As Mathbar Singh's brother-in-law, Bal Narsingh Kunwar, was
doubtless kept in close touch with all these developments, and it was
probably now, if not in the immediate aftermath of Bhimsen's release,
that both he and Jang Bahadur regained official appointments: the father's
signature is amongst those of bhavadavs attesting a royal decree at the
beginning of May, whilst the son is referred to as a kumbhedan (lieutenant)
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in a document dated 5 March. In April, Bhimsen again made a bid for
British support, telling the Residency that he was the East India Company's
sole friend in Nepal and that plans were being made for war with the British,
if envoys now in China, the Panjab and Burma brought back encouraging 
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replies. On his return to Nepal in March Hodgson had still been
sympathetic to Mishra and Ranjang Pande. He now first began to suspect
that they might be engaged in hostile activity, but in early May he
decided that Bhimsen and Rangnath, and not, as they implied, Ranjang's
party, had been responsible for all the embassies, perhaps as a tactic to
embarrass the king, or to create the impression that Bhimsen enjoyed
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powerful support abroad. The latter was, of course, certainly the
case with some of the dealings with Lahore.
In June, however, Hodgson changed his mind again and decided he was 
in need of different allies. He was told by Rangnath that the king
intended to restore his ancestors' lands to Ranjang Pande —  at the expense 
of the present occupiers —  and would also make Ranjang premier if he 
agreed to go to war. Rangnath, still nominally premier himself, promised 
Hodgson that he would provide information if he could be guaranteed a 
comfortable retirement in Banaras. Hodgson was inclined to trust him, 
but was also sounding out as a perhaps more reliable collaborator,
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Rangnath's brother Krishna Ram Paudyal, alias the mahdta guvu. All
four Paudyal brothers had been described by Hodgson in 1833 as 'shrewd'
and 'men of the world who have been ours, aforetime, fov a oonsdderat'ion
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[emphasis in original], and are ready to be again on like terms'.
Krishna Ram Paudyal was thus something of a contrast to Krishna Ram
Mishra, whom Hodgson characterised in 1837 as 'a jewel of a man —
simplehearted as a villager', and later, less charitably, as 'untalented
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and ignorant of affairs'. Nevertheless, it was the mahi-ta guru who
was to succeed to Mishra's old place, becoming Hodgson's closest confidant 
and collaborator over the next four years.
The Resident's change of allegiance corresponded to a shift in the 
focus of factional politics. Until mid-1838 these had largely revolved 
around Bhimsen Thapa, the key question being first whether he could be 
brought down, and then whether he might regain power. From now on it 
would increasingly be Ranjang Pande who occupied the pivotal position.
His actual power would never be as great as Bhimsen's, but opposition to 
him would be the platform around which much of the bharadari could unite, 
as opposition to Bhimsen had been before.
Bhimsen's Fall in Retrospect
In his study of Nepal under Bhimsen, Stiller has emphasised a failure 
to solve fundamental problems at two levels. First, the maintenance of 
an army much larger than the country now needed put an excessive strain 
on the peasant economy, and second, the limited availability of jagdrs 
and the consequent slow promotion rate within the bhavadavi led
inevitably to increasing tensions between its members. Stiller
implicitly endorses Hodgson’s view that after the Treaty of Sagauli 
Nepal needed to reduce emphasis on the military and concentrate on the
promotion of trade and commerce. As far as factionalism among the
bhavadari is concerned, his analysis was anticipated by Hodgson's
successor as Resident, Henry Lawrence, who summed up the situation in
1844:
The country is small and poor, and there are 
many and hungry chiefs, squabbling for power
and pelf, it is therefore their destiny to
quarrel. ^ 1
These factors were indeed vitally important, but they formed the 
essential background against which any Nepali regime had to operate, 
and cannot therefore provide the explanation for the fall of a particular, 
dominant figure. In 1846 Jang Bahadur was to emerge as the new Bhimsen 
and to establish political stability with his own family raised above 
the level of the other bhaTadavs, despite the fact that Nepal remained a 
poor country and the army actually increased in size. Bhimsen1s failure
must therefore be seen as essentially a political one: he was unable
in the new situation after the Queen Regent's death to manage tensions 
which had always been present, and, perhaps most fatally, failed to 
maintain the unity of his own family against outside contenders for power.
The coalition which operated against Bhimsen was essentially an ad 
hoc one, united by resentment against a man who so overshadowed the other 
bharadars. There were none the less, some elements of continuity in 
the alignments of the 1830s. The enmity between Bhimsen Thapa's family 
and the 'Kala1 Pandes dated back to the events of 1800-1804. It may have
originated even earlier, if Leo Rose is correct in supposing that the
families which then supported ex-King Rana Bahadur were essentially
those which had backed him in his earlier struggle with his uncle,
Bahadur Shah. However, although there is evidence for a close link
between Bahadur and the 'Kala' Pandes, the position of Bhimsen's family
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in the earlier controversy is unknown. On the other hand, the 'Kala'
Pande-Mishra axis, as has already been seen, certainly went right back to
the 1770s. It is also possible that a similar link may have existed
between the Basnets and the Paudyal guvus. Bhaktawar Basnet's decision
to back Rana Bahadur's return from Banaras was probably influenced by an
appeal from Rangnath Paudyal pointing out the guvu-oeZa relationship
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between the families. Jitman Singh Basnet's move against Bhimsen in
1834 (above, p.83) could in that case have been prompted by the Paudyal 
brothers. If there was such a connection, it was eventually to break 
down, for Jitman's cousin Prasad was later to combine with Ranjang Pande 
while the Paudyals remained opposed to him. It none the less seems safe 
to conclude that while patterns of alliance shifted constantly as the 
perceived balance of advantage changed, the guTU-ceZa bond, like marriages, 
provided a partial brake on the kaleidoscope.
It is largely through Hodgson's eyes that we are able to follow the 
ins and outs of the struggle, but this should not tempt us to attribute 
more importance to his role than it actually warrants. His hands were 
in any case partly tied by his superiors' lack of enthusiasm for 
pressuring Nepal into changing her defence and trade policies. By 
refusing to support Bhimsen over the Calcutta embassy Hodgson hastened 
his fall, but it is unlikely he could have survived indefinitely short
102
of an explicit British guarantee of support that neither Hodgson nor 
anyone else in the Indian government would have been prepared to 
contemplate at this stage. His specific backing for Krishna Ram Mishra 
and Ranjang Pande during 1837 strengthened their hand, but again they 
would probably have succeeded in any case, and their influence did in 
fact continue to increase once he had abandoned them. In so far as 
Hodgson's activity had been effective, he had actually scored a clear 
'own goal', and much of his time over the next three years was to be 
spent energetically opposing those he had previously regarded as his 
surest friends.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ROAD TO THE 'BRITISH MINISTRY1
Introduction
The years 1838 to 1840 saw a major crisis in Nepali politics which 
came close to involving the country in war with the British. The 
background to this was provided by the adverse position in which the 
British found themselves on several fronts, and in particular by their 
Afghan entanglement. Most important, however, was the tension within 
the bharadari as Ranjang Pande sought to strengthen his position with 
the king by offering the prospect of aggrandisement abroad and an 
increase in the royal share of the revenue. An encroachment on British 
territory in 1840 provoked the Company into a direct intervention in 
the internal struggle: backed by a military demonstration on the
frontier, Hodgson insisted on the dismissal of Ranjang and his associates 
and the appointment of new ministers acceptable to himself. Hodgson's 
allies were initially only the Paudyal brothers, Krishna Ram and 
Rangnath but the group later expanded to include most of the leading 
bharadars whether former staunch Thapa adherents or those who had helped 
bring Bhimsen down. The pattern was complicated, however, by 
individuals switching between the two 'parties', a tactic most dexterously 
employed by Prasad Singh Basnet, whose family's role has not been 
properly recognised in accounts of this period.
The struggle was essentially one between factions of the bhavadavi, 
but as tension mounted the army was also to become involved. Actions 
by rank-and-file soldiers were largely controlled by the rival bharadars, 
and the autonomous element should not be exaggerated. None the less
ill
there is evidence to suggest that the troops did see themselves as a 
group with interests potentially opposed to the bhavadars. The mutiny 
in 1840 set a pattern which was to recur over the following years, with 
the army's role seeming about to become decisive, but never quite managing 
the transition. The historian can thus reasonably pay greatest attention 
to the manoeuvring within the elite, but has to recognise that there was 
another element within the state which the elite could never take 
completely for granted.
The Bharadari under Pressure
As he prepared to enter an alliance with the Paudyal brothers, the
Resident did stop to consider whether the charges being made against the
increasingly influential Ranjang might stem from resentment amongst other
bharadavs who stood to lose financially for his benefit. However an
interview with the king and Krishna Ram Mishra in early August, a few days
before Rangnath's resignation from the premiership, convinced him that
2
despite their denials they were planning to break with the British.
By this time the situation in Nepal was causing considerable concern
in Calcutta. Troop movements in the east of the country had alarmed the
British military commander at Darjeeling, and the imminent possibility of
war with Burma plus the approaching departure of the expeditionary force
to Afghanistan heightened concern for British India's relatively unprotected
border with Nepal. Lord Auckland consequently gave orders for a
considerable strengthening of garrisons along the Ganges. News of these
military preparations reached the Nepali authories .at the beginning
3
of September —  by courtesy of the Calcutta press —  and the resultant
±12
alarm led to the appointment as liaison with the Residency of mahita guru
4
Krishna Ram Paudyal, whose pro-British orientation was publicly known.
With his help Hodgson rapidly secured nominal agreement to withdraw
Nepali envoys from various parts of India and to remedy the grievances of
British subjects trading in Kathmandu. The mahita guru's influence
on actual policy was, however, only intermittent, his opponents in the
Darbar arguing that the Afghan preoccupations of the British precluded
them taking any firm action against Nepal. To counter this the guru was
eager for a robust line from Calcutta, which would buttress his own
contention that the East India Company should not be provoked. Hodgson
was thus provided with useful ammunition for his own frequent dispatches
requesting stronger support. 'The Gooroo', he wrote to Calcutta in
February 1839, 'says that his strength is mine and mine the Governor-
General 's : and that however wanton the Durbar *s behaviour to him and to
me, the Governor-General has only distinctly to support us in order to
recall the vacillating young Rajah to the necessity of abiding by his
5
recent pledges to u s '.
Since October 1838 Ranjang Pande had been joint minister with Pushkar 
Shah, the oauntara who had helped launch the anti-Bhimsen campaign in 
1832, and who had just returned from leading the regular quinquennial 
embassy to Peking. Nevertheless, the Thapas were still politically 
active and their morale was boosted by the news that Mathbar Singh had 
managed at last to reach Lahore: his release from Ludhiana had been
due to a local misunderstanding of orders from Calcutta, and was embarrassing 
to Hodgson since the Darbar received the news a fortnight before he did.^
The 'secret intelligence' received by Hodgson claimed that the Thapas 
were boasting of a success over the Resident and the British government,
113
and that the king had been pleased by a letter from Mathbar reporting
Ranjit Singh was willing to negotiate an alliance with Nepal. Bhimsen
was in consequence no longer supporting Krishna Ram Paudyal*s attempt
to improve relations with the British. The report added, however, that
Krishna Ram and Rangnath Paudyal had now ended their political
differences —  they appear to have been at odds since before Bhimsen*s
dismissal —  and that they consequently ’possess a strength which renders
them wholly indifferent to Pandes, Thapas, Chauntarias or any other party 
7
of the state1.
Following this reconciliation within the Paudyal guru family, there 
was to be in 1839 a drawing together of most of the principal bharadars 
in opposition to Ranjang Pande and his patron, Senior Queen Samrajya 
Laksmi. Although for much of the detail we have to rely on Hodgson’s 
'secret intelligence1, which had a strong anti-Pande and pro-guru bias, 
there is no doubt that such a realignment did take place. At the root 
of this development was the government's desire to increase the resources 
at its command, an aim which, coupled with Ranjang's blind desire for 
vengeance against his opponents, directly threatened the economic 
interests of many of Nepal's most prominent families.
The government's own economic difficulties had been increasing since 
the early 1830s, when military preparations against the British were
Q
intensified and military expenditure accordingly rose. In March 1837, 
three months before Bhimsen's fall, the land revenue demand in the 
eastern Tarai (i.e. the districts of Bara, Parsa, Rautahat, Saptari, 
Mahottari and Morang) was substantially raised, and assessments in the 
hills also reached record levels. The increases were made from an
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already high base-line —  amounting probably to more than 50 per cent
of the peasant's gross produce in the hills and around a third in the
Tarai —  and the new rents struck even some of the intended beneficiaries
as unworkable: gag'tvdavs with lands in the western hills petitioned the
9
king in October 1837 for a reduction to the 1825 level. In May 1838 
Rangnath Paudyal (then mukhbi-yav) had difficulty in finding suitable 
bidders for the revenue contracts for the Tarai districts, whilst in 
August 1839, King Rajendra, in a khavita to the Governor-General, referred 
to ryots abandoning their fields because of the previous year's harsh 
settlement.^
Coupled with the simple raising of rents went constant alteration in
the means of collecting them. In 1830 the government had abandoned the
use of ■igaradavs (contractors) as intermediaries between itself and the
caudharis and other local revenue functionaries in the eastern Tarai in
11
favour of direct arrangements with the latter. By the late thirties,
however, the 'iga.’Padav system seems to have been reintroduced, though
with decisions taken on a' year-to-year basis whether to give a single
individual a contract for the entire region, or to appoint separate
12
contractors for each district. The 'Lgavadavs were in principal 
required to levy tax at the rates laid down by the central government, 
but must in practice have had a fairly free hand. Friction must often 
have arisen with 'igavadavs claiming they were unable to extract the 
higher amounts now being prescribed.
Notwithstanding what has been said about the importance of the centre 
in the Nepali polity, linkages between -igavadavs with a local base and 
senior bhavadavs must have played a part in the process, and it is
115
possible that disarray in the revenue administration reflected the
intensifying factional struggle in Kathmandu. Unfortunately knowledge
of the individuals who took contracts is still very limited. One of
them, Kulanand Jha, 'farmer-general1 for the whole eastern Tarai on at
least one occasion, was, however, an important bhavadar* in his own right,
13
and worth some half a million rupees when he died in 1840. Probably
more typical of the group was Girija Datt Mishra who became collector
for his native Mahottari district in the 1830s under the patronage of the
abbot of a local Vaisnavite monastery. He was subsequently imprisoned
for withholding three years' revenue, but released later and reappointed
in 1843 or earlier. Burghart, who recorded the story as told by Mishra's
descendants, suggests both his rise and reinstatement might be linked to
Thapa influence as 1843 saw the appointment as minister of Bhimsen's
nephew Mathbar. This is unlikely, as a list of bhavadars compiled early
in 1843, when Mathbar was still in India, shows Mishra already back in his 
14
post. There must, none the less, have been many appointees who were
in fact Thapa proteges, and others who owed allegiance to rival bhavadavs.
Given the possibility of Tarai peasants absconding across the border
into India if Kathmandu's extortions went too far, the prospects of
greatly increasing government revenue from that quarter were clearly
limited. Retrenchment in expenditure was an obvious alternative and,
as has already been seen, Rangnath had previously attempted to carry
through salary reductions. An Order in June 1838 had cut the pay of
15
non-military employees by 25 per cent. The army, however, was a more
difficult proposition, and a determined effort to make reductions here 
was not undertaken until 1840.
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At the end of 1838 a new source of possible relief for the treasury 
was found in the b'ivta holdings of leading bharadars. Wishing to 
counteract the temporary kudos which the Thapas had gained from stories 
of Mathbar Singh's alleged success in the Panjab, Ranjang Pande made 
the spectacular gesture of resigning his own birta lands and calling 
upon his peers to do likewise. At the same time alarm was created by
16
an announcement that the title of all rent-free land was to be examined.
Two months later, in February 1839, an order was issued prohibiting the
making of any new b'lTta grants for the next ten years. According to
Hodgson's sources, a general resumption of tax-free lands, including even
those obtained by purchase, took place towards the end of the year.
This cannot have been fully comprehensive, since the following summer the
chiefs were again reported under pressure to give up lands obtained
since 1803, but some grants must have been rescinded as a new
17
administration had to restore them in the winter of 1840. In any case,
it is undeniable that the apprehension of a general resumption contributed
greatly to the heightening of political tension throughout 1839.
Whatever wider measures were taken, the central treasury certainly
profited greatly from the proceeds of political prosecutions. By June
1840 it was alleged that confiscations had reached 48 lakhs, equivalent
18
to Hodgson's figure for Nepal's total annual revenue in 1843. Bal
Narsingh Kunwar was probably a victim of this process early in 1839,
whilst his brother Balram was fined 25,000 rupees for allegedly bribing
Rajendra's father-in-law to argue for Bhimsen's release from imprisonment 
19
in 1837. By June 1839, Hodgson's sources would be reporting that 
'few or none of the Sardars who have held office in the last twenty-five
i 1 7
to thirty years consider themselves free from the daily hazard of 
extortion1. ^
The severity with which this campaign was waged varied with Ranjang's
standing in the darbar power struggle. During the first three months
of the year, the king had appeared unwilling to give Ranjang his full
backing, despite Samrajya's once again withdrawing to Pashupatinath in
protest. In April, however, Rajendra, apparently yielding to her
pressure, ordered that he should be given precedence over Pushkar Shah,
his fellow minister. The ’secret intelligence' report giving the
Residency this information painted a lurid picture of the Senior Queen
and Ranjang bent on vengeance against their opponents at home and on..
war abroad, and claimed that the Junior Queen was in fear for her own
life and those of her children. The report concluded with a plea for
British intervention:
A rash and violent woman striving at uncontrolled
sway governs the Darbar, and all men of experience
anticipate the worst that can happen, unless renewed 
dread of the Company [i.e. the East India Company] 
should speedily recall the Raja to safe counsels 
and more resolution in abiding by them.^
There may have been some exaggeration, but Ranjang’s desire for
revenge was real enough. He was now allegedly claiming that he could
not accept confirmation as minister until 'pro-English' Thapa influence
22
was completely removed. Bhimsen had been questioned again concerning
the 1837 charge in February, and despite a seeming return to royal
23
favour in March, he was placed under arrest in April. On 18 May he
was brought to trial, now accused not only of the murder of Samrajya's 
infant son, but also of procuring the deaths of King Girbana Yuddha and 
his widow in 1816. No verdict was actually pronounced —  under Nepali
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law a confession had in any case to be extracted before this could be
24
done —  but the king ordered him to be detained indefinitely.
Against this background, Hodgson became convinced that war was very
likely and the mahita guru took an ever more important place in his scheme of
things. In early May he first suggested the possibility of securing
25
his loyalty with some financial reward. In June he asked for the
Governor-General1s instructions on how to respond to the approaches now
2 6
being made to the Residency, and in 19 June he spelt out in detail his
intention in case of war to use the gum to secure guides for the invading
27
British forces, and organise the co-operation of disaffected bharadars.
In the same letter he requested sanction for 2,000 rupees already paid
over to Krishna Ram and for payment of a further 3,000 if necessary.
28
The money for the guru was agreed, but instructions on the general
question of contacts with the opposition were to avoid any collusion so
29
long as Nepal and British India remained formally at peace. Prinsep
and other members of the Governor-General1s Council were unhappy with
this decision and, in a correspondence which continued into the autumn,
they urged Lord Auckland to authorise Hodgson to form a 'British party'
and to back this up with the threat of invasion if Nepal did not radically
alter her policies. The Governor-General remained adamant, however,
that an outright confrontation with Nepal could and should be avoided 
30
for the present.
Hodgson made it clear that he, too, thought creating a 'British 
party' premature, but that retaining the mahita guru was a different 
matter: he had already been useful in telling other discontented
bharadars that they should not appeal to the Residency now, and,
119
should circumstances change in future, he would also be able to create
31
a coalition with those bharadars very rapidly.
The bharadars whom Hodgson believed he could rely on are identified
in another 'secret intelligence' report, which he forwarded to Calcutta
on 9 June, adding himself the understandable request that it 'be kept
32
out of the hands of all office writers'. His informant claimed that
Samrajya wished to drive Rajendra to abdication, or, failing that, start 
a war with the British in order to profit from the confusion. She had 
the backing of Ranjang Pande and his family, guru Krishna Ram Mishra and 
cauntara Kulchand Shah, but was opposed by Junior Queen Laksmi Devi.
The Junior Queen now had the support of Pushkar Shah (Ranjang's co-minister), 
Fateh Jang Shah, Dalbhanjan and Bir Keshar Pande, Bal Narsingh Kunwar,
Prasad Singh Basnet, the re-imprisoned Bhimsen Thapa, Bhimsen's brother 
Ranbir, and his nephew, Mathbar Singh, who was now in the Panjab. Also 
in this coalition were two members of the other important branch of the 
Thapa clan, Amar Singh Thapa's sons, Ranjor and Ramdas. The list was 
thus virtually a roll-call of all the 'elder statesmen' of the day and 
was not confined to those who had already suffered directly from measures 
instigated by Ranjang, since only the two Thapa families and Bal 
Narsingh fell in this category.
Especially interesting is the inclusion of Prasad Singh Basnet, whose 
personal position, so far as is known, was never under attack at any 
time in the period 1837-1840, and who was actually to become a close ally 
of Ranjang a few months later. His choice of sides may well have been 
influenced by an alliance with Bal Narsingh Kunwar which appears to have 
been an important factor in both families1 political conduct over the 
next few years. As has already been seen, Basnets and Kunwars may have
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been closely associated from the time that Bal Narsingh's grandfather,
Ram Krishna Kunwar, campaigned with Prasad Singh's great-uncle, Abhiman
Singh, in the early days of Gorkha expansion. According to strong
oral tradition in Kathmandu, Bal Narsingh's son, Jang Bahadur, married
an illegitimate daughter of Prasad Singh in addition to later seizing
3 3by force her legitimate half-sister, Siddhi Gajendra Laksmi. Baburam
Acharya dates the first of these events to spring 1839, and although
the marriage is not mentioned in the biography of Jang by his son
Pudma, there is good reason to accept Baburam's testimony; Pudma's
silence could be explained by family embarrassment over anything connected
with Bhim Jang, Jang's son by this marriage, who was allegedly killed by
his father in a quarrel, whilst Bhim Jang's mother can be plausibly
identified with the first entry in a list of Jang's wives compiled by
Pudma himself many years before he wrote his book .3 4  Acharya also claims
that in return for agreeing to accept a girl whose caste status was
slightly impaired, Jang was given a commission in his father-in-law's
regiment. He is wrong in implying that Jang had not served in the army
previously, but in early 1839 he had returned from a stay in Banaras,
and may well have needed a highly-placed patron to help secure his 
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reappoxntment. The co-operation between the two families is not
mentioned in any of the standard accounts of Jang's life, but certainly 
helps to make sense of ensuing developments.
The political situation continued unstable through the summer.
King Rajendra showed signs of wishing to mend his fences with the British, 
and there was talk of Nepal offering her troops to assist the British in 
Afghanistan, but after news of Ranjit Singh's death reached Kathmandu,
121
the prospect of a more anti-British regime at Lahore made the Nepali
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Darbar less anxious to placate the Company. Against this background
the drama of Bhimsen Thapa's life was drawing to its close. In mid 
July, driven finally beyond endurance by the threat that his wife was 
to be paraded naked through the streets of Kathmandu, he attempted suicide 
with a khukri which had somehow been introduced into his cell: the wound
proved fatal, but only after an interval of nine days. In response to a 
plea from Bhimsen at the end of May, Hodgson had sent him a message that
37any intervention on his part could not help and might possibly harm him.
Now, however, in a letter to the Governor-General1s secretary, he wrote
that his silence over the brutal treatment of Bhimsen and others was
attracting adverse comment. He explained he felt his present
instructions bound him to turn a deaf ear to the appeals of 'old personal
friends like General Bhimsen' but would be glad to speak out if the
Governor-General could authorise it, and he suggested such action might
38
prove politically advantageous, as well as humane. Before any reply
could be received Bhimsen succumbed to his wound, and Hodgson closed
his official report of this event with the oft-quoted tribute to 'the
great and able statesman who for more than thirty years had ruled this
39
kingdom with more than regal sway'.
Hodgson had never denied Bhimsen's great abilities, so his formal 
praise of them was but to be expected. His reference to him as a 
'personal friend' is a little surprising, .but there had, after all, 
always been a certain ambiguity in his feelings towards Bhimsen, whom 
he had known for twenty years. The news of the death was brought to 
him by Lakshmi Das and Karbir Khatri, and they claimed afterwards that
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he wept on hearing it. Thirteen years later, Orfeur Cavenagh, Jang
Bahadur's escort on his European travels, wrote in Rough Notes on the
State of Nepal that he had often heard it said Hogdson refused to speak
out on Bhimsen's behalf when a single word from him could have saved the 
41
man. On seeing the book, Archibald Campbell, Hodgson's former
assistant, asked his old superior for information on the point so that
he could publicly refute the slur. In reply Hodgson referred to
Campbell's own presence at 'that solemn debate where I made a last attempt
42
to save the poor man'. This must, however, have been at a much earlier
stage in the proceedings than the final trial, since Campbell had left 
Kathmandu to investigate the Sikkimese border dispute some months before 
Bhimsen's death. Hodgson now made no mention of the government orders 
which silenced him in the last few weeks, nor of his own decision in 
May that his intervention would be counter-productive. He perhaps felt 
a little ashamed that he could have done more than he did, especially as 
he had taken a very robust attitude to government instructions on some 
other occasions.
In the aftermath of Bhimsen's death negotiations between Residency 
and Darbar, in which mahila guru Krishna Ram Paudyal again played a 
leading role, led once more to Nepal formally conceding a range of 
British demands, but to no great improvement in practice. Out of 
calculation, a natural tendency to vacillation, or, most probably, a 
combination of the two, King Rajendra was unprepared to give consistent 
backing either to Ranjang and his allies or to the Paudyal gurus and the 
other principal bharadars. The economic squeeze on the bharadart as a 
whole continued, though, as has already been suggested, it is unlikely to 
have been as severe as Hodgson represents: at the beginning of December he
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claimed that in addition to the forfeiture of all rent-free lands,
including those acquired by purchase, they were being required to serve
in public office for two to three years without pay, and that routes to
India had had to be specially guarded to prevent them fleeing the 
43
country. In these circumstances the Kunwars1 position inevitably
remained somewhat precarious, but no active measures were taken against
them. Bal Narsingh's name occurs in the Residency correspondence in
December in a complaint to Calcutta over the continuing failure of the
Kathmandu courts to enforce the claims of British subjects: the Kaji had
still not paid the money he owed his former gardener, despite a judgment
given in the latter's favour three years previously. The court officials
either simply made excuses or protested that Bal Narsingh would not
appear before the court voluntarily and was too important a man to be
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coerced into doing so. No doubt the latter claim was specious, but for
it to be made with even slightest degree of plausibility Bal Narsingh must
at least have retained some standing in public affairs. This was not
sufficient, however, to prevent one of his nephews, a son of his
youngest brother Balram Kunwar, from imprisonment at the end of the year.
The young man was probably an ahderent of Junior Queen Laksmi Devi, and
45
his arrest part of a move against her by Samrajya.
The new year opened with rumours of a possible alliance between China
and Russia against the British, and news of the outbreak of actual
hostilities between Britain and China the previous autumn led to Ranjang1s
46
investment as mu.khti.yav early in February. This formal change did not
bring him the complete control which he was seeking and which Samrajya 
was pressing for: Hodgson was probably right in assuming that the king
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wanted to use him to implement an anti-British foreign policy but at
the same time to deny him a complete predominance in domestic affairs.
The appointment nevertheless precipitated an important realignment which
affected the Kunwars1 position, for towards the end of the month it
became known that Prasad Singh Basnet and his two brothers, Buddhiman
Singh and Kulman Singh, were now presenting themselves as allies of 
47
Ranjang. It was at first widely believed that the change of
allegiance was only pretended, but it later became apparent that, in
Prasad Singh's own case at least, it was quite genuine.
February also saw Prasad Singh's son-in-law, Jang Bahadur, appointed
to the rank of captain in the artillery. According to the family's
own version of events, he earned this promotion when, whilst accompanying
King Rajendra on a hunting trip, he succeeded in tying together the
legs of a wild elephant that had just been surrounded. This feat was
allegedly only the first of a series of acts of bravery which were to
gain him further prestige over the coming months: they included resuing
a mother and daughter from a burning house, and leaping from a roof onto
the back of an elephant which had gone beserk and was rampaging through
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the streets of Kathmandu. Whilst it would certainly be wrong to
regard the many stories of Jang's exploits as pure fabrication, it is
hard to believe that his promotion was not also connected with his
father-in-law's political move, especially since he had probably been
49
serving in a regiment under Prasad Singh since the previous autumn.
Crisis and Intervention
Anticipation of a clash with the British was now once again
1 25
increasing. Mathbar Singh, whom Ranjit Singh, in deference to British
sensibilities had refused to meet, was now at Lahore and reported that
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the new ruler, Nau Nihal Singh, might be willing to join with Nepal.
Meanwhile, Rajendra had not abandoned hope of obtaining promises of
support from China. In April Nepali forces actually took control of
a number of villages in Ramnagar, claiming that the area had reverted
to Nepal on the death without legitimate issue of the Ramnagar Raja,
whose family had allegedly acquired it as dowry accompanying a Nepali
bride. In June an army mutiny over proposed pay reductions almost
turned into an attack on the Residency, because the soldiers were led
to believe that the cuts had been urged on the Nepali government by the
British. Hodgson's delivery in July and September of ultimata from
the Governor-General secured total withdrawal from the disputed territory
and full apology and compensation for damage done, but the British
followed with a demand for the exclusion from the government of those
responsible for hostile acts. This led to the dismissal of Ranjang
Pande and his associates and the formation of what is opponents dubbed
as the 'British ministry'. All these developments have been treated
in detail, from the perspective of Indo-Nepali relations, by Ramakant,
Mojumdar and Jain, whilst many of the key British documents have been
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published by Stiller. The present account will concentrate on two
aspects of particular significance for understanding the dynamics of 
Nepali politics at this time: the crisis in the army and the precise 
nature of the coalition which Hodgson helped into power.
Brian Hodgson had estimated the total strength of the Nepal army 
in 1838 as between 17,000 and 18,000 men, though the detailed unit-by-unit
126
breakdown for January of the same year preserved in his own papers
52
totals only 14,970. Military units were of two kinds - companies
{kampani) of between 100 and 300 men which normally had no senior
officers permanently assigned to them and were under the command of the
district governors in the regions where they were stationed, and regiments
or battalions (paltan - a corruption of the English 'platoon') which
varied greatly in size, but on average had a strength of 600 men.
Those regiments which were stationed at Kathmandu were known collectively
as the kampu and it was this 'praetorian' force which counted from the
political standpoint. The size of the kampu had risen during the latter
years of Bhimsen's predominance, since, as was seen in the previous
chapter, he had deliberately concentrated troops at the capital to keep
appointments under his personal control. Following his fall from power
in 1837, some 3,000 troops were moved back into the districts, reducing
the Kathmandu garrison to 4,300, but at least three were brought back
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for the wedding of the heir apparent in May 1840. These three units
were again sent out in 1841 but were back by 1843 and the kampu was 
subsequently further expanded both by the raising of new regiments and 
by transfers in from the provinces (see Table next page). The attempt at 
dispersal in 1837 thus proved to be only a temporary reversal of a 
continuing upward trend.
In principle all regiments were liable for service anywhere in the 
country, but in practice certain units were retained continuously as 
part of the kampu. Foremost amongst these were the Sri Nath and Letar, 
which had been established by Bhimsen in the 1820s and kept under his 
personal command. Following a more recent British Indian model than
127
CM CO «— „—>
CO S, im CD IT)
CO CQ r*- CO s r-> r*-. CO
h** CD CD CO CD CD CD
JZ CD CD r*- p". r*^ r^» CD
p CD r*- p c o JZ cd CD CD
01 eh r o CD 3 O r—
c LO r-- X3 sz to O ro to ID
0 01 CM fO JZ p >> ro O o ro
p M—r» O p j z ro to o cd p o >1
p SI r-> P ro p O r-> ro JZ P ro ro
to |— p ro DQ O <0 CD z : Q «—* p 0) p P
0 ro a DQ CD to <o Cl JZ T3 Q_
a s : ro c _c to Q to c
CD ro ■0 <0 • r- ro p a i JO ro E 0 <r—
cj* E •i— P > P i—■ P 0 cz P *•-> c ro JZ , _
00 ro p <0 (0 ro ro (0 3 JZ ro ro ro JZ ro ro
<■— oz c/5 _1 o DQ Cl CO CO CO Q i O ' CO S
SZ ro ro ro * o
»r- Z i sz P JZ i r ^ (0 Q a ro
c ro in O p o >> CO
JZ P ro p o ro JZ p ro ro
un p— P ro DQ o ro Z Q p <1> p p
-d" LO ro ro Q o DQ to ro CL S I “O Q_
LO O Z P ro c JZ ro a in c
r - ro T3 ro *r“ to P C7l X) ro E a>
• -cf E •r- P > P r— p <D C p • [-> C ro JZ t—
CL 00 ro P 0) ro t0 <0 3 JZ to to to ro ro
T— QC CO _ ! O DQ z : CL CO t o CO a : C£ CO S
XZ^  x: |j C ®  «) 
+J CO t_ ^
ra ca o ra O DQ
10
<0
E  ■>“  +■> >  •■“ ! > i>— ra t- © © ra ra ra 
J Q C D Z X
p _ _
ro O *
O
»r- CM O CD O *
JZ *—*• o  •—■ o o o P
~o JZ O  O  CD o CD
< P —  — • CD JZ ■s_^ o
O ) O  *»0 CD
E c O  t— o  **—' *r- ro r— o
O 0) r -  ' r -  c JZ P <0 o
P p . f t p  m to O Q
4 - p JZ r— P  CQ CQ
to i— P -----ro ro C
“D V—- rO ro Q  <0 DQ ro ro •r-
fl) a  p  p C E P
P CO ro »r- ’r-) ro 3 to
a . ro E  •«- P  >  C P C
fO 00 ro P (0 CD to ro 3 ro
TJ r - QZ 00 J  O  CO 5^ Cl X !c
to T3
'—' <
• ro—■ <J1 
O  -P  
•!- oo o
o
< L ®
LO
00
O r—
P 4-
CD O >.
JZ P
S C CO
(D O 3
to 'p- p
i— P  jQ
0 fO 0
3  Lp
TJ C
0
E P  CM
c
to O CO
r— O Lp
o
- -. 1_» S— 0 tn JZ 5
ct-
CO
> 0  C7> 0  
P  * r-  P
JZ GO _c CL E
P Zsi P o >>
JZ 3 0 CT>r— p *r— 0 _Q
*r- "O P QJ 0 JZ p < r— >
P  C 0  0 o P r \ p  p 0 0  *r- C
-C P  ro P  JZ o 0 0 0  0 3 0 ^  P  0
P ro DQ O  0 JZ c  c X  JZ c c >
ro O O  DQ 0 0 * r -  0 CO 0 0 0  0  •*—
X P  ro c N  E JZ JZ x :  x :  a )
to  »r- *0 0  *r— 0 0  3 p a> ro p  p
•r— P  >  P > i» — p *r- cn c 0 c  c CD ro 0
P 0  0  ro 0  0 3 P 0  0  JZ •r- 0 CM if} p  p  p
CO J Q C Q Z X Q_ CO s: x  co co oz 1 o 3 0 3
P *r— 
0  p
>> to »l— S I
p 3 1—tP  0
0 0 ro o  x :
*r— > C  P
Q 0 <
0 to to
o in 1— p E to— 0 0 0 p
c p JZ 0 > • c
-P  O  ©  £-
C Q) C (1)
P  ©  ,
o .co +J
«. a; 
>1 p ct“ » O (1)
t— -P  - I -  4) 
ro ©  P  p  
P  • ! -  05 .C  
C  C  3  P  
©  C  
T3 E  - I -  a)
• r- .r- p  >
O p  <Z 03 
O CL o  ©
(0 P  
-C  Q  P
P  HJ CD O  <D m fo
T O i O - i - Q  U  CD CQ CQ
a  z: p  (0
® p  hi 'i-  3  m
£ >r- E > •*-) >,r- P P
r o i - : 3 © r o r o r o 3 0
JZ r — o  o  ro c  0  ro x j
^  p CD p  < 0  JZ r—
ro j z  p  cn ro ro 0  3  0  3
P  to 0  o i x  - a X3 JO O
O  P o *> * -  <  *o JZ s
o  ro ro o  0 X cy> r o  s  < 0  CD O
CQ '  JZ JZ c tn  * ■— * >  C  P  10
0  0  o  *r- Ct • o  •«- ro «t- • r~
c  ro 3  2 : n CM O  X  05  D> JZ CO -— * JZ
ro u i  u  c  ro r o X  ^  c h*. p  o
P  P  XJ T -  0  O l 0 0  • rvfO ro > ,  P  CD CO
3  3  ro P  JZ ro T— O "C t-  Is-  — > ro ro x— i
CL q  t o  t o  t o  s CO OJ’r E  D  • CO
co m  «
era « ra
rape 
si Q  p  ra 
P  ro CQ
ro 'r~ O
^  E  ra 
ro * t -  p
• i -  p  >l 3 o ra w i c o m
JZ JZ JZ
JZ
to
to to to J *  .
0  1
ro roro DQ '
QQ CQ DQ JZ
»!_ 3 roro0OV
p— P p p Pro3 o o 3
—  x: x: <D U 3 S
_ _ _  __rapx: yooooirtiflw
—) s: ra 
>
o  o  ro 
cm ro w 
Eto co ra 
l p  u. >
• r-  c l  ©  •
r a i r  o 
K ' - P Z
cm (O  -d- m  co co
12 8
did the other regiments, the strength of each in 1838 wa*s 1,100, 
including a complement of five captains instead of one. On Bhimsen's 
fall the king himself had initially become commandant of these, and their
officers had all been drawn from among the cauntavas (royal
54
collaterals). Another unit with special status was the Hanuman Dal,
which Rajendra had founded in 1836 to serve as his own personal guard
55khas pattan). In addition, five other regiments were kampu
throughout the period 1832-1846, and the figure rises to eight if the
three units temporarily sent out in 1837 and 1841 are included also.
Retention of particular units would not, of course, have been of great
significance if the pajani- had ensured a general changeover of personnel
each year, as in principle it could, but in fact the rotation may not
have been so thoroughgoing as is often supposed. Hodgson's evidence on
this point is not entirely consistent, since he wrote in July 1840 that
the personnel of the Sri Nath and Letar had not been changed for years,
yet five months later claimed that the trouble in the summer had been
caused by 420 members of those units recruited by the Kala Pandes, who
56
would have had no influence on any pajan'i before 1837. None the less,
it is safe to conclude that many of the lower ranks served on year after
year, especially as Hodgson also noted that even in the first pajant- after
the the 1840 mutiny there was a complete changeover only amongst the 
57
officers. The soldiers of these two units, and to a lesser extent of
the kampu as a whole, must thus have had a strong sense of corporate 
identity and of their own elite status. The surprising fact is ' 
not that the peasant farmers who made up the bulk of these units mutinied 
in 1840, but that they were normally so docile, and that even in 1840
129
their action was to a large extent the product merely of political 
manipulation by a faction among the bhavadavi.
Although the outbreak on the night of 21 June 1840 was politically
inspired, there did lie behind it real and deep-felt grievances. The
background was the attempt to extend to the army the retrenchment which
had already been applied to civilians and to senior bhavadavs generally,
but from which the soldiers had until 1840 largely been exempt. As a
result of Ranganath Paudyal1s 1836/1837 economy exercise, expenditure on
the military had indeed been reduced by 14 lakhs, but new rates had not
58
been imposed on the ordinary soldiers. The new pay structure was
nevertheless waiting on paper to be implemented. In addition to an
actual reduction in pay of one-third to 60 rupees per year for the ordinary
kampu private, the aim was to curtail the patronage in the hands of senior
officers by substituting a single pay rate for each rank in place of the
discrimination on an individual basis practised under Bhimsen. It was
also planned to do away with the differential enjoyed by the kampu units.
At the same time the assignments of jagdvs to the troops was to be
59
replaced by payment in cash: the latter was a much less popular method
than the traditional one, probably because the gagi-rdav or his agent was 
normally able to extract from the cultivator rather more than his 
theoretical entitlement.^ All these projected changes fitted in with 
the overall design of strengthening the monarchy's central control both 
of the army and of the economic resources of the nation, but determined 
action to implement them was postponed until after Bhimsen Thapa's death, 
in the meantime such small changes as were made, plus the continued 
rumours of what was to come and repeated delays in the payment of money 
already earned, produced a sour atmosphere within the kampu.
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The first real effort to carry through the reduction was made in
August 1839 when the Naya Gorakh regiment was asked to serve at a rate
of 40 rupees per annum; this was not only a massive reduction on the
high rate prevailing at the end of Bhimsen's time, but also 20 rupees
less than the amount prescribed in the 1836/1837 scale. The regiment,
which at first reacted by piling its arms and leaving, was later coerced
into acceptance, but Hodgson noted the general belief that any attempt to
impose similar reductions on the whole army would provoke a mutiny.
None the less in 1840 the king decided to press ahead, hoping that
62success would enable him to double the number of troops. It was felt
that in view of threats of mass resignation and general unrest the cuts
could not be so draconian as previously mooted, and so in April Ranjang
was instructed to tell the troops that rates of 60 rupees per man for
the kampu and 50 rupees for the remainder, were to be paid in cash, not
63
as a land assignment. This was much the same as what had been planned
in 1836/1837, though, significantly, the kampu were to be allowed to
retain their differential. When the pagani* got under way in June the
responsibility for actually carrying out these changes was thrust upon
Ranjang's cousin, Kulraj Pande, as a condition of his appointment as head
of the Sadar Daphtav Khana, the office which controlled the assignment of 
64
lands to the army. Shortly afterwards the pagant, was suspended because
of the illness —  real or feigned —  of Ranjang himself. The mutiny followed 
a few days later.
Apart from the brief notice in the vamsavald account, we are dependent
for our knowledge of the outbreak on Brian Hodgson, and it has been
argued by M.S. Jain that the version of events he presents is severely 
65
distorted. There are, in fact, ample grounds for distrusting Hodgson's
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later account, in particular the 'private note 1 of which his biographer
made use, but his contemporary description in official despatches to
Calcutta, at which Jain actually directs his fire, is rather more 
66
reliable. In this earlier version Hodgson is very careful to give
the evidence for his statements and to distinguish certainties from 
speculation arid rumour, and the sequence of verifiable events can thus 
be reliably established.
There had been protest meetings among the soldiers for a number of 
days, but open disobedience was triggered by a summons of the entire 
kampu to the parade-ground on the afternoon of 21 June. It was generally 
believed that a proclamation from the king announcing pay reductions was 
to be read to them, but rather than waiting to hear this, the troops 
immediately grounded arms and demanded that their grievances be met.
These included not only apprehension about future reductions, but also, 
and, as Hodgson believed, even more importantly, fear that they might be 
deprived of arrears of pay owing to them at the moment: for the second
year running the pajan% had been delayed for many months past the end of 
the year for which the men had been enlisted, and if at this late stage 
they were now replaced by fresh troops, it was the latter who would be 
legally entitled to payment for the intervening period.
The demonstration, which involved all the troops of the kampu except 
for the Hamnuman Dal (or 'King's Own'), was at first non-violent. Early 
in the evening, however, a member of the Residency escort of Indian sepoys 
was wounded by a blow from a sheathed sword when he rashly attempted to 
remonstrate with a group of mutineers. An apology from the palace was 
soon forthcoming, but the troops were said to have refused to give the
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culprit up for arrest. Hodgson was in any case not overly concerned
with this incident, which he considered the sepoy had himself provoked,
and, believing that the general situation was becoming graver, he sent
a message to the king suggesting he disregard this relatively minor
matter and concentrate all his energies on dealing with the mutiny as a
whole. As the night wore on there was some talk amongst the troops of
attacking the Residency, and the escort was ordered to defensive positions
on the roof, but the mutineers in fact chose as their targets the houses
of five leading bharadars - Rangnath Paudyal, Pushkar Shah (who lived only
a few hundred yards away from the Residency), Kulraj Pande, Karbir Pande
and Prasad Singh Basnet. Hodgson made clear in his official report that
the attacks were violent, but not totally unrestrained: the women of the
households were insulted but not assaulted, and furnishings thoroughly
6 7
smashed but nothing of value actually stolen. At around 2.00 am,
King Rajendra went personally to the Tundikhel (parade-ground) in
response to appeals from the troops, and he there announced that the army
would continue to be paid 'according to the scale introduced by our
grandfather [Rana Bahadur] 1 and that the troops' own appointments were 
68
reconfirmed. The men now returned to their stations, and the mutiny,
strictly defined, was over.
Negotiations with the troops continued, however, later on the 22nd, 
whilst the regiments were escorting Rajendra to Thankot, a small village on 
the route to India where Queen Ramrajya had moved to the previous day, 
allegedly with the intention to travel to Banaras. King, queen and army 
returned to the capital the same day, and meanwhile the king first bowed 
to the demand of the troops for the dismissal of Kulraj Pande from his 
position as head of the Daphtav Khana, and then, when they rejected his
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"-choice "Of cauntava Guru Prasad, Shah as replacement, agreed to nominate
Ranjang's nephew, Jagat Bam Pande. Tension remained high for a few
more days, with some of the chiefs who had suffered on the 2 1 st
demanding an enquiry and compensation and the king at one stage
imitating his wife's favourite tactic by temporarily quitting Kathmandu.
On 5 July the kampu troops, now fully paid up to date, left to spend
their furlough at their various homes in the hills. Four days later
Kulraj Pande was reappointed to the Daphtav Khana, again under
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instructions to implement pay reductions. He was said to be
intending also to carry out a thorough change of army personnel, but
although he did recruit a number of fresh troops, a full-scale rotation
did not take place until the end of the year at a time when Kulraj
and other members of his family were being removed from the government
. , 70
m  response to British pressure. Pay cuts do appear to have been
eventually brought in, though rates for the kampu at least probably
remained above those laid down in the 1836/1837 scale. The change
71
from Qag'LV assignment to cash salaries remained unimplemented.
Despite recurring rumours through the latter half of 1840 that fresh 
disturbances were imminent, no further mutiny occurred.
A major obstacle to the proper understanding of this whole 
episode has been created by Brian Hodgson's own change of mind on the 
question whether the threats which some of the troops at one point 
made against the Residency were the result of a pre-concerted plan.
This is a possibility which he considered only to dismiss in his 
3 July despatch:
Regarding the suggestion that the soldiers fully- 
intended to attack the Residency on the night of 
the 21st, and would have done so, had I not make 
preparations to receive them —  I doubt this.
After comparing and tracing back numberless 
rumours, it is my opinion that, if such an 
intention existed, it was merely the reaction of 
a small group of Gorkha troops to the accidental 
clash with my S'ipdh't which was abandoned when 
their companions refused to support them. In 
short, I acquit the Darbar of any direct knowledge 
or instigation of so infamous an act."^
Hodgson did indeed go on to blame the palace for leaving the Residency
unprotected when a detachment of the still loyal Hanuman Dal might
easily have been despatched for the purpose, and he thought such
conduct serious enough to delay making further representations on the
Ramnagar encroachments until Calcutta should have time to consider the
mutiny events also, but there is still a stark contrast between his
attitude in 1840 and what he wrote in a despatch two years later:
In June 1840 a fictitious mutiny was got up among 
the troops (who were taught that the Resident 
had advised the wrongs of which the soldiery 
complained) in order that the assault they planned 
on the Residency might be covered by the pretence 
of their being unable to restrain troops in open 
revolt.73
This new version of events was to reach full-blown form in a 
'private note' which his biographer, Sir William Hunter, quoted 
extensively. In this document, Hodgson claimed that on the night 
before the mutiny {vdz. 20/21 June) he had been summoned to the palace 
and detained in conversation by the king and senior queen until nearly 
dawn, and that the queen had then had the troops told that throughout 
that time he had been pressing them to reduce the army's pay. The 
enraged soldiers had then marched on the Residency, but had finally 
decided against violating it without written orders from the palace.
13 5
In presenting the story, Hunter claimed that only Hodgson's calm and 
affable manner with the queen and his cool courage in the face of
74the mutineers had saved him from Sir William Byrnes' fate at Kabul.
Hodgson's modification of his original analysis was to a certain
extent the result of evidence subsequently uncovered. He clearly
must have learned quite soon after the events that the troops believed
he was involved in the plans for pay reductions, since in the autumn he
usccessfully pressed the king to issue to them a formal denial of that 
74
accusation. in addition he had been informed by mid-August that
a few men of the Sri Nath Regiment had been privy to a prior plan
for 'the plundering of the chiefs and threatening of the Residency1
(italics supplied —  Hodgson is careful not to say explicitly that an
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actual attack was intended). However, neither of these circumstances
is sufficient to explain the change of view which stems rather from 
Hodgson's own mental state. In 1842 he was seeking to justify 
his entire record in the face of Lord Ellenborough1s condemnation of 
the Residency's involvement in internal Nepali politics, and he 
naturally sought to highlight the extent of the difficulties he -had 
had to confront in Kathmandu: it is perhaps understandable that he
should have now begun to see as the major element in the events of 
1 June 1840 an aspect which at the time he correctly recognised as 
relatively minor. With his later 'private note', distortion seems to 
have been carried further by an old man's defective memory. The 
claim he now made that the disturbances were breaking out when he left 
the palace at dawn on 21 June directly contradicts his July 1840 
statement linking their start to a general parade ordered in the 
afternoon. One must also wonder whether he really was in the palace
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that night, for he could have had no reason to omit such a important 
detail in his initial report to Calcutta. Hodgson may in fact have 
conflated the events of the mutiny with an entirely separate episode 
a month earlier, when contemporary evidence shows that he had spent 
most of a night at the palace with the king and queen, discussing
77amongst other matters her request for a passport to go to Banaras. 
Regrettably the whole of Hunter's stirring account of the mutiny is 
thus suspect, and only the 1840 documents can safely be relied on.
It was all the more easy for Hodgson to convince himself that
there had been a real plot against the Residency because he believed,
with good evidence, that the 'anti-British party' was behind the
violence. In addition, in the immediate aftermath of the mutiny he
was provided with firm evidence of strong anti-British sentiments in
at least one section of the army and in those trying to manipulate it.
He was able to include in his July despatch the substance of notes said
to have been sent by the king and queen to the troops on 23 June, and
by the troops in reply two days later. The first note, actually
written down by a scribe in the confidential correspondence section
of the palace, ran as follows:
The English Government is mighty, abounding in 
wealth and in all other resources for war. I have 
remained friends with the English for so long because 
I could not cope with them. Besides, I am bound by 
a treaty of friendship and have no excuse now to 
break it. Nor have I money to support a war. Troops 
I have and arms and ammunition in plenty, but no money; 
and just now the marriages of my sons are costing me 
more than I know where to get. This is the reason 
why I have reduced your pay. I want treasure to 
fight the English. Take lower pay for a year or two, 
and when I have completed the marriages and got money 
in hand, I will throw off the mask and indulge you with 
a war. But now the English are my friends, and they
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have done me no harm. Again.the Bharadars 
[Chiefs] complain that you have plundered and 
insulted them. What answer must I make?"^
The army1s reply was composed by the senior pay accountant of the
Sri Nath, the regiment that took the principal part in the disturbances,
being indeed, according to Hodgson’s informants, the only one involved
in actual violence.
True, the English Government is great; but care
the bwanses [wild dogs] how large is the herd?
They attack! They are sure to fill their bellies.
You want no money for making war. The war shall
support itself. We will plunder Lucknow or Patna;
but first we must be rid of the Resident. He sees
and foretells all. We must be able, unseen, to
watch the moment of attack. It will soon come.
It is come. Give the word and we will destroy the
Resident, and then war will follow of course. You
want no excuse for w a r . There is one ready made.
Let us operate unseen, and we will soon make the Ganges
your boundary. Or, if the English want peace and are
your friends, as you say, why do they keep possession
of half your dominions? Let them restore Kumaon and
Sikkim. These are yours. Demand them back, and,
if they are not given, drive out the Resident. You
talk too of your Chiefs and their wrongs. Of what use
are the Chiefs? We want none. We will be Chiefs and
soldiers too. The Chiefs shall no longer do business
with the Resident. The Munsi- is enough and occasionally
the Minister, but no others. In the Thapa's time
[Bhim Sen] it was so. Let it be so again. Nor should
Your Highness any more than the Chiefs do business with
the Resident. Leave it to the Muna'i and to Ranjung
[the Minister]. So it used to be. So it must be 
79again.'J
Jain has challenged the authenticity of these documents, and it
is true that Hodgson was unable to procure exact copies of the 
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originals. None the less, in response to Calcutta's request for
verification he did provide the names of the scribes and messengers 
involved and gave details of the channels through which he had 
obtained his original information. Hodgson also checked the report 
from his secret agent with several other sources, and it seems
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unreasonable to doubt that notes on these lines were exchanged, even 
if the language has been exaggerated in transmission. At what 
level in the Darbar the message purporting to come from the king and 
queen originated is, of course, a different question.
Despite this undoubted anti-British backdrop, the real significance 
of the mutiny lay in domestic politics, as Hodgson himself made clear 
at the time. He saw it as a combination of a protest which the troops 
themselves had long been planning, and of a calculated manoeuvre by 
Samrajya and Ranjang. Left to itself, he argued, the army would
have kept its protest peaceful, the actual acts of violence being
instigated by Ranbam Thapa, Jagat Bam Pande and Dal Bahadur Pande, all 
of whom were known agents of Ranjang and the queen. The immediate 
aim of the plotters was to ingratiate themselves with the troops by 
standing forward at the appropriate moment as the champions of their 
interests. The longer-term objective was to pressure Rajendra into 
transferring power to Samrajya. In the event, Ranjang was certainly 
able to persuade the mutineers that he was on their side^ for before 
attacking the houses of other chiefs, the men had gone first to his 
and left after cheering him for the assurances he provided. It was 
also rumoured that the outbreak had so alarmed the king that he had 
indeed been on the point of signing over power to the queen. Hodgson 
believed this interpretation of events was further confirmed by the
refusal of the palace to set up a proper enquiry as demanded by some
of the chiefs whose homes had been ransacked.
Hodgson’s analysis can be accepted as fundamentally correct, 
though two difficulties have to be acknowledged. In the first place, 
the identification of the agents provocateurs rested primarily on the
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testimony of soldiers who were adherents of Pushkar Shah's family.
The Resident thus received the information through Pushkar, who was
hardly a disinterested party: he had been at one time more or less
an ally of Ranjang1s, but had been politically opposed to him for the 
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last few months. The second difficulty, on which Hodgson's own
silence is surprising, is that whilst two of the mutineers' targets,
Pushkar Shah and Rangnath Paudyal, were universally recognised as
opponents of the Kala Pandes, the remaining three were in fact key
members of the group: Kulraj and Karbir Pande were respectively
Ranjang's cousin and brother, whilst Prasad Singh Basnet, Jang's
father-in-law, had been ostensibly supporting the group since early
in the war and had been virtually acting as manager of affairs for him
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at the start of the pajani in May. The whole weight of circumstantial
evidence which Hodgson presents nevertheless prevents us from rejecting 
his reading of the situation: details such as the army's insistence on
the appointment of Ranjang's nephew as their new paymaster, and Queen 
Samrajya's evident satisfaction with the army on 22 June are two among 
many. At the same time there were clearly complexities to the 
situation which Hodgson did not explicitly bring out. Possibly the 
mutineers went further than Ranjang's agents had intended; alternatively 
Kulraj, Karbir and Prasad Singh agreed in advance to act the role of 
victims in order to give the vandalism an air of spontaneity: the
latter interpretation is perhaps supported by the fact already referred 
to, that nothing was actually stolen from the Chiefs' houses. Finally, 
there may at the time of the mutiny have been a temporary rift between 
Ranjang, who although nominal minister showed a continual tendency to 
prefer behind-the-scenes influence to public action, and members of
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his group who accepted a more exposed role; Hodgson does in fact
contrast the five victims of the 2 1 st, men 'simple or greedy enough
to take upon themselves...a part or the whole of the responsibility
of affairs without exercising any real power', with those 'who have
preferred to work invisibly and to lay the burden of affairs on other 
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shoulders'. if such a breach between allies had developed it was
quickly healed in the case of Karbir and Kulraj, but the ambiguous
attitude Prasad Singh was to display later in the year suggests that
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with him the affair still rankled.
Whilst some of the finer political detail must remain obscure,
the mutiny episode can undoubtedly be seen as a protest movement taken
over and directed for political purposes by members of the political
elite. It was client-patron ties between the troops and the latter
which determined the course of events. The men actually involved in
violence were, it later transpired, members of a contingent brought
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into the army some months earlier by the Kala Pandes, whilst it was 
the loyalty of individuals attached to Pushkar Shah's family which 
enabled the Resident to uncover so much of the background to the 
affair. If the army acted in violation of the most fundamental of 
client-patron relationships - that between subject and monarch - 
this was only because of the extreme situation which the heightened 
rivalry among the bharadars and within the royal family itself had 
created.
In summer 1839, Hodgson had identified an 'anti-Ranjang' - and 
thus potentially 'pro-British' - party comprising almost every major 
figure in the bharadar-i with the exception of Ranjang's own immediate 
clique (see above, p.119). in the months leading up to the mutiny,
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a somewhat smaller group had come to be generally regarded as attached
to the British interest. Apart from Hodgson's trusted agent mahiXa
guru Krishna Ram Paudyal and his brother Rangnath, this consisted of
the cauntaTa brothers, Fateh Jang and Guru Prasad, and the Gora Pandes,
whose senior representative was Dalbhanjan Pand e . ^  Also strongly
opposed to Ranjang, but less strongly identified with the Residency,
was ea.unta.Ta Pushkar Shah, the uncle of Fateh and Guru Prasad. These
were the men who were to be installed in office at the end of the year.
Although they owed their eventual success largely to British pressure,
all of them were major figures in the Darbar in their own right. It is
significant, for instance, that Rangnath, Fateh and Dalbhanjan were
amongst the five bharadars whom Rajendra had kept with him when he
conferred with Hodgson immediately after Bhimsen's arrest in 1837, even
though they were not then seen as the Resident's allies (see above, p.92).
It is, moreover, nonsense to assert, as Jain does, that the group 'had no
3?
^serious following among the nobility': Bhimsen Thapa had previously
associated them with his own rule precisely because they did have 
important influence.
Throughout 1840 Rajendra had made repeated efforts to associate
members of this group with the Kala Pandes in the administration,
beginning with an invitation in January to Fateh, Pushkar and Dalbhanjan
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to take office under Ranjang. The king clearly saw 'divide and rule'
advantages in bringing such antipathetic elements into the government, 
as well as the possibility of pushing forward one faction or the other 
as circumstances seemed to demand a more-or-less conciliatory approach 
to British India. From the royal point of view this was in principle 
a sound strategy, and not altogether dissimilar to that which Rajendra's
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descendant, King Mahendra, was to employ so successfully in the 
1950s and 1960s, but the instability of Rajendra's own temperament 
and the political tensions of the day were too strong. In any case, 
Ranjang's opponents declined the offer, being unwilling to accept 
responsibility without power. Although Fateh was prepared on at 
least one occasion to advise the king on appointments, he and the 
others generally continued wary of too close an involvement. In 
April, for instance, he, Dalbhanjan, Rangnath and Krishna Ram Paudyal 
all refused to help examine letters from the Resident, arguing that
the task should be given to those responsible for the abuses which
89had led to the British complaints.
Whilst the Senior Queen and Ranjang had hoped that the mutiny 
episode would strengthen their position, its actual effect proved 
largely the opposite. An immediate result was Rajendra1s decision 
to confirm a previously mooted arrangement assigning command of three
regiments —  the Purana Gorakh, Sri Bani and Devi Datt —  to Dalbhanjan,
90Pushkar and Rangnath respectively. In addition, the Pande position
was undermined by some disarray within its own ranks: as has already
been suggested above (p.139), the fact that three members of the
faction were victims of attack during the disturbances may have been
Uave
symptomatic of, or, alternatively,^led to, internal disruption, whilst
the queen's support for the pro-Pande element in the elite Sri Nath
and Letur regiments was weakened when these units were accused of
beating Laksmipati, a Maithil ascetic who was a great favourite and
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political confidant of hers. After having, as Hodgson saw it,
frequently feigned a kind of mental breakdown for political purposes,
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Ranjang himself became genuinely ill. His principal opponents,
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however, continued to refuse royal invitations to take office alongside
his brother Randal or cousin Kulraj.^
Following the delivery of an ultimatum by Hodgson at the end of
July 7 Nepali forces were withdrawn from the areas south of the foothills
which they had occupied in April. British pressure was none the
less maintained, Calcutta formally instructing Hodgson on 27 August to
present additional demands, including the surrender of the fort of
Someswar on the ridge overlooking the evacuated area, compensation to
a British tax-farmer wounded in the occupation, and also the settling
of long-standing claims in the Kathmandu courts involving British 
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subjects. In demi-official correspondence Hodgson was asked for
advice on the terms to be imposed on Nepal should the latest ultimatum 
be rejected and war ensue. He recommended the stationing of a British
subsidiary force at Kathmandu requiring that the Resident be given a
, . ag,
yeto over appointments to the posts of minister and chief justice.
The Darbar's compliance with the British demands was eventually
Q7
forthcoming in a form acceptable to Hodgson on 20 September.
Consequently his confidence that he could assemble a fifth column 
effective enough to give the British quick and easy victory in any 
war with Nepal did not have to be put to the test. His papers show, 
however, that during the critical negotiations plans to mobilise a 
'British party 1 had been well laid. A list prepared in early September 
gives the names of bhavadciTQ who, in case of war, were expected to try 
to prevent the Darbar from resisting the British advance, and, if all 
else failed, to cross over into the 'Resident's camp 1 (presumably this 
would be on the border as he would have already had to quit Kathmandu) 
when British troops were about to enter the hills. Foremost amongst
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these were, of course, the group which had been seen as Hodgson's 
allies throughout much of 1840, viz.> the Paudyal rajguvu brothers 
Dalbhanjan and his 'Gora' Pandes and Fateh Jang and his family.
Also included were the Junior Queen, the sons of Amar Singh Thapa 
(commander of Nepal's western forces in the war with the British), 
and a less prominent ohauntara, Kaji Kalu Shahi. Especially 
interesting was the position taken up by Pushkar Shah and by Prasad 
Singh Basnet and Balnar Singh Kunwar, all of whom had indicated they
g o
might join the coalition, but were not considered totally committed.
Prasad Singh is the most surprising name, given his close
identification both before and after with Ranjang Pande: clearly he
was adept at trimming his sails to the prevailing wind in the fashion
his' son-in-law, Jang Bahadur, was also to adopt.
During September, Hodgson had suggested that if the dispute were
settled without actually moving troops up to the hills, it would
still be desirable to insist on the dismissal of Ranjang and the
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appointment of men acceptable to himself. After the experiences
of the last few months, Lord Auckland was now prepared to listen to
suggestions for interference of this sort, even through his private
correspondence shows he was not over-confident of its results.
Two khari-tas (formal letters) from the Governor-General to King
Rajendra were sent to Hodgson for delivery: they contained demands
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for the dismissal of the counsellors who had led the king astray.
Fateh Jang Shah's appointment in place of Ranjang was already expected
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m  Kathmandu at the beginning of October, more than three weeks
before the first khar'ita was even written. Hodgson had therefore
discounted this change in advance, and, backed up by the moving of a
145
British force close to the border, continued to press the issue until 
the king had agreed to the removal of all Ranjang's associates and 
the installation of a new set of ministers to back up Fateh Jang.
The course of these negotiations is described in detail in
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Hodgson's lengthy report of 4 January 1841. Although he expressed
dissatisfaction that the changes achieved were not as complete as he 
would have wished, he was now convinced that everything practical in 
current circumstances had been' done. The new 'cabinet' installed 
comprised Fateh Jang Shah and his brother Guru Prasad, Rangnath and 
Krishna Ram Paudyal, Dalbhanjan Pande, Pushkar Shah and Kaji Kalu 
Shahi, all of whom except Pushkar had been on Hodgson's 'totally 
committed' list of potential fifth columnists, whilst Pushkar had at 
least rated as a 'possible'. There had also been a replacement of 
Kala Pande supporters by more acceptable men in a large range of posts, 
apd instructions to retire to Banaras had been issued to rajguru 
Krishna Ram Misra, Hodgson's one-time close confidant and how his 
principal bete noir.
The attainment of these results had been a lengthy process because
of a stubborn rearguard action mounted by Queen Samrajya and the
Pandes themselves. Their hand appears to have been strengthened after
the September crisis by the re-adherence of Prasad Singh Basnet, who
joined them in petitioning in protest at Fateh Singh's investiture as
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minister on 1 November. In mid-November Hodgson was able to
forward to Calcutta the translation of an avzi (petition) which Prasad 
Singh had presented to Queen Samrajya on behalf of another Pande 
supporter, Ranbam Thapa: the document warned her of danger to herself
and to the heir-apparent now that the Pandes had been removed from
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office, asserted that the English would remain a danger until Nepal
went to war against them, and claimed it now appeared 'that the
Maharajah is ready to pay 4 to 6 annas per rupees of our revenues to 
105the Company1. Prasad's shift back from his tentative support for
the Residency may have occurred because he was shrewd enough to 
realise that, despite the advance of Colonel Oliver's forces across 
the Ganges and Rajendra's consequent alarm, the British had in fact
now completely ruled out the possibility of a campaign against Nepal
, , , 106 
that winter.
Particularly alarming to Hodgson was the Pandes' success in
arousing feeling in the army against the new administration.
Inflammatory petitions and placards were constantly appearing. One
document submitted by the soldiers complained bitterly about the
concessions which the Darbar had made to the 'vile Madhesiahs [people
of the plain] whom greed of gain has brought here', vi-B. , the Indian
merchants whose cause as British subjects' Hodgson had constantly
defended. A placard put up for the attention of the army on 20 December
Warned that the queen, though wise, was only a woman, and denounced
the king himself as 'a hermaphrodite who will do nothing he ought
107and does all he ought not to do'. in discussing his plans with
Hodgson a few days previously, Fateh Jang had been confident that the
army was still basically amenable to control by anyone given the king's
authority to do so, but he stressed the need for a thorough pajant- to
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disperse the troops to different parts of the kingdom. Although
the opinions of the general population as opposed to the army did 
not generally have to be taken into political consideration, there is 
evidence that the strength of feeling amongst them was sufficient to be
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a possible danger: when Fateh told Hodgson that it would be unwise to
insist on Jagat Bam Pande's name being included in the written list of
'bad councillors', which the Darbar was being asked to prepare, he
gave as the reason Jagat's popularity with the people as well as with 
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the palace.
The fact that Hodgson was able to succeed despite all these
difficulties was due both to the effect of the British troop movements
(even if the demands of the Afghan situation made these something of
a bluff) and to his principal Nepali allies, together with less
prominent adherents, constituting an important section of the bharadard.
Even amongst the bharadars, however, the situation was more evenly
balanced than some of Hodgson's more optimistic assurances to the
Governor-General suggested. Notes which he himself compiled in
autumn 1840, listing separately the 'Good, Bad and Indifferent Chiefs',
show twenty-nine in the first category, but seventeen actually opposed
1 1 0to him and twenty-four remaining neutral. This interesting document
prompts two observations about the nature of factions among the
political elite. First, allegiances could change rapidly. This
has already been seen in strong relief in the case of Prasad Singh
Basnet, who joined Ranjang, became a half-committed supporter of the
'British party1 as the crisis reached a head in early autum, then
swung back into line with Ranjang once more. His latest change of
sides is reflected in his inclusion by Hodgson amongst the 'bad chiefs'.
Among the 'good'chiefs', on the other hand, was included the name of
Bataknath Mishra, whose reported appointment as Crown Prince Surendra's
gayatri guru in April had been regarded by Hodgson then as evidence
1 1 1of the ascendancy of the leading 'bad' chief, Ranjang Pande. A
148
change in the opposite direction was made by Singh Bir Pande, classed
as a neutral in the autumn/ but classed among the 'good' when his
appointment as Governor of Palpa in place of Ranjang's brother Randal
1 1 2
was recorded by Hodgson at the beginning of January. Singh Bir's
case also serves to illustrate the second general point/ namely that
although families tended to operate as political units, there were
frequent exceptions to the rule; Singh Bir had not adhered to the
'British party' earlier, even though he was the brother of one of
its prominent members, Dalbhanjan Pande. Another, and more serious
rift in the 'Gora Pandes 1 ranks was the firm support that Dalbhanjan
and Singh Bir's cousin Dal Bahadur provided for Ranjang, even though
this had previously put him on the opposite side to his father-in-law,
Bhimsen Thapa: Dal Bahadur had been one of the instigators of the
mutiny violence and his name was included in the 'blacklist' of
1 1 3
dismissed advisers which the Darbar submitted to Hodgson. The
Basnets were also divided, with Prasad Singh's brother Kulman and
cousin Jitman in the 'pro-British1 camp. Bal Narsingh Kunwar was
regarded as a neutral (despite his inclusion on the 'haIf-committed'
list in September 1840), but Bir Bhadra Kunwar, senior member of
another branch of the family, was unambiguously a 'good chief1, and
his appointment in December as head of the Daphtar lihana in place of
Kulraj Pande was a significant achievement for the 'British ministry'.
What was the rationale behind particular individuals1 choice of
sides? Auckland had argued in 1839 that bhavctdavs were aligned for
or against the British on grounds of tactical convenience rather 
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than conviction, and by and large this view is correct. The 
pajgiiFU families with their connections with the plains might be
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thought natural allies of the Residency, as Hodgson himself sometimes
argued, but although the Paudyals were consistent supporters of the
Resident from mid-1838 onwards, Krishna Ram Mishra was not deterred
from an anti-British line by the threat, eventually carried out in
115
October 1 40, that his jagtr at Banaras would be confiscated.
The oauntaras as a group might also be expected to lean towards the
British on the grounds that the martial orientation of Nepali life
over the previous half century had resulted in the predominance of
Khas bharadars with support from the army, but Kulchand Shah —  'the
blind chauntara* as Hodgson often referred to him —  was aligned with
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the Kala Pandes against Fateh Jang Shah and his family.
Once one or two-key figures had taken up positions, the alignment
of others might be determined by pre-existing feuds. This explained
the broad pattern whereby a number of leading bharadars of the Bhimsen
Thapa period gravitated towards the British in natural reaction to
Ranjang's playing of the anti-British card. Reinforcing this general
conflict between Ranjang and a part of the old establishment were a
number of more particular rivalries. It is likely, for instance,
that there existed an especially strong animus between the Kala and
Gora Pandes, which lay behind the confiscation of half of Bir Kesar
(Gora) Pande's property in February 1840 and the subsequent attempt
to prosecute his brother Rangambhir for 'stopping [Ranjang's] throat'
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by witchcraft. The family splits already referred to, especially
Dal Bahadur Pande's opposition to his Gora Pande cousins and his 
father-in-law's relatives, also probably resulted from long-standing 
jealousies and resentments. It would be wrong, however, to rule 
out the possibility that in some cases members of the same family
150
might join opposing sides as a concerted tactic to ensure they
would have influential friends whatever the outcome.
The different factors that could determine a particular individual's
course are well illustrated by the case of Jang Bahadur's father, Bal
Narsingh Kunwar. Since both he and his brother, Balram, had suffered
at the hands of Ranjang's Janckhana (tribunal of enquiry), there can
have been little love lost between him and the Kala Pandes. On the
other hand, he was also linked through Jang Bahadur’s marriage with
Prasad Singh Basnet who was a close ally of Ranjang's throughout'most
of 1840, a circumstance which made it difficult for him to declare
unambiguously for the 'British party1. Additionally, as he was himself
the target of legal action brought by an Indian creditor, his enthusiasm
for Hodgson's zealous championing of the legal rights of British
subjects in the Nepali courts will have been less than total; it is
not surprising that the Indian merchant Kasinath should have accused
Bal Narsingh of helping rajguvu Ram Krishna Mishra: obstruct his right
to a fair trial. 1 1 8
Bal Narsingh was further encouraged to adopt an attentdste
attitude by the game which his brother-in-law, Mathbar Singh Thapa,
had been playing in the North-West. Mathbar had been enjoying the
favour of the de facto Sikh ruler, Nao Nihal Singh, who wanted to
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employ him in his army. However, in early 1840 he had begun
making approaches to the British, having apparently only recently
learnt of his uncle Bhimsen's death and hoping for British help in
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getting his children out of Kathmandu to the safety of India.
Hodgson believed he would make an invaluable tool in the case of war 
with Nepal, and was eager to encourage him to re-cross the Satiej and
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live as a British pensioner. Yet at the same time Mathbar was
continuing to correspond with the Nepal Darbar, holding out the
prospect that if his credentials were renewed he could negotiate an
anti-English alliance with the Sikhs, and preparations were made in
Kathmandu to send Captain Karbir Khatri, a former protege of Mathbar's
121brother Wazir Singh, to meet a Sikh representative at Banaras.
Khatri actually informed Hodgson in advance of his own impending
departure, claiming that he himself had accepted appointment as the
Darbar's secret envoy only so that he could escape from Nepal, a n d ■
that Mathbar Singh, likewise, was not really intriguing against the
British but only trying to trick the Nepali authorities into releasing 
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his children. At the beginning of September, Mathbar Singh was
ordered to go to Ludhiana by the Sikh Darbar —  a step which he would 
in any case soon have taken voluntarily —  and there insisted that the 
anti-British statements attributed to him at Lahore had been made
123purely for Nepali consumption in order to protect his family at home.
Almost certainly, however, Hodgson was correct in believing that both
Mathbar and Karbir had in reality been keeping their options open and
were prepared either to co-operate with the British, or, should it
seem the more effective course, assist the Nepal Darbar to secure
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the long-sought-after Sikh alliance. A similar conclusion was
reached by Captain Clark, the Political Agent at Ludhiana, on the
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basis of his interviews with Mathbar. The latter was subsequently
sent to Ambala and later moved to Simla, whilst Karbir, who actually 
reached Banaras in November, was arrested and detained as a state 
prisoner. The policy which both men had been following was probably 
one which Bal Narsingh knew and approved of.
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The crisis of 1840 was thus essentially a matter of complex 
manoeuvring for position within the bhavadavi. None the less, it 
had the potential of developing into something more. The question 
of how far there was a real threat to the security of British India, 
as against mere posturing for domestic political purposes, will be 
taken up In reviewing Hodgson's whole record in Nepal in the next 
chapter. For the student of the internal political process the 
interesting development is the way in which the lower ranks of the 
army enter the picture. Admittedly, their intervention was guided, 
and to some extent instigated, by their patrons amongst the bhavadav't, 
but they had demonstrated a capacity and willingness to act when 
confronted with what they saw as a threat to their basic interests.
The army was never to develop into a power in its own right as the 
'kha'lsa was doing at this time in the Panjab, but apprehension that 
it might do so was to be a feature of political life over the next 
few years.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FROM THE 'BRITISH MINISTRY1 TO 
THE DEATH OF MATHBAR SINGH THAPA
Introduction
The close involvement of the Residency in Nepali politics was 
to last until 1842, when the new Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough, 
ordered a strict policy of non-intervention. This did not cause 
any worsening of Ancrlo-Nepali relations, which were never to return 
to the nadir they had reached in 1840. Nor did the change mean 
that the British ceased to be a factor in the calculations of Nepali 
politicians: the possibility of intervention was still feared by
some and actively sought by others. The withdrawal of support 
increased the tension between the Paudyal guru and cauntava sections 
of the ministry, proving eventually more fatal to the political 
fortunes of the former, even though they reacted with greater equanimity 
to the change than did their colleagues. In the short run the new 
British policy forced the bha.va.davi as a whole back on its own 
resources, and they responded to the erratic and violent behaviour of 
the Crown Prince with the 'National Movement' of December 1842.
This was a powerful demonstration of what they could achieve if only 
they remained united. However division among their ranks allowed 
Rajendra to escape from the restraints the Movement had sought to 
place on him and his son, and paved for the recall and appointment 
as minister of Bhimsen's nephew, Mathbar Singh Thapa. The dominance 
of a Khas minister, enjoying popularity with the army, was the pattern 
Nepal had been familiar with throughout the nineteenth century, and 
the British intervention had arguably delayed its re-emergence by the
support given to other elements in the state. However, Mathbar 
failed ultimately either to conciliate the remainder of the bharadari 
or to retain the support of the army, and, thus exposed, was 
assassinated in May 1845 on the joint orders of the king and queen.
The fatal shot was fired by his own nephew and erstwhile political 
collaborator, Jang Bahadur, who had begun to play a significant role 
after the death of his father in autumn 1842. Whether resulting 
from duress or from simple opportunism, his betrayal of his uncle 
was only the most dramatic of a series of tactical switches which 
the Kunwars, and even more their Basnet allies, had performed since 
Bhimsen's death. Such moves must have been typical of the adjustments 
Which other, less well-documented families had to make, and they 
provided Jang with a schooling in the skills he would soon employ to 
make himself master of Nepal.
This chapter will follow events down to Mathbar1s death, 
concentrating inevitably on the manoeuvring within the bharadari, 
but at the same time paying attention to the role of the army, which, 
as in the events of 1840, continued to hover on the brink of an 
autonomy never quite achieved.
Politics under the British Ministry
Even before Hodgson had to abandon his active support for Fateh 
Jang and his colleagues, they were never in sole and undisputed control 
of events in Kathmandu. None the less their position was strong 
enough to make them the most important of several factions jockeying 
for royal favour. They are often referred to in British sources as
lthe Chauntara administration1, but were, of course, an alliance between
one cauntara family, that of Fateh Jang Shah and his brother Guru
Prasad, and the Paudyal guru family; the other members of the ministry
were of considerably less importance, Dalbhanjan Pande being valued
for his family influence but himself far from a dynamic figure.
pissension between the two principal families was later to become a
problem, and rivalry between brothers was also a complicating factor.
Krishna Ram Paudyal, for instance, was highly indignant when it was
decided that Rangnath Paudyal's son, already gayatri guru to Surendra,
1
should become guru to Surendra's younger brother also. From January
1841 to summer 1842, however, they were largely able to maintain
internal cohesion and this, together with British support, gained them
considerable early success. Their most significant achievement was
the great improvement in relations with India, but they also managed
to reverse such steps as Ranjang Pande had taken towards weakening
the economic privileges of the bharctdari as a whole: in December 1840
Fateh Jang was able to restore a number of birta grants which had been
2rescinded by his predecessor.
As was only to be expected, the ministry faced relentless hostility
from the ousted Kala Pandes and their patron, Samrajya Laksmi. The
latter directed a continuing campaign against them, with only brief
intervals of reduced pressure, until her death in October 1841. The
opposition's strength lay in the first place in Samrajya's personal
hold over King Rajendra, demonstrated in February when her threat to
go to Banaras herself if Krishna Ram Mishra was expelled led the king
to follow her south to Hetauda. She was persuaded to return to the
capital, and Mishra did finally leave Nepal, but the guru was recalled
3m  May to act as her adviser again. Every scrap of information on
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her relationship with the king was eagerly seized for its political 
significance/ and in April she was 'confidently rumoured' to have
4allowed him to sleep with her again for the first time in three years. 
Sexual dependence may well have been a key factor in Samrajya's (and 
later Laksmi Devi's) influence over Rajendra, since in contrast to
many other occupants of the throne, he never showed any interest in
5
women other than his wives.
Samrajya’s position appeared to be further buttressed by continuing
support for her in the army. The pajam of the kampu which was intended
by Fateh Jang to clean out 'unreliable' elements, was not as complete
as he would have liked, for in the key Sri Nath and Letar regiments
6only the officers had been changed. Furthermore, a special bond
Was established between the queen and the Hanuman Dal and Kali Baks
7regiments when she was at Hetauda in March. The ministers were 
able, however, to prevent any disturbance in the ranks, using tools 
such as the transfer of privates between regiments and the granting
g
of extraordinary amounts of annual leave in the summer.
In addition to Samrajya's personal persuasion and the latent
threat of army unrest, Rajendra's failure to back his new ministers
unambiguously and his continuing desire to maintain some bridges to
the dismissed Pandes were also conditioned by foreign developments.
British discomfiture in China and Afghanistan, and, until news of
Zoraur Singh's defeat, the prospect that a Sikh victory in Ladakh
might make the borders of Panjab and Nepal contiguous, all combined
to renew the king's hankering for foreign support as a counterpoise 
9to the British. At the same time, consideration of the domestic 
balance of power made the Pandes an attractive foil to the ministers.
16 6
Both groups were aware of the royal game and in mid-July both were
reported consequently reluctant to take over at the autumn pajan-i.
Hodgson's summary of the king's position is charged with moral
indignation, but can readily be read in reverse as a tribute to
Rajendra's political skills:
Both parties distrusted and despised the Maharajah, 
yet he kept the balance between them, and probably 
would continue to do so. He was averse to extremes, 
a deep time server, and cunning and timid in the 
highest degree. He had one eye on Calcutta and 
the other on Pekin, and was anxious to discover 
whether it would be more profitable to side with the 
English or Chinese.^
On more than one occasion during 1841 political tension rose to
the point that Hodgson anticipated possible violence against the
ministers. The Resident therefore appealed to Calcutta for an
explicit declaration that Fateh and his colleagues were under the
11
Governor-General1s protection. M.S. Jain and Ludwig Stiller have
made much of the fact that Lord Auckland was unwilling to comply,
and have stressed the gap between Hodgson's concept of his role in
12
Kathmandu and the real intentions of his superiors. However,
Whatever might conceivably have happened had the East India Company's 
bluff been called, the limited support which the Governor-General di-d 
provide to Hodgson was in the event sufficient to achieve the political 
result required. The Resident's recommendation in March that Colonel 
Oliver's force should remain on the frontier for several more months 
was supported by Calcutta, and the 'khar'tta which Lord Auckland 
addressed to Rajendra on 29 March took a strong line, emphasising that 
there could be no question of withdrawing the troops until a 1 steady 
and consistent course of friendship' was shown, and referring to the
new ministers as 'men of distinguished loyalty and wisdom who
appreciate the blessings of peace, and desire the permanence of
harmony and friendship between this Government and the State of Nepal1.
In a Kathmandu well accustomed to the politics of hint and nuance,
this will undoubtedly have convinced Rajendra for a time at least
that he would have to face a major crisis in his relations with the
British if he moved from intermittent harassing of Fateh and his
colleagues to direct action against them.
Although Rajendra during this period has been rightly seen as
concerned primarily to play off ministers and Kala Pandes against one
another, published analyses have generally neglected the importance
of other groups in the bharadari. Amongst these, consideration can
conveniently be given first to those 'good sardars' of Hodgson's 1840
lists who, though willing to co-operate with British policies, were
not themselves part of the inner corps of the Residency's supporters.
This group appears generally to have continued its backing for the
principal ministers. Its two most prominent members were Kaji
Ranjor Thapa, a former close collaborator of Bhimsen Thapa and himself
the head of the other main Thapa family, and, secondly, the Magar
Kaji Abhiman Singh Rana. The latter, in addition to his position
as head of the treasury (Kaus'i) , appears also to have had some
supervisory role over the army as a whole, and was very popular with 
14
the rank and file. The group had lost a third influential figure
when Bir Bhadra Kunwar, appointed head of the Sadav Daphtar Khana 
(Lands Assignment Office) at the turn of the year, had died in
15
January 1841; his office had been taken over jointly by his sons.
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Bir Bhadra Kunwar's cousin, Bal Narsingh, was not generally his'
political ally, and, as has already been seen, he had earlier adopted
a decidedly attent'Lste attitude towards Hodgson and his Nepali allies.
None the less, both Bal Narsingh and Prasad Singh Basnet joined the
'good sardars' in falling in behind the ministers in the course of
1841: a Kala Pande-inspired placard, set up in July, included both
men, along with Abhiman Rana, Ranjor Thapa and the ministers themselves,
in a list of seventeen bhavadavs who were accused of. agreeing to
surrender the Tarai to the 'Feringhis1 and to pay them large sums of
16money in return for being confirmed in power for five years. Bal
Narsingh does not appear to have held any public office at this time,
but he was among the counter-signatories of a decree of 26 September
17
restoring the property of one of Bhimsen's relations. Prasad
Singh Basnet, who had been turned out of office at the end of 1840
because of his support for the Kala Pandes, was in April 1841 assigned
command of the Sri Mehra regiment and of Dhankuta district in the 
18
eastern hills. It is unclear whether his change of allegiance
predated that appointment, but at the time of the July placard Hodgson
could unequivocally categorise him as a 'friend of [the] present 
19
ministry1.
In supporting the British-backed administration, Bal Narsingh 
Kunwar seems to have abandoned, or at least de-emphasised, the connection 
With his brother-in-law, Mathbar Singh Thapa, who was now living in 
exile as a British pensioner but still hoping to recover, his position 
on the Nepali political stage. At the beginning of 1841 the prospects 
for a Thapa revival looked slender: although Fateh Jang had brought
back into office many of Bhimsen's old adherents, this had been done
169
on grounds of ability alone and Bhimsen's own family in Nepal
20remained poverty-stricken outcastes. Mathbar1s main potential
ally was Junior Queen Laksmi Devi, who had entrusted papers to his
follower Karbir Khatri when he left Kathmandu on his Banaras mission
21
the previous autumn. However, Laksmi Devi was herself in a weak
position in 1841, as on her return from Hetauda in March, the Senior
Queen, Samrajya, succeeded in persuading the king to expel her from
the royal palace. The threat against her remained very real, and
in April Ramrajya was talking of the need to get rid both of her and
22of her two sons, Ranendra and Birendra.
The position of the Thapas, as well as the political atmosphere
generally, eased greatly in July when the Senior Queen's illness led
her, for a while at least, to adopt a more conciliatory line.
Hodgson, on Fateh Jang's suggestion, visited Samrajya and found her
'determined to ease her conscience for her past cruelties and to
23reconcile all domestic disputes'. The possibility of a coalition
between the present ministers and the Kala Pandes (something Rajendra
had attempted unsuccessfully to achieve during much of 1840) was
again mooted, while the queen promised that the Thapas would be
24
restored to their caste. Although the coalition talk came to
nothing, the rehabilitation of the Thapas went ahead over the next
three months. A first step was the restoration of the sacred thread
to the vccidyas Ek Dev and Eksurya, who had been outcasted for
25
allegedly administering poison on Bhimsen's behalf. Even the Kala
Pandes themselves now began to speak in favour of the Thapas, though
Hodgson dismissed this as a stratagem to lure Mathbar Singh back to 
26
Kathmandu. The formal decision to restore the Thapas to their
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caste was made in mid-August, and at the end of the month permission 
was granted to hold the funeral rites which Bhimsen himself, as an
9  7
outcaste, had been denied at the time of his death.
It soon became clear, however, that the change in Thapa fortunes 
was motivated by a shrewd political calculation on the part of 
Rajendra and Samrajya, as well as by the latter"s desire to atone 
for past harshness. Although a British pensioner, Mathbar Singh 
Was still prepared to play the anti-British card, reportedly writing
to the Darbar to contrast its present humiliating dependence on the
28British with the sturdy independence maintained under Bhimsen.
That was an argument that Samrajya herself seemed willing now to
accept, declaring that ’the Thappas alone knew how to manage the 
29
Feringis'. The following month Hodgson reported that Rajendra
was dallying with the idea of appointing a Thapa as minister, even
though the probability remained that he would in the end reappoint
30Fateh and his colleagues.
The reappointment was eventually made on 9 November, but not
before the delay had caused some anxiety both to the ministers and 
31
to the Resident. Two developments appear to have been critical in
ending Rajendra"s procrastination: the death on 6 October of Senior
Queen Ramrajya Laksmi and the receipt of a letter from the Nepali
pakil in Calcutta reporting the Secretary Maddock had asked to be
informed within eighteen days whether the pajan-i had or had not taken 
32
place. In response to the latter, a letter was sent to Calcutta
on 2 October promising that Fateh would be reconfirmed once the 
astrologers could fix an auspicious day for the pajani.
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Rajendra now pressed again for the withdrawal of Oliver's force
from the frontier. The ministers had in August been anxious that
the troops be left in position, but they were now convinced that
they themselves would now gain the political credit if a withdrawal
was conceded, and so at the end of November Hodgson forwarded to
Calcutta a khav'lta from the king formally requesting this, together
33with his own recommendation for compliance. Before the Governor-
General 's reply of 27 December could be received in Kathmandu, news
reached Nepal of the catastrophe which had overwhelmed the retreating
Kabul garrison. A council meeting on 1 January decided to respond
by offering military help to the British and this was formally
34communicated to the Residency on the 6th. The ministers themselves
evidently believed that this gesture on Rajendra's behalf was genuine
since Guru Prasad Shah and Krishna Ram Paudyal, who delivered the
message, appeared anxious that the king might be getting so close
to the Resident that their own position might be jeopardised. None
the less, Hodgson delayed the delivery of the Governor-General1s
kharita and the issuing of the final order for withdrawal until he
could be more sure of the king's sincerity, and it was only on
16 February that Rajendra was told the British military threat
35against him had been finally withdrawn.
The Emergence of Surendra
Even before his mother's death in October 1841, Crown Prince 
Surendra had begun to exhibit the violent behaviour which was 
subsequently to increase in seriousness until it became the central 
issue in Nepali domestic politics. The earliest contemporarily
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attested incident took place in May 1841, when he struck his father,
and this was followed the next month by his drawing a sword on him.
In reporting both events, Hodgson suggested that the prince, then
only eleven years old, had been put up to such behaviour by one of
3 6his parents out of political calculation. When during 1842
Surendra progressed to outright brutality against both bhavadavs
and members of the general public, the Resident was still inclined
to interpret his activity in a similar way, believing that he was
being used as a tool by his father to unnerve both the ministers and 
37
the Resident. it was certainly true that Rajendra did use the
boy for that purpose, for British delay in avenging the Afghan 
humiliation, and alleged anti-British messages from both the Sikhs 
themselves and from Mathbar Singh offering himself again as the
architect of a Gurkha-Sikh alliance, all combined with the continuing
38British embroilment in China to render the king restless again.
Hodgson did, however, allow that Surendra was going further than
his father intended, and the description of his actions in the
Resident's Diary, corroborated both by the vamsavati* account and by
Pudma Rana, leaves no doubt that a streak of sheer brutality in
39
the boy's own nature was also responsible. In April 1842, for
instance, the boy wounded several bhavadavs and their sons with a
knife, whilst in April one of his Ranis (a girl of nine years) died
after he had kept her standing all day in a water tank at the 
40
palace. Surendra, at any rate, amply deserved Sylvain Levi's
verdict on the successors of Prithvi Narayan generally: 1 [Ils]
. 41
appartiennent plus a la pathologie qu'a l'histoire1.
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In his biography of Hodgson, William Hunter portrayed Surendra 
as adopted and pushed forward by the Kala Pandes in order to fill
42
the gap left by the death of his mother, their erstwhile patroness.
In this Hunter was a little more categorical than Hodgson had been at
the time, for the latter had generally put forward the Pande connection
43only as a strong possibility. None the less the theory is
plausible enough, for they made natural political bedfellows, and it
is not surprising that Kulraj Pande was the man who in August 1842
entertained Surendra by staging mock fights between 'Gorkhas' and
'British1, in which the latter were satisfyingly defeated.^ In
addition to this probable royal alliance, the Pandes also benefited
during 1842 from the news of British difficulties abroad. In July
Jagat Bam Pande, Ranjang's cousin, was commissioned to head the
quinquennial tribute to Peking,and the letters he carried appealed for
45Chinese help against the East India Company. The Pandes continued
to enjoy a high degree of consideration at court until a dramatic
reversal of fortune in the autumn.
For the bulk of the bhaTadavv, however, 1842 was marked throughout
by an increasing level of insecurity. Surendra's violence, in so far
as it was not purely random, was aimed both at the 'British ministers'
and at the much larger group who had been prepared throughout 1841
to go along with them. It is as a particular target of the Crown
Prince that Jang Bahadur first figures prominently in the Residency
Records, being mentioned in the Diary entry for 17 April 1842:
Jang Bahadur, son of Kaja Balhar [si-c] Singh, and 
a Chief of the highest character and promise, was 
made to leap down a well....He was not killed as 
was first reported but he was badly hurt.1^
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According to the version of the event given by Pudma Rana, the well
was partly filled by buffalo bones on which Bal Narsingh managed to
have thirty or forty bales of hay placed before the leap was made.
Jang nevertheless sustained an injury to his ankle which was to give
47
him recurring trouble for the rest of his life. The well episode
was only one among many occasions on which Jang was compelled to risk
his life in this way, and although some of the stories Pudma tells are
doubtless exaggerated, their general reliability is corroborated by
references in the Residency records to similar treatment meted out
to other persons. On 27 April twenty ordinary members of the public
aviso sustained injuries, four of them actually dying as a result,
whilst forcing bharadavs into water became such a common habit with
the prince that ' Have you drunk of the well today?' was a regular
48
conversational gambit when courtiers m e t .
Psychological pressure was maintained against the Residency, too.
Shortly after the removal of the frontier force, the king had been
greatly angered to learn of reports in the Indian press that Samrajya's
death had been due to poisoning. At an interview with Hodgson he
actually demanded that he tell the Governor-General there would be
war unless the author of the libel were discovered and handed over to
Nepal to be 'flay[ed]...alive and rub[bed] with salt and lemon till he 
, , , 4 9
die . This incident, however, swiftly changed from an Anglo-Nepali
confrontation to one between father and son, for Surendra began abusing
and then repeatedly striking Rajendra in Hodgson's presence. The
affair ended with an eventual apology from the king to the Resident and
a soothing khar'Cta from the Governor-General, deploring the libel but
concluding 'It is unworthy of a noble mind to be affected by the
50slanders of the base1.
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In the meantime there had occurred another clash between Hodgson
and Rajendra, which was to have much more profound consequences for
the future of Indo-Nepalese relations and also for Hodgson personally.
On 23 April, the king, accompanied by many bharadavs and backed by a
regiment of troops with loaded weapons, arrived before the Residency.
He demanded that Hodgson surrender to him an Indian merchant, Kasinath
Mull, who had been living for some time within the Residency Lines
for medical treatment and had failed to appear before the Kumav£ Cauk
as defendant in an action for debt. The suit had first been brought
before the Kathmandu court in 1837, and had seemingly been disposed of
in autumn 1840, when, after Residency intervention on the defendant's
behalf, an earlier finding against Kasinath had been quashed. The
plaintiff, after a long absence from Nepal, had now renewed the action
and the Darbar maintained tha Kasinath had in 1840 given an undertaking
to submit the case for fresh judgment in such an eventuality.
Hodgson, however, supported the merchant1s contention that he had
given no such undertaking, and in any case an agreement between
Resident and Darbar in November 1839 had provided that suits such as
this, in which both plaintiff and defendant were British subjects and
the transactions at issue had taken place on British territory, should
51not be admitted to Nepali courts. Against this background, he
refused to give up Kasinath, at one point throwing his arms around
52
him and telling Rajendra, 'You take both of us or neither1.
Surendra, who had accompanied his father to the Residency, angrily 
urged him to seize the merchant by force. Fortunately, calmer 
counsels eventually prevailed. After Rajendra had come away from 
the Residency, returned in force once more, and then come away again,
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he eventually sent back Fateh Jang and Krishna Ram Paudyal to
negotiate; the two had been with king throughout the day but had
earlier been unable to do anything other than whisper words of
encouragement to Hodgson. A compromise was now agreed under which
Hodgson would refer the whole matter to the Governor-General, whilst
in the meantime Kasinath voluntarily agreed to attend the court and
the two ministers accepted responsibility for his personal safety.
In the event he did suffer some ill treatment, but Fateh Jang's
brother and fellow-minister, Guru Prasad, was able to save him from 
53serious harm.
The episode was certainly a humiliating one, both for Hodgson and
the ministers, and not surprisingly he asked Calcutta for the return
54
of a British force to the frontier. At the same time, however,
Surendra's behaviour was reinforcing the pro-British sympathies of
many bhdvaddvs , even though some may have been Kasinath1s debtors and
therefore inclinced to support the Darbar's persecution of him.
Consequently, Hodgson could claim in April that 'Already many scrupled
pot to say, and to hope, that Nipal would soon cease to be independent
55
and would fall without a blow'. Such sentiments were strengthened
by fear of a resurgence of Kala Pande influence, especially as
Sheobux, the plaintiff in the Kasinath case, was a protege of Krishna
Ram Mishra. In May, Hodgson's position was further buttressed by
news of Pollock's victories in Afghanistan, and Rajendra commenced
56conciliatory approaches through Fateh Jang. The ministers now no
longer wanted an immediate British troop movement, but were content
to rely on their own internal supporters as long as they were backed
57
up by firm language from the government of India.
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At this point, however, the situation was dramatically altered
by the famous clash between Hodgson and Lord Ellenborough, who had
taken over as Governor-General from Auckland in February, and was in
Allahabad, away from his council, when the news from Kathmandu reached
him. He considered that the Resident had gone to excessive lengths
in the protection of Kasinath and instead of furnishing him with the
stern rebuke to Rajendra he had requested he sent a letter even-handedly
blaming both parties, and suggesting there must have been a 
58
misunderstanding. Hodgson was instructed to hand over a translation
of this letter to the premier. He believed that to do so would
critically undermine the position of the 'British Ministry' by giving
both them and the king the impression that the government of India
was no longer prepared to give the ministers firm support. The
latter might then be forced to protect themselves either by rash and
precipitate action or by abandonment of their support for British 
59
interests. Hodgson immediately, therefore, wrote back to the
Foreign Secretary with an impassioned plea for reconsideration.
For God's sake, do not distrust your own old tried 
Resident whose every act heretofore you have 
applauded...for God's sake don't trust the Raja whose 
every act heretofore you have denounced....Remember 
that whatever has been achieved here with so much 
applause of the Governor-General in Council had been 
achieved by and through the Ministers and against the 
Raja, and that to show the least distrust of the 
former so that the latter may perceive it, may be the 
death warrant or signal of disgrace of one or more of 
those who good faith to us has been as conspicuous as 
the bad faith of the R a j a . 60
The Secretary, who was Hodgson's own old superior in Kathmandu, was
unable to dissuade Ellenborough and the original orders were confirmed.
In the meantime, however, Hodgson had become involved in intensive
consultations with the ministers, striving both to calm their
17 8
impatience at the non-appearance of the firm response from the
Governor-General which they wanted, and also to reconcile differences
61
between the Paudyal gurus and the cauntaras. Hinting at, but 
never fully revealing, the contents of Ellenborough's 8 May letter, 
he agreed a plan of action with them under which his assistant,
Captain Thomas Smith, left to brief the Governor-General in Allahabad, 
ajid he himself on 11 June sent the king through Fateh a note of his
62
own, giving a suitably edited version of Ellenborough1s sentiments.
A little negotiation then finally enabled Hodgson to extract from
Rajendra on 22 June a satisfactory letter to the Governor-General,
apologising fully for the events of 23 April, whilst Kasinath himself
6 3
Whs finally discharged and allowed to return to Banaras.
By this time, however, Ellenborough had decided on the basis of
Hodgson's May despatches that the relationship between Resident and
Nepali ministers was fundamentally wrong. He considered that since
the ministers were evidently in constant fear for their own personal
safety and unable to prevent outrages such as that of 23 April,
their continuance in office could not guarantee British India any
greater security than her own military strength already provided,
whilst it detracted from her prestige if she was required to tailor
the language of her diplomacy and the deployment of her armed forces
64
to suit the ministers' political convenience. On 21 June, after
learning of Hodgson's deliberate disregard of his orders, Ellenborough
despatched an angry letter announcing he would be relieved of his
post at the earliest practical moment. Within twenty-four hours he
relented, requesting Hodgson to keep the previous day's letter 'a 
65
profound secret'. The second letter still implied, however, that
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Hodgson would eventually be relieved, and after lengthy correspondence
over the ensuing weeks, Ellenborough finally decided to allow him to
remain in Kathmandu to carry out a policy of disengagement from his
alliance with the ministers, on the understanding that he would quit
his post at the end of 1843.^
The issues between Resident and Governor-General generated
great controversy at the time, with the senior members of the Indian
Civil Service mostly firmly convinced that Hodgson had!'been in the
6 Vright and had been shabbily treated. Ellenborough1s judgment that
interference in Nepali internal politics was counter-productive was,
however, echoed in the views of Sir Henry Lawrence, Hodgson's
successor as Resident, and more recently has been championed strongly by
6 8
M.S. Jain and, rather more temperately, by Ludwig Stiller. On the
other hand, Hodgson has not wanted able defenders, most notably his
biographer Sir William Hunter, whose work has influenced so many
others. As Stiller points out, it is difficult for Hodgson's
apologists to fault in principle the arguments Ellenborough advances
for a policy of non-interference, and in particular his point that
'depending for the continuance of friendly relations with the State
of Nepal on a Cabinet formed on party principles places the Minister,
supposed to be attached to British interests, in constant opposition
to a Court party which becomes of consequence opposed to such 
69
interests'. Despite Hodgson's success in gaining widespread
support among the bhavadav'L for his 'British Ministry', it would 
probably have been better for Anglo-Nepali relations if the East 
India Company had in 1840 confined itself to demanding a change of 
policy, and not concerned itself with the identity of the king's
18 0
counsellors. The error was not purely Hodgson's, however, and Jain
pushes too far his thesis that Hodgson got into a false position by
70exceeding Auckland's instructions. The Resident did indeed wish
to extend his commitment to the minister personally much further than
the then Governor-General had wanted, but once Auckland had agreed
to insist on the dismissal of the Pandes, the state of politics in
the Darbar made it unlikely that 'good' men would stand forward
Without explicit British backing: after the decision to challenge
men as well as measures had been made, Hodgson's subsequent policy
followed logically from it. A second point that must be conceded
is that after the commitment had been made, political stability in
Nepal might have been better served by sticking to it. After 1846,
Hodgson and his apologists cited the Kot Massacre as proof that
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Ellenborough1s 1842 decision had been a grave mistake. Over the longer 
term, though, Jang Bahadur, the man brought to power by the massacre, 
saw his interest in collaboration with the British and thereby could 
be said to have vindicated Ellenborough and Lawrence: the Nepali
political system was to find its own equilibrium and geopolitical 
reality, not the manipulations of any Resident, would ensure that 
the new ruler co-operated with his southern neighbour.
The effects of Ellenborough's change of policy showed themselves 
slowly over the ensuing months. Though Karbir Sen, despatched by 
Rajendra on a complimentary mission to Ellenborough's camp the day 
before the fracas at the Residency, might conceivably have heard 
rumours, there is no evidence that either the Resident's Nepali allies 
or his opponents were aware at the time of the serious dissension 
within the British ranks. Hodgson himself made no announcement of
a change of policy to the ministers, but prepared to disengage
slowly, along the lines which he had himself suggested in June when
he replied to a letter from Lord Ellenborough denouncing any political 
72partisanship.
From June onwards relations between king and Resident appeared 
perfectly amicable, but rumours of Rajendra's possible long-term 
intentions abounded. He was allegedly planning to abdicate in 
Surendra's favour and himself become his son's minister, then to go 
to war with the British, trusting that in the event of defeat he
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could save his dynasty and kingdom by surrendering his own person.
To encourage this move the Kala Pandes had allegedly put the
astrologers up to announcing that Surendra was an avatav destined to
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destroy the Feringis. The 'secret ingelligencer' who provided
Hodgson with the most detailed account of this development covered
himself by adding that the whole plan was dependent on China being
prepared to back Nepal and on the Company’s embroilment in Afghanistan
continuing. Neither of these conditions was to be fulfilled so the
prediction was never put to the test.
There could be no doubt, however, that Surendra was being allowed
to believe that his accession to the throne was imminent.' By August
all Nepalis were required to address him as Maharajadhiraj, a title
hitherto restricted to the king himself, and Hodgson was formally
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requested-to do the same. in encouraging his son in these hopes,
Rajendra appears partly to have been acting out of calculation, using 
him to harass the bhavadavs without having to act directly against 
them himself. It is also probable that he was to some extent 
genuinely in thrall to the boy, both because of the astrologers'
183
pronouncements and because of pledges made to the late Senior Queen.
A belief in the sacredness of Surendra's person was in any case 
certainly a factor in keeping the court generally so subservient to 
a thirteen-year-old delinquent.
The ministers were particularly alarmed by the re-emergence of"
the Pandes and their role as Surendra's advisers. At an interview
with Hodgson in September they asked him to make an official protest
against this development. The language in which the discussion was
reported to the government of India was obscure even by Hodgsonian
standards: he refused to make any direct intervention of the kind
requested, but promised Fateh Jang that, assuming Rajendra neither
abdicated nor changed his ministers, he 1 should not seek to withhold
from him the indirect support of my Government's auspices'. The
Resident did however very clearly state that the failure of the
ministers to guarantee completely trouble-free relations meant that
the British no longer felt bound by the 'engagement' of January 1840.
When Fateh Jang then suggested that in that case he would have to
resign the premiership, Hodgson said that he had no wish to stop him
doing so. There was a marked difference in the way Hodgson's
message was received by Fateh and Guru Prasad, on the one hand, and
by Rangnath and Krishna Ram Paudyal on the other; whilst the former
were clearly dismayed, the gurus accepted the new situation with
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equanimity and urged their colleagues to do the same. The gurusf
attitude was partly to be explained, as Hodgson suggested, by 
Rangnath's age and wish for retirement in any case, and by Krishna 
Ram's sense of being above the humdrum political fray. But both 
men's relative sophistication and long experience of diplomacy and
183
court intrigue perhaps made them more at home than their younger 
oauntava colleagues in, a, world, of 'indirect auspices'. This factor
had been one of the reasons for tension between the two families 
even while they enjoyed full British support, and from now on there 
was to be a growing divergence between their political strategies.
In October the tenth day of Desai was marked by an ignominious
struggle by Rajendra and Surendra over who should receive the tika
first. Hodgson had to make a diplomatic retreat to the Residency
bungalow at Karkani when the son invited him to receive formal news
of the abdication plan and the king simultaneously sent an indirect
message advising him to avoid the summons by feigning illness. A
few days later Rajendra was actually expelled from the palace by
Surendra. He was then heard complaining about his lot and suggesting
he might have to follow Rana Bahadur's example of withdrawing to
Benaras and then using that city as a base from which to regain 
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power.
With the struggle between father and son at this critical stage
a dramatic development occurred: the Kala Pandes were accused of
responsibility for the story that Queen Samrajya’s death the previous
autumn had been due to poison. Rajendra personally led the
investigation which culminated in the conviction of a number of minor
agents but also of one of the leading members of the family, Kulraj
Pande. According to Hodgson's information, Amir Singh Das, Kulraj's
personal scribe, initially denied his authorship of incriminating
documents, but then boldly admitted it and rounded on the king:
He told the Maharaja that Nepal had vowed in 1819 
to Baji Rao (the ex-Peswa) to stand forth as the 
upholder and avenger of Hindu Put; and that he, 
the Maharaja, was a traitor to his country and to
all Hindus, and had broken all his own pledges 
to the Hindu states below, as well as to his 
only faithful Ministers, the Pandeys, who if 
supported, would have made the Ganges the border 
of Nipal during the recent troubles of the 
Company.79
This defiant avowal of Pande principles 'made much impression1, but
Amir Singh was immediately sentenced to have his right hand cut off.
An identical sentence was passed on Kulraj a week later, though in
80
his case it may not actually have been carried out.
Naturally enough, Hodgson saw great potential gain for the
British in this blow to the 'war party', coming on top of the failure
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of their prediction of British defeat in China and Afghanistan.
Their guilt may have been real enough, but in view of their close 
association with Surendra, it is perhaps more than fortuitous that the 
accusation against them was made just when Rajendra was being pushed 
further than he wanted by his son. The king had in effect weakened 
Surendra's political position without the necessity of confronting 
him directly.
None the less, Surendra was still able to insist on exercising
the key royal function of conducting the pajand, which commenced
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immediately after the completion of the trial. He did so in
conjunction with the oauntara minister Guru Prasad Shah. This 
collaboration is not necessarily proof of any special connection 
between the two men, since the bhavadavs generally had now taken to 
attending the son rather than the father, being for the moment
unwilling to take a stand against the former whilst the latter made
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no attempt to assert his own rights. However, the lack of
enthusiasm evinced shortly afterwards by Guru Prasad and Fateh Jang
18 5
when a movement against Surendra began in earnest suggests that the
brothers might already have been contemplating some kind of
accommodation with him. They probably felt this more possible now
that their arch rivals, the Kala Pandes, were no longer in a position
to exercise so much influence over the prince.
No list of 1842 pajani appointments has survived, but the
Residency Diary records, that Jang Bahadur was made a kajd and one of
his brothers a captain. In Jang's case there is confirmation from
Baburam Acharya.;who provides the aditional information ,thht he was
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given command of the Purana Gorakh regiment. This was a kampu unit,
and it is probably this appointment which Pudma Rana is really
referring to when he states that Jang was appointed to the king's
bodyguard in November 1841: the date must be an error for 1842, since
the appointment is placed after the well-jump episode which belongs
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to that year (see above, p.173). Jang's selection took place at
around the time of the deaths of both his father and father-in-law,
8 6
Prasad Singh Basnet. It is possible that the title of kaji. was in
part an honorary one, granted because of a promise to Bal Narsingh
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that the rank would be hereditary in his family. None the less,
the appointment is probably better seen as marking a small but
definite shift in the political balance within the bharadari, involving
an increase of power for the Kunwar-Basnet alliance. This is so both
because of Jang's own growing prominence in Darbar affairs from that
time onwards, and because it was probably at this time that his
father-in-law's brother, Kulman Singh Basnet, obtained the key position
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of head of the Sadav Daphtav Khana (Central Lands Assignment Office). 
Both Jang's and Kulman1s appointments could well have been the result
186
of their cultivating Surendra and/or Guru Prasad. The Residency
Diary states that most of the appointments made at the pajani- were
of Surendra's own men and for all the harsh treatment Jang had received
at the prince's hands he had apparently been a regular member of his
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escort and might well have been regarded as one of his adherents.
As for a possible connection with the oauntavas , Resident Lawrence,
who arrived in Kathmandu at the end of 1843, was told that Jang had
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been their enthusiastic supporter while they were in power.
The 'National Movement1
Within a few days of Jang's appointment a sea-change swept
through the bhavadavi. After months of grumbling but none the less
submitting to Surendra's brutalities and Rajendra's toleration of them,
it was decided to make a stand. The last straw was apparently the
prince's order that all pregnant women and virgins of prominent
families be brought to him so that 'he might examine their development
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and choose himself a wife'. The bhavadavs resolved to petition the
king for an end to Surendra's excesses, and a clear decision on whether
father or son was to occupy the throne. The formal leadership of the
movement was provided by Pateh Jang and Guru Prasad, but Hodgson
stressed that the cauntaras were very much acting under pressure from
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'the civil and military classes' as a whole. This lack of
enthusiasm contrasts with the two men's attitude in May, when a similar 
project had been mooted in the aftermath of the Kasinath incident and 
the atrocities against Jang Bahadur and others on 27 April. The 
oauntavas had then advocated involving the army and producing a written
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declaration from the chiefs , whilst the gurus thought this too risky
and wanted merely a verbal petition to the king from the bharadari., a
view which Hodgson supported and joined with the gurus in urging on the 
93
cauntaras. The project had been abandoned then in favour of relying
on Hodgson's protest to the king in the Governor-General's name, and
when it was revived the positions of the two sections of the ministry
were reversed, the cauntaras hanging back and the gurus sharing the
general eagerness of the bharadard as a whole. Fateh himself was as
anxious as anyone else to have a clear-cut decision on the abdication
issue, and was refusing to accept renomination as premier for the
following year until this issue was settled, but they had reservations
because of the wish of many of their fellow bharadars to grant a major
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political role to Queen Laxmi Devi as part of the settlement. They
had themselves been apparently content in May that the queen should 
head the proposed movement, but had probably envisaged that her 
subsequent role would not be a dominant one and that the ministry, with 
continued British backing, would remain the key factor in the political 
equation. Now that the continuance of the Resident's active role 
was in doubt, they were more apprehensive over the queen's future 
status, allegedly fearing that she might interfere with the legitimate 
succession to the throne, and that their personal positions might be 
jeopardised: they probably believed now that they could establish a
working relationship with Surendra if his worst excesses could only be 
curbed, whilst they were afraid that the queen might look to other 
bharadars for guidance rather than to themselves. The gurus, on the 
other hand, could be much happier at the prospect of Laksmi's accession
to power, as Rangnath, who was probably her personal guru, had been
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the one who had persuaded her to back the ministers in May.
Under these circumstances, Fateh Jang and Guru Prasad delayed
going ahead with the petition, thereby causing widespread indignation,
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and made another effort to obtain support from Hodgson. British
support would have strengthened their own hand in dealing with the
king and prince, without the necessity of mobilising domestic political
forces which they might not be able to keep under control. However,
Hodgson had of course to decline categorically to intervene in any
way, even though he permitted himself to observe in the Residency Diary
that 'were he authorised to interfere as arbitrator bye and bye, he
might perhaps prevent violence and bring about speedy and permanent 
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good'.
At the end of November, a few days after Fateh's last attempt to
enlist Hodgson's help, Surendra foolishly increased feeling against him
in the army by ordering the arrest and dismissal of a guard detachment
at the palace for failing to salute him when they came on duty, and
then by attempting to dismiss the entire kampu after some troopers had
been unable to find a captain and slave girl he wanted arrested. This
order was greeted by the men with loud complaints and then with 
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laughter. A meeting between bharadars and soldiers followed, and on
28 November a petition was finally presented to Rajendra demanding
among other things that Laksmi Devi, who was then out of fear of
Surendra living in Banepa just beyond the rim of the Valley, should be
recalled and granted her full rights as queen. It was also asked that
Ram Krishna Misra, the Pandes' guru ally, should be expelled from the 
99country once more.
When this failed to move Rajendra, a series of public meetings
were held on the Tundikhel - the parade ground on the east side of
Kathmandu. The participants were principally bharadars and army
officers, but the latter were present as representatives of the army
as a whole.^ ^ Whilst the first of these meetings was in progress,
the king himself unexpectedly arrived, and received a vivid demonstration
of how far disaffection had spread:
His Highness, by argument, entreaty, and even threat 
tried to persuade the Chiefs or the officers to 
accept the existing state of things, pledging himself 
that no further cruelties or insults to anyone 
should result from it. He was answered separately 
by both bodies, who boldly told him that they could 
not and would not any longer obey two masters and 
that he had broken his word too often to be further 
trusted. Numerous instances were assigned in which 
the Raja had allowed them to be punished by his son 
for obedience to his own express commands. Whilst 
for all the murders, maimings, beatings and insults 
perpetrated by his son he was told that he had evaded 
giving or authorising atonement or prevention in any 
single instance.
The debate was long and animated and had hundreds of 
auditors in its course from among the passers-by 
whose access was unmolested; and I hear that the 
Raja's equivocations and obstinacy at length elicited 
from the crowd loud murmurs of disapprobation, amid 
which His Highness in vain ordered the several 
components of the assembly to break up and disperse.
None would sever themselves nor an individual of any 
one body. In the end His Highness departed with 
but one follower for the palace, where he and his 
son have each four Sardars assigned for attendance 
on them and to prevent the personal freedom of either 
father or son . ^ 0 1
At a similar meeting the following day both Rajendra and Surendra 
attended, the latter appearing frightened by the gathering but gaining 
courage to address it when encouraged by his father. He proposed that 
he would be content with the title of luvarag ('Crown Prince1) rather 
than Maharagadhtrag (king) for the present, but that his father should
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abdicate in his favour next April if the astrologers could find an
auspicious day, or, failing that, on his sixteenth birthday (October
1845). The meeting was prepared to accept an arrangement on these
lines, and decided to have a written statement of it drawn up.
However, as night was approaching, this task was finally postponed to
the following day. Hodgson's informants overheard many expressions
of discontent from onlookers surrounding the assembly: the aauntaras
were criticised for leaning too much towards Rajendra's and Surendra's
interests and for failing to involve the queen in the proposed
agreement. Guru Prasad was singled out for particularly bitter attack.
Hodgson's language in reporting these sentiments to the Government of
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India indicates that he himself shared them.
Proceedings at the next day's meeting (3 December), which neither
Rajendra nor Surendra attended, appear to have accommodated these
criticisms. The drafting of the petition was delegated to a committee
of bharadars whose composition, Hodgson confidently reported to
Calcutta, would ensure that the final document took due account of
103
everyone's rights, including the queen's. The committee reported
back to the full assembly two days later, and after the king and prince,
who this time tried again to intervene, had been sent away politely
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but firmly, the draft petition was adopted by the meeting. The
petition was presented to the king on the 7th - the intervening day
being inauspicious - and accepted by him amidst the applause of crowds
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around the palace and general rejoicing throughout the city.
Immediately the king's signature had been placed on the document, a 
deputation was sent to escort the queen and her sons back into Kathmandu
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from her refuge at Banepa. She made a triumphal entry into the city
^ in 106the following day.
The exact terms of the settlement that had been agreed were not
discovered by the Resident, but it was said the government was to be
conducted in general accordance with the laws of Drabya Shah, the
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founder of the kingdom of Gorkha. Specific restraints were
placed on the crown prince, including a ban on his possession of edged
weapons, and action was to be taken against Krishna Ram Mishra
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(presumably banishment). However, whatever the situation on paper,
the queen did not in fact acquire the political powers which were
supposed to form a key part of the new order; the cauntaras had
apparently helped the king to resist this, with Guru Prasad once again
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making the running. Joint assemblies of the bharadart and army
were again held, the latter taking the strongest line: at one sta^e
the soldiers were reportedly threatening deposition and they 1 called
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the father a knave, and the son a madman, to the Maharaja's face'.
Rajendra was now reported to have accepted two new documents - one
placing more specific restraints on Surendra and the other giving the
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queen complete control for a limited period over foreign policy.
A tat mohar defining the queen's position was eventually issued in
January, but the cauntaras again ensured that its terms were much
1 1 2
less definitive than had originally been envisaged. The key portion
of the document ran as follows:
I direct...that all duties connected with the palace 
internally be conducted by you and that the Country 
and Government be managed by me with your advice and 
concurrence according to the suggestion of the 
Ministers. Should anyone come to me to complain of, 
or interfere with, this arrangement, let it not be
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attended to, and it shall be immediately enquired 
into by the Ministers and Chiefs, and as they decide, 
the transgressor will be punished with your 
concurrence and advice, either by dismissal or any 
other punishment his crime deserves. In short, 
whatever you advise or suggest for the government 
and welfare of the kingdom or do in the Administration 
of the Palace shall not be opposed by me nor by anyone 
else. This order for the future government of the 
Kingdom according to its ancient laws, my Gurus,
Ministers, Chiefs and soldiers will strictly adhere to. 
Should anyone disobey it, according to his caste and 
by your order, he shall be punished.H3
In forwarding the translated document to Calcutta, Hodgson expressed
a scepticism about its practical effect that was fully justified,
for at the time he wrote Rajendra had already effectively nullified it
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by himself reappointing Fateh as muk.hti.yav. The lal mohar
announcing this appointment did contain one reference to the queen - 
Pateh was to present his selected candidates for public office both 
to Rajendra and to Laksmi Devi - but the comprehensive nature of the 
powers delegated, and the fact that it was still the king who issued 
the decree made nonsense of the queen’s supposed superintendence of 
affairs. In addition it put the culminating touch to the separation 
of the cauntaras from the movement which they had nominally led, 
and that movement itself was now effectively at an end. The queen 
had been established as a contender for power but not given any real 
power of arbitration so that the uncertainty hitherto complained of 
was soon to be worse confounded, with three rival rulers instead of 
two, while the union of the bharadars had been broken.
Although the eventual results were not what had been hoped, the 
events of December 1842 none the less deserve close analysis for the
light they shed on the limits of the power of the monarchy under the
Nepali political system. An obvious parallel with struggles between
'the nation' and royal tyranny in Europe presented itself to the
Western, or Western-influenced, observer. This line of interpretation
is a strong factor in Hodgson's reports, as his use of expressions
such as 'the great national movement1 in itself demonstrates, even
though later on this enthusiasm was somewhat overshadowed by his
disgust at the cauntaras' breaking of a hitherto united front. His
description of events up to the end of the year was mirrored in the
enthusiastic response of Lord Ellenborough, who authorised him:
on any fitting occasion to make known the feelings 
by which his Lordship has been impressed by their 
conduct and to intimate that qualities so similar 
to those which under circumstances of a somewhat 
similar character have been displayed by the people 
of England in their best times must tend to improve 
the good understanding between the two nations.115
A similar line was taken half a century later by Jang Bahadur's son,
pudma Rana, who wrote that the petition presented to the king 'which
aimed at securing protection to life and property in Nepal, may be
called the Nepalese Petition of Rights, after its famous prototype
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of Charles I's reign'. Pudma also stressed, however, that in
'the East' a much greater degree of oppression was needed before open 
resistance materialised.
Such parallels prompt a natural and healthy scepticism, but they 
are not wholly inappropriate. The idea that there were limits which 
the king could not transgress was not as alien to the Hindu political 
tradition as implied by the European stereotype of Eastern absolutism,
. a stereotype which Pudma Rana, writing to establish his family in
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Indian princely society at the turn of the century, dutifully endorsed.
In Nepal's particular case the concept of the state, as opposed to the
personal bond between ruler and subject, was well understood, whilst
the concept of the nation was at least present in embryo. First and
foremost, however, the 'national movement1 has to be understood as a
project conceived and executed by the bha.ra.dari, with the other elements
involved - the local functionaries of the Valley towns, the chief
118
merchants, and, most importantly, the army very much in a supporting 
role. This is shown most clearly by the fact that the plan of action 
was first discussed amongst them as early as May 1842, and by the lack 
of any further disturbance amongst the army once the unity of the 
bharadars had been broken. That unity had in large measure been made 
possible by the eclipse of the Kala Pandes after Kulraj Pande's libel 
conviction in November; this was presumably a major factor in persuading 
the Paudyal brothers to back the movement so enthusiastically now after 
urging caution seven months earlier, though the non-availability of 
British support as an alternative to internal action was also an 
important consideration.
It can be surmised that the gurus played an important role in 
spurring the bharadari- as a whole into action, but it is probable that 
the principal pressure came from the 'good sardars' outside the 'British 
ministry' but generally supporting it, whose significance was discussed 
at the start of this chapter. Two key figures in this group - Ranjor 
Thapa and Abhiman Singh Rana - were members of the committee which 
drafted the petition to the king, as was Ranjor's kinsman Bhopal Thapa. 
Another important member was Kulman Singh Basnet, whose political ally 
Jang Bahadur probably now was. Whatever their standing with Surendra
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at the pajani the previous month they will have been enthusiastic
participants in the move against him*, this is presumably the reason
why the king and prince had one of their agents give Jang a beating on
the night of 30 November, just before the principal public meetings 
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commenced. Both Kulman and Jang began now to appear as members
of delegations sent to the Residency: the two conveyed official
congratulations to Hodgson on British success in China and Afghanistan 
on 23 December, while Jang accompanied Guru Prasad and Ranjor Thapa
on 8 January to announce the grant of political powers to Queen Laksmi
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Devi.
Although the army did not act independently of the bharadari
during the crisis, it none the less played a crucial role by choosing
to support the bharadars rather than the king and to resort to violence
in so doing. When Jang Bahadur was attacked on royal orders by
Captain Jamon Singh Khatri, it was the troops who rescued him and then
went on to plunder Jamon's house? he had apparently been opposing the
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consensus the public meetings had reached. Subsequently, the day
after the approval of the draft petition to the king, rank-and-file
soldiers sacked the homes of four or five individuals who, like Jamon,
Were believed to be trying to block the 'national movement'.
The victims then apparently promised to cease their opposition, but
that night, on Rajendra's orders, got three hundred troops onto their
own side and attempted through them to persuade the kampu as a whole
to arrest the principal bharadars behind the petition project. The
result was a conclusive demonstration of where the bulk of the kampurs
feelings lay, for the bharadars concerned were easily able to thwart
the plot and then had to protect the king's agents from the anger of 
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the soldiers.
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The willingness of the army to act in this way is paradoxical in
view of its normal stance of loyalty to the throne, a stance which
Hodgson had constantly emphasised in analyses on other occasions, and
which had been a principal reason why both he and the Paudyal gurus
had originally opposed the idea of a petition movement including the 
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army. Part of the explanation was that although it was the bharadars
who had been the principal victims of Surrendra's atrocities, the ordinary 
soldiers had also suffered on occasion; when Surendra had clashed with 
the kampu at the end of November ( above, p . 188) the troops complained 
that four hundred of them had 'died like dogs' on a journey to 
Hetaunda - presumably a reference to deaths from malaria when the
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prince had recently led a large force on an expedition to the south.
In addition, defiance of royal authority became easier when Surendra 
and Rajendra were acting in such an erratic fashion, and when the 
queen put herself forward as an alternative focus for allegiance.
Perhaps most important will have been ties between the soldiers and 
particular members of the bharadari. These could be client-patron 
relationships of the kind that helped determine the course of events 
during the 1840 mutiny, but loyalty towards particular 'charismatic' 
figures amongst the bharadars may have played a role. It is likely 
that both Abhiman Singh Rana and Jang Bahadur were the focus for 
feelings of this sort: Abhiman's popularity with the troops is
emphasised more than once by Hodgson, and may have been strengthened 
amongst the tribal element of the army because he was himself a Magar.
Jang Bahadur will have been a popular figure both because of his 
daredevil reputation and, assuming the accuracy of tradition in this 
respect, because he had shown a tendency to support the lower ranks in
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clashes with authority. The strain of Magar ancestry evident in
his features possibly meant that he, too, benefited from the 'Magar' 
factor. It is of course a possibility that the standing of both men 
vis-h-vis their fellow bharadars was enhanced by this support, in which 
case the importance of the army as a determinant of political developments 
will have been greater than this analysis has hitherto implied.
The action of the bharadars themselves, and of the army in
supporting them, was facilitated by a shared conception of the
bharadari1s entitlement to due consideration from the throne. The
ideology of the national movement was thus one of reassertion of perceived
traditional values, rather than of a 'revolutionary' challenge to the
existing order, though it has of course to be admitted that the dividing
line between the two can be a fine one, as the seventeenth-century
English parallel invoked by early commentators itself suggests. The
traditional rights of the bharadari now exercised had been perceptively
delineated fifty years previously by Kirkpatrick in the passage
discussed in Chapter One (above, p.38) . For the Nepalis themselves
they were in the main an implicitly recognised set of conventions, but
were probably also seen as grounded in certain documents. The
settlement reached in December 1842 was supposedly based on 'the laws
of Drabya Shah'. No texts ascribed to this ruler have survived, but
possibly Hodgson's informant had in mind the edicts {tithi) said to
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have been promulgated by Drabya's grandson, Rama Shah. The eleventh
edict gives a right of remonstrance to the original six tharghar, whose 
ancestors supposedly helped Drabya Shah to seize control of Gorkha in 
1559:
To you of the Pande, Panth) Arg'yal, Khanal, Rana and 
Bohora thars is given the title of Six thar, for the 
following reason: If a cautariyas kagi, or sardar
etc., should enter into an unjust or unlawful act in 
order to destroy the throne or impair justice, then 
it is laid down that the Six thar should come 
[forward] to explain the details to the king without 
bias or compassion. This order is given to you, 
your descendants, and their descendants, by u s , our 
descendants, and their descendants, for as long as you 
remain faithful to the throne.
Whilst these six families no longer had special importance, the thargars
in the wider sense - the principal bharadar families - regarded
themselves as inheriting their role as guardians of the state.
A final point to be noted about the whole series of events in
December and January is their underlining of the overwhelming
predominance of the centre in the Nepali political equation. The whole
drama was played out at Kathmandu with no contribution of any
consequence from the outlying districts. The leaders of the movement
did indeed consider the possibility that the dhakres - the off-roll
men, who will have been dispersed at their homes in the hills - might
be unhappy at what had happened, but they believed they could be
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readily conciliated. In the event, the Kala Pandes did attempt to
excite a reaction amongst the dhakves and in the eastern districts of
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the kingdom, but without success. Even if they had found some
sympathisers in these quarters, there was no possibility of any effective 
challenge to the force, both military and political, concentrated at 
the capital.
Mathbar Singh Thapa
The inconclusive ending of the 'national movement 1 had produced
a situation which satisfied the cauntarasf but not the king nor the
queen and the bharadars who had been pushing her forward. Both the
latter parties were ready to reach for a fresh piece to place on the
chess-board and the natural candidate for the role was Jang Bahadur's
uncle, Mathbar Singh Thapa, who had been in India since 1838. Up
till winter 1842 he had continued to live at Ludhiana or Simla,
receiving a British pension of 1,000 rupees per month. As was seen
in the previous chapter, he had presented himself to the British as
their willing collaborator, whilst telling a very different story in
his letters to Rajendra. He admitted this double-game quite freely,
expecting the British to understand that whilst his children remained
in Nepal he needed to keep on as friendly terms as possible with the
Darbar. Hodgson was quite prepared to tolerate this, but Lord
Ellenborough was less sanguine, and in April 1842 asked the Resident
whether it would be feasible to request Rajendra to recall Mathbar
to Nepal or at least to transfer him to Banaras or Patna so that he
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could negotiate his own return more easily. Hodgson was
unenthusiastic, and in any case the Governor-General soon decided that
the move would be inopportune, presumably because of the crisis in
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Anglo-Nepali relations brought about by the Kasinath incident.
During the summer, however, Mathbar's own friends in Nepal themselves 
suggested he should move closer to home, and he wrote to Hodgson that 
he was inclined to accept the invitation but wanted his advice first. 
The Resident still believed that Mathbar's actual return would be 
undesirable at that moment, but he was convinced that he would not 
actually cross the Nepali border unless under a British guarantee, and
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he recommended to the Governor-General that, as both Mathbar himself
and the Nepal Darbar now claimed to want him to return, the British
should put matters to the test by telling him he was at liberty to 
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go. In the event, Mathbar left for Gorakhpur in December, his
journey having commenced before news of the 'national movement' could 
134
reach him.
Mathbar will have received up-to-date information on developments
in Kathmandu from his sons and nephew, who had escaped from Nepal
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shortly before his arrival at Gorakhpur. He had, however, to
wait until early February for contact with a senior bhavadav, this
being rajguru Rangnath Paudyal who had travelled to Allahabad to meet 
136
him. Rangnath had told the queen that he wanted to sound out
Mathbar on her behalf, but his real motive seems to have been to find
a pretext for journeying to Banaras, probably with the intention of
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retiring there permanently. In any case he was not really in a
position to negotiate on L’aksmi Devi's behalf as he no longer retained 
her complete confidence: like Rangnath's own brother, Krishna Ram
{'Majhila Guru'), she considered he ought to have remained at her side 
in Kathmandu in the current critical situation, and she also suspected
l;
him of trying to reach an accommodation of his own with the Qauntaras.
In the event nothing concrete appears to have transpired at his meeting
with Mathbar, and his departure from Kathmandu is significant rather
for marking the start of a decline in Paudyal family influence at
Kathmandu: five of his relatives still held high office, but their
position was to weaken rapidly with the head of the family's withdrawal 
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from the scene.
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A few days after Rangnath's departure, Captain Aibaran Basnet
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left Kathmandu to invite Mathbar officially to return. The king
and queen were at first believed to be equally enthusiastic to secure
this, but Hodgson1s informants were soon telling him that Laksmi Devi
thought the invitation premature. Although Mathbar had throughout
his exile claimed to be her own partisan, she was unsure both whether
she could guarantee his safety at Kathmandu and whether she could trust
his intentions. Brian Hodgson, who indubitably was a fervent supporter
of Laksmi Devi, had since December been relaying advice to Mathbar,
via Reade, the Gorakhpur magistrate. He now counselled Mathbar to
refer both to the queen and to the Governor-General before accepting
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the invitation to return home. Accordingly when Mathbar met
Aibaran Basnet he told him that he required papers from the queen and
Surendra as well as from the king. As Laksmi Devi overcame her doubts,
the necessary invitations were all provided by the end of the month.
Despite this, Mathbar still hesitated: he had apparently received no
definite advice in reply to his letter to the Governor-General, and he
now sought Hodgson's opinion on whether it was safe for him to return.
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This the Resident felt unable to provide. Mathbar nevertheless
finally decided that he would enter the lions' den, and, crossing the
Tarai a few days before the malaria set in, he reached the Valley 
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early in April.
In February 1844 Henry Lawrence was to claim in a letter to
government that Mathbar Singh had returned to Nepal 'under some sort
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of pledge' from Hodgson. In fact there had been no formal promise
of support, and Hodgson, as has just been seen, had declined to accept
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the responsibility of advising him directly to cross the Nepal frontier.
In his message to Mathbar through Reade, however, he had continually
stressed his friendly feelings towards him. 'Give him my love', ended
one such letter in January, 'and say I will be ever mindful of his
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interests so far as circumstances permit1. A fortnight later
the tone was even more insistent:
Ere [Mathbar Singh] leaves you, make him understand 
in private that I am his sincere friend and have 
great hopes that his experience of the world will 
make him a valuable and useful man well disposed 
towards the British Government. Such are scant 
here and the Chountras have disappointed the Queen 
and country and me too....But all you need say - and 
try to impress it - is that I am his real friend,
as he will better know by and b y . ^ ^
(Emphasis in original.)
Such assurances were all given in demi-official correspondence, which
does not appear to have been copied to the Government of India.
Furthermore, as Lawrence also points out, Hodgson was at pains to urge
Mathbar to adhere to the queen and 'the nation1, and not to allow
himself to be used by the king even if the latter seemed to offer him
more rapid preferment. At the same time, though, he warned him not
to interfere with the succession to the throne: Rajendra and Surendra
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should be put under the queen's control as a temporary measure only.
Hodgson stressed to Reade that this detailed policy advice, in contrast
to his more general protestations of friendship, should be passed on
to Mathbar as Reade1s own ideas, without any mention of Hodgson's name.
He fully realised that he himself was personally distrusted by Mathbar,
who blamed him both for trying to block his 1835 Calcutta mission
148
and for failing to prevent Bhimsen's death in 1839.
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It is uncertain precisely what effect all this had on Mathbar,
and therefore on the course of Nepali politics over the next two
years. According to Mathbar's own later remarks to Lawrence, he had
indeed intended at one stage to throw his weight behind the queen, but
he might have decided to adopt this strategy even without Hodgson's
advice, and in any case he planned to go much further than the
Resident would have wanted and actually to supplant Surendra as heir
149
to the throne by Laksmi Devi's son, Ranendra. During the nine
months for which Hodgson remained in Nepal after Mathbar1s return the
two men met together privately on more than one occasion, but whatever
the surface friendliness Hodgson was unable to win the confidence he
wanted from the other. Mathbar's continuing resentment of him was
made abundantly clear in many subsequent conversations with Lawrence,
and also in the vamsavaZi account of Hodgson, which obviously reflects
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Mathbar's thinking and is very hostile to the Resident. The
vamsavaZi’s reference to Hodgson's dismissal 'for exceeding instructions' 
does, however, suggest that Mathbar was aware early on of the policy 
disagreement within the East India Company, and he was therefore able 
to retain the hope of support from the Company as a whole, and in 
particular from Resident Lawrence, despite his distrust of Lawrence's 
predecessor. It is therefore quite likely after all that he took very 
seriously the policy advice he received at Gorakhpur from Reade, 
assuming he did not realise that Hodgson was the source of this.
In addition to the British, Mathbar had also the constant advice 
of his friends in Kathmandu. Amongst these was his nephew Jang 
Bahadur, who may have been placed in charge of the Kumari Cauk (Audit
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Department) at the beginning of the year. According to Pudma
Rana's biography, Jang actually travelled down to India to meet
Mathbar while he was still at Gorakhpur. This is unlikely, since
Hodgson would certainly have recorded the departure of a man of Jang1s
rank, but nephew and uncle will certainly have corresponded at this 
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period. Once Mathbar had reached Kathmandu, Jang became one of
his close associates. On 19 April, only two days after Mathbar1s
arrival, he was accompanied on a visit to the British Residency by
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Jang and one of the Basnets. They reported to Hodgson an initial
triumph: despite earlier talk of the king insisting on Mathbar1s
giving up his plans for vengeance on the Pandes, the latter had
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confessed their crimes and were to be punished. Proceedings against
the Pandes and their allies continued over the next three months, with
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the first executions taking place at the end of April. It is
surprising that Rajendra should have been prepared to sanction this, 
since it arguably weakened his own scope for balancing one faction 
against another, but since the slander case had been brought against 
some members of the Pande family in autumn 1842, the king appears to 
have turned completely against them. The verdicts and recommendations 
for sentence were brought in by a court of bharadars and soldiers, but 
the king certainly had to consent for punishment to be meted out.
The purge covered not only actual members of the Kala Pande 
family, but also a number of others who had collaborated with them. 
Amongst the latter was Jang Bahadur's cousin Debi Bahadur, the eldest 
son of Balnar Singh's youngest brother, Balram Kunwar. According to 
a royal decree issued to Mathbar Singh Thapa and his relatives after
2 0 5
the sentences had been carried out, Debi Bahadur had been involved
after Bhimsen's death in producing a false affidavit aimed at
destroying the junior queen and at fomenting a quarrel between the
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senior queen and Rajendra. This is very different from the
version of Debi Bahadur's fate which is given in Pudma's biography,
and presumably reflects the story Jang himself had chosen to tell.
Pudma's version does not mention any connection between Debi and the
Pandes, but claims that some time after Mathbar's appointment as
premier, Jang's cousin was unjustly relieved of his commission in the
army because the queen wanted to transfer it to the lover of one of
her maids-of-honour. In retaliation, Debi rashly spoke out publicly
of a liaison between Laksmi Devi and Gagan Singh Khawas, dada (tutor
or guardian) to her son Ranendra. As a result he was sentenced to
death at the queen's insistence, and when Jang asked Mathbar to
intervene on his behalf, the premier pleaded the impossibility of
defying royal orders, insisting that if the queen commanded it he
himself would be obliged to kill Jang, or V'ioe versa. The story
ends dramatically with Jang assuring Debi Bahadur just before the axe
fell that he would seek vengeance on his behalf, and repeating the
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same message to his widow as she ascended the funeral pyre.
M.S. Jain has argued that Pudma's story, which is intended to
help justify Jang's later betrayal and murder of his uncle, is
completely discredited by the evidence of the contemporary royal
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decree. Certainly Pudma's chronology is at fault and details are
distorted, but his account nevertheless contains elements of the 
truth. Debi is almost certainly to be identified with the 'son of
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Bulram Kower' who, as noted in the Residency Diary, was imprisoned
along with Gagan Singh in December 1839 'in connection with some
infamous plot of the Senior Rani and Pandeys to ruin the Junior Queen 
159
and her children'. In the same Diary entry, Hodgson recorded that
the Senior Queen had falsely accused Laksmi of an illicit connection
with Gagan - this is the first reference in any source to the allegation
which was to play an increasingly critical role in Nepali politics.
It thus appears likely that the document which Debi Bahadur supposedly
helped the Pandes prepare dates from this time and that it was
concerned in part with Laksmi's supposed relation with Gagan. Debi
was most probably an original adherent of Laksmi Devi who went over to
the Pandes, as the text of the 1843 decree, on one interpretation 
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implies; though he could conceivably have been attached to the Pande
camp all along and been arrested in 1839 not as an accomplice of
Gagan1s but as a counter-move by Laksmi's supporters. It is also
quite possible that in 1843 Jang did, as Pudma claims, unsuccessfully
ask for his cousin's life to be spared. Whatever his personal
feelings, however, Jang did not allow the incident to hinder him from
collacorating with his uncle and profiting politically from his ascendancy.
From the time of his arrival in Kathmandu Mathbar Singh was at
once the most influential bharadar, the man to whom everyone paid 
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court. None the less, he did not actually take charge of the
army and the civil administration until September, whilst the usual
formalities of appointment as mukht'Lyar were further delayed until 
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late December. This is usually seen as the result of Rajendra
and the oauntaras resisting pressure from the queen and her supporters
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among the nobility for Mathbar's appointment. This is broadly
correct, though a few days after Mathbar*s return, the king had
wanted to make him minister straight away and the queen had opposed
this, arguing that the change should be left till the normal pajani
season. Clearly, the queen was initially uncertain whether Mathbar
would be a reliable choice from her own point of view.  ^The oauntaras,
on the other hand, consistently tried to block him even though Fateh
submitted his resignation in July. They encouraged Rajendra's hope
that Jagat Bam Pande, who was on his way back from Peking, might bring
promises of military support for Nepal and thus have a claim to the
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premiership himself. Jagat Bam never in fact returned to Kathmandu:
alarmed by the fate of other members of his family, he chose to go
directly from Tibet down to British India. Meanwhile the oauntaras in
early September were confronted with the queen, the crown prince and the
bharadars all pressing for Mathbar*s appointment, and attempted
unsuccessfully to win the queen over to their side with a bribe of 
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50,000 rupees. Rajendra, whose own proposal for the oauntaras and
Mathbar to hold the ministry jointly had found no favour with queen or 
166bharadars, was thus influenced to procrastinate a little further 
before Mathbar took charge in mid-September.
Another complicating factor during the summer of 1843 will have 
been uncertainty over what the British reaction to the appointment of 
Mathbar might be. M.S. Jain's suggestion that Rajendra might have 
been unwilling to remove the 'British ministers' until Hodgson's 
departure from Nepal in December 1843 was, of course, made in ignorance 
of the fact that Mathbar's do faoto appointment had been made three months
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earlier. None the less the oauntaras were certainly believed to
have tried to persuade the king that their own dismissal would violate 
the understanding reached with the British in January 1841. When 
Rajendra personally informed Hodgson of Mathbar's appointment, he was 
relieved to be assured by the Resident once more that internal 
arrangements were entirely his own affair.
The prospect of Hodgson's departure became a topkof direct concern
over the summer, as he sought to persuade Lord Ellenborough to allow
him to remain one more year in Nepal. Hodgson's own efforts were
reinforced by appeals from King Rajendra and leading bharadars for
his retention, the king actually requesting him in July to forward a
formal request to this effect to the Governor-General:
Mr. Hodgson has recently mentioned to me his 
intention to retire from the service and return 
to Europe in the coming cold season.
Since that day I have been perpetually reflecting 
upon Mr. Hodgson's perfect knowledge of the customs 
and institutions of my Kingdom and of the Parbattiah 
language, and likewise upon his long and zealous, 
kind and patient labours in the late troubled times, 
whereby the designs of evil persons inimical to both 
governments were foiled and peace and true 
friendship with your State preserved.
The more I think upon these invaluable qualifications 
and exertions, the more am I pained at the idea of 
his departure. It is therefore my earnest request 
and hope for the benefit of my kingdom, that Mr.
Hodgson may be persuaded by Your Lordship to remain 
a while longer with me. Let me constantly hear of 
Your Lordship's welfare, etc., etc. ^ 9
The khartta could not be officially accepted, but Hodgson forwarded
it informally to the Governor-General, explaining that the proposal
to send it had been originally made by 'a minister who has already
tendered his resignation' (i.e., presumably, Fateh Jang) but was now
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being carried forward by bharadars of all factions. Krishna Ram
3 0 9
Paudyal, who had been a political ally of the Resident for longer
than any other politician in Kathmandu, was chosen by the Darbar to
go down to India to repeat the same sentiments to the Governor- 
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General. Ellenborough did not, however, relent, and on 30 November
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Major Henry Lawrence arrived to take charge of the Residency.
Stiller has written that though the striking support offered to
Hodgson by the Nepalis might be submitted 'to a very cynical analysis...
the feeling is strong that at this time everyone in Nepal was setting
aside politics in an outpouring of affection for a man who had lived
among them longer by far than any other European in the history of 
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Nepal had done1. It would be churlish to deny that there was an
element of genuine affection in the tears shed by many bharadars when 
Hodgson did finally leave the country. Less personal considerations, 
however, also entered into it. Although Hodgson himself assured
Ellenborough that the Nepalis genuinely believed his story that his
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impending departure was due to ill health, there is no doubt that 
they realised there was rather more to it: shortly after his arrival,
Resident Lawrence reported to government the belief of the king and 
many bharadars that 'the late Resident was removed from Nepal for
saving the country from invasion...and that I had been sent as a sort
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of punishment to them and to Mr. Hodgson'. In addition, despite
the posture of studied neutrality which Hodgson had striven to adopt 
since the summer of 1842, particular individuals may not have given 
up hope that he might be pressed into alliance with them again. This 
will have conditioned the attitude of Fateh Jang, seemingly the main 
originator of the campaign on Hodgson's behalf, and also probably of
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Krishna Ram Paudyal. Kaji Abhiman Singh, who was a particularly
prominent member of delegations pressing the Resident to forward the
khartta formally to Lord Ellenborough, appears from his role in the
1 national movement 1 and from his later actions to have been a strong
partisan of Laksmi Devi and he was probably aware of how well disposed
Hodgson was towards her. As has already been seen, Mathbar Singh
did not share this general enthusiasm for Hodgson, but he thought it
politic to disguise his hostility, and when the Resident finally left
Kathmandu on 5th December, he led the Kathmandu garrison to escort him 
176a mile on his way.
During the three weeks following Hodgson's departure, the question
of whether Mathbar would be confirmed in the position he had occupied
d& facto since September seemed to hang in the balance. Distrust of
him among the chiefs was a major problem, whilst his failure to prevail
upon Henry Lawrence to give Surendra a duplicate of the memorandum he
had submitted to the king on being received at Darbar brought the
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prince's anger down upon him. However, Surendra dropped his
opposition on 24 December, whilst a meeting of leading bharadars also
gave their approval and he was formally invested as mukhttyar on 
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25 December. Mathbar's position, as seen through the eyes of the
new Resident, depended very much on an accommodation reached with the 
oauntaras, whose influence seems now to have recovered strongly; 
perhaps their position had, however, been rather stronger throughout 
1843 than was allowed by Hodgson, whose annoyance with their conduct 
since the end of his 'alliance' with them may have led him to portray 
them as foolish and ineffective. Mathbar held discussions with Fateh
jang during the last week of December, and it was agreed that the latter
should receive the key provincial command of Palpa; the deal satisfied
Fateh and his brother Guru Prasad, at least for the time being, but
179
was regarded as a 'sell-out' by some of the younger oauntaras.
The incomplete nature of Mathbar's predominance was underlined by the
fact that none of the four principal kajiships filled on 31 December
went to his supporters, and that Jang Bahadur, described by Lawrence as
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his 'favourite nephew', was excluded from office. Jang, who had
most probably been serving as a haft since late 1842, was reinstated
shortly afterwards, only to be dismissed again in March, his place being
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taken by Karnabir Pande, nephew of 'Gora 1 Pande leader Dalbhanj an.
During 1843, Mathbar had at times seemed to be drawing close to
Surendra, but throughout most of 1844 he clearly followed the strategy
recommended to him by Hodgson through Reade by throwing his weight behind
the queen. He planned in fact to go much further than Hodgson would
have wished, for he admitted to Henry Lawrence the following year that
he had been conspiring with Abhiman Singh Rana and Gagan Singh to
displace Surendra completely and put Laksmi Devi1s son Ranendra on the 
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throne. This decision will have given him additional allies
within the Darbar, for Abhiman, whether or not actually in office 
during 1844, enjoyed considerable influence, whilst Gagan, whether or 
not the queen's lover, was undoubtedly her closest confidant. There 
was no longer, however, the almost complete unity amongst the bharadart 
which had seemed about to carry the queen to power a year previously, 
and it is also doubtful whether queen's closest allies really trusted 
Mathbar. The minister accordingly made repeated efforts to buttress 
his position by appealing to two possible sources of support - the army, 
and the British Resident.
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There were reasonable grounds for him to expect assistance from
the troops. He had been a popular commander under his uncle, Bhimsen,
and had had a large share in establishing the privileged status of the
kampu by persuading the Darbar that, in the interests of professionalism,
the rank-and-file sepoys should not be rotated out except if actually 
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unfit. His reputation as a soldier had been enhanced by his time in
India, for he had claimed on his return to Nepal that both the Sikhs
and the British had offered him large amounts of money to enter their
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own military service. He had demonstrated his ability to handle
the Kathmandu troops in September 1843, when he had quelled a
disturbance amongst soldiers mobbing the palace by single-handedly
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entering the group and killing the ringleader. Once in full command
of the army, he at once enhanced his popularity by paying out two lakhs
of rupees as an advance on the money due to the troops from their
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yagers in the Tarai. This was a timely move, since the price of
rice in the Kathmandu Valley had risen considerably above the usual 
level that year, and this will have caused hardship to soldiers
dependent on bazar supplies until the harvest was in on their own
. . 187gagers.
During the crisis over army pay in 1840 reductions had eventually
been brought in, though less sweeping than had originally been envisaged
(see above, p.133). Discontent over this still existed, and in
January Mathbar sought to exploit it by encouraging demonstrations by
the troops and seeking their support for bringing Laksmi Devi to
power. The response of the troops was not as wholehearted as he
had expected - on one occasion they even protested that the king had
188
always been kind to them. As Lawrence pointed out, Mathbar was
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attempting to use the army as a substitute for support from the bharadars
generally, who were unwilling to give him full backing even though
189many were unhappy with the conduct of Rajendra and Surendra. The
Resident also argued that 'Bhim Sen Thapa managed the country for 
twenty years unsupported by [the bharadars] and only fell when the 
soldiery abandoned him'. To separate army and bharadari in this way 
is, however, to go too far. Patronage ties between soldiers and 
individual bharadars could play an important role, as was seen in the 
analysis of the 1840 mutiny, and the army's lack of enthusiasm in this 
new crisis was probably a direct consequence of feelings amongst the 
bharadars.
If Mathbar could secure only limited support from the army, Resident
Lawrence was completely uncompliant. He was working under strict
instructions to follow a policy of non-intervention, and even if his
hands had been left free he would not have wished to give the backing
Mathbar sought. In contrast to Hodgson, the new Resident saw Rajendra
as reacting defensively against a plot by his own bharadars to transfer
power to the queen and against what he genuinely, albeit mistakenly,
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regarded as aggressive moves by the British government. Lawrence
had no confidence in Laksmi Devi, whom Hodgson had regarded as the
potential saviour of her country. 'Let the Rani be as virtuous as
o - P
most ruling Ranis are to the cont^y', Lawrence wrote in early February,
'she must either as Regent fall into the hand of the Minister of the
time being; or if possessing the masculine qualities and ability that
would render her independent, it is but natural to expect that she
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would destroy her stepchildren and raise her own to the throne'.
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Mathbar himself could not be aware of Lawrence's real attitude,
and both what had happened under Hodgson and the counsel he had
received at Gorakhpur, encouraged him to make repeated attempts to
bring the Resident into action as his ally. His efforts were
assisted by the fact that the Darbar Munshi, Laksmi Das, who had
been a protege of Bhimsen's, was dedicated to Mathbar's interests, as
also appeared to be the case with other Nepalis attached to the 
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Residency. The pressure was such that Lawrence regarded himself
as virtually under siege. A particularly blatant approach was adopted 
in January when Mathbar sent a message that he was having to restrain 
the king from arresting the Assistant Resident, Thomas Smith, and that 
the British ought to warn the king that unless he kept proper order
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the army which had just reduced Gwalior would be sent against Nepal.
More usually, Mathbar openly talked with the Resident of his plans and 
difficulties and sought his advice. On such occasions Lawrence 
protested his neutrality, but answered factual questions and sought to 
dissuade Mathbar from any rash or violent action. At a conference at 
the Residency on 27 January, Mathbar, accompanied by Jang Bahadur,
Kalu Shahi and Abhiman Rana, announced that the king had agreed to 
make over power to Laksmi Devi temporarily, the regency to end when 
he himself ceased to be 'imbecile' and his son 'vicious'. Lawrence 
pointed out the practical difficulties. What would be the queen's 
position should the king change his mind after a few days? And who 
was to judge when Rajendra's 'imbecility' was at an end? Mathbar 
declared that the decision would be his own as minister, and that the 
bharadars had agreed that the soldiers should plunder the house of 
anyone who broke the united front now achieved. Jang Bahadur added,
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significantly, 'that the troops would be the judges'. Lawrence
continued to find difficulties and warned that if the Heir Apparent
were removed from power only to regain it, the queen herself would
probably have to bear the worse consequences. He also advised
strongly against allowing the army to interfere: 'once the soldiery
took to themselves such power there would be holding them'. At the
end, however, Lawrence said that if the king voluntarily accepted such
194
an arrangement he himself could have no objection. The following
day Jang informed the Resident that the king was pleased with the line 
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he had taken.
As already seen, the 'agreement' which Mathbar thought he had
secured from monarch and bhavadavi proved illusory, and his situation
became increasingly frustrating. On a visit to the Residency at the
beginning of February he announced that he intended to demand a
decision on who was to be master - king, queen or prince. If the
situation were not resolved he would resign and thereby precipitate a
military revolt. Lawrence had himself in December sent the king a
message that the crown prince's position should be 'adjusted', but he
refused to be involved any further, merely pointing out that Mathbar
knew the state of the Darbar when he agreed to accept the ministry and
that it would be highly irresponsible to resign now if he believed
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that disturbances would result. Mathbar continued to talk
frequently of resignation, but continued in office for another two- 
and-a-half months. During this time he was confronted with divisions 
within his own family Sher Jang Thapa, Mathbar's nephew and
Bhimsen's adopted son, returned to Nepal from Banaras and accused his
uncle of wrongfully retaining Bhimsen's former property which had
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been confiscated in 1839 and then handed over to Mathbar in 1843.
Bhimsen's brother, Ranbir Singh, also increased his difficulties,
telling Surendra that it was the minister's fault that his father
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still refused to relinquish the throne to him. Under these
cumulative pressures, Mathbar resigned in late spring, but for some time
he continued exercising the functions of office, just as he had done
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for some months^in 1843 prior to his formal appointment.
Through the summer Mathbar still hoped to win Lawrence's support,
and, as the Resident believed, deliberately slowed down the processing
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of the Residency's business in order to achieve this. Mathbar
himself continued to see Lawrence from time to time, but a key role in
his strategy was played by the Darbar1s Mir Munshi, Laksmi Das, who
after the 'resignation1 became the principal link between Residency
and palace. Das was one of the few Newars in 'high profile' positions
in the Nepali administration, and had originally secured his appointment
under the patronage of Bhimsen Thapa. According to the tradition
preserved by his descendants today, he was the grandson of a prominent
member of the aristocracy in the Newar Kingdom of Patan, but his father
had been brought up as a servant in the royal palace after the Gorkha
conquest. He himself was sent to study Urdu and Persian as a young
boy in Banaras, where he attracted Bhimsen's notice during King Ran
Bahadur's exile. Das was also said to have formed a special bond with
Bal Narsingh Kunwar, and before the latter's death in 1842 he is
supposed to have placed his son, Jang Bahadur, under the muns-i 
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care. It is unlikely that Das' personal links with Thapas and
21?
Kunwars were quite as strong as his descendants claim, but he certainly
seems to have been a supporter of Mathbar. At the beginning of June
he told the Assistant Resident, Captain Smith, that 'there would never
be peace and quiet in Nepal until the British Government interfered'.
Reporting this incident in his Diary, Lawrence commented acerbically:
[Laksmi Das] has never spoken so plainly to me, 
but several times hinted at the necessity of my 
being severe (sukht) with the Maharaja; with 
an affectation of great sincerity and plain 
dealing the Moonshee (though a Newar) rivals the 
deepest of the Goorkhas in duplicity.^02
It was no surprise when the following month the .munsi- explained the
current delays in official business as the result of there being no
minister, and claimed that nothing would go right until Mathbar was
restored to power.
In the fact of all this Lawrence stuck doggedly to the policy he 
had been instructed to adopt, and Mathbar's position remained unchanged 
until dramatic developments in the autumn. Despite the execution of 
the leading Kala Pandes the year before, Rajendra and Surendra had 
kept up some communication with other members of the family; in 
particular, the king had been in correspondence with Jagat Bam Pande, 
the envoy to China who had taken refuge in India rather than return to 
Kathmandu, whilst Krishna Ram Mishra was also consulted from time to 
time. In September, however, Pande hopes were once again destroyed 
when letters brought back by Jagat and claimed to be from the Ambans 
in Lhasa were denounced as forgeries. The documents had contained 
promises to make over gold mines to Nepal, and disappointment in this 
expectation appears to have turned the king violently against Jagat 
and his relatives. Several of them were interrogated at an assembly
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of bharadars and - significantly - soldiers in the military cantonment,
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over which Rajendra and Surendra presided. Investigations
continued until November, when the affair ended with the expulsion from
the country of forty-four persons, many of them the sons of men who
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had been put to death in 1843.
Mathbar, as Lawrence, believed would have preferred more drastic
punishment, but the episode strengthened his hand considerably as he
found himself united with king and prince in a common vendetta. In
October he was pressed by Rajendra to resume the premiership. In an
obvious attempt to manoeuvre Lawrence into at last coming out in his
support, he told the Resident that he himself really wanted to retire
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to the plains and asked for advice on what to do. This took place
against the background of rising political tension, for in addition to
the Pande affairs, it was believed that the Paudyal gurus and oauntaras ) I
who had been in Banaras and Palpa respectively, were about to return to
the capital. Lawrence continued to complain of the attitude the
contending factions took towards the Residency:
...since Bhimsen's decline and death there have 
been four parties aiming at the Ministry; the
Pandeys, Gooroos, Chountras and Thappas; all and
each, except the Pandeys, desire an offensive 
and defensive alliance with the Resident, even 
though they know that such confederacy would be 
directly opposed to the national feeling; but 
nevertheless the three last have by all means 
set themselves to effect such an alliance, and
the Pandeys have only been prevented doing so,
and stood for power on the national feeling, 
because they believed the late Resident pledged 
against them.^7
Lawrence added the perceptive comment that Mathbar Singh, despite his
actual failure to recruit the British to his cause, 'has doubtless
endeavoured to instil into all minds that I support him'; Mathbar's
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propaganda at this time is reflected in the vamsavali claim that it
was his request which caused the Governor-General to send Lawrence
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to Nepal in the first place.
Shortly afterwards Mathbar accepted the intivation to become
minister again, and the news was given to the Resident by Rajendra
and Surendra when he was brought to witness a military parade on
18 October. Mathbar had had to accept office without explicit
British backing, but he was nevertheless able in Lawrence's hearing to
extract a promise from Rajendra that there would be an end to the
system of two rulers 'after the Dassera', which was then in progress
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and due to end only three days later. Immediately on securing this
pledge he announced it to the assembled troops.
It was probably at this point that Mathbar made the crucial 
decision to switch allegiance from Queen Laksmi Devi to Surendra.
He may, as Oldfield suggests, have intended ever since his return to 
Nepal to secure Rajendra's abdication in favour of his son, but
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initially he had envisaged political power passing to the queen.
Two days after the end of Dasai, he outlined his current thinking to 
Lawrence, when the latter, having first confirmed that the king wished 
him to do so, accepted an invitation to visit the minister in his home. 
Mathbar complained that although Surendra had been allowed to take 
precedence in the Dasai ceremonies, Rajendra had not redeemed his 
'one ruler' pledge. Caught between father and son, he believed a 
possible way out was a scheme similar to that recently seen in the 
Panjab, where Khanak Singh had been nominal ruler but actual power had 
been held by his son, Nao Nihal Singh. Would the British accept such
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an arrangement, or, if they continued to hold aloof, would they be
prepared to grant him asylum and a position as a revenue-farmer in
their territory? Lawrence could only point out that the Panjab
scheme had led rapidly to Khanak Singh's death, and that whilst Mathbar
personally would always be allowed a refuge in India no promises of
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a jamindari could be made. In the same interview Mathbar boasted
of the army's loyalty to him, and claimed that he could if he wished
seize every bharadar in Kathmandu. In his report to Calcutta, Lawrence
mentioned that he had heard many predicting 'another Lahore' in Nepal,
and expressed his own belief that the struggle could end with the army
212taking charge and destroying both the king and his son.
Mathbar1s abandonment of the queen's party was caused in the first
instance by his belief that under her regency the real power would be
in the hands of Gagan Singh and Abhiman Singh Rana, while he himself
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would have only the nominal position of minister. Surendra, on
the other hand, was wooing him with the promise of powers equal to those
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his uncle Bhimsen had held. Another factor, and one probably not
given due weight in studies of this period, was that feeling in the
bharadari. generally was now veering behind Surendra. It was, after
all, a logical conclusion that, if Rajendra was not prepared to exercise
control over his son, matters could not be made worse, and might well
be improved, by placing responsibility as well as power in the latter's
hands. Surendra reinforced such sentiments by telling the bharadars
that if they did not now help gain what his father solemnly promised
him, then when he eventually did gain power he would not honour the
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sanads conferring jagi-rs upon them.
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In early November rumours spread that a hunting expedition to the
Tarai being planned by Surendra was a cover for action against his 
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father. Rajendra countermanded the orders to two regiments to
move south, but Mathbar assured Lawrence that if the prince took up
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the troops' standard and set out all would follow him. In fact the
two regiments left for the Tarai in advance of Surendra. With them
went Dil Bikram Thapa, a cousin of Mathbar's, and also Jang Bahadur.
Although a dhakro Jang had played a prominent role throughout the year
as an assistant to his uncle, and Lawrence believed that some ulterior
218
purpose of Mathbar's lay behind his departure now. The Resident
suspected that it was intended to allow a violation of British territory,
so that Mathbar could then claim he would be able to prevent such
incidents in future if the British gave him proper backing. The
minister did indeed try to involve Lawrence once more, telling him that
the prince intended to travel to Banaras, and requesting the Resident's
'order' on whether he himself should accompany the expedition to the
Tarai or stay in Kathmandu. Lawrence told him that as Rajendra
evidently intended to go south with his son, Mathbar as minister ought
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to stay at his side. He was able to get Mathbar to promise to
ensure the party stayed on the north side of the Churia hills, the
last range before the plains.
Rajendra, Surendra, Mathbar and most of the bharadars and remaining
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troops left the capital on 4 December. At Hetaunda, after a
furious quarrel with his father, the prince again proclaimed his 
intention to cross the frontier and make for Banaras. The army and 
bharadars followed him and at the village of Dhukuwas, which lay south
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of the Churias but within the Nepal border, all pledged 'to make him
Governor of all and call him Makarajadhiraj and taking an oath by-
touching the Nishan wrote an agreement that they should never obey
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another order except his'. Later the same day (10 December)
Rajendra came from Hetaunda to join his son, and issued a tat mohar'
which still left unclear the question of where real authority was to lie:
I have given the title of Maharajadhiraj to my son 
Sri Maharajadhiraj Surendra Bikram Shah. I retaining 
my throne and its authority, he (my son) will exercise 
authority over the Minister and the Chiefs and will 
carry on the Government. I retain the dignity and 
honours of the throne and the exercise of authority as 
was the practice of my ancestors. But he (my son) 
will refer to me, and receiving my orders, will issue 
them to the Minister and Chiefs and carry on the 
business of the state in the manner I have been 
accustomed to do.2 2 2
Despite this theoretical ambiguity it was evident that Surendra was,
for the moment, in the ascendant, and his accession to power was
publicly acclaimed. On 14 December he returned to Kathmandu amidst
great celebrations, riding on an elephant at the head of the procession
and attended by Mathbar and two of his cousins. Rajendra's elephant
was in third place, following Bhimsen's fakir brother Ranbir, and the
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king was reported as 'looking sad, and...twisting his thumbs'.
Mathbar was anxious to secure British recognition for the 
arrangement he believed he had achieved, and he pressed Lawrence hard 
for this, both in person and through Jang Bahadur, who on the 13th 
successfully urged the Resident to come out to Thankot on the edge of 
the Valley to greet the prince's procession. Lawrence, of course, 
refused to be drawn, telling them he could make no move until he had 
received instructions from the Government of India. In fact he was
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sceptical over the permanence of the new dispensation, but believed
it would make Mathbar the de facto ruler and that this would be
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advantageous for the British. At this stage he had not been shown
Rajendra's actual 'lot mohar and he believed that Rajendra had formally
conceded more than was the case. When a delegation of leading
bharadars met the Resident on 18 December, they confirmed his impression
by telling him that '[the king] had made over all authority to his son,
reserving to himself the throne, the mint, and the direction of British
225
and Chinese correspondence'. When this formula was reported to the
Governor-General he regarded the proposed arrangement as totally
unacceptable:
... it would appear from the statement contained in 
your letter that all the authority of the Government 
with plenary powers of sovereignty are to be vested in 
one party while the control of foreign affairs and 
negotiations is to appertain to another. This is a 
state of affairs which cannot, for obvious reasons, be 
permitted. Thd foreign relations of a State must be 
vested in the Government of that State, and we can 
only recognise as the party with whom our affairs are 
to be conducted, and our correspondence carried on, 
the de facto ruler of the country...a distinct avowal 
is required formally announcing who is the ruler of 
Nepal, since the Governor-General in Council cannot 
recognise the divided authority of two Rulers such 
as that which would virtually be created by the 
arrangement explained to y o u . 226
Stiller claims it was this decision by the Governor-General which stymied
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the 'coup' attempted by Surendra and Mathbar. In fact it is
doubtful whether Lawrence did demand a 1 distinct avowal' from the 
Darbar of who was in charge, since before the government instructions 
to him had been written he had seen from the tat mohar that Rajendra
had reserved ultimate sovereignty to himself. Even if the Resident 
had made such a demand, that might have tipped the scales in Surendra's
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direction as likely as in his father's: for in proclaiming the
necessity of 'one ruler' the Governor-General was repeating what
Mathbar had been saying for months. It is true that by giving explicit
backing to the minister the British could have enabled him to achieve
the supplanting of Rajendra, but intervention of this kind had been
ruled out long before Hardinge's orders of 28 December were issued.
In fact the Residency succeeded in preserving its neutrality, and the
explanation for Mathbar's seeming initial success and later failure
must be sought in the internal Nepali political balance.
From the account which Mathbar gave the Residency Munshi the
following day, it is clear that he directly ordered the army to follow
Surendra from Hetauda to Banaras on 10 December, ignoring the pleas of
King Rajendra, who even seized hold of his minister in an attempt to 
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detain him. The bulk of the army was prepared to accept Mathbar's
instructions, whether from personal loyalty or out of apprehension that
the prince would indeed cross the frontier and provike a crisis with
British India; Mathbar seems to have been keen to keep the latter
consideration to the forefront of the men's minds, for immediately after
Surendra had set off he read out to them the memorandum of 1841 in which
the bharadars had pledged themselves to the preservation of good
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relations with the East India Company. Three bharadars closely
associated with the queen - Kajis Abhiman Singh Rana and Gagan Singh, and
the more junior Kumedan (Lieutenant) Dal Mardan Thapa - none the less
resisted the move, getting a number of hudas (NCOs) to urge the troops
to remain with Rajendra. One of these dissidents actually lunged
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at Mathbar with a bayonet, but was overpowered in time. Sixteen
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'mutineers' were arrested and later that day, after he had been
proclaimed king, Surendra ordered their execution. Mathbar and
Surendra were lucky that the split in the army had not been more serious,
for in addition to loyalty to Rajendra as the reigning monarch they
had had to overcome the popularity with the rank-and-file which Abhiman
Singh had long enjoyed. In counteracting these influences Mathbar
will have been helped by Jang Bahadur's support, for he, too, was a
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favourite with the men.
In the immediate aftermath of Surendra's triumphant return to
Kathmandu, it seemed at first that Mathbar had not, after all, eliminated
his opponents completely. Abhiman Singh remained prominent amongst
those regularly in contact with the Residency, whilst Mathbar's attempt
to gain complete control of the pajan% was resisted, as Rajendra sought
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to keep military patronage in his own hands. The minister was
however reported to have secured appointments for several members of
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his own family, including Jang Bahadur. Within a few days opposition
melted away entirely, and Mathbar was offered appointment as minister for
life, which he accepted on 3 January, the actual investiture taking
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place at Pasupatinath on the 20th. As a further mark of
distinction, the following month he received the title of prcrim m.'Ln.'istev
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(i.e., prime minister) - this same title was subsequently granted to 
Jang Bahadur (below p . 280) and was to remain in use in Nepal until its 
replacement after the 1950/1 'revolution' by the Sanskrit equivalent, 
pradhan mantri. He was also presented by both Rajendra and Surendra 
with special medals listing his titles and guaranteeing his safety.
The trappings of power were paralleled by the substance. He was 
in full control of Nepal-British relations, being able to conclude a
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final agreement of the Ramnagar border, and also to secure the
appointment as vcik'it in Calcutta of Bam Bahadur, Jang Bahadur's brother.
Everyone at Kathmandu was apparently acquiescent in., if not enthusiastic
about, his supremacy, and the Paudyal gurus, who might have posed a
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threat had they entered the lists, chose to remain at Banaras.
Others, too, decided that exile might be the wiser course: Abhiman
Singh Rana, who had been appointed as a Nepali representative on the
commission delineating the border, fled to India with his colleague
Bhawani Singh Khatri, persuading Fateh Jang Chauntara, until then
Governor of Palpa, to accompany them. The Palpa post was subsequently
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allocated to Til Bikram Thapa, one of Mathbar's cousins, it was
allegedly discovered that the oauntavas had removed a large sum of
money from the Palpa treasury before fleeing, and attempts were made to
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get the British to induce them to return.
Realising the importance of preserving his position with the
soldiers, Mathbar took three measures early in 1845 calculated to
appeal to them. At Dhukuvas he had got Surendra's agreement in
principle to rescind the limited pay reductions put through in 1840,
and in January a new pay-scale was worked out, to take effect from the
harvest the following autumn; although this development is reported
in the vcmsavati. and ignored in the British sources there can be no
doubt that it did take place since the author of the main rescension
of the chronicle, Buddhiman Singh, was himself involved in the 
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exercise. Secondly, Mathbar persuaded Rajendra to agree to the
raising of three additional regiments; this was done partly by the 
transfer of men from existing regiments, but involved an increase in
236
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six hundred in total strength, together with an increase in promotion 
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opportunities. Finally, a tat mohav in mid-January laid down that
none of the existing kampu regiments were to be transferred to other
stations; this was merely the ratification of what had become standard
practice, but it will have come as a welcome reassurance to the men of
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the kampu that their privileged status was to be maintained.
<t)
All was seeming^at Mathbar's feet, yet beneath the surface his
position was far from secure. Surendra remained totally committed to 
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him but the queen, whom he had first supported and then abandoned,
was unreconciled, whilst Rajendra, too, mistrusted and feared him.
The raising of the three new regiments was seen by the king as possibly
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aimed by Mathbar against himself. The army's support for the
minister made the king reluctant to move against him, but in April
Mathbar foolishly weakened his position by ordering the soldiers to
work as ordinary labourers on the construction of a new barracks.
Lawrence, who was ready to proffer advice although barred from
partisanship, warned him against imposing what the army would see as a
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humiliation, but to no avail. On the evening of 17 May Mathbar was
summoned to the royal palace, on the pretext that the queen was will,
and assassinated within her chamber. It was officially given out that
the king himself had fired the gun, but information reaching the
Resident suggested that Gagan Singh, Kulman Basnet and a third,
lesser-known bhavadav, Sardar Rabi Dhoj, had been the murderers.
Before authorising these men to kill his minister, Rajendra had
consulted with other influential members of the bhavadavi, including the
oauntavas in exile in India, Mathbar's own uncle Ranbir Singh Thapa, and
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Narsingh Thapa, senior member of the other Thapa family.
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It was rumoured within hours of Mathbar's death that Jang Bahadur
had been the man who actually pulled the trigger. In reporting to
Calcutta a week later Lawrence accepted Jang's denial: 'Poor as is
my opinion of his moral character, I do believe him guiltless of the
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act of which he is accused'. Some years later, however, once
securely in power, Jang was to admit that he had indeed been the 
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assassin. Despite M.S. Jain s elaborate attempts to argue the
contrary, there is no plausible reason why Jang should have incriminated
himself if he had not fired the gun and his involvement can be taken 
249
as proved.
The fullest account of his participation in the conspiracy is that
provided by his son, Pudma. This contains a number of contradictions
and distortions, but one can accept the core of the story, viz., that
io9
Gagan Singh suggested bring^ him in as the instrument of the king's
and queen's vengeance and that Kulman Singh Basnet was the intermediary
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who summoned him to the royal palace. These two men were the ones
on whom Lawrence's informants had placed the main responsibility for
the killing, and Kulman, brother of Jang's late father-in-law, had
long been his political ally. The whole episode was a great
embarrassment to Pudma, who sought to explain his father's conduct as
resulting from the threat to his own life if he disobeyed an order
from the king and queen, and also from anger against his uncle over
the latter's failure to intervene in favour of Debi Singh Kunwar.
It has already been seen that Debi Singh's execution had taken place
not shortly before Mathbar's death, as Pudma strongly implies, but a
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full two years earlier. In between the two events Jang had
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co-operated closely and enthusiastically with his uncle, so Pudma's 
reference to this affair must be dismissed as special pleading, the 
source of which could of course have been Jang himself rather than 
conscious distortion by his biographer. However, Pudma also lists 
other events which created tension between uncle and nephew in the 
months leading up to the assassination, examination of one of which, 
together with material from the vamsavdl'i and from the British records, 
may throw some light on the political situation.
In his first mention of any clash between Jang and Mathbar, Pudma
reports the following interesting incident:
Some tenants of the crown lands applied to the 
Council [vdz,s the bhavadavi. sabha] for remission 
of revenue on the ground of the crops having been 
damaged by frost. The Prime Minister passed orders 
that the remission applied for could not be granted.
Jung Bahadur, who was also a member of the Council, 
opposed the Premier, by declaring that the matter 
must be investigated into before any order should 
be passed. Upon this Matber grew crimson with 
rage and exclaimed "You are a mere stripling, how 
dare you speak so insolently in such an august 
assembly!" Jung Bahadur promptly replied, "I am 
not a child; it is the rest of the councillors 
that are acting childishly". The King and the 
Prince [i.e. Surendra] put an end to the 
altercation by declaring that Jung Bahadur wasO C o
right and that enquiries should be made
Although Pudma's implied chronology places this after the December 1844
expedition to the Tarai, it is very likely that it should be linked
rather with the delegation of three hundred Tharus (the indigenous
people of the Tarai) which visited Kathmandu in October 1844 to
complain of alleged oppression by Hira Lai Jha , who held the revenue
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contract for the region. The final decision may have gone against
the tenants - at any rate Hira Lai was publicly honoured the following
230
month - but during the debate some bhavadavs may have sought to attack
Mathbar through Hira Lai, who was probably his protege: in a letter
written five years later Jang Bahadur was to describe him as a 'tiger1
unleashed by Mathbar upon the peasantry, whilst Hira Lai was to have
considerable difficulties with the new government in the months
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following Mathbar1s death. It is inconceivable that Jang Bahadur
should have spoken out against his uncle in November as boldly as
Pudma depicts, but if the indignation over Mathbar’s and Hira Lai’s
conduct which he expressed in 1850 was at all genuine, he must have
strongly disapproved of his uncle’s action.
The author of the vamsavali account, who was a contemporary of 
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Jang's, agrees with Pudma in depicting a growing rift between uncle
and nephew in the last months of Mathbar's life, but the selection of
incidents is rather different. The vamsavali devotes the most space to
a quarrel arising from attempted action against the bhavadavs who had
participated in the 'national movement' at the end of 1842. According
to the vamsaval'i-, Mathbar was ordered by Surendra to bring all of them
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before him so that their punishment could be decided upon. The
Residency Diary confirms that Mathbar did carry out an investigation on 
these lines, and that it took place in the week preceding his 
assassination. Lawrence's information was that Surendra was claimed 
to want some of them put to death - a detail about which the Resident 
was personally sceptical - but that the affair ended with the mere 
imposition of small fines varying according to the rank of the 
'offenders' (this label will, of course, have covered virtually the 
entire bhavadavi, since the 'Petition of Right' presented to Rajendra
231
in December 1842 had been signed by almost everyone of any consequence
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present then in Kathmandu). The vamsavali, claims that Jang, who
was himself a signatory, had convened a meeting of all those under
threat, put himself forward as their spokesman, and then, despite
Mathbar's opposition, appealed successfully to the court for clemency.
As in the case of the tenants' appeal the previous autumn, Jang cannot
have taken the lead in the way depicted, but he might, at least
covertly, have expressed his sympathy with the bulk of the bhavadavi
in the face of Mathbar's action.
Both Pudma and the vamsavali represent Jang as arguing in private
with his uncle as well as opposing him publicly. In particular they
describe an exchange between them over the need to obey royal commands
whatever the circumstances: Pudma links this with the Debi Bahadur
affair and the vamsavali with the attempted punishment of the 'National
Movement' bhavadavs, but in both versions Mathbar is made to lay down
the principle that a man must be prepared to kill even a close relative
2 58
if ordered to do so by the king. It is highly suspicious that he
should thus conveniently have provided the justification for his own
assassination, and more likely that Jang kept up at least a pretence
of cordiality with his uncle until the end. Certainly, both Jang
and his brothers continued to enjoy Mathbar's patronage to at least
the end of February. Following Jang's own appointment to office in
late December, his brother Bam Bahadur was make vdki/l in Calcutta,
and the captaincy that fell vacant as a result was awarded to a third 
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brother. Later it was rumoured that Jang was in line for nomination
2 SO
as an envoy to China. What appears most likely is that Jang made
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secret contact with his uncle's opponents, whether this was through a 
direct approach from Gagan Singh, as suggested in the vamsavaH, or via 
Kulman Singh, as claimed by Pudma. He may indeed have nursed some 
resentment against Mathbar but his fundamental motive was almost 
certainly the wish to align himself with what he believed was to become 
the dominant force in Darbar politics. Even if he was given the order 
to fire the fatal shots only at the last moment, and accepted under 
duress, as Pudma claims, it is likely that he had been alerted some days 
earlier that a move was to be made against Mathbar.
In killing his uncle, Jang had destroyed a man whose general
direction of Nepali policy followed lines derived from Bhimsen Thapa,
and later to serve as a guide to Jang himself. Like the other two,
Mathbar1s aim was to concentrate full power within Nepal in his own hands.
Externally, again like them, he was prepared in practice to seek an
accommodation with British India, though for domestic political reasons
he could choose sometimes to highlight this fact but at others to pose
as strongly anti-British. M.S. Jain has rightly emphasised the reality
of his foreign policy, and the fundamental misreading of it found in
the works of some modern Nepali historians who see Mathbar as a feared
opponent of the British and his assassination as a conspiracy in which
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the Residency was implicated. The persistence of the misconception
is perhaps a tribute to the effectiveness of the original propaganda.
In addition to seeing Mathbar as very much 'a man with whom we can 
do business', the British also came to regard him as a Nepali receptive 
to new ideas and not bound by the prejudices of many of his countrymen. 
Such a judgment was, of course, partly the result of the tendency to
33 3
see as a 'good' ruler anyone whose foreign policy largely matched
one's own interests. Hodgson's and Lawrence's view of him as a man
of large horizons was none the less not without foundation. He saw
the advantages that could accrue from a knowledge of English and of
European learning, remarking on a visit to the Government School in
Patna in 1835 that he would like to place his two sons there for that 
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purpose. Ten years later Lawrence was particularly impressed by
his reaction on hearing how a steam engine could transport 3,000 men
at 2 0  mph: whilst all the other bharadavs present exclaimed how
useful it would be in war (probably just the impression that Lawrence
had calculated they would get), Mathbar was heard to remark in Nepali
263
to a companion, 'What an advantage it would be in a famine'.
Finally, in the political sphere, Mathbar was ready to consider 
solutions to Nepal's constitutional problems drawn from both Sikh and 
British practice, even if he did not always fully appreciate their 
implications.
How far did intelligence and knowledge of the world translate into
success as an administrator? Only a few days after Mathbar's death,
and with experience of Nepal only under Mathbar's direction, Henry
Lawrence opined that:
The Gurkhas...are the best masters I have seen in 
India. Neither in the Tarai, nor in the hills,
have I witnessed or heard of a single act of
oppression since I arrived here a year and a half  ^  ^
ago; and a happier peasantry I have nowhere seen.
Lawrence seems to have forgotten the delegation which came to Kathmandu
some months previously to complain against Hira Lai Jha and whose arrival
he had himself noted in the Residency Diary. Aside from this incident
there is no direct evidence of agrarian discontent under Mathbar's
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administration, but a document of November 1845 refers to hardship
caused in the Tarai by a 25 per cent increase in revenue demand, and
this additional levy may well have been instituted, or at any rate
allowed to continue in force, after his assumption of the premiership 
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in 1843. It is reasonable to assume that pressure on the revenue
base was at a high level, given the increases in army pay that Mathbar
put through, and also the lavish allocations of land that Mathbar
himself received: in addition to an annual gagiv of perhaps 15,000
rupees, Mathbar recovered the bivta lands confiscated from him when
Bhimsen Thapa fell, as well as new bivta grants which could have been
2 66
worth up to 110,000 rupees a year. The latter amount would
represent around 1 0 per cent of the total revenue from the crucial
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eastern Tarai districts. The government in Kathmandu had thus
every reason to encourage Hira Lai to extract the maximum amount
possible from the peasantry.
In his 1850 letter Jang implied that Mathbar's fall was the result
of divine anger over the sufferings of the people. At a more mundane
level of analysis, however, it can be seen as caused by the growing
resentment against him both in the royal family and amongst the bhavadars.
Henry Lawrence suggested, and later commentators have generally agreed,
that he might have saved himself either by being more conciliatory, as
Lawrence himself had urged, or by greater ruthlessness: 'He acted only
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by halves'. It is possible, as Lawrence also speculated, that the
king may have intended violence against Mathbar all along, and that in
prompting his return from India and raising him to the premiership he
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was only seeking to give him enough rope to hang himself. This is
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debatable, but Lawrence was certainly right in pointing out that the 
king made his move only after Mathbar had made himself generally 
unpopular: his standing with the army had been undermined through his
use of the soldiers as labourers, his opponents among the hhavadavi 
remained unreconciled, and it is possible that some of his own adherents 
were beginning to doubt his willingness to protect their interests.
1841-1845: Political Trends in Retrospect
The fundamental problem persisting throughout the period covered 
by this chapter was the incapability of King Rajendra either to take 
direct and effective control of the administration personally, or to 
trust anyone else to do so. Factionalism therefore continued to 
flourish unabated, both within the royal family itself and amongst the 
bhavadavi. Against this background, the 'time-serving' of which Henry 
Lawrence accused Jang Bahadur became vital to political survival. It 
is at first hard to detect any consistent pattern at all to the Byzantine 
turns of Darbar politics, but certain tendencies can in fact be singled 
out.
In the first place, these years saw the influence of the Paudyal 
guru family peak and then decline. This was largely because the change 
of British policy in 1842 reduced their scope for acting as political 
'brokers' between the Resident and the court. The importance of the 
institution of rajguruship for religious legitimation of the political 
order was not removed, however, and the secular influence which might 
still go with it was to be demonstrated by the rise of Vijay Raj Pande, 
which will be examined in the next chapter.
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Also persisting throughout this period was the 'national feeling' 
of distrust towards the British which Lawrence correctly saw as 
violated by the efforts of rival factions to secure the Resident's 
support. It was this sentiment which the 'Kala' Pandes appealed to, 
and its vitality was well represented by Amir Singh D a s ' outburst 
against the king at his trial in 1842. When combined with resentment 
against the bharadavs as a class, as had briefly been the case with the 
mutineers of 1840, this was potentially a very powerful force. Just 
such a mixture of sentiments was to drive the Sikh army to its fatal 
clash with the British only a few months after Mathbar's assassination. 
The strength of the vertical ties between bhctradavs and soldiers, and 
the consciousness of Nepal's weakness relative to British India, were 
none the less sufficient to ensure that the Panjab scenario would not 
be enacted there.
Whilst the army was never to get completely out of hand, its
loyalty to the crown, which was identified above all as a major force
for stability, was subject in these years to an ever-increasing strain.
It is significant that even though Mathbar had forfeited much of his
own popularity with the troops by employing them as labourers, the
king nevertheless felt that the minister must be assassinated in
secret rather than openly arraigned, lest there be a military reaction 
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in his support. The possibility that the army might turn against
the present occupant of the throne was thus becoming ever more 
apparent.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
JANG BAHADUR TAKES POWER: 1845-47
Introduction
Sixteen months after Mathbar's death, the instability which had
beset Nepal since the fall of Bhimsen Thapa climaxed in the massacre
of
of many of the leading bhavadavs and the appointment^Jang Bahadur as 
minister. Jang had come to power as the queen's partisan, but he then 
broke with her to back Crown Prince Surendra, whom in 1847 he installed 
on the throne in Rajendra's place. The deposition and the events 
leading up to it will be examined in this chapter for the light shed 
on the inter-relationship between the key components of the Nepal policy: 
throne, bharadari and army. Since it marked the inauguration of a 
century of Rana rule, this whole episode is of key importance in the 
modern history of Nepal. The question of responsibility for the massacre 
and the details of the manoeuvring before and after have therefore 
attracted considerable scholarly attention, but the conflicting stories 
circulated at the time and afterwards have ensured that the controversy 
has never been fully resolved. It is doubtful whether even a court of 
enquiry convened with full powers in 1847 would have been able to 
establish the truth with certainty, much less a twentieth-century 
historian. However an account will be presented here on the basis of 
a full survey of the previously available evidence and of new material 
recently brought to light.
Politics after Mathbar
Mathbar1s death revived the hopes of contenders for power who had
2 5 5
been completely deprived, of influence during his ascendancy. Prominent
amongst those rejoining the fray were the cauntava brothers, Fateh Jang
and Guru Prasad Shah, who had been in exile since the beginning of the
year, and vajgupu Rangnath Paudyal, who had spent most of the last two
years in Banaras and whom the Resident thought the most likely to emerge 
1
as premier. In fact* the spoils went in the first instance to the
most active participants in the plot against Mathbar, Gagan Singh and
Kulman Singh Basnet being appointed as kajis whilst Jang Bahadur was made
a general. All of these appointments were believed to have been the
queen's, and she showed further favour to Jang's family by the bestowal
of captaincies on four of his brothers. Not surprisingly, the junior
cauntavas who were in Kathmandu at the time complained that all the
2
profit from the assassination was going to one family. Jang also 
began acting as de facto minister, though he informed the Resident through 
a personal messenger that he had declined the king's offer of the
3premiership and recommended Rajendra to appoint Fateh Jang instead.
He did, however, explicitly accept overall charge of the army, with
4
direct command of three regiments.
Despite - or rather because of - this sudden rise to glory, Jang's 
position was a precarious one. He had been recruited into the plot 
against his uncle, and subsequently rewarded so handsomely, because 
his popularity with the army was expected to keep the soldiers content 
under the new regime. This did not alter the fact that real power 
rested with others: Gagan Singh, the queen's closest confidant , and,
to a lesser extent, Abhiman Singh Rana, who returned from his exile in
5
early June, were actually directing the administration. Whilst thus
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in subordinate collaboration with Mathbar’s enemies, Jang was also
attempting to retain his standing with those who had been his uncle's
allies: some of these had found it prudent to leave the country, but
Karbir Khatri remained influential, and above all there was Prince
Surendra, whom Mathbar had championed and whose adherent Jang was now
claiming to be.^ Jang's assistance to Mathbar's sons to escape from
Kathmandu, though conceivably also influenced by genuine concern for
7
his cousins, must be seen as part of this political strategy. At the 
same time, he took pains to assure the Resident that he had not been 
involved in the murder, and, as has already been seen, these assurances 
were believed.^
A tat mohav issued at the end of May provided that the king was to
issue commands to the prince, who would then pass them on to the queen,
9
and that she would then give instructions to the ministers. In the
event, Surendra appeared to lie low for a while whilst king and queen
jockeyed for power. Laksmi Devi was eager to have her own men, Gagan
Singh and Abhiman Rana, receive the title of general which had already
been given to Jang, and she pressed to have the pajant started in
August. Rajendra opposed this, preferring to wait until Fateh Jang Shah
10
returned to Kathmandu. The cauntava finally arrived on 15 August,
and it was subsequently reported that the king was backing him for 
premier, while Surendra and the queen supported Jang Bahadur and Gagan 
Singh respectively.’'""'" The queen's preference for Gagan makes it clear 
that her elevation of Jang in May had been motivated by the need to 
conciliate the army, not by any personal favour towards him.
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The outcome of the argument between king and queen was the 
assignment of specified civil and military responsibilities to the 
three aspirants for the premiership and to Abhiman and Dalbhanjan Pande. 
Fateh was to be mukhtiyav, but the title did not carry with it any real 
authority over his colleagues. He received command of the Bajrabani,
Sher and Singh Nath regiments, the supervision of foreign affairs and 
of the four principal law courts, and responsibility for the 
administration of western Nepal; the latter was to be exercised largely 
through his brother Guru Prasad, who was appointed Governor of Palpa.
Gagan Singh was made a general, and assigned seven regiments: the Letar
and Srinath (the largest and most privileged of the kampu units), the Kali 
Prasad (formerly the Hanuman Dal - the unit set up in 1836 as a royal 
bodyguard), the Ramdal (the artillery regiment), and the Mahindradal,
Rajdal and Shamsherdal, three of the regiments which had been either set 
up or renamed under Mathbar. He also received charge of the arsenals 
and magazines at the capital. Abhiman Singh Rana, too, became a 
general, but was assigned only the Naya Gorakh and Sarvadhoj regiments, 
together with reappointment as head of the Treasury (Kausi- Tosakhana) 
the post he had held when the ’British Ministry' had been formed five 
years earlier. He was also to have charge of the hills east of 
Kathmandu. Dalbhanjan Pande, Bhimsen's old colleague, who was now no 
longer regarded as a serious contender for power but included as an 
'elder statesman1, was allotted the Rana Priya Dal, also probably one of 
the regiments set up by Mathbar. Jang Bahadur retained the three units 
assigned to him in May, pis., the Purana Gorakh, the Devidat and the 
Kalibaks. According to Lawrence's report he was also given 'the office
258
of Chief Judge, which he held under his uncle' - probably a confused
reference to the post of Kaji of Kumavt Cauk, an office responsible for
12
auditing government accounts but also functioning as a court. The
Resident originally was given the impression that Jang was not regarded
as a full member of the 'ministry1, but it soon became clear that he was
13
functioning as such.
The allocation to Gagan of seven regiments - including those that 
had been the most politically sensitive - underlined his de facto 
superiority over the other ministers. Abhiman was probably second in 
terms of influence over the internal administration. It is surprising 
that he held only two regiments to Jang Bahadur's three, especially since, 
like Jang, he was a favourite of the army. The explanation probably lies 
in his own discinclination to push his claims too strongly, since in 
reporting the state of the Darbar a month before the formation of the 
ministry, Lawrence had contrasted Gagan and Jang Bahadur's eagerness
14for the dangerous office of premier with Abhiman's probable cautiousness.
Perhaps more significant, however, will have been the unwillingness of
the queen to let Abhiman secure a position strong enough to challenge
Gagan Singh. Precisely because Jang was so much junior to Abhiman he
could more safely be entrusted with military patronage. Not that Jang
either could be totally trusted. Although the Purana Gorakh regiment,
with which he had been associated in the past, might be strongly
attached to her personally, the queen's interference in the pajani- of
his units in September suggests she was eager to ensure subordinate
15officers were loyal to her rather than their immediate commander.
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In the manoeuvring for position that accompanied the pajani Surendra 
put forward a proposal to recall and reconcile both Thapa and Pande exiles. 
This notion was particularly alarming to Gagan and the aueen, the latter 
threatening to retire to Allahabad or Benaras if the Pandes were 
allowed back. Rajendra, too, was annoyed at his son's suggestion, and 
Surendra could do more than fulminate against Gagan Singh as the 'slave 
son of a slave chobdar1. In an attempt to conciliate her stepson, the
queen suggested that those appointed at the main pajan'C should present 
their ceremonial gifts {najar), to him, though he was allowed no say in 
the selection of personnel, which was in the hands of herself and 
Rajendra jointly.
The pajani itself was marked by one very significant change: the
removal from his post as dharmadhi-kar of Janardan Paudyal, the son of 
Krishna Ram Paudyal and nephew of Rangnath. Janardan thereby lost a 
post which as well as great prestige carried an income of 30-40,000 rupees
per annum, contrasting with the 400 rupees that went with the kajiship
17
now bestowed upon him. This blow to the Paudyals came only five
months after Lawrence had reckoned Rangnath the man most likely to become 
premier following Mathbar's death. Rangnath had indeed travelled up to
‘ii
Kathmandu from Banaras with high hopes of regaining a key position in the
Darbar. However, after his arrival in August he appears to have had no
influence on the course of events: there is no mention of him in any
of the accounts of the struggle leading up to the installation of the
18
'coalition' ministry in September. The decline in Paudyal fortunes
which the pajani underlined might be linked with the Death of Krishna Ram 
. 19
m  Banaras m  April, but much more important must have been the fact
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that the queen, whose guru Rangnath was,e had lost confidence in him.
His departure from Nepal at the end of 1842 had seemed to her like a
desertion, and resentment on that score, coupled, no doubt, with Gagan1s
efforts to ensure he had no rival as her confidant, prevented him from
re-establishing himself as a political force. It was an eclipse from
which the family was never to recover.
Janardan1s replacement, Vijay Raj Pande, belonged to a family which
had supplied the guru to Prithvi Narayan Shah's father but had thereafter
been overshadowed by both the Mishras and the Paudyals. Shortly after
Rangnath and Bhimsen Thapa had returned to Nepal with ex-King Rana
Bahadur, the last Pande to act as dharmadhikar, Bani Vilas, had been
ousted in favour of the Paudyal brothers, and for some forty years no
20
member of the family had been prominent in Nepali public life.
Vijay's own grandfather, Narayan Pande, had left the hills as early as
1753, after Prithvi Narayan had tricked him into entrapping the King of
Tanahu, to whose family the Pandes had been gurus since before they
21
became involved with the Gorkha dynasty. According to one account,
Narayan's son, Vijay's father, had spent a short time in Kathmandu
after Rana Bahadur's return, but otherwise the family had remained
throughout in Banaras. Some time before 1843 Vijay himself had come up
to Kathmandu and his expounding of the puranas at a temple just outside
the Hanuman Dhoka palace had attracted royal attention and secured him
22
employment as a court pandit. It is not clear whether the king or
the queen was his principal patron, though later events suggest that 
it was more likely the latter.
Vijay's relations with other members of the bharadari, are something 
of a mystery. The family tradition just cited claims that he had entered
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the palace under the joint patronage of Rangnath Paudyal and of a man
23
holding the rather obscure office of jetha budha. It is likely that
the claimed link with Rangnath, at least, is based on a confusion, as
it is difficult to see why he should thus have assisted a member of a
family who were hereditary rivals to his own. There is, however, a
possibility that he was already an associate of Jang Bahadur's. According
to the most widely known account ~ that of Pudma Rana - the partnership
between the two men began after the appointment of Jang as premier in
1846, but, as will be seen below, the details Pudma gives are certainly
inaccurate and the connection between the two could well have been a 
24
longstanding one. This is supported by a story still told in
Kathmandu, according to which Vijay knew Jang in his young gambling days
25
and became his creditor.
At the time Vijay was appointed it was becoming clear that war was
imminent between the British and the Sikhs. The prospect of becoming
the only independent native state in India naturally caused grave alarm
in Kathmandu. The old stock responses of having the pandits consult the
scriptures to predict the outcome, and sending an appeal to Peking for
assistance were both forthcoming. Our sources do not give the priests'
conclusions, but the Celestial Government returned its usual dusty answer.^
There remained the crucial problem of whether Nepal herself should
intervene in the conflict. At the time the issue was under discussion
the intelligence reaching the Residency was that 'many ministers', and
also Prince Surendra, were for joining the Sikhs whereas the king and
27
queen wished to preserve peace with the British. In December Rajendra
himself informed Lawrence that Nepal could make 5,000 troops available to
28
support the British in the Panjab if a month's advance notice were given.
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Pudma Rana's account claims that Fateh Jang, Abhiman and Dalbhanjan
were a l l ‘in favour of coming in on the Sikh side, and that it was contrary
advice from Gagan and Jang Bahadur which swayed the king and queen
29
against such rashness. Given the previous pro-British orientation
of all the allegedly pro-Sikh ministers, and also their reputation for
caution, Pudma is almost certainly misrepresenting their attitude, and
merely reflecting an attempt by Jang to discredit his predecessors with
the British. It is possible, however, that the three counselled a
policy of strict neutrality whilst Gagan and Jang Bahadur proposed the
offer of assistance to the British. Furthermore Pudma1s picture of Jang
and Gagan working together as allies is consistent with contemporary
sources, which show both men increasingly perceived as working in tandem
in the queen's interest.
Jang's new alignment was dramatically highlighted in late October
1845, when placards were displayed in Kathmandu warning Surendra to
beware of him and Gagan, and alleging that they had murdered Mathbar
Singh at the queen's instigation. This allegation was almost certainly
true, but it offended Rajendra as he had been claiming ever since the
night of Mathbar's death that he himself had killed his minister. He
ordered the removal of the placards, but they seem to have the desired
effect on Surendra: the following month he first threatened to leave
for Banaras and return at the head of an English army, and later gave
out that he now knew who Mathbar's murderers were and would take 
30 , .
revenge. Nothing came of these fulminations, but the following
February Rajendra felt it necessary to order the arrest of three persons 
who had repeated to Surendra the charge that Gagan and Jang had killed 
Mathbar, and had also told him that the two men were now plotting with
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the queen to put one of her sons on the throne. In the midst of this
tension within the royal family, the question of a possible reduction in
the soldiers' pay to finance an expansion of the army was again raised.
In stark contrast to earlier occasions, such talk did not lead to any
unrest; in the same Diary entry recording the proposal, the Resident
noted the presence for the pajani of 10,000 dhakres and a consequent rise
in the price of rice, expressing his surprise at:
How peacefully these crowds of soldiers came
and went: one set discharged, another enlisted,
and a third disappointed; all with the same 
perfect peaceableness.^
The men's docility might have had various explanations. The pay curb
proposal was perhaps rapidly dropped, or, alternatively, since it was
mooted just as the Panjab war was about to begin, no one wanted to be
seen opposing a way of increasing the country's military strength at a
time of possible peril. More likely, however, the men were quiet because
no bhavadar of any influence wished to rouse them. With the Pandes in
exile Surendra had no real party behind him, Gagan and Jang between them
held the direct patronage of the greater part of the kampu, and the
other ministers will not have wanted to make a move whilst the king
openly opposed those few malcontents trying to stir up opposition to the
queen's faction.
In January 1846 Rajendra issued a tat mohav granting authority to 
the queen. The precise nature of the powers delegated is unknown, 
since the document has not survived and there is no mention of it in any 
contemporary source. It is referred to in a lat mohav of 1868, however, 
and the prominence there given to it suggests that it provided the main 
case for Jang Bahadur's claim that the queen had been put in complete
command of the state and that all his own actions in September 1846,
which he maintained were performed on her orders, were therefore 
33
entirely lawful. It is likely that the 1846 document was in fact
ambiguously worded, leaving the usual doubt as to where ultimate authoruty 
actually lay.
Whatever the position on paper, the queen certainly appears to have
remained the dominant influence in practice, though by the end of March
34
Rajendra seemed fully reconciled with Surendra. Within the ministry
her favourite Gagan Singh had the strongest voice, but there was a clear 
split between him and Fateh Jang, with whom Abhiman Singh was now 
apparently aligned. Munshi Laksmi Das attempted to draw Lawrence's 
successor as Resident, I.R. Colvin, into expressing support for the queen -
and thus for Gagan also - reminding him of the high opinion which Hodgson
35
had held of her. Although for most of the year political life in
Kathmandu seemed peaceful enough, behind the scenes a struggle continued 
over the appointments to be made at the next pajani. In July, writing 
privately to Brian Hodgson in Darjeeling, Colvin reported that Gagan's 
allies were expected to win, and that Fateh Jang was declining in influence 
there was even talk of his brother Guru Prasad being superseded as
Governor of Palpa by Jang Bahadur, who was evidently still seen very much
36
as Gagan's ally. The following month tension rose, with Jang openly
criticising Fateh in Darbar. Shortly before the end of August, however,
Fateh and Gagan had a long private interview and were reported to have
agreeg that the present coalition arrangement would be renewed for the
37
coming year, as the queen wanted. Three weeks later, before the
pajani actually got under way, this seeming harmony was shattered by the 
most dramatic episode in Nepal's modern history - the assassination of
2 8 5
Ga^an Singh, the massacre of a large section of the bha.ra.dari, and Jang 
Bahadur's appointment by the queen as mukhtiyar.
The Kot Massacre
Gagan was killed by a shot fired through a window of his house while
he was at prayer, at around 10.00 pm on the evening of 14 September. His
assailant escaped, and his identity remains a matter of controversy.
The 'official' version, promulgated after Jang Bahadur had gained control
of the government, put the blame on Lai Jha, a Brahman who had been
suspected of various crimes in the past but had always avoided conviction.
Jha allegedly admitted his guilt in a death-bed confession early in 1847,
and he claimed that he had been acting for Fateh Jang, Abhiman Singh Rana
and other ministers. His account was supported by that of a supposed
accomplice, Daddu Upadhyaya, who was interrogated on 4 February 1847
in the presence of the head munsi of the British Residency. After
Surendra became king later that year, he told the Resident that Fateh in
turn had been acting on instructions from King Rajendra. The conspiracy
was said to have included all the ministers except Jang Bahadur, who was
left out because of his recent identification with Gagan and the queen.
Rajendra's motive was alarm at Gagan's position as an 'over-mighty'
subject - essentially the same consideration which had led him to act
against Mathbar - and also anger over his liaison with Laksmi Devi. The
ministers, long resentful of Gagan's pre-eminence, were willing instruments
3 8
of the royal vengeance.
Regardless of whether Gagan and the queen were in fact lovers, the 
above story is perfectly consistent with everything known about the state 
of feeling in the Darbar at the time. However, against it must be set
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the widespread tradition in Nepal which claims that either Jang Bahadur 
himself, or his brother Badri Narsingh, acting on his instructions, was 
the murderer. According to one version, Badri had easy access to 
Gagan's house because he was the lover of Gagan1s daughter, but this 
elaboration may have been invented on the basis of a later relationship 
between the two. The belief that Jang was behind the assassination is, 
of course, linked to the assumption that the consequent Kot massacre was 
pre-planned by him, and although such a view cannot be definitely disproved, 
it is scarcely consistent with the cautious attent'Lste role which Jang had 
hitherto played in Darbar affairs.
A new twist to this longstanding debate has been given by the discovery
of a letter written by Queen Laksmi Devi to Rajendra eight months after the
event. In this she implies strongly that Jang was indeed responsible for
Gagan1s death, but reveals also that some time before the assassination
Lai Jha had actually informed the king and queen that the crime was being
planned. He had alleged that Bir Keshar Pande, cousin of the minister
Dalghanjan Pande, had discussed with 'Randhoj Dada' the possibility of
murdering Gagan, exiling the queen to Tibet and blinding her two sons. The
conversation had supposedly taken place in the private apartments of
Prince Upendra, second son of the late Queen Samrajya, and Mathbar Singh’s
40
mother was also present. This ties in at two points with the story
that Jang Bahadur and Surendra gave the British: in their version Bir
Kesar was one of the conspirators, while Upendra, who was young enough 
not to attract suspicion, was used by Rajendra as the channel to convey 
his instructions for the murder to Fateh Jang. Mathbar1s mother is not 
mentioned in other accounts, but she would have had an obvious motive 
for joining in a plot against Gagan, as he was believed to have been the
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key figure behind the murder of her son. Bir Keshar was her brother,
so that the plot which Lai Jha denounced - whether real or a figment
of his imagination - had the appearance of a bid for family revenge.
Finally, we have to consider the story preserved by the descendants
of Ransher Shah, younger brother of Fateh Jang and Guru Prasad.
According to this, Lai Jha was indeed the assassin, but was acting on
orders from both Fateh Jang and Jang Bahadur, the two having jointly
41
decided that morning to kill Gagan. Jang Bahadur would thus have
been involved, but only as a collaborator of Fateh and possibly of the
other ministers. This theory coincides neatly with the hypothesis put
forward by Ludwig Stiller (apparently without any knowledge of the Shah
42
family tradition) in 1981. It is also reconcilable with Laksmi Devi's
May 1847 letter, for Lai Jha might deliberately have laid false
information against Bir Keshar and his sister in order to cover himself
and those for whom he was working. Whether the real originator of the
conspiracy was Rajendra or (as Triratna Manandhar has argued) Fateh 
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himself, Jang Bahadur would have been brought in on the expectation 
that he could be induced to betray Gagan as he had his uncle Mathbar, 
and that his adhesion to the plot would ensure the continuing loyalty of 
the army. It is still just possible to argue that Jang was not involved 
at all, but this new alternative hypothesis seems now the more probable.
The news of Gagan's murder was brought to the queen in the nearby 
Hanuman Dhoka palace by his son, Wazir Singh. After a visit to the 
house, she went to the Kot, the arsenal and assembly hall by the palace 
and ordered Abhiman Singh Rana, whose own house was close by, to have the 
bugle sounded to summon all the civil and military officials. Whereas
the other bharadars came mostly unarmed and with only a few followers,
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Jang Bahadur brought his three regiments with him, as well as his six
brothers. Pudma Rana claims that he acted thus out of fear that the
assassins of Gagan Singh would try to strike at him next, because he too
44
had seen seen as an ally of the queen during the last few months.
Although, as has been seen, Jang himself was very likely party to the 
plot against Gagan, his fear may still have been quite genuine: he will
have been uncertain whether he could trust his new-found friends, and 
also perhaps apprehensive lest the regiments that had been under Gagan's 
command should turn against the surviving ministers, himself included.
Because of what she had previously learnt from Lai Jha, the queen was 
convinced that Bir Keshar Pande was involved in the murder, and she ordered 
Abhiman Singh Rana to place him in irons. ' Abhiman complied, but when 
Laksmi Devi, gave a further order to kill Bir Keshar he refused to obey, as 
the king would not confirm the instruction. This angered the queen, and 
she told the general that she held delegated powers to act however she 
pleased. Abhiman stood his ground. He was, from a legal standpoint, 
quite right to do so, for notwithstanding claims to the contrary,
Rajendra had never made an unambiguous grant of regency powers to his wife: 
the fact that he had so far allowed the queen to take the lead in 
conducting the investigation did not detract from his own ultimate authority.
Fateh Jang had still not arrived at the Kot, despite the queen's having 
earlier sent Jang Bahadur's brother to summon him. The king now decided 
to go in search of Fateh himself, and so left the Kot. The queen 
meanwhile ordered all the bharadars to assemble in the large hall on the 
western side of the Kot and to remain in session until the murderer could 
be identified. She herself appears now to have retired to a first-floor 
room, above the hall where most of the bharadars were gathered.
3 6 9
Up to this point the account given in a document which the Resident,
Major Thoresby, forwarded to Calcutta in March 1847, and which has been
the main source for the foregoing paragraphs, is not controverted by 
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other evidence. Unfortunately, this is far from being the case with
the critical events which followed, and it has to be explained why the
'Thoresby Report*, as the document has been dubbed is more trustworthy
than the alternatives. Best known among the latter are the accounts
given by Pudma Rana in the biography of his father, and by Orfeur Cavenagh
in the book he wrote after acting as Jang's guide on his 1850 European
journey. These versions differ from each other, as well as from the
Thoresby Report despite the fact that both authors must have relied
mainly on what Jang himself had told them. M.S. Jain and Ludwig Stiller
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have argued that the Residency document, too, originated with Jung,
but this is unlikely. As will shortly be seen, the Thoresby Report does
not explicitly state who fired the volley of shots which it claims began
the violence, but the details presented make it easy to infer, as was
first done by Thoresby himself, that Jang's own partisans were responsible.
The document is thus plainly inconsistent with Jang's own statement two
days after the massacre to the Officiating Resident that the first blow
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had been struck by Fateh Jang Shah's son, Khadga. Now, when the
Thoresby Report was submitted in March 1847, Jang Bahadur's position was 
still far from secure as King Rajendra was in British territory and being 
urged by political exiles to act against him. Jang will therefore have 
been particularly anxious to convince the British of the legitimacy of his 
position, and would therefore surely have stuck to his original story.
It follows that although the Thoresby Report may have been based partly 
on information obtained directly or indirectly from Jang, it must also
have drawn on other sources, and can thus be accepted as more impartial
than either Pudma or Cavenagh's accounts.
There remains another, rather more fundamental difficulty. Despite
many differences between them, the Report, Pudma and Cavenagh all agree
in presenting Jang's actions at the Kot as a response to a perceived
threat after the bhavctdavs had assembled, and not as a plot which he had
hatched beforehand. They also coincide in asserting that these actions
were approved at the time by Queen Laksmi Devi, a contention which is
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also supported by the account in the Buddhiman Singh vamsaval-t.
This leaves intact Jang's defence that he had. her authority for what he
did. However, suspicion that the real truth may have been different
has often been expressed, and has, of course, only been increased by the
fact that Jang himself originated mutually contradictory accounts: in
addition to the stories already mentioned, in 1856 he had it given out
that the slaughter had actually been ordered in writing by King Rajendra.
Laksmi Devi's recently discovered May 1847 letter to her husband appears
at first sight to provide damning confirmation that Jang acted entirely
on his own initiative. The critical passage runs as follows:
On the night of Aswin Badi 9 (14 September) you and 
I installed outselves at the Kot. [We asked] who had 
killed General Gagan Singh by firing a shot from the 
roof and for what [alleged] crime he had been killed.
We declared that those in the conspiracy to murder 
him, as well as the actual assassin, must be identified 
and arrested. The search for the murderers began, but 
at the moment, Vijay Raj Pande and Jang Bahadur 
deceitfully submitted that all of them [i.e. they and 
the other bharadars] would sit in council together 
and would discover the murderer and that you and I 
should leave and take our rest. I then went inside 
the kothavi while you set off for the palace.
Meanwhile, Jang Bahadur surrounded the palace with his 
officers, NCOs and men of the regiments under his 
command, created confusion and killed the bharadars, 
then drove out their wives and children.
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Elsewhere in the letter, Laksmi Devi repeatedly emphasises that she
gave no orders for violence to be used against anyone except Bir Keshar
Pande, Mathbar Singh's mother and two others all of whom had been
denounced by Lai Jha as involved in a plot against the queen's party.
Laksmi Devi also claims that in the days immediately following the
massacre Jang Bahadur had explained his action purely as self-defence
and said nothing about orders from herself. It is not surprising,
therefore, that Triratna Manandhar, the Nepali historian who discovered
her letter in the Foreign Ministry archives, should have concluded his
discussion with the suggestion that the standard accounts of the
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massacre would now have to be radically revised.
Some revision there undoubtedly must be, but a critical examination 
of the document shows that reliance on the Thoresby Report need not be 
abandoned as a consequence. In the first place, the kothav'L to which 
the queen said she retired is clearly to be identified with the chamber
on the first floor of the Kot where the Residency Report, Pudma and
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Cavanagh all agree she remained as events reached their climax.
Contrary to Manandhar's apparent belief, Laksmi Devi does not claim that 
she quitted the scene entirely, only that she left the main hall where 
she had ordered the bhava.da.Ts to remain at the moment her husband set off 
to summon Fateh Jang.
Secondly, and more fundamentally, Laksmi Devi was far from being an 
impartial witness and her assertions can only be regarded as authoritative 
if they concern points which must clearly have been within the knowledge 
of the recipient of the letter, Rajendra. Thus it must be accepted that 
Vijay Raj Pande and Jang Bahadur tendered joint advice to the royal 
couple before the king left the Kot, but the queen's denial of responsibility
for what subsequently happened carries very little weight. The Thoresby 
Report will therefore now be taken up again from the point at which the 
king left the scene entirely and the queen retired to the upper floor.
As he had announced, the king did indeed reach Fateh Jang's house
and send him and his relatives off towards the Kot, but he did not
return with them. Instead he rode to the Residency to seek an interview
with Captain Ottley, who had been the sole European there since the
Resident, Colvin, and Dr. Login had departed for India a day or two
previously. Ottley, who was suffering from rheumatism, refused to
come out to meet Rajendra at such an hour (it was now 2.00 am), but sent
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out Dabi Prasad, the Residency's m%T rnunst. The king explained what
had occurred, beginning his remarks with the ominous words, 'See things 
are turning out here as they have at Lahore, and the ministers are 
continually put to death1. He urged the munsi. to return with him 
immediately to the Kot so that he would subsequently be able to give a 
first-hand report to the Resident. Dabi Prasad demurred on the pretext 
that his horse would take some time to be got ready and that the king 
would thus be delayed at a critical juncture. Rajendra then rode back 
with his attendants to the Kot, only to find the gutters in the street 
filled with the blood flowing from it. He was prevented from entering 
by 'the people about’ - according to one tradition in Kathmandu it was 
Vijay Raj Pande who dissuaded him - and he retired to the nearby Hanuman 
Dhoka palace.
The sequence of events leading to the slaughter had been triggered 
by the arrival at the Kot of Fateh Jang Shah. Jang Bahadur met him in 
the courtyard and proposed that the way to revolve matters was for them 
to back the queen and have both Abhiman Singh and Bir Keshar Pande 'made
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away with'. Fateh refused to take any action against Bir Keshar without 
a proper trial, and protested that Abhiman had done nothing whatsoever to 
merit such treatment. He argued that they should concentrate on a 
thorough search for Gagan's assassin. This last statement was highly 
disingenuous, given that both Fateh and Jang Bahadur, as well as the 
men whose fate they were discussing, had most probably been involved in 
the plot against Gagan; presumably Fateh was confident it would be 
possible to appease the queen by fixing the guilt on some minor member 
of the conspiracy. Fateh's particular anxiety to protect Abhiman is 
not surprising, given that the latter though once a partisan of the queen, 
was noW generally regarded as Fateh's own ally. While Jang now went 
to the queen1s room above the main hall, Fateh and his relatives proceeded 
to a small hall on the north side of the courtyard, where Abhiman was 
sitting. Abhiman was now seemingly informed of Jang's proposal, as he 
ordered his officers to put his troops in the courtyard on alert (he was 
presumably not accompanied by all his troops, but had brought a small 
detachment to the Kot). From one of the upper storey windows Jang 
Bahadur saw these troops loading their muskets and he informed the queen, 
who immediately descended to the main hall and demanded that the 
ministers reveal the name of Gagan's murderer In her rage she 
attempted to strike Bir Keshar with her own sword, but Fateh Jang,
Abhiman and Dalbhanjan Pande restrained her. She then started to go 
back upstairs and the three men followed her to the foot of the wooden 
steps in a dark passage room at the end of the hall. As they waited 
for her to go through the trap-door so that they in turn could mount 
the ladder, shots were fired killing Fateh and Dalbhanjan outright and
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wounding Abhiman. In his covering note to the Report, Thoresby suggested
that one of Jang's brothers probably ordered the firing, in the belief
that either Jang or they were in immediate danger. The Report does not
state from which direction the fatal shots were fired, but it implies
that Jang had remained on the upper storey ever since leaving Fateh, and
Ganpat Sahai, one of the Residency clerks, actually asserted in a private
letter written a month after the massacre that Jang and his brothers
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fired from the top of the stairs, on the queen's instructions. Without
being aware of Sahai's letter, the travel writer Peter Mayne has offered
a very similar reconstruction, though supposing it was Jang alone who
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was with the queen and fired on the ministers from above; this accords
slightly better with the Thoresby document which gives the impression
that the Kunwar brothers (apart from Jang himself) remained on the ground
floor throughout. If, on the other hand, the shots were actually fired
by Jang's people inside the hall, one may assume that on his way to
join the queen after leaving Fateh, he had either warned them to be
especially vigilant, or, as Ludwig Stiller, has suggested, given explicit
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instructions for the shooting of Abhiman and Fateh. After his
proposition to Fateh in the counrtyard had been rejected, Jang will not 
have needed to await the sight of Abhiman's man loading before realising 
that his own position had become extremely perilous.
Staggering back out of the darkness surrounding the steps, Abhiman 
Singh Rana now tried to get through the hall to join his troops outside, 
'exclaiming that Jang Bahadur had done this treacherous act'; had he actually 
seen Jang fire at him from the upper storey, or was he just drawing a 
natural conclusion from the information Fateh had given him earlier? In 
any case, before he could reach the door he was cut down by the sword of
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Jang's brother, Krishna. Fateh's son, Khadga Bikram Shah, now attacked
both Krishna and Bam Bahadur, the brother immediately junior to Jang.
He then felled a sepoy before himself being killed by a shot. The
Thoresby Report does not say who fired this, but according to Oldfield
the marksman was Jang Bahadur in person; he had rushed down the steps
when he had heard the initial firing, and arrived just in time to prevent
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Khadga renewing the attack on Bam Bahadur. Some of Jang's men now
burst into the hall and a general massacre ensued. The official list
posted up in the centre of Kathmandu mentioned thirty individuals actually
killed in the Kot (two others, Gagan Singh and Bhavani Singh Khatri, died
respectively before and after the massacre), but this will have included
only the more important victims.^ Amongst them in addition to relatives
of Fateh Jang Shah and Dalbhanjhan Pande were the brothers Ranjor, Nar Singh
and Arjun Thapa, sons of Nepal's most prominent military commander in the
1814-16 war. Ranjor was the one non-minister included in Lai Jha's
list of those involved in the conspiracy against Gagan Singh. Some of
those in the hall were able to escape - allegedly with the assistance in
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some cases of Jang's brothers - but the families and retainers of all
those slain were formally expelled form Kathmandu later that day.
Virtually every first-rank political figure with the exception of Jang
Bahadur himself was thus removed from the political stage. Shortly after
daybreak, Jang's cousin, Jay Bahadur, and mi-v muns'L Laksmi Das arrived
at the Residency to tell Captain Ottley that official communication with
him would henceforth be in Jang's hands, and later Ottley heard that
Jang had received 'the orders of the Maharani as well as of the Maharaja
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to conduct all public business'. On the following day (16 September)
Jang himself went to the Residency and explained that he had been appointed
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'minister and commander-in-chief.
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It seems clear that the appointment was really the queen's and was
confirmed by the king under duress, though the detailed account as
presented in the Thoresby Report is open to some doubt. It is claimed
that she gave Jang 'the grant of the wizarat and of the command of the
sixteen regiments at the capital1 whilst the slaughter at the Kot was
still actually in progress. When Jang presented himself to the king in
the morning, Rajendra demanded an explanation for the bloodshed and
received the answer that 'all which had been done had been ordered by the
Maharanee, to whom His Highness had made over the sovereign power'.
Rajendra then had a furious argument with his wife, who told him that
unless he placed her son Ranendra on the throne 'more calamities would
ensue'. Declaring that he was leaving for Banaras, Rajendra rode
towards Patan, the city situated three miles south of Kathmandu across
the Bagmati River. He was accompanied by Sardar Bhawani Singh Khatri
and Captain Karbir Khatri, both of whom had originally been associates of 
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Mathbar Singh. That night, however, the king was persuaded to return
to Kathmandu by one of Jang Bahadur's brothers; before then Bhowani Singh 
had been killed by troops acting on the queen's orders after Karbir had 
reported to her that Bhowani had had a consultation with the king which he was 
not allowed to overhear. Jain has argued that the whole story of a 
quarrel between king and queen is a fabrication, since at this time Jang 
was not yet claiming that the massacre had taken place by the queen's 
orders: Jang told Ottley on the 26th that he had acted in self-defence
when he and his brothers were attacked by the other bhavadavs and the
king must have accepted this as he told Thoresby in December that he
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still did not know who was behind the massacre. This is hardly
2 7 7
conclusive, since there is no reason why Jang should not have told one
story to the king and another to the Resident, nor why Rajendra should
have automatically believed what Jang said to him. However, in her
May 1847 letter, the queen herself emphasises that Jang did not accuse
her of responsibility for the death in the period immediately following
the m a s s a c r e ^  and she could hardly have written thus to her husband
if Jang had used the words to him on 15 September that the Thoresby
Report puts in his mouth.
The detailed account of what took place within the royal palace on
15 September cannot thus be trusted, but it remains certain that there was
tension between queen and king, and that the former, with Jang as her
chief supporter, for the moment held the upper hand. This was certainly
the impression gained by Ottley at the Residency, and he also reported
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rumours that Laksmi Devi was responsible for the massacre. The
refugees who subsequently reached Sagauli in British territory all 
supported the accusation against the queen, and they also expected the
king to quit Kathmandu, either after abdicating or simply to build up a
„  ,  . 6 8  party of his own.
The queen and Jang initially had no difficulty in asserting their
authority, as the troops who had lost their commanders accepted the new
arrangement without demur. Jang himself told a British companion four
years later that this was partly from fear of his own regiments, which
were placed around the other units with their weapons primed when the
army was assembled to hear the news, and partly because of the prospect
of wholesale promotions with the elimination of so many senior officers 
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at the Kot. Troops were kept in position within the city for several
days, whilst the expulsion of the families of the dead bhavadavs and the
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confiscation of their property proceeded. Jang was empowered to carry 
out the pajant. of the army which was now due, and he was thus able to
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consolidate his position further by removing anyone he could not trust.
About a week after the massacre there were some signs of a reaction
against the new regime, though it was not effective. The king tried to
reassert his authority with an order for the recall of those who had been
expelled, but the fugitives were in fear of their lives and refused to
return. On 23 September, Jang ordered those in hiding to leave the
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country within ten days. Refugees streamed across the Tarai into
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India, the total reaching as many as 6,000. Dissatisfaction among
the troops came to the notice of the Residency on the 24th, but this,
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too, had no concrete results. Most interestingly, there was also
evidence of popular opposition, though it is uncertain how reliable this
is. The source was the Darbar Munshi, Laksmi Das, who in an extraordinary
interview with the Residency's Mir Munshi on 23 September, spoke of
rumours of a wholesale resumption of land grants. If this occurred,
he claimed, the whole population 'would be up', and his own people, the
Newars, would suffer the most, and would rise at his command. He added
that the victims at the Kot were friends of Britain and were killed for
that reason. When the Mir Munshi showed a memorandum of the conversation
to Ottley the next morning, the latter lectured him on the need to stay
out of internal politics and made him burn the paper. In reporting the
incident to Calcutta Ottley suggested that Laksmi Das was less likely
to be genuinely seeking British support than testing out whether their
74
public professions of non-interference were genuine. It is in fact
probable that Laksmi D a s , who had previously always proved a reliable 
instrument of whoever controlled the Darbar, was acting as an 'agent
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provateur' on behalf of Jang and the queen rather than genuinely trying 
to protect the interests of the Newar community as a whole. There is 
no reason to doubt, however, that there was considerable public disquiet: 
the confiscation of exiles' property might easily have produced alarm, 
whilst the extent of the violence which had occurred will also have 
created anxiety as to how far the victors might now be prepared to go.
The Bhandarkhal Affair
Discontent amongst people and army may have been a reality, but the
dramatic change in the political situation which occurred in October
owed nothing to this, being instead the result of Jang's decision to
abandon the queen and emerge as the ally of Surendra. Jang thus
duplicated the path followed by his uncle Mathbar Singh, and like him,
must have calculated that he would have a better chance of concentrating
real power in his own hands if nominally serving the prince rather than a
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women as formidable as Laksmi Devi.
The rift between Jang and the queen began to develop soon after the
Kot, for although he obeyed her instructions to keep Surendra and his
brother Upendra under close watch, he prevaricated when she urged him to
V 6
kill the two princes and secure the throne for her own son, Ranendra.
Jang's attitude emboldened Rajendra to make a stand, and on 15 October a
tat mohav was issued authorising the minister to ban both Ranendra and
his brother Birendra from entering Kathmandu and to kill the queen's
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servants if they helped the two with arms and ammunition. The document
was evidently not made public, for an entry in the Residency Diary the
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following day asserts that the queen was still fully in command. On
the 23rd, however, the Officiating Resident was summoned to the palace to
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hear the king explain, in the presence of both Surendra and Jang, that
he intended to go on pilgrimage to Banaras, taking all his family with
him, excepting Surendra, whom he wished to be recognised as regent during
his absence. He added signifi'cantly that 'family differences' made it
impossible to refer to all of this in the khari-ta which he was about to
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send to the Governor-General. Preparations for the departure went
ahead, and a second ZaZ mohav was issued authorising Surendra to assume
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fche throne if his father should not return.
The queen must by now have realised that she was in danger of being
decisively out-manouevred, and she sought to save the situation with the
help of a group of close supporters. Chief amongst these was Kaji Bir
Dhoj Basnet, who had not previously been prominent politically, but who
had acted with Jang as the queen's agent in the expulsions of the previous 
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month. Accounts of the 'conspiracy' differ, but the group allegedly
aimed to do away with Rajendra, Surendra, Upendra and Jang himself. Bir
Dhoj had been given a document from the queen promising him the
premiership if he placed Ranendra on the throne, but Jang got to know
of this and after he had laid the information before the king he was
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authorised to kill Bir Dhoj and his associates. Around a dozen persons
were executed, and a larger number fled the city. The hharadavi- were then
convened and sentence of banishment passed upon the queen, whilst in
token of his services, the king granted Jang the lands held by Bhimsen
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Thapa and also the title of pra-im mi-n'Zstar. The queen made preparations
to leave for Banaras with her sons, and Rajendra, apparently against 
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Jang's advice, decided to carry out his original pilgrimage project 
and to accompany her. LaZ mohavs were issued authorising Surendra to
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act as regent, and pardoning and approving all Jang Bahadur's actions, 
and finally on 23 November king and queen departed for the plains.
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Bir Dhoj's conspiracy and its suppression is known in Nepali as
the Bhandarkhalparba ('Bhandarkhal Affair') after the name of the palace
within the Basantapur complex where the conspirators were allegedly
waiting in ambush for Jang when he himself surprised them with an armed
force. The details of the affair given in the Thoresby Report and in
Pudma Jung's book have arounsed considerable scepticism, some writers
suggesting that there was no fullv-worked-out conspiracy against Jang,
merely a decision by him and the king to launch a pre-emptive strike
86against the queen1s supporters. It is, however, worth noting that
even after Rajendra had again become opposed to Jang and was manoeuvring
against him the following summer, he still accepted that his own and
Surendra and Upendra's lives had been in real danger from Bir Dhoj and
his associates.^
Because Bir Dhoj and eight others involved were Basnets, the whole
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affair has often been seen as a Basnet family enterprise. This is
misleading for two reasons. First, the most prominent members of the
'queen's group', apart from Bir Dhoj himself, were Uzir Singh, the son
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of the assassinated General Gagan Singh, and Dalmardan Thapa. Second,
the Basnet participants were not the most prominent members of their 
thari Sardar Bakht Singh Basnet, whose sons Bir Dhoj and Bir Keshar died 
and who himself fled the country, had indeed been one of the ninety-four 
bhavadavs who signed the 1841 pledge of friendship with the British, as
had Sardar Dariyal Singh Basnet, father of another victim, but neither
90of them were of great political weight. Neither they nor any of the
other 'conspirators' appear in the Basnet genealogies published by
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Stiller or given in the Hodgson papers, and they are probably only 
distant relatives of the two most prominent Basnets at this time,
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Kulman Singh and Jitman, respectively brother and cousin of the late
Prasad Singh, Jang's father-in-law. Kulman and Jitman themselves were
probably not connected in any way with the 'queen's party'. Whilst Kulman
was amongst relatives of the conspirators who were arrested in the
immediate aftermath of the bloodshed, he must have been cleared of
complicity, as he and Jitman are amongst senior bharadars attesting a
Xal mohar issued nine days later, and in summer 1847 he was in command
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of troops sent against the refugee bharadars. The 1Basnet-Kunwar
alliance' sealed with Jang's marriage in 1839 thus seems to have survived
the upheavals of 1846, though now, of course, with the roles of junior
and senior partner reversed.
A vital factor in Jang's successful move against the queen was the
co-operation of Vijay Raj Pande, who is identified by the Thoresby Report
and in later sources as the man who betrayed the 'conspiracy' to him.
The fullest account of his role is that given by Pudma Jung, who claims
that Vijay was promised appointment as rajguru as a reward for his
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co-operation both by the queen's party and then by Jang. This story
has been rejected by Jain on the grounds that he already held this office
before 31 October, but the argument rests on the mistaken notion that the
posts of dharmadhdkar (which Vijay had held since October 1845) and
94rajguru automatically went together. In fact, the uamsavaZ'b account
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shows that he was only appointed rajguru in November 1846. Even so,
Pudma's version is still not entirely trustworthy, as is immediately shown 
by his bizarre description of Vijay as merely a 'private tutor'. His 
assertion that the pandit was fully committed to the queen, and only 
switched sides when he mistakenly formed the impression from Jang's manner 
that his secret was already known, is highly questionable. Apart from
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the general doubts on the reality of the 'conspiracy', there are reasons
for suspecting that he and Jang had been working together from an earlier
date and that he had only feigned support for the queen and Bir Dhoj.
In the first place, Vijay's descendants claim today that he was from the
first determined to protect Surendra, who had allegedly been committed
to his care by his mother before her death in 1841. According to this
version, at some time before the Kot Massacre he induced Jang and his
brothers to sign a written oath (dharmapatra) that they would uphold
Surendra1s right as legitimate heit to the throne. The original
dharmapatra was supposedly loaned by a member of the family to King
Mahendra, but the king died in 1972 without returning it and the family
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have not asked the palace to make a search for it. Without the
retrieval of this document the Pande family story cannot be proved, but
the case for Vijay's early connection with Jang is buttressed by Laksmi
Devi's reference to the two working in collaboration at the Kot on the
night of the massacre, by the story current in Kathmandu today of the
two being friends in Jang's youth, and by another Pande family tradition
according to which Vijay's dying words were 'The sin of Gagan Singh',
suggesting that he, like Jang, was privy to the plot against the queen's 
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favourite. Whatever the truth in all this, it is incontrovertible
that Vijay remained a‘ key associate of Jang for the rest of his life, 
and it seems reasonable to accept that he did supply the minister with 
information which enabled him to convince the king of the danger from 
the queen's party.
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Rajendra's Withdrawal and Deposition
Immediately after the Kot Massacre, Jang was able to place members
of his family in the key administrative positions. His brothers Bam
Bahadur, Badri Narsingh, and Krishna Bahadur took charge of the Badakausi-
(treasury), Kumardook (audit office) and the key governorship of Palpa
respectively, whilst his elder half-brother, Bhaktawar, became karpardar
(controler of the royal household), His cousin Jay Bahadur was appointed
to head the Sadar Daphtarkhana, or Central Lands Assignment Office.
Jang's three remaining brothers, Ranoddip Singh, Jagat Shamsher and Dhir
Shamsher, all received senior military appointments, as did his childhood
friend Ran Mehar Adhikari, and his brother-in-law Sanak Singh Khatri,
whose sister, Nanda Kumari, Jang had married in 1841. In November, two
days before the king and queen departed for Banaras, Hemdal Thapa, whose
98son was to marry Jang's daughter, was made a kaj-i. Hemdal's home was
at Nava Buddha near Dhulikhel and he was probably an old family friend of
the Kunwars, although he does not seem to have been related to either of
99the two prominent Thapa families.
A critical appointment already mentioned was that of Vijay Raj Pande 
as rajguvu. The Pandes thereby attained a monopoly of the rajguruship 
which was to last until the downfall of the Rana regime over a century 
later. The path for this development was smoother because there was by 
this time probably no male member of either the Mishra or Paudyal guru 
families still in Kathmandu. The Mishras had been in eclipse since the 
final downfall of the Kala Pandes. Rangnath Paudyal, who had come up to 
Kathmandu in summer 1845 from Banaras, had probably returned there once it 
became clear that he would not be able to regain his former standing.
His sons had also left Kathmandu before the Kot Massacre, while his
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brothers Narayan and Visnu and the sons of Krishna Ram, Hodgson's old
ally were among those expelled afterwards. Krishna Ram Paudyal
himself had died in 1843. The king's purohit, Vidyaranya Aryal,
probably fled the country after Bhandarkhal, and although another member
of his family seems to have assumed his functions, he will have lacked the
standing to challenge Vijay's place as the king's spiritual adviser, with
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all the possibilities of secular influence which that position carried.
In addition to relatives and close personal associates (Vijay can
probably be included in this category), Jang also retained a number of
bharadars who had previously held important posts, in particular
individuals who had been closely allied with the Thapas. Karbir Khatri
and Umakant Upadhyaya, as well as Jitman and Kulman Singh Basnet were
among these. All four were to continue in favour for many years,
whereas Hira Lai Jha, who had held revenue contracts for the eastern
Tarai several times in the past few years, appears first as a trusted
collaborator with the new regime and then as one of the emigres most
bitterly opposed to Jang. The reasons for this change of sides, which
took place in April 1847, are not known. Hira Lai had, however,
earlier differences with both Jang and Surendra: Jang probably opposed
him in 1844 over complaints brought against him by cultivators, whilst
several months before the Kot Massacre he had quarrelled with Surendra
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and had to leave Kathmandu. He had returned to the capital in mid-
October, when his appointment to a lands assignment office and supervision 
of an arsenal was seen as evidence of the queen's supremacy. Nevertheless,
the appointment was confirmed after Bhandarkhal, and Hira Lai was made
7 ..103
a Kagt.
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Individuals like Hira Lai were probably wanted in the administration
for their personal abilities and influence. In the case of the cauntaras,
however, tradition demanded that one or more of these royal collaterals
be closely associated with the government. As the family which had
previously played this role, that of Fateh Jang and his brothers, were
now dead or in exile, the solution found was to turn to Bir Bind Vikram
Shah,.;the son of Rajendra's uncle Ranodyat. Bir Bind was a closer
relative of the king than Fateh, and probably for that reason his name
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headed the cauntara section in the 1841 pledge to the British, but
he does not seem to have played any significant political role up to
now and is unlikely to have enjoyed any real say despite his formal 
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precedence. His son, Samser Jang^ . later succeeded to his position
but the family were eventually eclipsed after the reconciliation between
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Jang and Fateh Jang's youngest brother Ransher in the 1850s.
Aside from seeking to establish a bharadart which would be both
personally loyal to him and ensure the minimum necessary degree of
continuity, Jang had above all to maintain his hold over Surendra as
regent. I-F a rumour reaching the Residency in November is correct,
Jang was able to obtain a document from him promising to retain him as
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minister so long as he held the royal power. Certainly Jang himself
envisaged a lasting arrangement, for a written oath (dharmapatra) which
he presented to Surendra in the first half of December committed him
to lifelong {ji samma) allegiance to the regent so long as the latter
did not conspire in any way with those expelled after the Kot and
Bhandarkhal, but ended with a blunt warning that should Surendra combine
with the refugees against him Jang would look to his own interests and
108
cease protecting him from his enemies. After the bloodshed which
had so recently occurred, the note of menace in this was unmistakable.
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Fear of action against him from India by the refugees, who were now 
to have King Rajendra to complain to, was an overriding concern,and it 
was probably to widen his political support at home that Jang put great 
stress on a programme to compensate Brahmans for land confiscated forty 
years previously. The episode is of great interest, highlighting the 
importance of Brahmans as the recipients' of royal gifts.
The background to this measure was an order issued in March 1806, 
confiscating, or perhaps in theory merely imposiricj taxation, on lands 
previously dedicated to a religious function as guthi or gifted to 
Brahmans as btrta. It has been pointed out that this action, taken by 
Rana Bahadur as mukhti-yar for his son Girvana, was only the culmination 
of a trend which had been in operation since 1787, as the Kathmandu 
government sought to increase revenue, bringing land gifted by previous 
rulers back under the normal taxation structure. The 1806 decree had, 
however, been particularly dramatic in its effects, either because of 
outright dispossession or because individuals were now faced with a level 
of taxation on their holdings which made continued cultivation impractical
On 15 November 1846, just one week before the royal party departed
for Banaras, a tat mohar was issued in King Rajendra's name to Jay
Bahadur Kunwar as head of the Sadar Daphtar Khana, ordering that land
at present not under cultivation, both in the hills and in the Tarai,
be given as compensation to those who had lost land in 1806 and that
funds be made available to cover the cost of bringing the new allotments 
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under cultivation. The preamble explained that 'Jang Bahadur and
others 1 had represented that until the injustice done in 1806 was 
righted there could be no peace and stability within the Darbar. It 
went on to explain that restoration of the original land involved was
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not possible as this had now been allocated as jagtr to the army and 
thus could not be disturbed without undermining the bulwark of h'Lndu 
dharma.
Over the next two years considerable administrative effort was put
into implementation of the scheme. The tharghars (land survey officials)
were busy assessing the value of lands originally lost and adjudicating
disputes between Brahmans reclaiming land and the occupiers of adjacent 
111
plots. Yet at the end of the exercise it appears that most of those
who had lost their rights in 1806 went uncompensated, for Ranoddip Singh,
who succeeded his brother Jang as prime minister and maharaja in 1877,
had to tackle the problem all over again. His own order on the subject
explained that the beneficiaries of Jang's programme had lacked the
resources to bring the lands assigned to them under cultivation. Accounts
in the Lagat Phant show that as against the 250,487 rupees estimated
necessary to finance the 1846 scheme, only 5,359 rupees were actually
forthcoming. Neither the share of the money pledged by the government,
nor the levy on jagtrdars, which should have amounted to almost 1 0 0 , 0 0 0
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rupees, was forthcoming. This was despite the fact that apparently
vigorous measures had been taken to make the collection; an order to
jay Bahadur in March 1847 made army commanders responsible for obtaining
the money due from their own men and liable to have the full amount
113realised from their personal jagtrs if they failed to do so. As
Regmi suggests, failure to carry through the programme may simply have
occurred because Jang lost interest once the threat to his own position
114
seemed to have subsided. It is also possible, however, that having
made a gesture towards the Brahmans, Jang decided a higher priority was 
not to press bharadars or ordinary soldiers too hard.
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In launching the compensation programme in the first place, Jang's
motivation will have been complex. In the first place, there is every
reason to accept that he personally subscribed to the assumptions
implicit in the November tat mohar, believing that violation of the
sanctity of b-irta grants could bring divine retribution. Although in
British company in later years Jang might sometimes speak scornfully
of some Hindu religious prejudices, in a letter to his brother he freely
invoked the notion of an avenging deity, whilst even to the British he
115admitted a belief in ghosts. He was also the son of Bal Narsingh
Kunwar, a man of outstanding piety. It would not be unnatural, 
therefore, if Jang followed the example of previous rulers in Nepal by 
seeking secular success through the obtaining of religious merit.
Even without taking into account Jang's personal religiosity, there 
were also sound political reasons for taking the step he did. The 
compensation programme was actually initiated before King Rajendra left 
Nepal, and by suggesting such a measure to a king who set much store 
by religion the minister might have hoped to strengthen Rajendra's 
confidence in him. More important, however, was probably the calculation 
that the reaction of the Brahmans themselves would strengthen his own 
position. The Brahmans did not exercise political influence as a 
bloc, since those who participated in public affairs as rajgurus or 
puroh'tts operated on a familial rather than a caste basis. However, 
the relationship between monarch and rajguru. was replicated at a lower 
level by the guru-S'isya ties binding particular Brahman and non-Brahman 
families. As an example of the kind of influence a guru might have 
over a particular bharadar, there is the case of Dilli Singh Basnet 
who in the 1850s demolished a new house after his guru told him the
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death of his son had occurred because the structure blocked the path of
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the Serpent King (Nagraja). An administration which was careful of
Brahman rights could therefore hope to influence the bharadari, as a whole
through the advocacy of their spiritual counsellors. The wish to win
such support was perhaps the greater because the new rajguru, as a
Kumaon Brahman, might have anticipated some resentment from the purbiya
Brahmans, who were, and still are, regarded as their superiors in the 
117ritual hierarchy. Vijay himself may have played an important role
in formulating the project, for the advice he gave in conjunction with 
Jang Bahadur is included in a list of his services presented to him by 
Surendra seventeen years later.^^
Whilst Jang concolidated his position in Kathmandu, in India King 
Rajendra considered his options. His own objective was to return to 
Nepal to take effective charge of the administration whilst protecting 
Surendra's position for the longer term. At the same time he was now 
open to the influence of the exiled bharadars who wished to regain their 
previous positions of influence and to obtain vengeance against Jang 
and his supporters. Foremost amongst these were Guru Prasad Shah,
Fateh Jang's brother, who had been Governor of Palpa at the time of 
his brother's death, and had been able to flee the country before Jang's 
agents could arrive to arrest him, and also the Kala Pande refugees 
who had been in India since the campaigns against their family under 
Mathbar Singh Thapa. They were reinforced, after his break with Jang, 
by Hira Lai Jha. Finally, Rangnath Paudyal was also urging the king 
to act against Jang, though his position appeared a little ambiguous 
at times: in December he gave the impression in a private letter that
he was now more interested in pilgrimage than in politics, whilst in
291
March he was acting as an intermediary for correspondence between 
119
Rajendra and Jang.
Before leaving Kathmandu in November, the king had stated he 
would return in Magh, that is by the end of January or by mid-February,
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depending on whether the reference was to the lunar or the solar month.
When the deadline passed, Jang, informed by his agents on the plains of
the activities of the exiled bharadars and of the queen and apprehensive
that Rajendra was waiting to return together with the emigres, secured
Surendra's authority to send extra troops to strong points guarding
121
routes into the hills. On 22 February the king left Banaras, but
although moving close to the frontier, still delayed in the plains.
In correspondence with Jang and with Surendra, he sought to negotiate
terms for his return, whether through a genuine wish to reach an
accommodation with the minister or as a cover to plans for drastic
action against him. Rajendra wanted in particular to have control of
the military pagan-i promised to him, a condition that Jang was unwilling 
122
to meet. The king was conciliatory as possible on other matters,
writing to Surendra in April that he gave him authority to assume the
throne if he himself should ever plot against Jang, approving his
promise to let Jang conduct next year's civil pagani-, and declaring
that the bharadars and the army should disregard anything in orders
that Surendra or himself might give inconsistent with their promises 
123
to Jang. At the end of the month he issued a tat mohar promising
124
that he would allow the queen no political role; he had been in
contact with the queen in India, but did not fully trust her, and 
realised that her return to Nepal would in any case be completely 
unacceptable to Surendra and Jang. Surendra, Upendra and Jang all
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wrote to the king urging him to return at once, but presumably not
providing him with the assurances he wanted. In reply Rajendra
expressed his approval of all Jang's actions, but pleaded that the
onset of the malarial season now made it dangerous to cross the Tarai
and that he was therefore going to stay at Ghusot (where Hira Lai Jah's
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estate was situated). This was despite the fact that he probably
knew that on 8 April the astrologers in Kathmandu had been asked to
fix an auspicious date for Surendra1s coronation; this decision had
been taken, so the Residency, was assured, in the hope that it would
cause Rajendra to return immediately and thus remove the need to go
ahead with the ceremony.
The twenty-day period within which the astrologers had been ordered
to fix a day was allowed to elapse without the coronation taking place,
but a few days later the final break with Rajendra was precipitated
by the arrest of two ex-soldiers involved in a plan to assassinate Jang.
Would-be assassins had been apprehended before, but on this occasion
those arrested had with them a tat mohar of King Rajendra calling on
the army to seize or kill Jang and his relatives. Jang had the document
read out to the assembled troops and asked them whether they wished to
carry out the order. The army replied that what the king now commanded
was inconsistent with his earlier instructions and that they thought
it right to abide by the latter. The bharadars then called upon
Surendra to assume the throne. He accepted the invitation and the
127
ceremony took place that evening, 12 May 1847. The same day a letter
signed by all the principal bharadars and state officials was despatched 
to Rajendra. It detailed Jang's services and the consequent injustice 
of the royal order, pointed out that in the same document Rajendra
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himself had upheld the authority of Surendra, listed the bloodshed in
Nepal from Bhimsen's death onwards for which Rajendra was held
responsible, and concluded that 'Sri Panch Maharajadhiraj Surendra
Bikram Shah...being now ruler of the Raj with the aid of the Prime
Minister, we cannot hereafter act under your Highness' orders and
authority1. They offered Rajendra honourable treatment if he now
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returned to Kathmandu, but no share in the government.
In response, Rajendra wrote separate letters of protest to the
bharadars and to Jang, denying the authenticity of the tat mohar
found on the would-be assassins and maintaining that neither he himself,
nor Jagat Bam Pande and Guru Prasad, who had allegedly handed the men
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the document, had had anything to do with the affair. With the
bharadars he took a robust line, rejecting their accusation that he had
made over complete authority to the queen, suggesting that the killings
at the Kot might in any case have gone beyond what the queen ordered,
and finally accusing the signatories of 'setting up the flag of treason1.
With Jang, on the other hand, he was relatively conciliatory, refusing
to accept his own deposition, but promising to retain the minister in
favour if he disowned the bharadars ' letter and either surrendered
control of the military pajand or persuaded the Resident to allow Nepal
to annex the Sikkim territory which she had held before the Anglo-Gorkha
war. The ex-king received dusty answers to both letters. The bharadars
repeated at length the argument that all the troubles were the result
of the queen's orders and of Rajendra's folly in alienating his authority 
130
to her. In making the latter claim, the document on which they
relied, and which they offered to let Rajendra examine, was probably the 
tat mohar issued in January 1846, though Pudma Rana might possibly be
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correct in suggesting that the earlier grant of January 1843 was still
131
the one on which argument centred. In either case, the bharadars1
claim was tendentious, but there was truth in their assertion that a
repetition of the divided authority existing the previous autumn, with
'two Rajas, a Rani supreme and four Mukhtiyar Ministers...would have
caused the final ruin of the king of Sri Maharaja Prithvi Narayan 
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Shah'
Shortly after receiving the news of his deposition, Rajendra had
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summoned all the fugitive bharadars to join him at Sagauli. Urged
by them to act against Jang, on 23 July he crossed the frontier with
about 1,500 followers and established himself in the Tarai settlement
of Alau. Troops from the Purana Gorakh regiment, with which Jang had
long been closely associated, were sent from Kathmandu under his
brother-in-law, Sanak Singh. At about 3.00 am on the 28th, Jang's
forces attacked, killing eighty of the king's party and taking Rajendra
himself prisoner. Many of the dead were Rajputs from the plains,
including Rajendra's maternal uncle, Ram Baksh Singh, but all of the
principal Nepali refugee bharadars were able to escape back across the
frontier. Rajendra was taken back to the Valley and installed in the
old royal palace at Bhaktapur. He was treated with due deference, but
was in fact a political prisoner and to remain so for the remainder of 
134
his life.
Although the Resident dubbed Rajendra and his followers 'invaders'
and accused the Champaran Joint Magistrate of negligence in allowing an
armed force to assemble and cross the border, the Magistrate's reply
makes it clear that the party were not equipped for full-scale battle
135
but rather expected troops in Nepal to come over^their side.
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After his capture, Rajendra himself claimed that Guru Prasad and Jagat
Bam Pande had told him they had raised several regiments and Pudma Jung
alleges that the refugee bharadars had in fact received funds for this
136
purpose but had diverted them to their own pockets. A further
intriguing possibility is that the ex-king was deliberately enticed over
the border into a trap, for the Champaran magistrate believed that it
was a letter from Nepal that prompted him to leave Sagauli. A recently
published tat mohar of Rajendra's, ordering the army and civil officers
to arrest Jang and his brothers and bring them to him at Kararbana in
the Terai or Chisapani within the hills, has been identified by its
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editor with the document found on Jang's would-be assassins.
However, the reference to Jang's making the addressees sign a document 
repudiating Rajendra's authority shows that the tat mohar must in fact 
have been issued after, not before, the discovery of the assassination 
plot and the installation of Surendra on 12 May. It is probable that 
the tat mohar was sent to Nepal at the end of June, after Rajendra had 
received the replies to his initial protests, in which case Jang could 
well have had a letter sent in reply, purporting to be from a section 
of the army willing to support Rajendra.
Whatever the truth of the matter, Thoresby's acceptance of Jang's 
version was in line with the favourable attitude he had taken ever 
since his arrival at the Residency in December 1846. His despatches 
were consistently sympathetic to Jang and Surendra, and critical of 
Rajendra, and he was eager to prevent British territory being used by 
exiles as a base for hostile activity against the new regime. In part 
this willingness to work with those actually in power was simply the 
logical continuation of the non-intervention policy pursued since
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Hodgson's departure. It is likely, none the less, that the personal
impression Jang made upon him was also important. Certainly there is
a complete contrast with the sentiments voiced by British officials in
the immediate aftermath of the Kot, when Colvin, the departing Resident
following events from Sagauli, had dismissed Jang as 'too rash and too
vicious to play successfully the role of a second Bhimsen1, while the
Governor-General's Agent at Banaras wrote to Brian Hodgson that he
expected Rajendra and Surendra soon to combine agains the minister who
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would then meet a well-deserved end. Something of this sentiment
persisted in Calcutta into summer 1847, for although the Governor-General
authorised Thoresby to order Rajendra away from the frontier if he did
not reach an agreement with his son, he initially refused to recognise
the new regime formally as Thoresby had recommended at the end of June,
giving as the reason for delay the fact that Jang had 'obtained power
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by means the most revolting to humanity'. When, a month after Alau,
a khari-ta was finally send to Surendra recognising him as king, it
140
contained no congratulations.
While moral sentiments may have coloured individuals' reactions,
it was the logic of non-intervention that shaped British policy during
the critical months. M.S. Jain has rightly pointed out that both
Hardinge's unwillingness to extend recognition before it was certain the
change was permanent and also his measures to restrain the exiles were
natural consequences of the decision not to become involved in internal 
141
Nepali politics. Realisation that British protestations of
neutrality were genuine may have been the reason that neither Jang nor 
Rajendra tried to enlist British support in the blatant fashion of 
both Ran Bahadur and his opponents fifty years previously. At the
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same time, however, anxiety that, despite everything, the other side
might secure an arrangement with the Company cannot have been entirely
absent. Jang's appeals to Rajendra before May to return to Kathmandu
were probably quite genuine, for as long as he remained in India he was
142
a card the British could choose to play at any time. In the other
camp, Jagat Bam Pande played upon Rajendra's corresponding fears by
telling him that Jang had pledged part of Nepal's revenue to the 
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British. The final securing of British recognition must have been
a great relief to Jang, but with many of his opponents still in India 
continued fostering of British goodwill was still a high priority.
Three years after the dramatic events of 1846/7 Jang was to find
himself in London when a mentally deranged ex-army officer assaulted
Queen Victoria. The incident led him to remark to his British
travel ling companion on the severity with which such a crime would be
punished in Nepal, and he went on to give an interesting characterisation
of political upheavals there:
Although revolutions often occurred..; yet the 
country at large did not suffer more from such 
disturbances than England would from a change of 
ministry; as the slaughter was confined almost 
entirely to the chiefs and their dependants: 
neither the army not the peasantry taking any part 
in the disputes, and submitting without a murmur 
to the dictates of whichever party might prove 
the victors.144
As an analysis of the process which had brought him to power, this has 
some validity, but the reality was a little more complex.
In the first place, Jang was correct in representing the change 
as one essentially involving members of an existing political elite, 
and certainly not a 'revolution' in the twentieth-century sense. As 
M.C. Regmi has pointed out, it is even misleading to talk in terms of
'the emergence of a new aristocracy', the thesis proclaimed in the
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title of Jain's book. The victims were not outsiders displacing a
governing class, but themselves established members of the bharadard, 
within which Jang himself, Vijay Raj Pande, and the Basnet brothers 
Kulman and Jitman Singh had already reached.influential positions.
Their victims were members of other bharadar families, in particular 
the Fateh Jang Shah branch of the oauntaras, the two most prominent 
Thapa families, the Gora Pandes and a section of the Basnets. Although 
Jang would employ his victory in a novel manner, establishing his own 
family as a new ruling elite within the aristocracy, nothingthat, had yet 
occurred was fundamentally different from earlier upheavals, such as 
those in which Bhimsen Thapa had established his supremacy.
There was, of course, a new development in that for the first time 
in the history of unified Nepal a king had been deposed by his subjects. 
The significance of this is greatly lessened, however, because the 
throne was transferred to an heir whom Rajendra had himself on previous 
occasions virtually set up as co-ruler. In any case, Kirkpatrick had 
pointed out half a century earlier that the loyalty of the bharadard 
was focused on the dynasty of Prithvi Narayan Shah rather than on any 
one individual descendant (see above, p. 38 ), and it is significant 
that it was Prithvi's name that the bharadars invoked in their reply to 
Rajendra's protest at his deposition. The willingness of both bharadars 
and army to accept the change of monarch thus did not involve any radical 
change in their attitude towards royal authority. The justification 
for their actions which those at Kathmandu produced also relied largely 
on the existence, real or supposed, of royal sanction for those actions, 
with insistence that until Rajendra's final unacceptable order for Jang's
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death everything had been done in accordance with the old king's own 
instructions or with those of a relative to whom he had delegated full 
authority.
The events of 1847 were not only readily reconciliable with Nepal's
own political tradition but also fully consistent with current Hindu
political theory. The Sukrandtdsara, which may well have been composed
only a few years previously in a Maratha state, clearly envisaged
deposition as a legitimate weapon against a bad ruler:
If the King be an enemy of virtue, morality and 
strength, and unrighteous even though from the 
[royal] family, people should desert him as the 
ruiner of the state.
In his place for the maintenance of the state, 
the purohdt, with the consent of the ministers,
should instal one who belongs to his family and
is qualified.14^
The lines could almost have been written with the enthronement of
Surendra in mind; it is in fact possible, though unlikely, that they
were composed after the event, since the Sukrandtdsara was only discovered 
in 1850. For Nepal fully to fit the general case, however, one needs 
to substitute 'guru' for 'purohit1, as it was Vijay Raj Pande, Jang's 
political collaborator, who actually placed the tdka of sovereignty 
on Surendra's forehead.
Jang claimed that the role of the army in all this, like that of the 
peasantry, was purely passive. This is slightly misleading given that 
he himself had appealed directly to the army in May 1847 when the 1.01 mohar 
ordering his own death was found upon Sher Mardan and Dambar Singh 
above (p.292). It had also been Jang who told Henry Lawrence in 1844 
when discussing a possible regency while the king's 'imbecility' 
persisted, that the army would be the judge of when Rajendra recovered
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his sanity (above, p . 215). The army's decision on such occasions had 
always followed that of its senior officers, but it was in fact being 
granted an authority which it might conceivably choose in future to use 
autonomously.
There is perhaps another point that emerges from the crisis, namely
that alongside the tie between king and subject and the power of the
military, the concept of the state and its interests formed an undercurrent
in Nepali thinking. As has already been seen (above, p . 298), in
writing to the deposed Rajendra of the possible final ruin of the kingdom
of Prithvi Narayan Shah, the bharadavs were at one level simply
expressing their loyalty to the Shah dynasty as a whole. Nevertheless,
the word used in the original Nepali was almost certainly not rajya or
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rajaim, but dhumga, the realm as a concrete reality rather than simply 
the area within which kingship was exercised, and the implicit logic was 
that its preservation was the fundamental political consideration. This 
is not, of course, to argue that the signatories of the letter were 
disinterested public servants y but rather to underline that what Brian 
Hodgson termed the 'eminent nationality' of the Gorkhas retained its 
effect on their thinking and set Nepal slightly apart from most political 
units in South Asia at that time.
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE RANA REGIME: 1846-57
Introduction
Although it was not apparent at the time, the events of 1846-47 
proved a decisive turning point in Nepali history. Unlike the ministers 
who had preceded him, Jang Bahadur managed not only to hold on to power 
for the rest of his life, but to ensure that it remained with the 
Kunwars afterwards.
in this chapter the principal features of the new regime will be 
analysed - Jang's relationship with the monarchy, his strategy towards, 
and dependence on, bharadari and army, the machinery of government, 
the codification of Nepali law, revenue policy, and the importance of the 
relationship with the British. The major political events down to 1857, 
the year in which Jang assumed the joint posts of praim ministar and 
maharaja, will be treated briefly as they impinge on the different 
thematic areas.
Underlying the study of these particular areas are questions 
concerning the general nature of the rule of the Kunwars - or Ranas as 
they were to be known from 1848. The whole Rana period is still widely 
characterised in Nepal as a dark age which impeded national development, 
but although the regime had undeniably by its closing years become an 
obstacle to political and economic progress, both Nepali and foreign 
historians have come increasingly to realise that there were also more 
positive features of Rana rule. Mahesh Chandra Regmi, Nepal's leading 
economic historian, has characterised the Rana years as marking 'the 
transition from the semi-feudalistic Gorkhali empire to a centralised
3 12
agrarian bureaucra.cy'. Regmi's own work has done much to make the main 
outlines of this process clear, as have the contributions of Kumar, Jain, 
Edwards, Adhikari and Marize, but there is still truth in Regmi1s statement 
that 'we remain ignorant about the nature and composition of the new power 
elite, and about the measures it took to achieve legitimisation and
2mobilise the support of the old and new political groups in the country'.
In addition there is the problem of how far changes under Jang were the 
result of a consciously devised strategy and how far merely the 
elaboration of trends already evident and only requiring administrative 
stability to work themselves out. In so far as Jang can indeed be 
considered a conscious reformer, there is the further question of the 
extent of his reliance on Western models. This chapter will attempt 
to provide some tentative answers.
The Establishment of the Maharajaship
Accounts of Jang's relationship with Surendra have normally stressed
the close supervision of the king's person and the element of intimidation
involved. This was undoubtedly an important factor, and one which
operated right from the start, as shown by the note of menace in the
dharmapatra of December 1846 (above, p.286). It is confirmed by the
observations of the Residents, and also admitted in Pudma Rana's biography
of his father, which explains that Surendra was dissuaded from abdication
3
in 1851 'partly by indirect inducements, but mostly by direct threats'.
At the same time, there is evidence that Jang at least attempted to 
employ subtler methods. A strong oral tradition in Kathmandu maintains
that he showed great personal deference to the king, in particular often,
carrying him about on his back, as bharadars had sometimes been required
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to do before 1846. This contrasts strongly with the picture in the 
British records, but Resident Ramsay, writing in 1863, did allow that 
Jang had been outwardly polite to Surendra after the marriage alliances 
between the two families in the mid-fifties. It is of course possible 
that even before then Jang displayed a more domineering attitude in 
front of British officials, and behaved more respectfully in private.
There was also an attempt to repeat a well-worn strategy by 
influencing the king through his wives. At the time of his accession 
Surendra had three queens, Trailokya Rajya Laksmi, Sura Rajya Laksmi 
and Deb Rajya Laksmi (a fourth had died as a result of his ill treatment 
five years previously - see above, p.172). At some point before 
November 1847 Surendra was prevailed upon to issue a f'Lvman to them
6acknowledging his own unfitness to rule and'making power over to them.
The document provided that after the birth of a son he would be placed
on the throne and the mother act as Regent. Queen Trailokya did
produce a son on 30 November 1847, but the arrangement previously mooted
was not implemented and Surendra remained king. None the less the
involvement of the queens in the administration seems to have continued,
as in December a lal mohdP stipulating that no one should contact ex-king
Rajendra without Jang's permission also provided that Surendra1s monthly
meetings with him were dependent on the joint advice of Jang and the 
7
queens.
It is probable that the role of Queen Trailokya was particularly 
important. when she fell ill during Jang's 1850 trip to Europe, he 
wrote to his brother Bam Bahadur, who was acting premier, that he would
g
forgive him anything else so long as he ensured the queen recovered.
On reaching Bombay on the journey home Jang learned that she was dying,
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and told a British companion that it was through her great influence 
over the king that he was able to guide him along the correct path.
9
Two days later he was in tears when he received the news of her death.
By whatever means he kept Surendra under control, Jang used his
power over him to secure a succession of royal orders which marked a
definite break with the traditional status of a minister. There was a
precedent for appointment to the premiership for life in the document
issued in 1844 to Mathbar Singh Thapa, and Rajendra allegedly promised
10
as much to Jang before he left for Banaras in November 1846. Shortly
after Surendra's accession, however, this promise was not only renewed
but extended into a commitment that the office would remain in his 
11
family. The next step was the recognition in May 1848 of the Kunwars1
claim to descent from the Ranas of Chitaurgadh. Jang and his brothers
were authorised to style themselves 'Ranaji', to assume the title
svtmadvajjkimav kumaratmaj ('royal prince and descendant of princes')
and to marry as Rajputs. Since the Shah dynasty itself traced its
ancestry back to the Chitaurgadh Ranas, the effect of the royal order was
to promote the Kunwars from their status as Khas to caste equality with
the royal family itself. This logically opened the way for intermarriage
between the two families, but this was seemingly barred by the restriction
in the document on the Kunwar Ranajis marrying into any of the plains or
hill families with which the Shahs themselves traditionally had marital 
12connections. There was either definite resistance within the royal
family to levelling the barrier completely, or Jang felt it advisable 
to advance one step at a time. The premier 1s strategy was perhaps 
devised in conjunction with Vijay Raj, whose approval in matters of caste 
status would certainly have been sought.
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Before further moves to enhance Jang's status could be made, a crisis
occurred in his relations with both the royal family and his own relatives.
This was precipitated by his journey to Europe in 1850, which both involved
his absence from Kathmandu for just over a year and also brought
religious complications as he had to cross the forbidden kato pani-.
Although Jang discounted the pollution problem in advance, arguing that
his caste could be readily restored by a purification ritual such as
13
returning envoys from China underwent, the innovation must still have
disturbed the more orthodox. During the summer he learnt by letter
from Bam Bahadur that Surendra's brother Upendra was behaving suspiciously,
and he sent a curt reply ordering Bam to expel from Kathmandu anyone trying
14
to attach himself to the prince. Jang arrived back in Kathmandu on
5 February, and ten days later was informed by Bam of a plot against him 
involving Upendra, and his own brother Badri Narsingh and cousin Jay 
Bahadur. Also implicated was Kaji Karbir Khatri, one of Jang's party 
on the European journey who had spread stories about Jang violating caste 
rules by dining with Europeans. Bam himself had been invited to join 
the conspiracy two previously, and had pretended willingness to do so 
so as to learn all the details. He claimed he had delayed informing 
Jang out of reluctance to seal Badri Narsingh's fate. As it was, Jang 
learned just in time to seize the culprits, who planned to assassinate 
both Surendra and himself the following morning. The three principal 
conspirators confessed after an incriminating paper had been produced, 
and the state council recommended death or blinding as the penalty. 
Influenced both by the pleas of his mother and by political considerations 
Jang opposed this, but told the British that the bharadars would insist 
on the extreme penalty unless they could be removed completely from Nepal
so that those who had condemned them would be safe from their future
vengeance. After lengthy consultation Dalhousie eventually agreed to
accept the three as state prisoners in the fort at Allahabad for five
years. in Karbir K h a t r i1s case it was considered sufficient to deprive
15
him of his caste by having untouchables urinate into his mouth. After
Jay Bahadur's death at Allahabad in September 1853 Jang requested the
release of Badri Narsingh and Upendra, both of whom had their property
restored, while Badri was entrusted with the key post of Governor of
Palpa. Karbir Khattri was already back in favour before the end of 
16
1852.
All of the information about this conspiracy is derived either from
Jang's account to the Resident or from Pudma Rana. It is presented at
length by Jain and subjected to his standard scepticism. He argues
that there was no assassination plot but that Jang moved against Badri
Narsingh because of his popularity with the army, which he had commanded
during Jang's absence, It was necessary for him to remove a dangerous
rival in view of the feeling against him in Kathmandu on the grounds that
17
he had become too close to the British. There is indeed reason to
doubt some details of Jang's story, and it is certainly true that his 
enthusiasm for Britain was not universally popular (see below, p.382), 
but, as usual, several of Jain's arguments are wide of the mark. He 
alleges/ for example, that Karbir could not have accused Jang of loss of 
caste by drinking wine because the purification he underwent at Banaras 
would have been accepted by the orthodox as wiping out any previous 
transgression. In fact if the purification ceremony had been regarded 
as a licence for every infringement of caste rules, there would have
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been no reason for the party to take the elaborate precautions which
they did against even being seen eating by the local population in
London and Paris. His suggestion that Bam collaborated with Jang to
bring false charges against Badri is also clearly wrong, for in 1856
the British Resident recorded that Jang had mistrusted him ever since
1851 because of the suspicion that at one stage he had actually intended
18
taking part in the conspiracy. Jain is also incorrect in asserting
that only Badri Narsingh actually confessed his guilt (a legal requirement
in Nepal before a defendant could be convicted). It is in fact clearly
stated in the British records that confessions were obtained from all
19
three of the principal conspirators.
Whether or not the dissidents had laid their plans as thoroughly as
Jang claimed, there is no reason to doubt that they all nursed grievances
against Jang. Jay Bahadur had come under suspicion before, and this had
20
been noted at the time by the British Resident. Pudma Rana may well
be correct in claiming he had a grudge against Jang since being detected
accepting a bribe two years previously; the fact that he was left as
21
head of the Sadav Daphtav Khana (Central Lands Assignment Office)
while Jang was in Europe is not the strong counter-evidence that Jain
makes it out to be, since Jang may well have thought it safer to keep him
in employment. Badri Narsingh was similarly said to have been disgraced
when Jang learned on his return to Kathmandu of his accepting a 12,000
rupees bribe to reinstate a subba (district administrator and revenue
22
collector) previously dismissed for corruption. This is probably a
reference to the case of Sivanidhi Jaisi, whom Jang had removed from 
office for oppressing the cultivators and whose reappointment earned 
both Badri and Bam Bahadur a severe rebuke in one of Jang's letters from
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Europe. Finally, Prince Upendra, whether or not unhappy over the
24
size of his jagix* or over Jang's correspondence with one of his wives, 
was probably resentful of the eclipse of the royal family by the Kunwars 
and believed Badri and Jay could offer him a higher status.
Jang told the British that at the council meeting to decide the 
conspirators1 punishment both Surendra and his father had been present 
and had declared that Upendra should suffer whatever penalty was fixed 
for the others. However, the claim that the plot was aimed at 
Surendra's life as well as Jang's is one of the more suspicious details 
in the 'official version1, and the sceptics are probably correct in 
thinking that both father and son were acting under duress. Upendra's 
disgrace, following upon the death of Queen Trailokya, will have weakened 
the non-intimidatory element in Jang's relationship with the royal family. 
Surendra's attempt at abdication that summer was a clear indication of 
his unhappiness with his situation. Jang's refusal to accept it suggests 
both his continuing need of the monarchy as a source of his own legitimacy, 
and his lack of confidence that he would be able to control either of the 
surviving queens, one of whom would have had to be appointed regent had 
the infant crown prince been put on the throne as his father wished.
With plots by Jang's opponents continuing both inside and outside the 
country, this constituted a disturbing weakness in his position.
In 1854 this situation was remedied with the first of a series of 
marriage alliance between his family and Surendra's. On 8 May Jang's 
eldest son, Jagat Jang, was married to the king's daughter. This was 
followed within a few days by Jang's own marriage to Hiranya Garbha 
Kumari, the sister of Fatah Jang Shah, who had been the most prominent 
victim at the Kot, and of Guru Prasad, one of the leading refugee
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bha.Ya.davs urging Rajendra to action in 1847 and since then an inveterate 
deviser of plots against Jang. Hiranya's family were collaterals of 
Surendra's, so that both marriages depended on the acknowledgement of 
the Kunwar Ranas 1 caste equality with the royal family. Such an 
acknowledgement had been almost granted by the 1848 tat mohav, but 
withheld by the ban on inter-marriage which was now removed. Why 
should this final step have waited until now? Possibly because Jagat 
and the princess, now eight and six years old respectively, were 
previously considered too young, but more probably because Surendra agreed 
to become part of an alliance between Shahs and Ranas worked out by Jang 
and Ranasher, the younger of Hiranya's two surviving brothers.
Ranasher Shah's important role in the consolidation of the Rana regime
is inadequately reflected in the literary sources, but can be deduced from
the frequence with which his name is coupled with Jang's in administrative
documents, from family tradition, and also as the most economical explanation
for developments in 1854. According to his present-day descendants he
was present at the Kot on the night of the massacre, but had remained
outside the main hall and was warned by Jang's youngest brother, Dhir
25
Shamsher, to make his escape. Ranasher accompanied ex-King Rajendra
to Alau but escaped back to India, and, in contrast with his brother
Guru Prasad who continued his attempts to procure Jang's assassination,
he appears to have remained quietly with his mother and sister at Bettiah,
where many of the Nepali refugees settled. Some of the exiles began
attempting to make their peace with Jang when he passed through Bihar
2 6
on his return from Europe at the end of 1850. Family tradition
claims that Ranasher took Hiranya back to Kathmandu in 1907 VS (i.e., 
the year to mid-Arpil 1851), while British sources place their return in
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spring 1854. In fact, it must have been before January 1854, when
Ranasher was a signatory of the new Mutuki- Avn. The family maintain 
that the main motive for the return was anxiety that a suitable husband 
for Hiranya could not be found, and there may be some truth in this since 
at twenty-three she was already well past the normal age for marriage.
It is possible that the marriage to Jang was only broached after they 
had sought pardon and been allowed back into the country, but rather more 
likely that the whole arrangement, including also Jagat Jang's marriage 
to Surendra's daughter, had been worked out in detail before they left 
Bettiah.
After her marriage, Hiranya persuaded Guru Prasad to return to
Kathmandu also, but he refused a position in the army offered by Jang,
28preferring to retire into private life as a land-holder in the Tarai.
Ranasher was made a Kaji, and in autumn 1856 was promoted to the rank of 
29cauntCLTa. In the meantime the links between the Shah and Rana families
were further strengthened with the marriage on 24 February 1855 of Jang's2
only other legitimate son, Jit Jang, to the king's second daughter, Nain
Laksmi Devi. A few days previously Jang's eldest illegitimate son, Bhim
Jang Bahadur, had married a grand-daughter of Rajendra's uncle, Ranodut 
30
Shah. On 30 April, Jang himself married a niece of Hiranya and
31
Ransher, the daughter of Birbahu Shah, who had died at the Kot.
When the first marriage with the royal family had taken place in 1854,
rumour had connected it with the approval that year of the Mutuk'i A'Lnr a
compilation of Nepali law which will be discussed below. The A'in was
supposed to have provided for female succession to the throne, so that if
the king's two sons died without issue it would go to Jang's daughter-in-
32
law or her male child. None of the texts of the A'in which have survived
321
contain such a provision, but Jang had certainly given thought to the
rules of succession. In 1851, when the king had talked of abdicating,
Jang had told Dr. Oldfield, the Residency Surgeon, that if Surendra and
his son (the second prince had not yet been born) died without male heirs,
the English system might be followed and Surendra's daughter accepted as 
33
successor.
If Jang had seen the marriages with the royal family as a possible
way of appropriating the crown, in 1856 he turned to a different strategy
of establishing his own family as royalty in their own right. On
31 July of that year, just after the conclusion of a war with Tibet on
terms amounting to a qualified Nepali victory, he resigned the premiership
in favour of his brother Bam Bahadur. The resignation took Kathmandu
completely by surprise, the Resident reporting that there were no rumoured
explanations available other than Jang1s own claim that he was simply
34tired of the burdens of office. Within twenty-four hours, however,
speculation was well under way. One theory, found plausible by the
Resident himself, was that Jang wished to avoid the unpopularity of
rescinding 1 , 2 0 0  promotions which had been made during the war and for
which there were no gagvrs available. Dhir Shamsher, Jang's youngest
brother, who visited the Residency on 1 August, gave what is probably
the key factor, namely that Jang had resigned in order to ensure that
his brothers would be kindly disposed to his own sons. This was consistent
with another rumour now circulating that Bam had been promised the
35
premiership when he revealed the 1851 plot.
Jang's strategy became clear on 6 August when the king issued a 
ZaZ mohar creating him Maharaja of Kaski and Lamjung, two former princedoms 
in central Nepal with which both the Shah dynasty and Jang1s own ancestors
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had been closely connected. The document confirmed Barn's appointment
36
as mukhtdyar, or as premier, and provided for that office to go in 
turn to each of the other Kunwar brothers and then to Jang1s eldest son.
As maharaja, however, Jang would have not only total control of Kaski and 
Lamjung but also the right to over-rule both the king and premier in both 
domestic and foreign affairs. As interpreted later by Jang's sons, the 
tat mohar stipulated that the title of maharaja should not be subject to 
agnate succession like the premiership but should pass direct from father 
to eldest son. This was disputed by Jang's brothers, however, and 
there is also uncertainty over precisely what powers should accompany 
the maharajaship after Jang's death. These are key issues for 
understanding both the constitutional structure that Jang was trying to 
set up and also the conflicts which later broke out amongst the Rana 
family. Is therefore necessary to look at the wording of the document 
in detail.
There is an initial difficulty in that several different versions
are now extant. The most authentic is probably that which is included
37
in the vamsavali. account. This corresponds almost exactly with the
'Abstract Translation' which was prepared by the Residency staff for
38
transmission to Calcutta. The correspondence in itself proves that
the vamsaVa'l'L version is a condensation of the original document, but
other versions which have survived are no fuller so we are still justified
in taking it as representative of the lost original The vamsaval'C
is translated below:
When my stepmother, having received from my father 
control of the military and civil administration 
including the pagan.'L and the power of life and death, 
killed our umraos and bharadars and attempted to place 
her son on the throne, you killed her partisans and 
installed me on the throne.
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You strengthened our friendship with the queen badsah 
(i.e., Queen Victoria) by paying a courtesy visit 
to her in Britain.
The Tibetans formerly continually intrigued against 
us, threatening us with the power of the Chinese 
emperor, but you defeated them in war, making them 
agree to pay an annual tribute.
39
When my father, plotting against you, sent men 
from Sagauli to kill you with a ZaZ mohar 
instructing the whole army to that effect, then came 
himself with his principal limraps as far as Alau for 
the same purpose, you destroyed his army but brought 
him back without harm to his royal person and treated 
him with honour.
When my second brother tried to take your life I 
ordered the army to kill him but you spared his life, 
put him in custody for five years to remove the 
creature and otherwise treated him with honour.
You have conducted the premiership so as not to cause 
distress to the UtnrctQS, army and peasantry of our 
country but treat them justly and keep them content.
You have stopped the diversion of revenue by vagabonds 
and tricksters and by putting up taxes where appropriate, 
found extra resources and increased the army without 
touching the ordinary revenues of the treasury.
Being pleased with these services and seeing you so 
well-intentioned, I had taken an oath that if you gave 
up the premiership I should give up the throne, but when 
you came to resign I forgot my oath. Because I was 
unable to consult my Ranis and the other uytraQS and you 
requested that I give the office of prime minister to 
your brother, I gave it him. I left you without 
employment but stayed on the throne and so went against 
my oath. If I keep so able a minister without 
employment, I shall appear foolish in the eyes of the 
world. Therefore I have given you the title of Maharaja 
of Kaski and Lamjung. If I should oppress my wnrctOSt 
peasantry or army, or jeopardise friendship with the 
queen bctdsah of England or the Chinese badsah, you as 
maharaja of your territory are not to allow me to do so. 
If when you try to restrain me I resort to force then 
my wnvaos and army should assist you. If prime minister 
Bam Bahadur should make any mistake in the military or 
civil pajand or in the work of strengthening friendship 
with the badsahs of England and China you are to warn 
him against it, and if he disregards your warning and 
acts violently, then I have given orders to my principal
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umraos and to the army to act under your instructions.
Make your kingdom happy! In the administration of 
justice I have given you the right and the kingly 
authority {ragadm) to inflict the death penalty. If 
any inhabitant of my country attempts to act against 
your kingdom, title or life, I have given you the 
authority to inflict the death penalty upon him.
Enjoy kingly authority down through the generations of 
your descendants (tdmra santandarsantansamma ragadmko 
bhog gara) . In the roll of succession to the 
mukhtiyarship which we had previously established for 
your brothers your son Jagat Jang Kunwar is to follow 
Dhir Shamsher Rana. Wednesday Sravan 5 Sudi 1913 
(6 August 1856).
The natural way of interpreting the penultimate sentence does seem to be
as Jang's sons claimed, vdz., that the title of maharaja should be kept
separate from the post of mukhtdyar and should be inherited by Jang's
direct descendants. The words tdmra santandarsantansamma (literally,
'up to your descendants upon descendants') could conceivably be taken
as applying both to Jang and his brothers, but this is very unlikely as
the notion of agnate succession is not introduced until the following
sentence. It is not surprising, therefore, that after the principle of
agnate succession to a combined post of maharaja and mukhtdyar had become
established, the wording of the ZaZ mohar needed to be 'improved'.
Chandra Shamsher Rana, Jang's nephew and maharaja from 1901 to 1929,
provided the British Resident of the day with an English version which
reversed the order of the final sentences:.
In the roll of mukhtiyarship bestowed by me in regard
to brothers, after the roll (term) of Dhere Sham
Shere Jung Rana, thy son Juggut Jung Bahadur Rana 
shalt succeed to mukhtiyarship and so on your (thy 
and thy brothers') generation after generation shall 
be made maharaja and mukhtiyar.^
Ah alternative solution was simply to use the vaguer phrase ananta kaZ
(for ever) as in a paraphrase of the ZaZ mohar found at the excise office
at H a m  in the eastern hills.
325
It is virtually certain, then, that Jang intended the maharajaship
to remain in his own direct line whilst the premiership was treated as
the property of the Kunwar brothers as a unit. What is much more
difficult to determine is whether he envisaged the supervisory powers
over the government of Nepal as a whole to be inherited along with the
title of maharaja and lordship of Kaski and Lamjung. The word vajaim
translated above as 'kingly authority1 because of the etymological
connection with vaja and vajya {'king' and 'kingdom') is normally
glossed as 'rule' or 'government'. Whichever meaning is taken it
could conceivably refer only to the government of the maharaja's own
mini-kingdom or to the whole range of powers listed in the tat mohav.
The various extant versions of the document opt sometimes for one
alternative and sometimes for the other. Kumar's translation, which
is based on the same vamsavati text as is used in this discussion, has
'Att this will be enjoyed by you up to offspring upon offspring' and the
42
translation offered by Rose has 'These vights will be enjoyed...' 
Similarly the Ilam text uses the phrase sabai ti hak (all these rights). 
In contrast, the British Residency's abstract translation has the more 
restrictive 'this tevTitovy...1 (italics all supplied). To the present 
writer it seems quite possible that the ambiguity is one which Jang 
himself had not resolved and the wording may have been left deliberately 
vague. If, as Resident Ramsay believed,at the time and most writers 
have assumed since, Jang saw the title of maharaja as merely an interim 
step on the road to supplanting the Shah dynasty completely, Jagat Jang 
could hope to inherit the throne of Nepal outright and the question of 
the future relationship of maharaja and premier would not arise.
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Whatever Jang's long-term intentions, he retained full effective 
control of Nepali policy, Bam Bahadur acting throughout in accordance
43
with his instructions and actually signing a dharmapatra to that effect.
When Bam died in May 1857, the Resident could inform Calcutta with
complete confidence that it would not make the slightest difference to
44
either external or internal policy. The next brother in seniority,
Krishna Bahadur, was appointed acting premier. Despite remaining in
de facto control of the government Jang had been unable to secure any
official British recognition of his special position: the Resident,
determined not to provide Jang with any encouragement to make a final move
to displace Surendra, continued to insist that he was accredited to the
king and could only deal with him or his minister. The situation became
particularly galling to Jang when news of the outbreak of the Indian
Mutiny reached Kathmandu and discussions began with the Residency on
45
the offer of Nepali assistance to the British. Accordingly, pleading
the 'persuasion1 of the king and the bhavadavi-, he resumed the premiership
on 28 June. The tat mohar of appointment gave formal recognition to the
46
powers which he had in fact never ceased to exercise.
The reappointment was, as Jain points out, a violation of the roll
of succession to the premiership as laid down in the tat mohar of the 
47
previous summer. It was made acceptable to his brothers by allowing
Krishna as commander-in-chief to continue to receive the pay he had
received as premier and adjusting the salaries of the three remaining
brothers accordingly. It was also arranged that Krishna was to manage
internal affairs (subject of course to Jang's power of veto), whilst Jang
48
himself was in direct control of external policy. This established a
division of responsibility which was to hold good throughout the Rana
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period. Ranoddip, Jagat Shamsher and Dhir Shamsher, were given
responsibility for the western, southern and eastern areas of the country,
an arrangement soon to crystallise into the standard Rana hierarchy of
Western, Southern, Eastern and (a later addition) Northern Commanding 
49
Generals.
In terms of his formal relationship with the king Jang's new 
position could be seen as a step backwards, because although he retained 
his position as maharaja, as prime minister he was once again in theory 
a royal servant. He had, however, been able to reinforce the quasinroyal 
status of his own family by another marriage bond. On 25 June, a few 
days before his reappointment, two of his daughters, were married to the 
Crown Prince, Trailokya. The lat mohar formally proposing the matches 
had been issued the previous month, and spelt out the caste equality of 
the partners by stipulating that the prince would accept the most ritually 
sensitive food, boiled rice, from his wife's hand .5 1 Although hypergamous 
marriage (with consequent restriction on commensality between husband and 
wife) was common in Nepal, hypogamous unions were not permitted and the 
previous marriages of Jang's sons to the king's daughters ought in 
themselves to have removed any question of the Kunwars' caste status being 
inferior to the Shahs'. The fact that the point still had to be laboured 
suggests that the irregularity of the whole arrangement had not wholly 
be overcome. The doubts will, however, have been confined to the most 
rigidly conservative and no one will have ventured to voice them.
The relationship between king and maharaja-prime minister established 
in 1857 would remain in the same mould until 1951. Intermarriage between 
Shahs and Ranas continued in each subsequent generation, so that the 
restoration of the monarchy's political supremacy in 1951 can in some
ways be seen as an exchange of places between two branches of one family.
Also to persist throughout the Rana period was the admission of the king's
formalr and especially ritual supremacy, in stark contrast to his lack
of real power over the administration. Jang and his successors as
maharaja were kings themselves if the strict sense of their title is
pressed, but they were at an altogether lower level of numinosity than the
maharajadhirdj. There was thus a separation between the religious and
secular aspects of Hindu kingship which were surveyed in the first chapter
Although Jang would probably have preferred to unite both species
of supremacy in his own person, and might, as Rose suggests, have declared
52
himself king if the Tibetan war had ended in a more triumphant fashion
he and his successors accepted and indeed‘exploited the king's ritual
superiority. One writer was consequently even led to suggest that the
belief in the king's status as an avatar of Vishnu was created by the
Ranas as part of a strategy to use him as a source of legitimacy whilsti
53
keeping him isolated from contact with his subjects. This is, of
course, to ignore the antiquity of the religious conception of kingship,
but it probably is true that the Ranas deliberately reinforced it. The
approach was one which Bhimsen Thapa.had pioneered, when in the 1830s
he had sought to persuade Rajendra that the king's chief duty 'was and
ought to be the reception of his subjects' worship and homage as God's
54
representative on earth and not a meddling with temporal.concerns'.
However minimal the Shah dynasty's actual power under the Rana regime, 
the doctrine that government rested on their consent could not be violated 
When Jang Bahadur's sons were ousted by their Shamsher cousins in 1885 
the latter took the infant King Prithvi to the army barracks to ensure the 
support of the troops, 'whose loyalty to the throne', one of the defeated
55
party explained afterwards, '[was] almost a passion1. When in 1950
King Tribhuvan escaped from Rana custody and put himself at the head of 
the regime's opponents there could be no question of supplanting the 
dynasty, rather the Ranas tried to place his infant grandson on the throne. 
Tribhuvan's victory left the monarchy in an unchallengeable position, 
strengthened in fact by the Rana period because its sacred aura had been 
protected and indeed enhanced, while its century-long secular powerlessness 
absolved it from responsibility for the country's economic backwardness 
and for the 'collaborationist' policy towards the British Raj.
Relations with the Bhavadav'i
The killings and expulsions that marked Jang's accession to power in 
1846 eliminated many of the leading bhavadaTQ and ensured that the newly- 
constituted bhavadaTt- were all men ostensibly committed to his own 
interests. None the less, they remained a potential source of opposition 
opposition as well as of support, and maintenance of their loyalty was 
essential.
A convenient starting point for a discussion of the political elite in
the early years of the Rana regime is the list of 219 officials who
5 6
attested the Mulukt A'in (legal code) promulgated in January 1854.
The signatories are listed in order of importance, and the first ninety-two
names can therefore be made the basis for a comparison with the list of
ninety-two bhavadavs who signed the 1841 guarantee of goodwill for the then
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Resident, Brian Hodgson. . The following Table shows the distribution 
of posts between the various thars and caste groups. Members of the same 
thap were not -ipso facto even distantly related, but major changes in a 
thav’s representation are in fact normally the result of a change in
TA
BL
E 
il
l 
TH
AR
 
AN
D 
CA
ST
E 
D
IS
TR
IB
U
TI
O
N
 
OF
 
SE
N
IO
R
 
PE
R
SO
N
N
EL
: 
18
41
 
AN
D 
18
5
4
3 30
r o  cni | r ' -
io c  -a
JZ ■<- Cx> to
ro :3 to 4->
Ol r- loo
I -4-I-3-
C£
< 0
O CD C
< ro
2 : <
SZ JZ 
co ro 
j z  JZ 
c o  c o
CV)|c|C0
TO 4-5 ro • r - ro <r~ CO
CD *o to 4-) P •P »r- z* P ro 4->.r to (D to
•r* c c 44 ro O P t j 4-5 2 ro JZ r — *o Q._C lO ro to CDJZ to P TO ro c JZ *«-"> C ro
XJ ro JZ O o _ c ro JZ JZ d ro ro ro <0 SI
< □Q CQ m CQ CQ o 2 : 2 : Cl t—
4-3
Z)
to JZ
Q .
Z> • n
O O--- C
P  CN
CD 1 <
C 0
P JZ
o Cl 4-5
JZ CL
<D <D JZ
O >
O C
5  JZ £
4-J ro o
XJ
C CD
O CD X J
C V) • r-
ro
44 i—
3
_Q to >»
JZ
<D p a
p 4-5 p
D <D ro
Cl  JZ p
O 0
> i *r-
JZ
p
to ro ,—
o p 1—
i»— o ro
c c p
JZ o 0
o JZ >
CD O
4-*
to 0
0 ro JZ
P 4-5
a) x>
£ (D C
X ) • r -
p
c to to
o CD 4-5
*r- 0 C
4-> p i r -
o o
to >1 CL
p
4-5 JZ 4-5
X to C
CD JZ 0
o P
to p 0
ro Q - 4 -
-C M-
i t : a> »f—
p XJ
<4- 0
O £ 4-5
ro
c to
CD c XJ
E o 0
X ) 44
0 4-5 13
(D JZ
P (0
4— O P
CL 4->
to
(O JZ • r—
0) CD XJ
4-5 JZ 0
P P
to C TO
JZ
o to
to 0
XJ r — 4-5
c CO (0
ro a TO
XJ o
V)
p > p
(0 ro
CDTJ 5to c 0
2 : • r- Z
i r o  i i  cd
2  <0 < i- (D >,2: (o co > ,.c
X  now ■!-C'04->-a‘at-]
C  > , ' r  io «  m c  c  3  nj u
Q3 c i o r o o n i o i o  Q .X :
CQ < - 3 “ 0 - > i s : D . C L Q . = ) + J
331
fortune of one particular family. This is shown most dramatically by 
the increase enjoyed by the Kunwars and the drastic decline suffered by 
the (Khas) Pandes. The stability of the Basnet total, on the other hand, 
reflects an ability to maintain their place through successive changes of 
regime.
The key feature of the new bhavadari, was the elite position given to
Jang's own immediate relatives. As well as the most senior positions, his
brothers, sons and nephews received regular pay increases whilst the
salaries of other functionaries generally remained static from year to 
58
year. Most importantly, they were included on the Roll of Succession
to the premiership. The rights of Jang's full brothers to the succession
may already have been agreed by 1854; it had at any rate been decided
upon before August 1856, for in the tat mohav of that month conferring
the title of maharaja the king added Jang's son Jagat Jang to 'the roll
of mukhtiyarship which I have established (hami-te badh'tbakseko) for your 
59
brothers'. A roll of thirty names, including second and (in the case
of Jang's grandchildren) third generation Ranas was promulgated in 1868.^
It has been generally accepted that the adoption of the agnative
principle was intended by Jang as a device to secure the continued loyalty 
(51
of his brothers. As a witness of the part which Ranbir Thapa had
played in the downfall of his brother Bhimsen, Jang must have realised 
the paramount importance of maintaining family unity, and the 1851 plot 
against him can only have strengthened that conclusion. The wish to 
prevent a minor succeeding to the premiership with the consequent risk 
of instability may have been an additional factor, but cannot have been 
the decisive one; Jang was much less likely in the 1850s to have been 
worried about immediate political difficulties than the long-term prospects.
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As Jain points out, the system did not in fact prevent strife breaking 
out within the family after Jang's death, but it was an adequate response 
to the demands of his lifetime and even afterwards Rana solidarity 
remained sufficient to protect their rule from outside challenges.
Jang's most important non-Rana ally was arguably Vijay Raj Pande, 
whose role at the Kot and in the Bhandarkhal affair and in providing 
legitimation for Jang's claim to caste equality with the royal family has 
already been highlighted. In contrast with the nonchalant attitude he 
adopted towards Surendra (at least in British company) Jang was careful 
to treat Vijay with respect in public. Laurence Oliphant, who met Jang 
on board ship when he was returning from Europe in 1850 and was invited 
to accompany him back to Kathmandu, was particularly struck with the 
deference he had shown towards the rajguru at Banaras and believed that
6 2part of Jang's popularity in Napal was due to his friendship with Vijay.
It is arguable that the belittling attitude towards Vijay displayed in 
Pudma Rana's book reflects Jang's wish in later life to play down his 
early dependence on him. None the less, whatever may have been said 
between family members in private, the special link between Pandes and 
Ranas was recognised in 1863 by an order promising that Vijay and his 
descendants would remain gurus to Jang and his descendants. This
3
paralleled a similar undertaking to the Pandes from King Surendra.
In later years the role of personal guru to the Ranas was in fact shared
between different Brahman families, presumably because, like the Shah
kings before 1846, the Ranas thought it safer not to allow a monopoly in
64
such a sensitive area. On the other hand, the Pandes were permitted
to retain their monopoly as personal gurus to the royal family until
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after the fall of the Rana regime: when the royal family no longer
exercised real political power their gurus 1 role became of less political 
significance.
While Vijay Raj and his close relatives eclipsed the Mishras and
Paudyals, another branch of the Pande family took over the role of the
65
Aryal family in providing the king's purohi-t. Tirtha Raj Pande
appears in this position in the Mutuki A'in list. In compensation the 
Aryals, who had been rajgurus themselves in the earliest days of the 
Shah dynasty, were at least allowed to retain the post of khajanci,, or 
state treasurer. Shiva Prasad Aryal remained for many years in this 
post, which he had assumed some time before 1846. This position lost 
something in importance, however, with the creation of a second khajanci-.
The cauntaras as a group retained little of their former importance, 
and there is no evidence that either Samser Jang or Kulchandra (the 
latter a former ally of the Kala Pandes during the turbulent 1839-40 
period), enjoyed particular influence. The number of posts held by them 
at lower levels in the bhar.adari- declined spectacularly after 1846, as 
Table III shows, and they were clearly the group which lost most heavily 
through the changes of 1846-7. Only one individual, Ransher Shah, 
appears as a contradiction to their general decline. As has already 
been suggested, he probably played a major role in preparing the way for 
the Shah-Rana marriage alliances. A kaji in 1854, he was soon to become 
Jang's brother-in-law and also principal cauntara. His place on the 
list of signatories to the A'in, immediately after the Rana officers and 
before Vijay's family, is symptomatic of his personal importance.
A prominent place among the Khas bharadars went to relatives of Jang 
by marriage. The appointments of Hemdal Thapa, father of Jang's son-in-law
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Gajraj, of Sanak Singh Khatri, his own brother-in-law, and of Kulman
Singh Basnet, brother of Jang's late father-in-law, have already been
commented upon. The first two seem to have remained in Jang's confidence
without a break. Kulman Singh Basnet, on the other hand, is missing
from the K'itabkhana record for 1848, possibly because his nephew,
Meghambir Basnet, Jang's brother-in-law, was involved in an alleged plot
against Jang in the autumn of that year.^ His cousin Jitman, who
afterwards disappears from the records, is shown as a kagi in his place
that year, and Kulman himself was soon back in office where he remained
into the 1860s. Kulman and Hemdal are shown as colonels in the register,
for 1855, when a reorganisation of the hierarchy that year had downgraded
the post of kagi which henceforth carried a salary of only 3,200 to 3,600 
67
rupees per annum. Sanak Singh reached the higher rank of Commander-
Colonel, the only non-Rana to do so.
Jang's childhood friend Ran Mehar Adhikari, who had played a key
role both at the Kot and at Bhandarkhal, would have been another member of
68
this group had he not died in 1852. The b'ivta grant conferred on him
in 1846 was later confirmed in his sons' names, but none of them became
69
political prominent. It is now known whether the Captain Juddha Bir
Adhikari on the 1854 list was a relative.
A second Khas group consisted of a few men who had been closely
associated either with Bhimsen or Mathbar Singh Thapa. Most important
of these was probably Mathbar's adherent, Dilli Singh Basnet, described
by Resident George Ramsay in 1852 as one of the few- bhavadars prepared
70
openly to contradict Jang's opinions. A savdav in 1848, he was a kagi
when he accompanied Jang to Britain in 1850, then, like Hemdal and Kulman,
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exchanged the title for that of colonel in 1855. He was made Chief
Colonel in charge of the Tarai districts in the early 1860s and was
succeeded in this post by his grandson, Bhakta Bahadur, on his death in 
71
1873. The involvement of his elder brother Bhotu Basnet in a plot
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against Jang in 1852 had not shaken confidence in his loyalty.
Kaji Umakant Upadhya had served as vakil in Calcutta and as head
of the treasury during Bhimsen's time. Because of his activities in the
latter capacity, an attempt to recover two lakh rupees from him was made
73
by the Pande administration in 1839. Umakant, according to Hodgson,
had pfayed a central role in a system of trading monopolies set up for
74
the benefit of Bhimsen and his closest associates, Jang was to set up
a similar system and part of Upadhya's usefulness may have been his
expertise in this line.
Another former Thapa adherent was Captain Lai Singh Khatri, who had
been arrested four months after Mathbar1s death for carrying out orders
75
of which the new administration disapproved. He was a fluent English-
speaker, having been taught by Brian Hodgson when subedar in charge of
76
the Nepali guard at the Residency in the early 1840s, He was almost
certainly the first Nepali to publish in that language, contributing a
letter to the Illustrated London Hews on the subject of the Nepal-Tibet
77
border when he was in London with Jang in 1850. His special expertise
was to be used again in the late 1850s when he was a Nepal Government 
Agent in Calcutta with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and then again 
as a full colonel when he brought news of the 1885 coup by Dhir Shamer's 
sons to the British Residency.
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Another clearly identifiable group amongst the bharadari were
Newar financial administrators, several of whom were in 1854 serving
in the grade of subba; holders of this title had originally been district
revenue collectors but might also hold general administrative powers in
their areas. By Jang's time, subbas were additionally employed as the
7 8
heads of certain offices in the central government. Most conspicuous
were the three Rajbhandari brothers - Ratnaman, Siddhiman and Meherman,
79
the first two of whom held the higher ranks of mir subba and amir subba.
None are mentioned in Hodgson's 1843 bharadari list, which includes only
five subbas, all of them Brahmans in charge of Tarai districts, and no
Newar other than Mir Munshi Laksmi Das. Ratnaman and Siddhiman probably
first came to prominence in 1845/6, since Jang describes them in a letter
80
as proteges of Abhiman Singh Rana and Gagan Singh respectively. Their
appointment may well have been the result of disenchantment with plains
Brahmans such as Hira Lai J'ha, who had fallen foul of Surendra, and
Motahari district collector Girij Datt Misra, who according to oral
tradition in Janakpur had managed to divert most of the revenue into his 
81
own pockets. In a letter written during his 1850 European journey,
Jang denounced both Ratnaman and Siddhiman as oppressors of the peasantry,
82
and he actually imprisoned Ratnaman on his return to Nepal, yet he 
continued to use the family's services. Ratnaman was soon back in 
charge of the Tarai district of Bara and continued in that post at least 
until 1854/5, whilst Siddhiman took charge of the day-to-day running 
of the old government treasury, the Kausi Tosakhana, and then became one 
of the two khanganehis (state treasurers) before returning to Tarai 
administration in 1858. He was made a colonel in 1861, despite the
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fact that Newars were not accepted into the army as ordinary soldiers.
Meherman Singh was for many years deputy head of the Muluk.'ik.h.ana, a new
central treasury set up by Jang in parallel with the old Kaus'i Tosakhana.
In 1863 he was in charge of the Tarai district of Sarlahi, with the rank
84
of lieutenant-colonel.
Alongside the Rajbhandaris, other Newars such as Dhan Sundar and 
Hriday Ratna worked as revenue collectors for Patan and Bhadgaon 
respectively. Dhan Sundar was a member of the Salmi or Manandhar (oil 
presser) caste, and later in the fifties other Manandhars appear in the 
K'itab Khana lists, probably all relatives of Dharma Narayan Manandhar, a 
financier who was a close associate of Jang's and who purchased many of 
the commodity monopolies against which the British Resident railed (see 
below, p . 376). These newcomers' duties were generally the collection of 
excise duties on substances such as tobacco, for which they were themselves 
probably monopoly suppliers. ^ '
The Newars did not entirely displace the Brahmans who had been the 
most frequent appointees as subbas previously - the Brahman Laksmapati 
Jaisi, for example, subba in charge of Saptari district in 1843 and 1846, 
was collecting revenue in Morang in 1854/5, despite having earned Jang's 
displeasure for similar reasons to Siddhiman and Ratnaman in the 
meanwhile.^ There can be no doubt, however, of the special reliance 
which Jang came to place on men such as Siddhiman and pharma Narayan.
A mark of his favour was the royal order of 1848 permitting the chhathav'iya 
Newar thavs (the most prestigious section of the Shrestha Newars, who 
are ranked as Jtsatviyas) to adopt certain marriage customs, such as the 
groom's carrying of the khalas dr sacred pot, which had hitherto been
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allowed to the higher Indo-Nepali castes only. Both Siddhiman and
88
Laksmi Das, the m'iv munsh't, availed themselves of the privilege.
There is also a disputed tradition that Dharma Narayan's Salmi caste
was raised from impure to pure non-twice-born status by Jang as a reward
89
for services in the 1855-6 war with Tibet. This cannot be true as it
stands, for Dhan Sundar was a subba in the early fifties and could not
have held such a position as a member of an impure caste: confusion has
arisen because of the low status of the corresponding caste in India and,
if the Nepal Salmis were regarded as impure at one time, their elevation
will have taken place under the Newar kings of the Valley before the 
90
Ghorkha conquest. On the other hand, it is admitted by some Manandhars
today that a number of families.were at one time regarded as outcastes,
and it is possible that Jang confirmed the status of the whole caste
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when it had been brought into dispute.
Jang1s patronage of particular Newar families did not amount to a
new deal for the Newars as a whole, for they remained a suspect group
in.Indo-Nepali eyes. The individuals who made the greatest gains in
status were Hindu, not Buddhist Newars, and they accepted a high 'degree
of cultural assimilation. Laksmi Das' family, for instance, were to
become known to later generations as the 'Newar Ranajis 1 in view of the
92
assiduity with which they followed the customs of their masters.
Oldfield, who knew them both, wrote of Laksmi and Siddhiman as having
93
been !raised(?) from the rank of Niwar to that of Parbattiah1. They
were none the less still regarded as Newars by the dominant ethnic group, 
and it was perhaps precisely because as such they could have no hope of 
reaching the most powerful position that they were safe confidants for 
Jang.
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The various groups so far identified leave unaccounted for a 
considerable proportion of the 1854 list, including in particular most of 
the thirty-three captains, who will presumably have been those attached 
to the hampu battations, In many cases they must have been relatives 
of individuals already described, but the links cannot at the moment be 
demonstrated, and it must be remembered that possession of the same 'bhav 
does not in itself prove a family connection. Their loyalty was retained 
not so much by the level of pay they received, but by the prospect of 
future promotion and because the expansion of both the army and the civil 
service increased the changes of employment for their relatives. The 
army increased in size from 18,971 in 1846 to 26,659 in 1863, almost the 
entire increase taking place in the politically important kampu, whilst 
the civilian payroll went from 2,997 to 4,226 over the same period.^
Thus the initial support for the new regime which the many promotions 
following the Kot Massacre had generated was further consolidated as the 
patronage in Jang's hands steadily expanded.
How far was the bhctvccdo.V'L as a whole influential in policy decisions?
An extreme view advanced by the Resident, George Ramsay, in 1864 was that
it counted for nothing at all. Dismissing Jang's claim that it was
politically impossible for him to open the country to British merchants,
he wrote as follows:
[Jung Bahadoor] is himself the obstacle to all free 
intercourse between Nepal and the British Provinces, 
he is the mainspring of the Goorkhas' policy. All
restrictions emanate from himself and not, as he
wishes to make it believed, from the Sirdars, There 
is not a Sirdar in the country who has a voice in the 
matter. His Excellency's power is absolute; he can 
do■what he pleases; his word is law; his Government 
is the most perfect autocracy that can be imagined; 
he could throw open the country tomorrow to English 
merchants if he willed it, and without a dissentient 
voice being heard, but he does not choose to do so...
340
It is indeed true that formal meetings of the bhavadav't - or 'Grand 
Council' as British sources sometimes describe - were rare, but Ramsay's 
picture is in fact a gross exaggeration, contradicting much other 
evidence, including that of his own earlier despatches, and explicable 
only in terms of his frustration at Jang's habit of sheltering behind the 
bhavadars r real or imagined feelings whenever asked to do something 
inconvenient by the Government of India.
In the first place, whatever limitations there might be on the formal
processes of consultation, Jang had always to contend with the possibility
of 'extra-systemic' opposition in the shape of the many plots and
conspiracies against him, especially in the early years of his rule. As
has already been seen, these could involve even his closest relatives, as
well as non-Rana bharadars. Basnets were particularly prominent in this
activity, including the affairs of Meghambhir and Bhotu Basnet noted above,
and also a plot to assassinate him when he left Kathmandu in December 1857
96
at the head of a force marching to assist the British at Lucknow.
The warning given in Chapter Five against seeing such activity as 
necessarily a family enterprise still stands, but it is reasonable to 
suppose that Basnets in general were particularly liable to chafe at 
their subordination to the Kunwars, since they were numerous enough amongst 
the bhavadav-i to make aspirations for higher things seem not entirely 
unrealistic.
Such opposition to Jang could to some extent be regarded as simply 
the result of the (relatively) 'outs' against the 'ins', but attitudes 
were also shaped by policy issues, and in particular by Jang's relations 
with the British, It is abundantly clear from the writings of the 
Britons who accompanied Jang back to Kathmandu, in 1850, and from Ramsay's
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letters after his appointment to the Nepal Residency in 1852, that
considerable opposition to Jang existed and that the belief that he was
now too close to the British was a factor in this. The role of such
feeling in 1851 plot has already been considered (above, p.316)f and it
was still causing Ramsay considerable anxiety over a year later. He
suggested in a private letter to his cousin, the Governor-General Lord
Dalhousie, that Jang was showing a disregard for caste and other religious
prejudices which could result in his fall if not stopped. Such a belief
on the Resident's part had indeed been partly fostered by Jang himself
telling the new arrival that the bhavadavs sometimes taunted him with
being an Englishman, but it was substantiated by instances such as Jang's
draining the sacred pool or Rani Pokhari and defying the ban on sexual
relations with outcastes by riding around in public with a Muslim dancing- 
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girl. Nor surprisingly Dalhousie suggested in reply that 'the chief
practical result of [Jang's] civilisation will be that he will get his
throat cut some time before that event would otherwise have occurred in
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the common course of nature in Nepal1. In later years Ramsay was to
come to believe that the picture of Jang as a progressive ruler held back
by the prejudices of his countrymen was a totally false one deliberately
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planted by the premier himself, whereas in fact this was only part of 
the truth and Jang had also had to modify his more impetuous reactions 
to his exposure to Europe in order to appease political feeling among 
the bharadars.
As well as having to take some account of the general climate of 
opinion amongst senior office-holders, Jang would not doubt consult 
directly on some occasions, even through peremptory command was a style 
which came easily to him, as the tone of his letters to his brother from Europe
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shows. There was an inevitable tendency for bhavadavs to give the
advice they thought the premier wanted to hear, but there were a few
individuals, such as Dilli Singh Basnet, not afraid to speak their 
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minds, Jang's brothers, though at times very deferential to him,
were at least once prepared to correct him openly in front of the British
Resident (see below), and must therefore have often offered very frank
advice in private. It is probable that the real debate took place on
an informal level with few people present, and that fuller meetings of
the bhavadavi- when they took place had more of a rubber-stamp quality.
This was probably the case with the bhavadavd sessions which decided on
Rajendra's deposition and on the punishment of the 1851 conspirators (in
the latter case the bhavadavs supposedly argued for a severer penalty
than Jang himself wanted to inflict, but they will have done so out of
the conviction that this was what Jang wanted them to say, so that
proceedings were a ritual performance rather than a genuine debate).
The existence of this contrast between two levels is the most likely
explanation of the conflict in the sources over the decision to support
the British in the sepoy revolt. This was formally debated on 27 July
1857, after the first troops had been sent down to the plains, but while
Jang was pressing an offer of additional troops. The meeting was attended
by bha.VQ.da.VQ down to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, which will have
included mostly members of the Rana family but also prominent non-Ranas
such as Hemdal Thapa, Dilli Singh Basnet and others. Jang asked those
present whether they were prepared to support his policy, making it clear
that if they did so they would have to share the responsibility should
anything go wrong. The result, according to the Resident's report sent
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two days later to Calcutta, was a unanimous endorsement. This is
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seemingly contradicted by many other accounts: according to Pudma Rana
opinions were offered in favour of joining the British, joining the rebels,
and also in favour of staying completely neutral, whilst the vamsavat'L
records that all of the bhavadavs spoke against giving support but were 
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overruled by Jang. In addition, one of Jang's brothers told Ramsay
In June, before the council had met, that he was under pressure from
many leading men to join the rebellion, and similar sentiments were
expressed to a subsequent Resident in 1877 by Dhir Shamsher, the youngest
of the brothers. Rajguru Vijay Raj Pande was most conspicuous amongst
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those convinced that British rule in India was now doomed. Jain
implies that all the accounts of opposition to Jang's policy were
fabrications aimed at persuading the British of the obstacles he was
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overcoming in their interest, but the more plausible explanation is
that such opposition did exist but that no one was prepared to vote openly
against Jang once his own opinion was made totally clear. Ramsay
certainly continued to believe that the anti-British faction might yet
carry the day, for he warned in October 1858 of possible danger from
those in Nepal 'who have not the same wholesome dread of our power that
[Jang] has, and who may impel him, in spite of his own inclinations, to
break faith with us, and to try to extend the Goorkha possessions into
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the provinces of Dumaon and Darjeeling1. Such worries were to remain
until the final elimination of rebel fugitives from the Nepal Terai in 
the winter of 1859-60. Jang's government may have struck Ramsay four 
years later in peacetime as a 'perfect autocracy', but in time of crisis 
a more complex reality came into play. The 'iron law of oligarchy' 
applied in Rana Nepal as it did anywhere else.
344
The Army
The support of the army had been crucial to Jang's attainment of 
power and its continued loyalty was the most essential single factor in 
his regime's survival. This was partly secured by Jang's own personal 
popularity with the troops, which rested on his reputation for bravery 
and possibly on sympathy shown earlier in his career for the problems of 
the ordinary soldier. This hold over the men was commented on by various 
British observers, including one who witnessed the tearful farewell at 
Calcutta between Jang and his favoured Rifle Regiment in 1850, and another 
who, during the Mutiny crisis, contrasted the Gurkhas’ loyalty to Jang
2.06with their attitude towards other officers regarded as less courageous.
Despite this, however, Edwards is probably correct to argue that it was
107
the material rewards offered that had the greater importance.
Rates for pay for the army, and in particular for the kampu regiments
at Kathmandu, had been a major source of contention during the early
forties, but by December 1843 the normal pay for a private had been
brought down to 72 rupees per year, compared with the rate of 80-100 for
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the kampu prevailing under Bhimsen. The data for rates under Jang are
regrettably rather less clear. The table presented by Orfeur Cavenagh, 
the liaison officer who accompanied Jang on his 1850 journey to Europe 
and returned with him to Kathmandu, has sepoys receiving between 100 and 
300 rupees, whereas the calculations of the cost of the increase in army 
strength to 1863 given in a register at the Jangi Adda (War Office) imply 
a figure of only 50 rupees for the k a m p u . The same register does, 
however, give 1 1 0  to 1 2 0  as the rate for privates in the vissala (cavalry) 
regiment, whilst the Rifle Regiment, Jang's own elite corps which was
110raised after 1846, paid between 200 and 400, according to a British report.
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Cavenagh had therefore presumably taken preferential rates for standard
ones. The Jangi j4c?tfa(War Office) register is in fact consistent with
other evidence indicating that the pay of privates outside Kathmandu did
1 1 1
range between 36 to 50 rupees. The rate for the kampu must, however,
have been substantially higher than this: the December 1843 rates were
increased under Mathbar and although there was talk of reductions in 1845
(see above, p.263), there would surely have been some record in the
sources if this had actually been implemented. A kampu private's actual
pay under Jang may well have been close to the 110 rupees received by
cavalry troopers.
As with private soldiers, the pay rates recorded for officers show
wide discrepancies. Cavenagh1s figures are again far too high with
captains, for example, ascribed a salary of 3,000 to 4,000 rupees whereas
the Karnyandavi Kitab Khana record for 1863 shows lieutenant-colonels only
11#2
receiving from 1,800 to 4,366. In contrast, the Jangi Adda analysis
of the kampu gives figures for captain and lieutenant, 900 and 675 rupees
respectively, which tally with those for these ranks in regiments outside
the capita], given in the Ki-tab Khana documents and also for the cavalry
113
regiment (part of the kampu) in the Jangi Adda register itself.
There is no evidence that kampu officers, as opposed to private soldiers,
necessarily received more pay than their non-kampu equivalents, and it
must therefore be assumed that these figures are correct. The rate for
a captain is thus less than one-third of the pay for that rank prescribed
114
by the veduoed scale brought in in 1836/7. This is explicable if one
takes into account the effective down-grading of the rank which had 
occurred in the meantime: whereas Hodgson in 1843 could write of a
Nepali captain as the equivalent of a British colonel, this had changed with
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the introduction of the new grade of 'major captain1 between 1844 and 
115
1846. The 1863 lieutenant's rate of 675 rupees was 200 less than
the 1836/7 salary, but was the same as the old sudebars' rate, presumably 
because subedars had been given a notional promotion to lieutenant when 
'major captains' were introduced. In a similar fashion, the subedars 
shown by the Jangi, Adda register on 254 rupees equate to the 1837 j emadars 
on 205. The change had resulted in the elimination of jemadar as a rank 
in the kampu by 1846 (see Table IV). This structure, which was most 
probably brought in by Mathbar Singh, was modified by Jang with the 
reintroduction of jemadars, a large increase in the numers of lieutenants, 
the introduction of the new rank of lieutenant-colonel, and increases in 
the numbers of colonels and generals. The very highest ranks were of 
course monopolised by the Ranas themselves, but, taking the total numbers 
of officers from jemadar up to lieutenant-colonel, covering in 1863 a 
pay range of 126 to 3,068 rupees, one obtains a total for the kampu of 
635 posts. In contrast, in 1846 posts in the rame range totalled only 
222, so that Jang's first seventeen years in power saw not only a steep 
absolute rise in the number of higher-paid posts, but also an improvement 
in the ordinary soldier's perceived chances of promotion, since the ratio 
of posts paying over 1 0 0  rupees to the total strength of the kampu went 
from 1:58 to 1:30. The strategy thus appears to have been one of securing 
the loyalty of the mass of the troops not by increasing their basic pay, 
but by holding out the prospect of advancement before them. If, as is 
likely, recruitment was often from families which already had members 
serving, the increased prospect of employment for one's kin brought by 
the army's expansion will have further strengthened the bond between the 
troops and the premier.
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An exception to the standard pattern was made in the case of the
Rifle Regiment, which was set up after 1846 and became the elite of the
kampu. The pay of an ordinary soldier in this regiment ranged between
200 and 400 rupees per annum, thus placing him in a vastly superior
position to his comrades in the other units. The Sri Nath and Letar
regiments, which had once been the most favoured part of the Kathmandu
garrison, now seem to have received no special treatment. Their loss of
status probably preceded Jang's coming to power, since their numerical
116
strength in 1846 was similar to that of the other units.
In addition to the use of material incentives, Jang sought to 
strengthen his hold over the army by exploiting ethnic diversity. Up 
until 1846 troops had been recruited from only three ethnic groups - the 
Indo-Nepali (excluding the low castes and thus comprising Thakuris, Khas 
and Brahmans only), the Magars and the Gurungs. According to Hodgson's 
1839 account all the officers were drawn from the first group alone,
117
whilst the other two accounted for about half of the NGOs and privates.
Certain families such as that of the Magar general Abhiman Singh Rana,
were treated as 'honorary Khas/Chetris', whilst the ordinary Magars and
Gurungs were dispersed through all units of the army. In 1847 Jang
altered the traditional pattern by throwing open recruitment to the
118
Kiranti tribes (Rai and Limbus) of the eastern hills. Perhaps at
the same time, and at any rate before 1850, he decided to segregate the
different groups in his own regiments. The intention, as he explained
it to Captain Cavenagh during his European journey, was to minimise the
119
danger of mutiny spreading from one regiment to the others. The
account in the Resident's report of a near mutiny in 1857 makes it clear 
that the Kathmandu garrison by that time consisted of units of three
3 4 9
different ethnic types; Indo-Nepali, Gurung and combined Kiranti and 
120
Tamang. Oldfield implies that Magar units were also set up, but-
there is no evidence elsewhere for this. At the outbreak of the war
with Tibet in 1854 separate corps were also set up composed of Bhotias -
121
tribespeople of close Tibetan cultural affinity. Within Gurung (and
Magar?) regiments officers up to the rank of captain were from those 
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ethnic groups. This was a paper improvement, on the situation in the
1830s, when they were normally unable to rise higher than the rank of
jemadar, but really offset by the 'inflation' in the rank structure
described above. There may therefore have been resentment that the hill
tribals were being herded off into second-class units. It is likely that
Magars and Gurungs serving in units earmarked to become totally Khas were
rotated out gradually, thus explaining the continuing ethnic mix observed 
123
by Oldfield. Segregation was probably still not totally completed
when the policy was abandoned. A royal order of 1863, conferring
rewards on different groups in the country for their part in the war
against Tibet in 1855-6 and during the Indian Mutiny, declared that
Gurungs and Magars were both to be admitted to the roja pattern ('select
regiments1), presumably referring to kampu units which had hitherto
124
been earmarked as purely Khas, The same document opened up military
ranks up to that of colonel to these two ethnic groups, whilst also 
removing from the Kiranti their liability to enslavement. The number 
of non-Indo-Nepali who did reach senior positions remained minimal, but 
Jang had clearly reached the conclusion that the advantages of a fully 
rigorous 'divide and rule' policy were outweighed by those of at least 
an apparent equality of opportunity.
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The loyalty of the array was put to its most rigorous test in the 
summer of 1857/ after news of the mutinies in the British provinces 
had reached Kathmandu. On 1 June, the day after the Nepal government 
had made a formal offer of help to the British, the officiating prime 
minister, Krishna Bahadur, informed the British Residency that a Gurung 
subedar had been arrested after attempting to incite the Rudra Dhoj 
regiment, a Gurung unit of the kampu to mutiny and assassinate Jang 
Bahadur. His confession had indicated that disaffection existed in 
several regiments, and Jang and the senior bharadars had decided to 
have the document read out to the assembled troops and to order them to 
pass sentence upon the culprit. Loaded guns were to be in position 
around the parade ground and if any regiment failed to call for the death 
sentence, the artillery would open fire upon them and the other units 
be ordered to join in the slaughter. Resident Ramsay was horrified 
at this proposal, believing that the Gurung troops might hesitate to 
condemn one of their own to death even if they were still basically loyal 
themselves, and that ordering their comrades to open fire on them might 
precipitate a general revolt. Jang and his brothers sent word that 
they would act on this advice. Later that day proclamations were read 
separately to the high-caste (Indo-Nepali) regiments, the Kiranti and 
Tamang units, the Gurungs, the artillery and the garrisons at the other 
Valley towns of Patan and Bhadgaon. The high-caste and the Kiranti 
units declared at once that they would accept any orders from their 
officers, but the Gurung regiments, numbering altogether 1,700 to 1,800 
men, broke ranks, formed into separate groups and began an animated 
discussion. The guns were in position around them, but, following 
Ramsay's advice, Jang had ordered them not to be loaded. Ranodip
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Singh, second youngest of Jang1s brothers, told the Resident later that 
at the moment he and all the senior bhavadavs were convinced they were 
about to be murdered. However, the discussion was allowed to take its 
course:
No steps were taken to excite them; they were 
addressed by the well-affected of their number, 
who pointed out to them the privileges that had 
been accorded to them by Jung Bahadoor; when 
suddenly, calling out that the honour of their 
caste was concerned, they made a simultaneous 
rush to the place where the prisoner was standing 
(who had been brought upon the Parade Ground to 
be shewn and repeat his confession to the troops) 
and put him to death upon the spot.^25
The normal loyalist spirit of the Nepal army had thus prevailed.
The background to the whole affair, according to Krishna Bahadur's
account to the Resident, had been attempts by 'petty Mahomedan merchants
and other inhabitants of the plains of India' resident in Kathmandu to
induce the rank and file of the army to persuade their officers to join 
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the Indian revolt. The Darbar's offer of help on 31 May, which Jang
and his brothers had not expected to be accepted and which was probably 
not yet public knowledge, is unlikely to have been a factor. So far as 
is known, there were no direct grievances against Jang's government 
involved either, but merely excitement communicated by events taking place 
in India. A sense of solidarity with the Indian rebels is unlikely to 
have been a major factor, for one would have expected the higher-caste, 
more strongly Hindu regiments to have felt this more than the Gurungs, 
but given the national sense of grievance against the British for 
halting Gorkha expansion, some restlessness in the army was inevitable. 
Although discipline was maintained throughout the crisis, it has been 
plausibly argued that Jang's motive in giving military support to the
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British was not only the prospect of reward from the victory he confidently
expected them to win, but also the necessity to let the army have a part
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in the drama being enacted on the plains below. The temper of the
army remained throughout a critical factor. Although the six regiments
initially sent into India, which operated under close British supervision,
proved completely reliable, there were some problems with the force which
Jang himself took down in December to assist in the reduction of Lucknow.
An accurate assessment of these is made more difficult because of the
attempt which Jang made to have the Resident, George Ramsay, recalled
from his post, which meant that the latter was not inclined to put the
most charitable interpretation on his actions. None the less, it is
certain enough that Jang was in communication with zamindars involved
on the rebel side, in particular with Duman Khan, who had organised raids
by Nepal-based bands against British positions across the frontier.
Jang told Brigadier McGregor, the British liaison officer with his force,
that he was simply employing Khan as a spy, but Ramsay suggested in a
letter to the Governor-General that Khan had in fact been used by the
rebels to influence the Nepali bHdTadcLTS and troops against the British,
and that Jang himself had been unable to stop this happening. 'I have
always represented1, concluded Ramsay, 'that Jung Bahadoor, though in
many respects a despot, is the mere tool of his army and holds his power
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only by keeping it in good humour.' Like Ramsay's later and very
different characterisation of Jang's regime as 'the most perfect 
autocracy imaginable1 this is an exaggeration, but it still contains an 
important element of truth.
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The Machinery of Government
In conversation with Captain Orfeur Cavenagh in 1850, Jang claimed
that he exercised direct personal control over every aspect of the
administration:
All written and verbal communications, relative 
to affairs Political, Fiscal and Judicial, are 
submitted to the Minister, who generally proceeds 
to issue his orders thereon without consulting the 
Maha Raja or...the Grand Council....The minute 
supervision exercised by General Jung Bahadoor over 
the management of all departments of the State is 
most extraordinary and deserving of the highest 
commendation, for the amount of labour thereby 
entailed upon him must be immense. I believe that 
I am fully justified in saying that not a rupee is 
expended from the Public Treasury, nor a merchant 
permitted to pass the Forts at Muckwanpore or Seesa 
Gurhee without his knowledge and sanction. All 
appointments Civil and Military are conferred by 
him and all complaints regarding the conduct of 
Public Officials are brought to his notice.^29
This command of the administrative machine was allegedly achieved despite
the fact that, as Jang also told Cavenagh, he had been virtually illiterate
on entering office but had overcome this handicap and been able to handle
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official documents adequately within one year. There is no reason to
doubt that Jang did keep a very tight grip on much government activity,
and especially on appointments, but the complexity of the bureaucracy
even in 1846 has caused at least one scholar to doubt the claim made by
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Cavenagh and the similar assertions found in Pudma Rana's book. This
scepticism is justified for- there is, in fact, direct evidence that Jang 
had an inadequate grasp of the nuts and bolts of administration. The 
Resident's report of his resignation from the premiership in 1856 
speculated that distaste for such activity might have been one of his 
motives, and included the following revealing account of a discussion he 
had had with him the previous month on the financing of Nepal's war with
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Tibet then just concluded:
...Jung Bahadoor tried to explain to me what the War 
had cost his Government, but he made so many blunders 
and mis-statements that I was able to correct him on 
some points, whilst his brothers, who were sitting near 
us, contradicted nearly every other statement he made.
Amongst other things, he told me that he had raised 
70 lacs of rupees by the tax of one-third on all landed 
produce and on Jagheres, Pay, etc. (reported in my 
letter to your address No.3 of the 18th of January), 
that his now surplus grain would sell for 2 0  lacs more, 
etc., etc. I reminded him that he had in the first 
instance only estimated twenty lacs as the sum that 
could be raised by the taz just mentioned and that 
seventy lacs would be nearly double the revenue of his 
country. He then corrected himself and said that the 
amount so raised must have been only 3 5 lacs, and he 
went on to try and prove to me by adjusting the value 
of his Assets that the war had only really cost his 
Government some 5 or 6 lacs of rupees. He told me 
nearly two years ago that it had then cost the country 
upwards of sixty lacs. In fact, His Excellency seemed 
quite puzzled and not to have the least knowledge of 
hwat he was talking about.132
When Jang assumed the premiership again in 1857 it was reported that the
ihternal administration of the country would be the responsibility of his
brother Krishna Bahadur as Commander-in-Chief, and at least during the
last two or three years of Krishna's life (he died in 1863) this was the 
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actual practice. Thus by the 1860s Jang was not even attempting to
superintend every detail of the administration, whilst even before then
he must have been dependent to a considerable extent on his subordinates.
The general lines of policy were certainly his, and his letter to Bam
Bahadur show how strongly he could feel on some issues, but detailed
planning and execution was the work of others.
The civilian government employees to whom this reponsibility fell
numbered just under 3,000 in 1846, the total rising to almost 4,000 by 
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1863. The bulk of these were employed in routine record keeping
activities etc., but particular key individuals, even if not politically
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influential, kept the administrative machine going and carried through
major changes. MuZuk’i Khavvdar Gunavanta, who shaped the revenue system
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under Bhimsen, was one such administrator, and it is likely that 
Siddhiman Singh Rajbhandari and other financial specialists played a 
similar role under Jang. The Nepali administration impressed Brian 
Hodgson, who contrasted it with the difficulties often met in other native 
states:
...here there is an unsophisticated nobility rendering 
administration a comparatively easy task. We have no
popular commotions, no getting into debt by the
Government or any deferring of pay due to its servants, 
so that the administrative clock moves on almost 
without the touch of the Durbar's h and.l^
Political tranquility was one reason for this state of affairs, and this
was a condition which disappeared with Bhimsen's fall soon after Hodgson
wrote these words in 1837, but which was restored with Jang's coming to
power. The inherent quality of the bureaucracy was now able to reassert
itself.
The principal government offices in Kathmandu in the early 1840s were
described by Hudgson in a paper which was unpublished, but from which
extensive extracts were included in Edwards' survey of the pre-Rana 
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administration. The most important were the treasury, or Kaust- Tosakhana,
which as well as receiving the income from lands not assigned as salary,
was the office through which the subbas of the Tarai were appointed; the
Sadav Daphtar Khana, which assigned jagirs to all civil and military
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employees other than the soldiers of the kampu? the Kampu Daphtar* Khana
which dealt with kampu assignments; the Kumari. Cauk, which Jang himself 
had once headed and which audited the accounts for all government income 
as well as acting as a court of law for revenue and revenue-related matters;
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the Muns'ikhana, office of the Mi-v Muns-i, which handled correspondence with 
the British, Tibet and China; and the four principal courts of the capital, 
the K ot'i K in g , I t a  C a p a l'i, Taksav and Dhansav. Mention should also be 
made of the Dak Cauk DhukutZ, depository for the state reserves, which 
in 1843 allegedly held ten million rupees. There were, in addition, 
many lesser offices whose functions are not always clearly understood.
Most offices were situated in or near the palace complex at Hanuman Dhoka, 
and their names, if not descriptive of their function, referred to their 
location.
Jang largely retained this basic structure, but instituted a new
treasury, the MuZukZkhana, which took over the Tosakhana1s function of
receiving revenue and also the Dak Cauk DhukutZ rs of holding the main
government reserves. The Tosakhana continued to act as a channel through
which payments were made, receiving funds for this purpose from the
MuZukZkhana. The keeping of land tax assessment records was simplified
with the creation of a single Moth Adda ('Register Office1) in place of
the previous sixteen separate offices. A number of new agencies and
departments were set up for specific tasks, the most important innovation
being the setting-up in 1848 of a personnel records office, the KamyandavZ 
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KZtab Khana.
This last-mentioned step eased the task of control over the 
administration and went hand-in-hand with a trend towards great 
systematisation. It had already become common in Nepal for letters of 
appointment to contain detailed instructions on the task to be performed, 
but under Jang there was a proliferation of saWaZs, administrative manuals 
attempting to provide as fully as possible for all contingencies. A 
separate office - the SawaZ Adda - was created to oversee their production.
The same drive for standardisation was seen at work in the production
for the first time of a Legal Code for the country - the MulukZ AZn
promulgated in January 1854.
The MulukZ AZn
The preamble to the AZn states that its purpose is to end the
situation in which identical offences have attracted varying penalties
and to ensure that in future everyone shall be dealt with uniformly on the
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basis of his offence and his caste. The Code runs to 693 pages in
the 1965 printed edition (essentially the revised version of 1867), and
covers not only criminal law in the ordinary sense, but also land tenure
issues and offences relating to caste which fell within the sphere of the
dharmadhZkar*. Within the last category special emphasis is placed on
the punishment of sexual relations violating caste barriers, and on the
expiation required even from those who have been unwittingly polluted by
the offenders. The penalties laid down bring out clearly the strict
prohibition of hypogamy and relative toleration of hypergamy that was an
essential feature of the caste ideology. The same logic is extended into
the treatment of homosexual relations: cases where the active partner is
of lower caste than the passive are treated much more severely than those
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where the reverse applies. As well as illustrating a general principle
these sections of the AZn provide a wealth of detailed information on the 
caste hierarchy in Nepal, with the relative positions of the different 
groups explicitly formulated for the lower castes and implied for the 
upper ones. This has rendered the document of immense significance for 
anthropologists, and an extensive analysis of the AZn from this point of
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view has been made by Hdfer. Detailed, though not comprehensive
examination of other sections is found in Adhikari and Jain. These 
discussions, and also briefer accounts elsewhere, have highlighted two 
main issues: was the AZn consciously reformist or merely a codification
of existing practice, and how far, if at all, did it reflect Western 
influence?
Precisely because no codification of the law on the scale of the AZn
had been attempted before, it is not always clear whether or not
particular provisions are innovations. There can, however, be no doubt
that Jain is right to see it as a fundamentally conservative document.
This is clear both from the overall thrust of the code and from the fact
that a relatively small number of sections are highlighted as if they 
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were new. Jain goes much too far, however, in seeking to deny Jang
the credit for mitigating the severity of the Nepali penal system which
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is given him by Cavenagh, Pudma Rana and others. Whilst mutilation
was indeed already becoming rarer during Hodgson1s time in Nepal, and Jang 
himself exaggerated the extent of past severity so as to appear in a 
reforming light to the British, there are many instances of this penalty 
being applied in the years before the AZn was promulgated. This is 
amply documented by Adhikari, the punishments imposed in one royal order 
of 1838 which he publishes including castration for a Magar who had had 
sexual relations with his patrilateral cousin, and amputation of a thumb 
of a slave convicted of theft. As late as 1850 two untouchables were 
castrated for having sex with women of pure caste; this was at a time 
when Jang was already telling his British friends that mutilation was no 
longer practised, but the sentences were decided on in Kathmandu whilst
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he himself was in Europe. With the implementation of the AZn
physical maltreatment of offenders did not cease altogether, since
cutting of the nose was retained in some circumstances for women involved
in adultery or theft, as was branding for both sexes, but castration was
abolished as a penalty and capital punishment greatly restricted. SatZ
was not prohibited - this step was not finally taken until the time of
Jang's nephew, Maharaja Chandra Shamsher - but the circumstances in which
it could take place were restricted, widows with male children under
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thirteen, for example, being barred from ascending the pyre.
There can be no doubt that mitigation of the severity of the penal
code and restrictions on satZ were largely if not wholly the result of
British influence. Whatever their feelings on the intrinsic merits of
reform, Bhimsen and Mathbar Singh Thapa appear to have realised that it
could win them British approval. Already by 1832, the law prescribing
the death penalty for outcastes having sexual relations with pure caste
females had been relaxed in practice, whilst in 1836 Hodgson reported that
the British presence in Kathmandu was having an 'ameliorative effect' on
the Nepali system and that the Darbar had been careful to bring to his
notice the fact that there had for some years been no case of satZ amongst
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the families of the leading bhavadams. As has already been seen,
Jang was eager to present himself to the British as liberal-minded, and
the need to protect this image will have helped shape his conduct,
whether or not he actually went so far as to use the possibility of
adverse reaction from The TZmes as an argument against imposing the
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death penalty on the 1851 conspirators.
However else the AZn may have reflected foreign influence, there are 
adequate grounds for suspecting that it helped plant the idea of
360
codification in Jang's mind. It is true that Nepal's own history
offered precedents, for there existed already law codes of sorts
ascribed to the fifteenth-century Kathmandu ruler, Jayasthitii Malla,
and Rama Shah, a seventeenth-century king of Gorkha, and Prithvi Narayan
Shah in the DZvya Upades had referred to his own intention (not in fact
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fulfilled) of following their example. The Jayasthitii regulations
which, as the AZn was also to do, underwrote the existing caste hierarchy,
were regarded by the Nepali courts in the 1830s as authoritative for
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disputes involving Newars, Bhotias or lower-caste Indo-Nepalis.
Nevertheless, both Jayasthiti's and Rama Shah's 'codes' were on a much
less extensive and comprehensive scale than the AZn. To understand
the origins of Jang's more ambitious project, it is probably necessary
to take into account both the openness to non-Hindu influence on issues
of form (not content) which Nepal had already displayed, and also Jang's
own experiences in Europe in 1850. The first of these is illustrated by
the wholesale adoption of Muslim, and specifically Moghul, terminology in
land revenue and administration, and also by Bhimsen Thapa's efforts to
learn about foreign legal systems? Hodgson was requested during the
1830s to provide the Darbar with details of crimes and penalties in
British India, and while Hodgson thought this was prompted by his own
curiosity about the Nepali system, Bhimsen had much earlier instructed
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members of a mission sent to Burma to seek similar information there.
When Jang was in Europe it is likely that the Code Napoleon came to his 
attention and made a strong impression on him. The passages concerning 
the emperor in Jang Bahadurko BelaZt-Yatra, the account written by one 
of his travelling companions, are especially vivid, and there is a 
tradition among Jang's descendants that he regarded Napoleon as his
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political exemplar. The fusion of the roles of warrior and law-giver
was an important element in the Napoleonic legend, and Jang’s wish to
have himself presented in the same light is neatly illustrated by the
design of the marble statue of him erected in March 1854 on the
Tundhikhel: he was depicted holding a sword in one hand and a law code
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m  the other. As a final reinforcing piece of evidence, there is
the Belait-Yatra1s mention of ain~kitap ('law-book') in the list of 
things which President Louis Napoleon had suggested Jang might care to 
see while in Paris.
The possibility of Western influence in a more subtle form is raised
in Hdfer's valuable discussion of the Ain's relationship with the Indian
legal tradition. He points out that whereas the orthodox view requires
the king to uphold dhavma but not to interpret it, the Ain, a document
drawn up and promulgated by the prime minister and the entire bha.ra.davi
kausal, not just its Brahman members, represents a state take-over of
the latter function also. Together with this strengthening of the
state's role goes an emphasis on territoriality - the Ain is concerned
to demarcate Nepal from 'Mughlana', the India formerly ruled (and thus
polluted) by the Muslims and now by the British, and the dharmadhikar's
authority to grant patiya (certificate of expiation) in cases of
involuntary pollution is delegated in some circumstances to local
authorities or jagirdavs having tenurial authority over an area. In
this Hflfer sees not only a natural extension of the king's position as
protector of his people and as ultimate owner of the soil, but also the
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influence of the modern concept of the nation-state.
This suggestion is an attractive one, but a number of reservations 
need to be recorded. In the first place HOfer's picture of the secular
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ksatra merely acting as the executive arm of the brahman spiritual
authority is too stark a dichotomy, failing to take into account the
religious aspect of Hindu kingship itself. Secondly, in the Nepali
case although the subordination of the Brahman dharmadhikar to the
secular authorities is seemingly complete (he is barred from issuing patiya
without the permission of king and premier except in routine, non-
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intentional pollution (bhor)), neither Vijay Raj nor his successors
became mere cyphers, and they retained prestige and authority as brahmans
and gurus. Thirdly, HdJfer slightly understates the role of the Hindu
state elsewhere in India. As a contrast to the Nepali pattern he examines
the Maratha kingdom before 1818, and, relying in Gune's account of its
judicial procedure, argues that in caste matters the state 'represents
merely the executive power enforcing the resolutions of the caste
assembly and/or Brahmins and helps the offender to expiate and reattain 
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his caste status'. In fact, a more recent study of the Maratha system
than Gune's has shown that the state's role was a stronger one, with
restoration of lost caste-status, for example, possible only when
sanctioned by the government; caste-fellows readmitting an offender to
commensality or priests performing the prayaschitta ceremony were punished
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if they did so without the state's authority. It would be wrong to
deny, however, that 'etatisation' was taken to further limits by the Ain, 
the role of caste assemblies, for example, which was an important though 
subordinate one in the Maratha territories, being nowhere even mentioned 
in the Nepali document. Hdfer's basic contention can therefore be 
accepted, but the gap between the Nepali and the 'orthodox' Hindu pattern 
is a narrower one than he suggests.
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The essential feature of the Ain is arguably not the state's
assumption of the right to prescribe a moral order, but the fact of its
promulgating such an order encompassing all the territory under the king's
control. Burghart has argued that at the turn of the nineteenth century
there existed a clear distinction between the king's muluk (possessions),
which was simply the area happening to be under his tenurial authority
at any one time, and his realm or desa, which was a region of fixed extent
under the protection of the king's tutelar deity. The obligation to
maintain a moral order - and in particular the vama  hierarchy - applied
pre-eminently to the latter. The muluk, on the other hand, was not
seen as a single moral universe, but as a collection of different 'realms'
and of different 'countries' (des - vernacular form of the Sanskrit
desa), the latter being geographical regions and/or the homes of
different peoples. The Ain, by setting up an all-Nepal caste hierarchy,
extends the desa to coincide with the mu.tuk and replaced a multiplicity of
15C
'countries', each with its own customary law, by a single society of jati.
Burghart's analysis, like Hdfer's is pushed a little too far, since the
pre-1854 state certainly sought to impose certain moral values on the areas
of the country outside the desa, that is outside the old kingdom of Gorkha
and the Kathmandu Valley and immediately surrounding hills: as Burghart
himself points out, the ban on cow-slaughter was enforced throughout the
country, and the king reserved to himself the right to deal with crimes held
particularly polluting even when he alienated his tenurial authority in a
160birta grant to a Brahman or ascetic. Nevertheless, the Ain represented
a significant advance towards integration of all Nepal's territory,
justifying H&fer's verdict that its society was 'on the way to becoming
161 „ . ,
a nation of castes'. The kvn S role in this respect complemented
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the steps already discussed of enlarging the number of ethnic groups 
from which the army could be recruited and the levels to which members 
of less-favoured groups could be promoted.
Revenue Policy
Important though the legel enforcement of Hindu orthodoxy was, for
the ordinary citizen it was the revenue demand that was the most important
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element in their relation with the Nepali state. The government's
claim on agricultural produce was its principal source of income, and the 
first object of revenue policy was to maximise that income without placing 
an intolerable burden on the cultivator. This concern for the 
agriculturalist was motivated first and foremost by the danger that he 
would 'vote with his feet' against a harsh regime by abandoning his plot. 
In the early Rana years land was still in surplus, and except in the 
western hills it had no capital value, so that the cultivator's interest 
lay only in the standing crop. The problem was at its worst' in the 
fertile lands of the eastern Tarai, where a peasant might easily abscond 
with his harvest across the border into India, a move made all the easier 
because the frontier did not correspond to any cultural or geographical 
reality.
The second object of state policy was to manage the relationship 
with the intermediaries, whether holders of land grants from the central 
government, or collectors or farmers of the revenue. All these groups 
had to be conciliated, but at the same time prevented from becoming too 
powerful and from frustrating the government's first objective by 
oppressing the peasants or by diverting revenue into their own pockets. 
Here again, the Tarai posed particular problems because the chaudhuris
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responsible for collection at the pavgana level had the advantage of
much greater local knowledge than the central authorities and also,
like the peasants beneath them, could easily abscond across the border,
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where most of them already kept a large part of their assets. Where
people of Tarai origin occupied higher positions in the revenue structure, 
as was the case with individuals such as Hira Lai Jha or Suba Girij Datt 
Mis.hra, whose careers have already been discussed, the danger was 
correspondingly greater.
After many years of frequent changes in revenue demand and collection 
mechanisms, Jang put in place a more stable and lasting structure. A key 
part of this strategy was long-term settlements, and in the hills surveys 
between 1854 and 1868 fixed taxation levels which were then kept broadly 
constant for the rest of the century. Previously jagirdars had been 
entitled to oust their tenants if they received an offer of a higher rent 
from another peasant, but this practice was forbidden by the Ain, other 
than on land under birta tenure. Even though the sale of land in the 
central and eastern hills remained theoretically illegal, the granting 
of security of tenure led to the emergence of a de facto market in land, 
especially after the 1870 edition of the Ain laid down that whoever 
paid tax on a plot would be registered as the holder. In contrast to 
such moves which paved the way towards private ownership of land and, 
later in the century, growing subinfeudation, Jang also maintained the 
raibandi system, which had first been introduced in the late 1830s and 
under which the government reserved the right to redistribute ricelands 
amongst families which were already holders in order to ensure each 
retained a viable unit. However, although there is evidence of 
redistribution actually taking place among families with vakam tenure,
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that is holding land direct from the government in return for labour 
services, its use does not appear to have been widespread.
There are not precise data available on the proportion of the crop
taken in rent. Regmi's calculations suggest that it was around one-
third in the Tarai and the western hills, and one-half or more in the
central and eastern hills. In the west and in the Tarai rent was
normally assessed in cash and was paid either by a zamindav or by
independent peasants known as chuni, whereas elsewhere the registered
land-holder was normally a peasant termed mohi ('tenant'). The mohi
worked the holding himself with his family, whereas both zamindar and
chuni had their land cultivated by sharecroppers (adhiyar) . The revenue
burden on those who actually tilled the fields was thus much the same
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all over the country.
Under Jang's rule the level of rents probably remained broadly at 
the level it had reached in the early 1840s, except that in the Tarai 
he did away with the 25 per cent surcharge which had been imposed on the 
region during that period and which had led to the flight of many peasants 
across the border. The tendency for intermediaries in the revenue 
hierarchy to extract more from the peasantry than they were legally 
entitled to no doubt persisted, but Jang's measures to prevent this were 
rather more whole-hearted than had previously been the case. His tirades 
against oppression of the peasantry, included in letters written home 
from Europe, have already been referred to , as has his arrest and 
imprisonment on his return to Nepal of Ratnaman Singh Rajbhandari for 
that offence. This incident appears to have made a great impression 
in India as well as in Nepal, for Lawrence Oliphant on his way back to 
the plains from Kathmandu was escorted by a guide who gave it
367
as his reason for moving from East India Company territory into 
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Nepal. This strict policy was continued, and instructions issued
to Jagat Shamsher as Governor-in-Chief of the Tarai in 1856 specified 
that if peasants deserted their fields an enquiry should be held, and 
any local official found guilty of oppression should be punished.
Jang's wish to reduce pressure on the peasantry was probably also 
behind the temporary abandonment of the ghara system of pressed labour, 
though this was reintroduced during the war with Tibet and seemingly 
retained afterwards. The Ain's ending of enslavement for debt belongs 
in the same category. The peasant still none the less had to bear much 
of the risk of crop failure, for the Ain permitted an adjustment of the 
revenue demand only if the yield were 25 per cent below the level assumed 
for tax calculations.
On land where the state had alienated its claim to the revenue, 
either on a temporary or permanent basis, that is on territory under 
birta, guti, or jagirtenure or included within a dependent rajya, the 
collection of all dues was the responsibility of the grantee. Elsewhere 
the central government employed a number of different collection systems. 
In the hills there was a division between khet (irrigated) lands, where 
collection was normally the responsibility of local officials known as 
jimawats, and pakho (dry) lands, which were taxed on a homestead basis 
rather than as a proportion of actual yield. Homestead dues were 
collected either by contractors or through the village headman (mukhiya). 
In the Tarai, there had been constant switches between different methods, 
with the one constant element - the chaudhuvis at pavgana level - handing 
over their collections to salaried government employees, to a single
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contractor-general for the whole Tarai or to contractors at district level.
Jang continued on much the same lines as before in the hills, but
radically revised the system in the Tarai. Although the revenue farming
element was not eliminated immediately, it was phased out in favour of
direct collection by salaried subbas (later lieutenant-colonels)
responsible to the Tarai Governor-in-Chief, normally a member of Jang's
own family. These officials were generally from Kathmandu or the hills,
so their assets were readily confiscable in case of need, and they were
prohibited from trading or owning land in the area for which they were
responsible. Under military discipline, and subject to the control of
the pagani and of the new personnel department they were unlikely to
emulate the exploits of such as Girij Datt Mishra. Local people were
only brought into the hierarchy at the pargana level, where the chaudhuvi
system was continued. To tighten arrangements lower down, Jang in 1861
instituted the gimidar system at mauga level. Jimidars collected the
revenue within their area, receiving as remuneration land calculated
of- the. faVcid coUet-Vloo 
to provide 5 per cent^(10 per cent in the far western Tarai returned
to Nepal in 1860). This land was to be worked compulsorily by the
peasants from whom they collected. The arrangement was intended partly
as an insurance against absconding cultivators, for the gimidar was
personally liable for the revenue on land which remained uncultivated.
The Revenue Regulations setting up the new system gave the provision of
finance to the peasantry as one of their responsibilities, and Jang
evidently intended them to operate not only as collectors but also as
'improving landlords'. The logic behind the arrangement was thus
similar to that of the Bengal Permanent Settlement. Over the longer
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term their role as entrepreneurs became of little significance, once the
supply of readily reclaimable land was reduced and they 'only combined
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the functions of tax collector, rent receiver and moneylender'.
Towards the end of the century they emerged as virtual landlords, with
the sale of gimidari rights known to have occurred as early as 1885.
The system thus depressed the position of the chuni peasants who had
hitherto dealt independently with the chaudhuris. Politically, however,
the arrangement had the advantage of tying the interests of local 'big
men' closely together with those of the central government: appointments
as gimidar were made by the local authorities in the year immediately
following 1861, but by 1890 the role had been taken over by Kathmandu
directly. As a collection mechanism the system appears to have worked
satisfactorily, and although flight across the border will have remained
a problem at first, this must have diminished after the British agreement
in 1866 to make revenue embezzlement an extraditable offence, and been
168
even further reduced as land acquired a capital value.
The payment of government employees through gagir assignments both
eased the burden on the central authorities and gave the gagirdar the
opportunity to realise more than the theoretical value due to him. Jang
retained the system, but imposed a number of restrictions. In 1852/3
the use of Tarai land for gagirs was abolished: this was reversion to
the situation in the early 1830s, but constituted a major change from
the practice in the intervening years, as Hodgson's statistics for 1842/3
show that half the assignments to civilian bharadavs and one-sixth of
169
those to the kampu were then in the Tarai. Revenue statistics for
1852/3 graphically illustrate the extent to which the hills were given
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over to gagirs as less than 1 per cent of the 2 . 1  million assessment for
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the region actually reached the treasury. The gagirdarsr rights
were reduced somewhat by the new security of tenure given to the
cultivator, whilst the juridical powers which officers (as against rank-
and-file army men) held over their tenants were limited by a ban on their
trying cases involving claims over 500 rupees? jurisdiction in serious
criminal offences attracting the panekhat remained reserved to the centre
as before. The expansion of district courts (adatats) through the hills
will have made it easier for the aggrieved tenant to exercise his
theoretical right of appear against the gagirdar1s decision.
The gifting of land as birta was prohibited by the Ain in areas
already under cultivation, and such grants in theory reserved as an
inducement for the development of new lands. In practice, however, Jang
sometimes violated this rule in his own interest, and large grants were
made to himself and to members of his family, particularly in the western
districts which were returned to Nepal as a reward for assistance in
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suppressing the Indian Mutiny. In other areas Jang did at least
sometimes pay for land made over to him, but his Rana successors
discontinued the practice and received grants as outright gifts from the
state. By 1950, the year before the fall of the Rana regime, over a
third of Nepal's total cultivated area was under birta tenure, and
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three-quarters of this in the possession of Rana family members.
The birtadar was placed in an especially favoured position by the Ain
because in addition to permanent possession he was allowed to oust a
tenant who failed to match an offer of a higher rent from another peasant.
It should be noted, however, that the state retained the right to levy tax
on birta holdings in extremis and this was done in 1855 to meet the cost
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of the war with Tibet.
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Similar in position to large birtadars were the rulers of the
various ragyas not fully integrated into the regular administration.
The original ragyas were pre-unification states which had been left with
internal autonomy in return for tribute. Under Jang and his successors
ragyas were set up or abolished as rewards and punishment. The 'rajas'
thus created might enjoy full autonomy on the old pattern - the one which
had of course been followed when Jang himself was created Maharaja of
Kaski and Lamjung in 1856 - or merely birta rights plus the title, or
some other arrangement. The procedure was, however, never taken to the
extent that the preponderant power of the central government was jeopardised.
Rulers of major old-established ragyas such as Sallyana or Phalabang
might also intermarry with the Ranas, thus further confirming that the
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Kunwars enjoyed Thakuri status.
The kipat~system of communal tenure, principally involving the kiranti 
of the eastern hills, was continued. The Ain allowed the mortgaging of 
individual plots but recognised the reversionary right of the communith 
as a whole by providing that after the debtor's death or absconsion his 
creditor no longer had any claim on the land, but only against him 
personally or his estate. The kiranti had surrendered to Prithvi 
Narayan on terms, and subsequent administrations had been careful to 
respect their rights. It is likely that Jang, who had spent part of 
his childhood at Dhankuta in Limbu country, and his associate Hemdal 
Thapa, who had many years of experience on the eastern border, were 
especially aware of the situation in this part of the country, and 
sympathy for the kiranti, as well as an eye to 'divide and rule' may have 
lain behind their admittance to the army in 1847. Such sympathy did not 
however halt a trend towards de facto alienation of land to non-Limbus
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which continued through the nineteenth century, for in 1901-3 the Limbus
had to seek legislation banning further alienation of cultivated rice
lands. Individual kipat holders were probably no better off by Jang's
time than their counterparts on raikar (ordinary crown) land, for kipat
was taxed on a homestead basis and progressive subdivision of holdings
must have boosted the proportion of the crop actually taken. Land
settlements were made by the central government not with each individual
holder but with headmen who were known significantly as zamindars and
who distributed land amongst their fellow-tribesmen while often having
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their own plot cultivated for them on a sharecropping basis. Life
for the average Limbu or Rai cultivator was thus far from tribal communism,
and problems were compounded by a growing land shortage in the eastern
hills which led to large-scale migration from the 1830s onwards.
The surest way to increase state revenue without putting undue
pressure on any level of the tenurial hierarchy was to expand agricultural
production, and this was mostly done by expansion of the area under
cultivation. The greatest scope for this was in the clearing of the
forest which covered much of the Tarai, a process which the pre-unification
states of Palpa, Makwanpur and Bijaypur had already begun with the
assistance of cultivators from India, and which continued under Prithvi
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Narayan Shah and his successors. Under Jang the policy was pushed
forward with renewed energy. Individual rayats were allowed land on 
favourable terms and given the building materials to construct homesteads. 
The main thrust, however, was provided by the jimidars who brought in 
cultivators to open up large areas. In 1854 the Ain offered them either 
a three-year tax holiday on new land together with birta to the value of 
1 0  per cent of the extra revenue thereafter generated, or alternatively
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a five-year tax-free period without any birta grant. Revenue regulations
issued in 1861 for the elastern Tarai offered a greatly improved deal:
no tax for ten years, plus a birta grant and the right to retain their
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holding even if they committed a criminal offence. The result was
the stimulation of migration from India on a large scale, which was to
continue throughout the Rana period. The financial terms and the
security of tenure offered on the Nepali side of the border contrasted
favourably with the Bengal tax-and-tenure regime, and even more with the
vulnerable position of Oudh rayats vis-a-vis the talukdars after the latters'
rights were reinstated in the wake of the 1857 rebellion. Another ’p u s h 1
factor was the pressure on the peasantry from the indigo planters, this
being a major reason for a large number of rayats crossing over from 
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Champaran in 1866. The success of Nepali policy is in ironic
contrast to Kirkpatrick's prediction when he visited the Tarai in 1793
that the blessings of the Permanent Settlement would soon lead the Nepali
179rayats to flock into India.
Since there were no improvements in basic agricultural techniques, 
irrigation remained the only means of boosting production other than 
simple land clearance. In the eastern Tarai the government met half 
the cost of irrigation works constructed by peasant farmers or jimidars 
and in the late sixties the government ordered the local authorities to 
undertake such projects themselves and to extract a 50 per cent 
contribution from local revenue functionaries. The local administration 
in the western Tarai (naya muluk) was instructed to construct facilities 
if this would increase the revenue. Regmi suggests that despite such 
edicts from the centre, relatively few such improvements were actually 
made, and that most of what was actually constructed was 'possibly nothing
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more than temporary channels and earthen embankments which did not outlast
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the first monsoon'. This is perhaps unnecessarily disparaging, but
our knowledge of the agrarian history of the region is insufficient to be 
certain.
On at least one occasion Jang did seriously consider a much more
elaborate irrigation project, involving the use of imported technology.
His objective was to use the water of Phewa Tal, the large lake in the
Pokhara Valley, to irrigate the surrounding country, which is at a
considerably higher level. It was calculated that the resulting increase
in revenue would be between 5 and 6 lakhs per year. Dr. Oldfield claimed
that the project was not implemented befause of Nepali unwillingness to
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allow foreign surveyors or engineers into the hills. This may have
been a factor, but lack of enthusiasm on the British side was also partly
to blame. Whilst in London in 1850 Jang requested the East India Company
to purchase on his behalf a steam pump and tubing for this purpose, and
there was extensive correspondence on the subject over the next three
years. In spring 1851 Jang asked the Resident for the provision of an
engineer to operate the steam engine and to construct a road into the
hills to allow the engine to be brought in from the plains. The Governor-
General offered to provide an engineer for the road project, but later
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refused to make one available for the survey of the Pokhara Valley.
The Finance and Home Committee in London now provided an estimate of 
the cost of the steam pump and associated equipment, together with the 
salaries of the engineers needed to supervise its setting-up and 
operation. The full bill would have been around £10,000 (equivalent to 
one lakh Indian rupees, rather more in Nepali currency). Jang finally 
told the Resident that in view of the heavy expenditure and the fact that
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no one in Nepal would be able to operate the machinery, he was cancelling
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his order. As the investment involved would have been swiftly
recouped by the increase in revenue, reluctance to allow foreigners into
the hills may have been the real reason for the change of plan. However,
Jang had clearly been willing to countenance this the previous year, and
if Dalhousie had then been able to meet his request the outcome might
have been very different. Opposition to the idea must certainly have
existed among the bhavadavs, but Jang might have been able to carry the
project if given backing at the critical moment. As it was, Jang
proceeded with an order for a rice-threshing machine which had been part
of his original 'shopping order 1 and this reached Kathmandu in January
1855. It had despatched without user's instructions, which the
Resident now requested. It is not known whether the machine was ever
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actually assembled and put to use.
Jang thus toyed with the idea of applying to agricultural production
the technology which he saw on his visit to Europe. Did foreign
models influence in any way the revenue arrangements which have been
described above? Bhimsen Thapa had certainly been interested in learning
details of the relationship between peasant and government in other
states, as this was one of the topics the mission to Burma in the 1820s
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was tasked to investigate. In a passage which is probably based on
Jang's own lost diary, Pudma Rana includes the 'relation...between public
and private rights in land' as one of the things Jang was interested to
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learn when he travelled to Britain. As with the question of
foreign influence on the Ain, there is no way of being certain, but it is 
conceivable, for example that the jimidavi system introduced in the eastern 
Tarai, with its expectation that the jimidars would play the role of
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1 improving landlords 1, owed something to the thinking behind the
Permanent Settlement. The model was certainly not followed in detail,
however, one vital difference being that the Jimidars lacked the right
to evict their 'tenants' or to increase rents, except on their own birta 
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holdings.
Although it has attracted less attention than direct agricultural
taxation, trade was none the less an important source of government
revenue. Excise duties were one part of this picture, but increasingly
during Jang's rule the sale of monopoly rights over particular commodities
brought in substantial income. Lynch-pin of these arrangements was
Jang's Newar associate, Dharma Narayan Manandhar, whose activities, if
Ramsay's reports are correct, aroused widespread hostility. By the
1870s government monopolies included raw cotton, tobacco, fish, salt,
opium, grain and ghee.^^ It is unclear whether the grain monopoly
included rice, staple food of most inhabitants of the Kathmandu Valley,
but if so this was a late extension: in the mid-sixties a proposal to
place the commodity in Dharma Narayan's hands was mooted, but Jang was
allegedly persuaded by his brothers that such a move, with the consequent
rise in price, would lead to a popular revolt. Feeling on the issue
reached such a pitch that King Surendra, normally prepared to follow
tamely whatever his prime minister suggested, is said to have roundly
abused Dharma Narayan at an audience and to have struck him on the arm
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with the flat of his sword. British indignation on the subject
sprang from the restrictions placed in British Indian merchants and from
their free trade ideology; the tone of Ramsay's complaints to Calcutta
echoes that of Palmerston's diatribes against similar practices in the 
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Pasha's Egypt. Jang's policy was partly founded on genuine fear
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that giving a free rein to British subjects to trade in Nepal would
ultimately compromise the country's independence, but more fundamental
was a view of trade as a direct source of government revenue rather than
an engine of economic growth. Government monopolies went hand-in-hand
with widespread participation by Jang and his family, and by leading
bharadars, in trading ventures, in which they were normally sleeping
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partners to Newar merchants. Even allowing for the bias of our
British sources there can be no doubt that the regime's commercial policy
raised the cost of living of the ordinary citizen, and although it ensured
that profits went to Nepali merchants rather than Indian, it did not
prevent Nepali craftsmen suffering the inevitable result of competition
with a more advanced neighbour: in 1861 Ramsay reported that 'the very
inferior manufactures of Nepal...are annually deteriorating rather than
192improving, and are gradually giving way before our own manufactures'.
On its own terms, however, Jang's management of Nepal's finances was
successful. Revenue from the eastern Tarai, for example, doubled
between 1852 and 1862, whilst total revenue across the country rose from
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47 lakh Nepali rupees in 1843 to 115 lakh in 1877. The increase will
have accrued largely from the expansion of the area under cultivation,
including of course the addition of the western Tarai, formerly part
of Oudh, in 1860, but also from improvements to the collection machinery.
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The expense of the Tibet war - 27 lakhs or more - was thus absorbed 
without too much dislocation, though the strain in the short term was 
considerable. As government revenues increased so did the personal 
income of Jang and his family: running Nepal was a lucrative business.
The total impact of Jang's regime on the well-being of individual 
Neaplis is difficult to assess in the absence of reliable figures for
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total national income and for population. Assuming that the elimination
of some - only some - of the worst abuses in the revenue system outbalanced
the effects of the monopoly system on those who had to buy their food,
the average standard of living perhaps showed a slight increase. Such
improvement as there was cannot have been dramatic and Regmi's harsh
verdict is substantially correct: Jang and his family were principally
concerned to use the surplus they obtained from the peasantry for
conspicuous consumption, and they protected their dominant position by
allowing a share of the proceeds to go to the landowning elite - the
jagirdars and non-Rana bivradars - as well as to the village-level
functionaries on whom the system depended. There was no substantial
investment in agriculture which would have enabled the population as a
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whole to climb above subsistence level.
In accepting Regmi's analysis, it is none the less necessary to
enter two caveats. First it is wrong to suppose that all measures taken
by Jang which favoured the peasant were simply the result of his desire
to protect revenue levels over the long run or to curb the power of Jagirdavs
and other intermediaries. This was undoubtedly the main motive, but it
was not the only one. Jang's letters to his brother, documents which
were certainly not intended to be made public and which are therefore
free from propagandist distortion, show that he did accept that the
function of government was to promote the happiness of the governed:
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'God put us where we are in order to keep the people happy'. This
was a realisation which he attained only intermittently and which he 
allowed to be over-ruled when in direct conflict with self-interest, but 
the fact remains that at times he was capable of seeing the state as 
something more than a system for battening on the. producers.
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Secondly, just as Jang's performance bears comparison with that 
of previous Nepali regimes, so he had no worse record than other South 
Asian native rulers. The defects of the Nepali political economy were 
those of the traditional South Asian order. Everywhere in the 
subcontinent those at the top of the social pyramid were content to 
maintain their status and comfort within a relatively static society, 
and to import from Britain or British India those products of Western 
technology which they wanted for their own consumption. Western methods 
of military organisation and military hardware were adapted as far as 
possible - Panjab under Ranjit Singh had been the most successful in 
this direction - but the spirit of post-Meiji restoration Japan or of 
an Attaturk was nowhere in evidence.
It can of course be argued that after his 1850 journey to Europe,
Jang should have been more aware than other South Asian rulers of the
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possibilities for agricultural and industrial progress. During and
after the visit he himself impressed upon British acquaintances that he 
was personally eager for modernisation but unable to disregard the 
prejudices of his countrymen. As has already been seen, George Ramsay, 
the Resident who served the longest period at Kathmandu during Jang's 
time in power, was convinced by the mid-sixties that all this was simply 
a pose for political purposes, and it is certainly true that Jang shared 
to some extent the general view of the Neapli elite that an opening-up 
of the country, such as the widespread appliance of modern technology 
would certainly have implied, would endanger the country's independence.
Yet the enthusiasm with which Jang initially viewed the steam-pump 
irrigation project discussed above, suggests that he was not hypocritically 
pretending to a degree of enlightenment which he did not really possess,
380
but rather emotionally oscillating between conflicting ideas: this
was a trait in his character well illustrated by his toying with the
idea of actually giving up his position in Nepal in order to remain in
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Europe as permanent Nepali ambassador to Britain. With Jang himself
thus in two minds it was indeed the isolationism and conservatism of 
the bharadari generally which proved decisive, and Nepal under his rule 
saw a strengthening of the state machinery, with consequent increased 
potential for change in the long run, but no immediate attempt to 
transform the nation's productive capacities.
The British Connection
Whilst continuing the isolationist policy which Nepal had followed
since the days of Prithvi Narayan, Jang and his successors made a firm
alliance with British India the bedrock of their foreign policy. In
so doing they followed lines which had been laid down during the final
years of Bhimsen's predominance and also under Mathbar Singh, but the
contrast with the pretence of hostility Bhimsen had maintained for
internal purposes and also with the real tensions during the Kala Pande
ascendancy was a marked one: not surprisingly The Times remarked during
Jang's 1850 visit to Britain that 'the Court of Kathmandu was almost
the last in India from whom but a few years back any mission of amity
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or compliment might have been reasonably expected1. The bond between
the British Indian government and the Rana regime grew even stronger 
under Jang's successors, as the British came to see the traditional 
regimes of the subcontinent as natural allies against the rising 
nationalist challenge and to regard Nepal's insulation from 'progress' 
as politically advantageous. In consequence the belief developed
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amongst the Nepali intelligentsia that Jang had been a British puppet 
whose rise to power was engineered by the Residency, and this view is 
still widely held by educated Neaplis today, despite its demolition by 
archival research since 1951.
Jang's policy was in fact dictated simply by the belief that
British power was irresistible and that collaboration was the surest
means of securing advantage in the short term and of postponing as long
as possible the absorption of Nepal in the British Empire which he regarded
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as probable in the long run. His offer of support in the second Sikh
War was a natural consequence of this belief, and his conviction was 
strengthened by what he saw for himself during his 1850 visit to Europe.
Jang's journey, which he made in the capacity of ambassador from 
King Surendra to Queen Victoria and which involved an absence from Nepal 
of just over a year, was proposed as a fact-finding mission and accepted 
by the British as such. Though this was doubtless part of the real 
reason, most important was the wish to demonstrate Nepal's goodwill 
towards the British in the aftermath of the annexation of the Panjab and 
to strengthen Jang's own position at home by creating the impression that 
he enjoyed a special relationship with the British. In addition, he 
wished to obtain three specific concessions from the authorities in 
London: extension of the existing extradition agreement to cover civil
offenders (in particular absconding revenue collectors); permission to 
employ British engineers on irrigation and military projects; and the 
right to correspond directly with London in future should he be 
dissatisfied with the Resident in Kathmandu.
In the event, the home authorities simply referred him back to 
Kathmandu on all the points he wished to discuss, and the visit became
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essentially a public relations exercise. The British were anxious to
impress Jang with their industrial and military strength, whilst Jang
himself, as the first Hindu of such political importance to visit Europe,
proved the sensation of the season both in Britain and subsequently in 
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France.
Although the Embassy had thus been a success of sorts, it is
uncertain whether it did Jang any political good at home, at least in
the short term. Too close an identification with the British could bring
its own dangers, as previous episodes in Nepali history had demonstrated.
The conspiracy against him and the general atmosphere after his return -
examined earlier in this chapter - suggest that the negative reaction was
predominating. It is also possible that his lack of success with his
three requests became known. There is no direct evidence of this in
contemporary sources, but earlier this century there was a story current
amongst the older generation in Kathmandu that Jang had failed to obtain
his objectives in Britain and left hurriedly for home without his hosts' 
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permission. Against all this one can set only the approaches for a
reconciliation made by some of the Nepali refugees as he returned home 
through India (see above, p.319): his treatment as an honoured guest by
the British perhaps helped to convince them that a change of regime was 
no longer to be hoped for.
So far as Anglo-Nepali relations are concerned, the effects were more 
clearly positive. Improved extradition arrangements were eventually 
conceded, albeit after lengthy negotiations, whilst the visit stood Jang 
personally in good stead with the British and also reinforced his own 
belief that alliance with them was the only realistic policy for Nepal. 
With assured peace on his southern border, he took advantage of the
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Taiping rebellion in China to return to the 'forward policy' towards Tibet
which Nepal had to abandon after the Chinese intervention in 1792.
Logistical difficulties limited his advance and led him to give up the
aim of wresting control of the frontier districts of Kuti and Kirong,
but the war ended with Tibetan agreement to pay an annual tribute to
Nepal and with increased extra-territorial privileges for the Nepali
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merchant community in Lhasa. Jang's opportunity to participate in
a more decisive, and financially more profitable, campaign came with the
Mutiny outbreak. After providing troops who held Azimghar and Jaunpu-r
districts against the rebels, Jang took the field personally at the end
of 1857. He told Sir Colin Campbell, with whom he participated in the
assault on Lucknow, that had it not been for his visit to Britain he
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would now be fighting against the British not alongside them. This
statement was perhaps an exaggeration on his part, since even before
1850 he probably had a sufficiently realistic view of British power to
deter him from risking openly opposing it. Nevertheless, Jang would
probably have stayed neutral if he had not had his own first-hand
experience of Europe to set against the opposition of the bharadars to
assisting the British. The intervention did not, of course, make the
difference between British victory and defeat, as Pudma Rana tried to
claim, but it eased their task considerably. In their despatch to
Canning authorising the return to Nepal of four districts of the Oudh
Tarai annexed from her in 1815, the Court of Directors did not try to
minimise the significance of the Nepali contribution:
We are unwilling to imagine the position in which we
should now have been without this aid from the
Maharajah - and still less of the course which events
must have taken had the Maharajah taken advantage of
our distresses, and directed against us the force he
206, has employed in our defence.
It is also arguable that the situation in Oudh and the United Provinces
would not have deteriorated as it did if Canning had not countermanded
Ramsay's initial offer of Nepali help at the beginning of June 1857.
The fact that Jang's 'collaborationist' policy brought concrete
results was in itself a powerful justification from the Nepali viewpoint,
but it could not entirely resolve the contradiction of a professedly
Hindu state aiding the mteeha conqueror of the Hindus of India. Even
though the Nepalis, then as now, though of themselves primarily as such,
not as 'Indians' or 'South Asians', the religious tie, as well as the
racial factor, did mean that they had some sense of solidarity with the
peoples to the south. Very clear evidence of this is provided by one
of Jang's travelling companions on the European trip, who wrote that on
reaching Bombay on their return journey the party felt as if they were
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back in their own homes. Whether or not Jang felt this as a personal
dilemma, it was obviously a factor in the thinking of many of his
countrymen, and therefore something which he had to take into account
in the presentation of his policies.
The problem was similar to that which had long faced Hindu rulers in
the plains when they accepted service under the Mughal emperor against
their co-religionists, and a partial solution had been found through the
incorporation in 'Rajput ideology' during the fifteenth to seventeenth
centuries of the theme of service to one's overlord, a schema within
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which a non-Hindu suzerain could be accommodated. However this model
was not appropriate for Nepal, because even though Jang could arily
declare to a British visitor that Queen Victoria 'has not got a more loyal
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subject than I am', he did not in fact wish to acknowledge that Nepal 
was a vassal of Britain. He therefore concentrated instead on two other
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themes: first, stressing that even if not part of a general Hindu
crusade Nepal's conduct always reflected the demands of dharma on a
Hindu ruler, and, second, exploiting the hillman's sense of separation
from the plainsman. Under the first heading came gestures of
independence from the British such as granting asylum to Rani Chand
Kunwar of the Panjab after her escape from Allahabad in 1849, but also
justification of collaboration as in itself dictated by Hindu principles:
the vamsavali account of the decision to assist in 1857 has Jang argue
that it is a Hindu's duty to avenge murder of women and children such as
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the sepoys had committed. The evidence for the second ploy is not
so explicit but prejudice against madesis was too marked a feature of 
Nepali psychology for its usefulness to be ignored. Hill superiority 
was implicit in the ranking of jati in the Muluki Ain, which counted 
plains Brahmans for some purposes below Thakuri and Rajput, and such 
feelings must have helped quell any misgivings felt by the Nepali troops 
who fought alongside the British in 1857-9.
As well as these considerations of realpolitik and national psychology,
there is an important aspect of the British connection which has largely
been ignored in the various studies of Indo-Nepali relations, and that
is the personal relationship established by Jang with the principal
British officials with whom he came in contact. In memoirs published
shortly after Jang's death, Orfeur Cavenagh records a conversation on
board ship at the start of the return journey from Europe. Jang
apologised to his companion for any inconvenience he had caused him and
told him that, although even brothers sometimes had disagreements, he
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had certainly looked up tp him as an elder brother. Jang's choice
of words will have been influenced by the fact that in Nepali 'elder
brother' (dai or dajyu) is a common way of addressing both a person of
superior status and also an equal with whom one is not particularly
intimate. However, the conversation was in Hindustani, which Cavenagh
understood very well, and Jang was certainly explicitly placing himself
in the junior position. This was a pattern of apparent dependence
which was to be repeated with other individuals. Brigadier MacGregor,
who was attached to Jang's force during the Gorakhpur and Lucknow
campaign of 1857-8, rapidly developed a close rapport with him, which he
described in a letter to Brian Hodgson:
I get on capitally with Jung. We are already the 
best friends in the world....He leans very much upon 
me, indeed almost too much so, but this I consider 
to be a fault on the right side.^^
There were also frequent occasions on which Jang accepted the advice of
Resident Ramsay. The most crucial of these was the near mutiny by a
Gurung regiment in 1857, an episode already analysed in detail (above,
pp.350-1)• Ramsay had before then been consulted often in connection
with Tibetan affairs. In 1852 Ramsay had persuaded him against
threatening hostilities over Tibetan encroachment on a border tract of
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little economic value. One year later, when war had begun but Jang
had already realised that he would be unable to secure the cession of
Kuti and Kirong districts, he discussed with the Resident his anxiety for
the fate of the local people who had collaborated with the invading
Nepali force and against whom the Tibetan commander-in-chief was now
said to be planning vengeance once the war was over. One of Ramsay's
suggestions was making a promise of no reprisals a condition of the
eventual peace settlement, and a clause to this effect was in fact
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included in the Nepal-Tibet Treaty of 1856.
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Interpreting Jang's real attitude to such situations is difficult
because of his talent for telling people what they wanted to hear: he
was certainly subtle enough to realise that a relationship which was
friendly but in which they themselves could feel the superior partner was
what the usual British official would most prefer. After Ramsay had
effectively blocked his plan to wield supervisory authority while not
holding the premiership, Jang's continued protestations of friendship
towards him were certainly insincere, for the grudge he conceived against
him led him in 1858 to seek his removal as a favour from Lord Canning and
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to fabricate various charges against him to that end. Having insisted
that it would be an unbearable personal humiliation if Ramsay, who had 
temporarily left Kathmandu, were to return, Jang nevertheless accepted 
the situation once it was clear that the Governor-General would not give 
way, and thereafter he once again treated the Resident in an ostensibly 
friendly manner. Flattery could therefore often be insincere, but at 
the same time it is clear enough that at times Jang genuinely welcomed 
and respected advice from individual Britons. Deference towards the 
representatives of a state incomparably more powerful than his own would 
come naturally to a man accustomed to view both family and political 
relations in hierarchical terms, while the Resident, unlike many of 
Jang's Nepali counsellors, could be expected to give advice without fear 
or favour on any issue where the interests of Nepal and of British India 
were not directly opposed.
Conclusion: Continuity and,Change under Jang Bahadur
The establishment of the Rana regime was undoubtedly a major turning- 
point in Nepali history, but the elements of continuity have not always
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been given sufficient weight. Despite the elimination of many leading
bharadars at the Kot, the new elite was very much an outgrowth of the
old. Jang's own family overshadowed the others, but great care was
taken to bind the latter to the Kunwars. In addition to the various
marriages discussed above, there were many undocumented alliances, so
that by the 1870s a Residency Surgeon could claim that the Ranas 1
interests were 'interwoven with those of almost every other family, from
216
that of the king down to the lowest officials'.
In caste terms power remained as before in Chetri (Khas) and
Thakuri hands, with Brahmans providing legitimation and advice. There
had been, however, an important shift in the relationship between the
first two. Though claiming caste equality with the royal family, and
thus Rajput status, the Ranas still remained in some sense Chetris, both
receiving brides from, and giving them.to Chetris. The Chetri caste,
which had always been the most numerous element within the political
elite, could now feel even more strongly that they were the dominant
caste, and the Ranas could thus rely on a basis of Chetri solidarity
that remained virtually intact up to the overthrow of the regime in 
217
1950-51.
The relationship of the regime with the mass of the population 
remained fundamentally the same as before, and the major lines of policy 
which Jang followed were similar in their objectives to those of Bhimsen 
and Mathbar before him. Extraction of the maximum revenue without 
driving the population beyond endurance had always been the guiding 
philosophy of Gorkha administration, whilst from Bhimsen's later years 
onwards most contenders for power had realised the necessity for good 
relations with the British. Jang Bahadur did not so much innovate in
389
these spheres, as display greater finesse, and perhaps greater 
determination, in working them out. The notion of promoting more 
radical change did indeed occur to him, but more as a passing fancy 
than a settled determination, and it is highly doubtful whether in any 
case his power-base would have survived the strain of a thoroughgoing 
attempt at modernisation. Jang's achievement was rather to have 
stabilised the political structure, to ensure that Nepal survived as an 
independent country, and to allow the consolidation and strengthening of 
the central government and the continuance of the slow trend towards 
national integration already in operation.
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CONCLUSION 
NEPAL AND HINDU POLITY
This study has shown how the different elements of the Nepali polity 
functioned during a period of acute instability, and how that period 
closed with the inauguration of a new regime which nevertheless retained 
the same basis of legitimation and also the same relationship to the mass 
of the population. The Rana regime would not prove totally immune from 
the strains which had earlier beset the Nepali monarch and bharadari3 for 
there was to be a further violent upheaval in 1885 when sons of Dhir 
Shamsher, Jang's youngest brother, assassinated their uncle, Maharaja 
Ranoddip Singh, and killed or exiled Jang's own sons. The coup was 
completed before non-Rana contenders for power could enter the lists, 
and Dhir's descendants ruled Nepal until 1951, the combined office of 
maharaja and prime minister being held in turn by five of his sons and 
two of his grandsons. The basic structure established by Jang was 
maintained throughout and can be seen as remaining in the tradition of 
Hindu kingship, leaving the way fully prepared for the resumption of 
power by the kings themselves after the end of the Rana regime.
Jang's system rested essentially on the same three pillars which 
were identified in the first chapter as supporting the king's authority.
The religious aura of kingship continued to be important, for although 
the king himself now had virtually no effective voice in the administration 
Jang ruled in the king's name, whilst also, in his capacity as maharaja 
acquiring a lesser but still significant degree of royal divinity himself. 
The virtual separation of the principal sacerdotal and administrative
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aspects of kingship had the advantage of allowing Jang and his Rana 
successors a little more flexibility with regard to religious observance 
than would otherwise have been the case. Jang's European journey, for 
instance, unsettling as it was to the orthodox, might have been completely 
impossible for the king himself.^- The military factor remained important, 
and indeed became more so, because Jang, like the founder of the Shah 
dynasty, could project himself as a charismatic military leader. Finally, 
control over land continued to be crucial, Jang reinforcing this through 
some reduction of the power (though not the income) of jagirdars. The 
extensive birta grants to himself and to members of his own family, and 
the extension of the rajya system might have posed a threat to central 
control, but the overwhelming military predominance at the centre was an 
insurance against this. In a sense, therefore, it was business as usual, 
only with the central focus shifted for most purposes from ma.harajadhi.raj 
to maharaja, and with a steady strengthening of the state machinery. Nepal 
remained a Hindu monarchy, and under a system of government that European 
observers described as 'autocracy1. Nevertheless there were limits to 
this autocracy, limits which repay consideration in the context of both 
the 'traditional' Hindu state and of new influences acting on it.
The hereditary premiership was itself claimed as a check on autocracy 
by members of the Rana family. This view was put forward by Dhoj Nar 
Singh, son of Jang's youngest brother, Ranoddip, in a memorandum presented 
to the Indian government in 1888. Dhoj Nar had fled Nepal three years 
previously, when the sons of Dhir Shamsher had staged their coup. The 
refugees sought British assistance against the Shamshers and therefore 
tried to present Jang as a reformer who ended despotism in Nepal by 
introducing 'with the assent of all the Estates of the realm...a Constitution,
which, while it upheld the dignity and supremacy of the Crown, at the
same time curtailed the power of the Sovereign by vesting all executive
2
authority in the hands of his ministers1. The implied equation of
the Rana maharaja's position vis-a-vis the King of Nepal with that of
Gladstone vis-a-vis Queen Victoria is a false one, the real analogy
being with the combination of hereditary minister and titular monarch
sometimes found in other Indian states, most notably in the Maratha
confederacy and in Vijaynagar. The arrangement can also be seen as an
instance of dvaivagya - dual monarchy - which had been a recurrent
feature at earlier periods of Nepali history, both in the medieval Newar
kingdoms and in the concurrent reigns of Licchavi and Gupta kings in
the seventh century AD. As a term in Indian political theory dvaivajya
first occurs in the Avthasastva, and later features in Kalidasa's 
3
Mdlavikagnimitva. Jayaswal sees it as true joint sovereignity, an
extension into the realm of politics of the legal principles evolved to
4
accommodate the Hindu joint-family system. In its practical working, 
however, it generally provided not the counter-instance to the 'Hobbesian 
doctrine of indivisible sovereignty' claimed by Jayaswal, but rather 
confirmation of.that doctrine's universality, for either one of the 
partners held the real power and the other a formal title only, or both 
were dependent on some third party. Kalidasa's jointly ruling brothers 
fall in the first category, having been placed on the throne by a foreign 
suzerain, whilst the Nepali Guptas, like the Ranas, had effectively 
appropriated the power of the dynasty they left on the throne. If one 
is looking for the influence of the joint-family on the political world, 
then the various attempts by Rajendra to associate queen and/or crown 
prince with his own royal authority, are more promising candidates.
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The system manifestly failed to work, however, and the bharadars and
troops clamoured for 'one master1, just as many greeted the news of
Jang's title of maharaja with the comment that 'there cannot be two swords 
5
in one scabbard1. The maharajaship worked because for practical
purposes there was indeed only one master.
The de facto restraints on Jang's freedom of action have been identified
in the previous sectons: bharadard, army and local elites all had to be
conciliated. It would be stretching the meaning of the word to
describe such restraints as constitutional, for fear of provoking revolt
acts as a check even on the most absolute of despotisms. None the less,
the Muluki Adn in its original version clearly seeks to circumscribe the
authority of both king and prime minister, providing specifically that
the law binds them also.^ These provisions could be violated in
practice, and were in fact repealed in a subsequent edition, but they show
that the rule of law was at least an ideal at which government was
supposed to aim. It is possible to see here influence from Jang's
European journey, for the Betadt Yatra stresses the subjection of both
7
monarch and premier to the law as laid down by parliament. But it is 
equally legitimate to view the provision as a natural development of the 
traditional Hindu view that the king is subject to the rule of dharma.
This theme is stressed particularly in Manu's seventh book, acting as
Q
a counter-balance to the same text's insistence on royal divinity.
This tradition was very much alive in nineteenth-century Nepal, as is 
demonstrated by the dharma patra (solemn undertaking) to which the 
bharadars subscribed in 1799 and which provided for the regulation of the 
kingdom during the minority of King Girvana Yuddha:
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Let the Raja observe justice and equality... and 
cherish his able and faithful servant....Let the Raja, 
if he can, exceed in act what is enjoined in the 
inscriptions in copper; and if he violates that 
engagement let his authority cease.^
The effectivness of such doctrines as a check on the abuse of authority
was somewhat weakened as the implication was often that retribution
would be provided by the working out of the king 1s karma rather than by
his subjects exercising a right of revolt. There was, however, a more
activist strand to the tradition: the Mahabharata laid down in one
passage that an oppressive king should be killed like a mad dog, whilst
Jang Bahadur had himself advocated in 1843 that the army should be the
10
judge of King Rajendra's fitness to rule.
Orthodox political theory also required the king to be guided by
the advice of his ministers. The Arthasastra recommends that when
any non-routine question arises the king should convene his council and
11
follow the opinion of the majority. More pertinent to the case of
Nepal, the Sukranitisara, a nineteenth-century text combining traditional
material with newer influences, also lays down that the wise king always
12 . .
follows the advice of his councillors. Texts on n'it%sastra were of 
course frequently the work of men who were themselves royal advisers 
(the Arthasastra would be the prime example if it does in fact derive 
from an original work by the historical Kautilya) or who aspired to be 
such, and consequently what they prescribe may be widely divergent 
from actual practice, but in Nepal in the period under review the advisers' 
influence was often paramount. When Jang himself, though technically 
still the king's minister, became de facto king, he too relied to some 
extent on his bharadars. Even if debate might not always be full and 
free, it is significant that Jang felt the need to obtain formal
4 07
endorsement of his policies at critical moments, such as when the
13
decision to help the British in 1857 was taken.
In contrast to senior b h arad ars, or even lower level administrators,
the ordinary citizen normally had no role in the affairs of state, and
Jang himself stressed this point in conversation with Orfeur Cavenagh
(see p. 297 above) . This absence of a democratic element explains readily
why the author of the BeXadt l a t r a  was unable to perceive that aspect of
the British constitution and presented Parliament as a totally aristocratic 
14
institution. Yet closer examination shows that there were traces of
popular involvement both in political theory and in practice. In the
first place the traditional Indian view saw government as very much f o r
the people though not by them. The myths of the origin of kingship
presented in the A dtareya  Brahmana, and Mahabharata and in Buddhist
sources depict men as deciding on the need for a king either to lead them
against their enemies or to maintain law and order. The word r a ja
itself was derived incorrectly, but illuminatingly, from the verbal root
rano ('to please 1), the king being someone who pleased his people. In
one sense the king did this by ritual incorporation of the whole community,
so that, as the Mahabharata put it, 'the whole community is pleased by
his, the one man's pleasure, and when the one man is in distress all
15
become distressed'. The persistence of this notion in the Nepali case
probably lies behind the BeXadt Y a t r a ’s inclusion of 'always being happy'
16
in its list of the functions of the British monarch. More important
in the Indian tradition, however, was the king's obligation to provide 
his subjects with direct benefits rather than vicarious satisfaction, 
and this, too, was fully reflected in the Nepali political consciousness, 
starting from Prithvi Narayan's characterisation of his newly-created
408
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kingdom as 'a garden of the thirty-six castes'. The l a t  mohav
appointing jirang Maharaja of Kaski and Lamjung included the instruction
'make your subjects happy', whilst Jang himself wrote to his brother in
1850 that 'God put us where we are so that we could protect the common 
X 8
people'. Actual practice might not always correspond with theory,
but it has already been shown that consideration for the public good did
have some effect on Jang's policy. It is also significant that even in
the relatively disturbed political conditions of the early forties, the
regime's treatment of its subjects struck the Lawrences as superior to
19
the general South Asian level.
Indian political theory extended the notion of government in the
public interest to include government in accordance with public opinion,
even where that opinion might not seem soundly based. The classic
example is provided in the Ramayana, where Ram, though himself confident
of Sita's chastity, rejected her because his subjects believed it-•had1
been lost. In the same vein the Mahabharata advises the appointment of
20
ministers who enjoy the people's confidence. In the practice of Hindu
states respect for public opinion is seen most clearly in the king's
function of providing royal sanction for regulations with a particular
21
caste or community devised for itself. Nepali reflexes of the general
Indian view are again easy., to find. Jang's letters to Bam parallel the
thinking behind Ram's treatment of Sita, with the dramatic assertion
that 'if it will please the people, [a ruler] should even have his own 
22
son killed'. Endorsement of a community's self-regulation was also
common both before and after Jang's coming to power: the rules for the
Gurung tribe promulgated in 1867/8, for example, will have been drawn up
23
m  the first place by leading Gurungs themselves.
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The Shah period in Nepal provides little else which could plausibly
be described as self-government, but there is evidence that the Newar
kingdoms of the Kathmandu Valley did allow a role in the administration to
24panes representing a particular town or area. The 'panchayat democracy1,
which, after the monarchy itself, is the major feature of Nepal's present
constitution, involves elected bodies at village or town, district and
national level, but is nevertheless contrasted with 'alien' multi-party
democracy as continuing an indigenous tradition, and there has therefore
been a tendency for Nepali scholars sympathetic to the official ideology
to exaggerate the importance of p an ch aya t-style institutions in earlier
periods. None the less contemporary sources from the Licchavi
inscriptions (fifth-eighth centuries) onwards do attest their existence.
After the Gorkha conquest pancayats continued to play a role in the
judicial system: in the politically sensitive case of the Indian merchant
Kasinath, for example (see above, p.175) a pancayat of merchants was
instructed to look into the evidence, whilst panes representing the
lower and upper sections of Kathmandu city were involved in disputes 
25
between Newars. There are also indications that panes had a hand in
administrative as well as judicial affairs. In 1775 'p an es1 were included
26
in the ’Nepali delegation negotiating a treaty with Tibet. After the
execution of a leading bharadar in 1778, the regent, Bahadur Shah had to
allay the suspicions of the Kathmandu panes by showing them his nephew,
King Rana Bahadur, from the window in the Hanumandhoka known as p an ejh yat 
27
('pane window'). The privileges of the panes and of the citizens
generally were naturally most respected when disunion at the highest level 
caused contenders for power to bid against each other for support.
When Ran Banadur abdicated and then attempted to reassert his authority
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against bharadars claiming to act in the name of the infant King Girvana
Yddha, the latter issued an order to 'the panes, mahajans ('merchants')
and people of Bhadgaon (third of the Kathmandu Valley towns)' to support
2 8
them and promised to confirm the addressees' old privileges.
Whilst these privileges were eroded in the nineteenth century, during 
the 'National Movement' against Crown Prince Surendra1s excesses at the 
end of 1842, the town functionaries and the merchants were amongst the 
signatories of the petition presented to King Rajendra (see above, p.194).
The precise mechanism by which panes were selected in the Newar and 
early Shah periods is unknown, but it can be assumed they were drawn 
from dominant castes and the wealthiest families. The local communities 
they 'represented' should certainly not be portrayed as models of 
egalitarianism and consensus democracy. None the less, their existence 
did at least mean a wider sharing of power than one confined to the 
king and his nobles.
Whatever the real significance of panes in earlier times, there is no 
evidence of any role for them under Jang, other than a subsidiary one in 
the judicial process. Direct popular participation in politics, in so 
far as it occurred at all, was extra-systemic, as in the 1850 riot by 
Bhotiya (Tibetan) inhabitants of Muwakot district against miners brought 
into their village by an i ja r a d a r or in the 1776 revolt by Magar
29
supporters of a man claiming to be an incarnation of the god Lakhan Thapa.
The influence of the army, however, remained important, and the nearest
approach to a representative assembly the period provides is the
gathering of officers from jemadar upwards to which Jang unsuccessfully
30
appealed in 1863 to forgo their salary for a year. In the years
before 1846 the role of the army had been crucial, as the whole of this
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study has demonstrated. The authors of a study of the panchayat system
have rightly pointed out that the maintenance of a standing army and
its concentration at the capital naturally resulted in the troops
assuming in relation to the Gorkha government the position which the
leading citizens of the Valley towns had enjoyed v is - a - v is  the former 
31
Newar sovereigns. Whereas in Newar times the army - generally
consisting of non-Newar mercenaries - had been of little political
significance, Nepal now came closer to a newer pattern, seen at its
most extreme in the dominance of the khatsa during the life of the Sikh
state in the Panjab.
It is arguable that the army at Kathmandu, though it had special
interests of its own, was not entirely unrepresentative of the castes
from which it was drawn. Though he enjoyed some of the rights of a
j a g i r d a r , the ordinary soldier was a peasant farmer in origin and would
32
become so again at the end of his service. The tenants who worked
soldiers' plots were often themselves dhakres - men who had been
rotated out of the army - whilst the serving man's own family would
continue to look after his plot whilst he was in the cantonment at
Kathmandu. The largest single element in the army was Khas -
or Chetris (Xsa.tvi.yas) as Jang ordered they should be styled - who were
also the largest community in the country and the one from which the
bulk of the political and military leadership was drawn. There was
thus a stark contrast with the medieval Indian pattern in which soldiers
33
were drawn from lower castes and from criminals. None of this made
the regime under Jang or his predecessors 'democratic', but it did mean 
that the danger of a sense of alienation between rulers and upper- and 
middle-caste ruled was reduced.
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Nepal under Jang Bahadur continued as a traditionalist Hindu monarchy,
but latent within that tradition were elements completely contrary to the
model of 'oriental despotism1 which, is sometimes foisted upon it.
Precisely because the tradition was a complex and diverse one, the question
of 'modern' influence on his policy, which arises particularly in relation
to the MuZuki A in , becomes extremely difficult to answer categorically.
When the A in lays down specifically that all religions, including
Christianity, may be freely practised in Nepal, subject only to the ban 
34
on cow slaughter, how far was this simply a natural development of the
tolerance implicit within Hindu notions of hierarchy, and how far was it
a response to 'liberal' ideas from the outside? Four years before the
A in was promulgated, Jang had proudly claimed in conversation that
Captain Orfeur Cavenagh that perfect religious toleration existed in
Nepal, and received the reply that the British went even further by
35
actually praying for the conversion of heretics. Who was then being
more 'modern' and who more 'traditional'?
The case of Nepal thus illustrates the inadequacy of any analysis
which sharply contrasts traditional and modern. This point has been
argued by Edwards in the context of the Nepali bureaucracy, a study of
which he made the basis for a criticism of the Weberian dichotomy between
36
patrimonial and bureaucratic administration. Its applicability can,
however, be extended to the whole range of political thought and behaviour 
in nineteenth-century Nepal. The patterns which have been read into 
Nepali history either by the too ready application of foreign parallels, 
as in Hodgson's seeing the shade of 1688 in the events of 1842, or by 
present-day scholars eager to find a pattern of democratic monarchy to 
fit the Shah dynasty's current ideological needs, are over-simplifications, 
yet they contain an element of truth: obedience to the autocrat and
413
and his tax-gatherers did not exhaust the traditional view of what 
politics was or should be about.
The Rana regime was strong enough to ensure that the more 1 liberal' 
tendencies inherent within the traditional system remained largely below 
the surface. It did, however, allow progress towards the creation of 
a Nepali sense of identity to continue. The self-conscious fostering 
of a ’Nepali nationalism’ should perhaps be seen as starting only in
the time of Maharaja Chandra Shamsher (1901-1929), under whom the word
37 -'Nepali' was adopted as official title of the 'parbatiya' language..
None the less, steps such as the promulgation of the MuVuki A in and the 
admission of the Kiranti to the army reinforced older factors such as 
the relatively porous barrier between the key Khas/Chetri caste and the 
main western hill tribes, and the hillman's sense of distinctiveness 
from the people of the plain. The process was one which did not embrace 
all groups equally, and the impure Indo-Nepali castes and the people of 
the Tarai are arguably still not really included today, yet the elements 
working towards unity were strong enough to require us to see 
nineteenth-century Nepal as a nation in the making as well as 
representative of wider South Asian patterns.
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APPENDIX 1 : JANG BAHADUR'S FAMILY
The earliest reference to Jang's supposed descent from the Ranas 
of Mewar is in the lal mohar of 15 May 1848, authorising his family to 
style themselves 'Kunwar Ranaji'.-*- An account made available to 
Danel Wright (Residency Surgeon, 1863-76) and published in translation 
in 1877, names the ancestor who entered the western hills as Ram Singh 
Rana, and implicitly links his arrival with the final fall of 
Chittaurgadh in 1568.2 A more elaborate family history was published 
in 1879 by Jang's former servant, Ram Lai. This places the departure from 
Chittaurgadh in the twelfth century, and also traces the Rana line back 
to the hero of the Ramayana.2
It is possible, as Baral has argued, that the claim to Rana ancestry 
was made only after Jang became prime minister, since his original kill 
name was not Rana, but Khandka.^ However, Rana was a long-established 
Magar thar, and those who bore it in the 1830s certainly claimed descent 
from Chittaurgadh.  ^ Jang's ancestry very probably included Magar Ranas 
on the female side, as his own physiognomy suggests Magar blood, and either 
this connection, or simple imitation of the Shah dynasty's claim, might 
have prompted the family to devise the story before 1846.
Whenever first advanced, the family's purported genealogy is even 
less reliable than that of the Shahs, and the first ancestor who can be 
accepted as an historical personage is Jang's great-great-grandfather, 
Ahiram Kunwar. Ahiram is agreed by all sources to have moved from the 
caubisl kingdom of Kaski to Gorkha, in the reign of Prithvi Narayan's 
father, Narbhupal Shah. gRam Lai's 1879 account, which is closely 
paralleled by Pudma Rana, gives Ahiram's son, Ram Krishna, and grandson, 
Ranjit, central roles in the conquest of the Kathmandu Valley and 
subsequent campaigns. While not the key figure his family claimed, Ram 
Krisha's contribution was significant enough for Prithvi Narayan in 1772 
to grant him the revenues of Dhulikhel, and to tell him that 'to reward 
you in proportion to your efforts, not even half my kingdom would be 
sufficient'.^ Ram Krishna's son, Ranjit, was similarly less prominent 
than the Rana family historians suggest, but took part in the campaigns 
against Tibet and the Chinese invaders in the 1790s. Both Ranjit and 
his father were associated in military operations with Abhiman Singh 
Basnet, and this link, or, less probably, an already established alliance 
with Bhimsen Thapa's family, may have been the reason for Ranjit's son 
Bal Narsingh Kunwar gaining an appointment to the staff of ex-King Rana 
Bahadur and subsequently accompanying him to Banaras.®
The family's political importance rose with Balnar Singh's appointment 
as a kaji after he struck down Rana Bahadur's assassin in 1806. Ranjit 
was at this time serving with the Nepali forces in the far west, and his 
grandson, Jang Bahadur, himself told the British Resident in 1852 that he 
died in the fighting at Kangra, the fortress on the west bank of the Satiej 
which the Gorkhas besieged in vain for four years.® In fact, Ranjit is 
mentioned as on active service in a document of May 1814, over four years 
after the Nepalis had abandoned the territory beyond the Satiej to Ranjit 
Singh's Pan jab kingdom.-*-® In the 1852 interview Jang had also mentioned 
the death at Kangra of his maternal grandfather, Bhimsen's brother, Nain
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Singh Thapa. This death is independently attested, and Jang presumably 
thought two dead grandfathers better than one for making his point that 
he was implacably hostile to Ranjit Singh's descendants. As Ranjit Kunwar 
may well actually have died in action against the Britih, Jang had another 
obvious motive for deception.
Other Kunwars were prominent in military operations in the west in 
the early years of the nineteenth century, in particular Ranjit's cousin, 
Chandravir, and his sons, Bir Bhadra and Bal Bhadra. There is evidence 
of continuing friction between the two branches. Following Nain Singh 
Thapa's death in winter 1806/7, a compromise agreement with the ruler of 
Kangra was provisionally negotiated, but eventually rejected on the 
advice of Amar Singh Thapa, overall commander in the west.2-2' Ranjit Kunwar 
appears to have supported the compromise, whereas a contemporary Gadhwali 
poet writing under the patronage of Bir Bhadra Kunwar accused the Nepalis 
who negotiated the agreement of having taken bribes from Sansar Chand.2-2 
Thirty years later Bir Bhadra refused to give help to Bal Narsingh when 
the latter was in financial difficulties after his dismissal from office. 
Jang retaliated after coming to power by treating Bir Bhadra1s son less 
generously than his other relatives.2-2 Jang also never told the British 
that Bal Bhadra, the gallant defender of the hill fort of Kalunga against 
them in 1814 who had won their admiration, was a Kunwar and his own 
cousin; they continued to believe that 'our gallant adversary Bulbudder', 
was a Thapa. ^
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NOTES TO APPENDIX ONE
1. Vide supra, p.314 . If the decree of 13 Baisakh Sudi 1904 (28 April 
1847) published in Udayraj Shastri, Nepal Digdarsan (Kathmandu 1957, 
cited by Marize, op.cit., p.63) is accepted as authentic, the title 
of Ranaji was conferred a year previously, but this is highly 
unlikely as correspondence later that year still refers to Jang 
simply as a Kunwar.
2. Wright, History of Nepal3 op.cit., pp.285-8.
3. Sri Ramlal, Nepatasya Suryavamsi Sisodiya Rana ki Vamsavali arthat 
Srimaharaja Jangbahadur ke Gharana ka, 1879, n.p., n.pub.
4. Leelantswar Baral, 'Life and Writings of Prithvi Narayan Shah', 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of London 1964, p.Ill; Bista,
Culte du Kuldevataj  op.cit.,  p.27, argues for Rana as the original 
lineage name, but elsewhere {ibid., p.43, n.2) admits that the case 
for 'Khandka' is supported by the story of Kunwars this century 
who declared themselves as 'Khandka Kunwar' being admitted to the 
'Rana Kunwar' kuldevata ceremony at Panchitani temple in Kathmandu.
5. HP, Vol.58, ff.37-8, cited in Baral,-Op.cit., p.121.’
6 . The correspondence was first pointed out by Marize (op.cit., p.64).
It is mostly likely the result of both men having translated the 
same Nepali source.
7. Prithvi Narayan to Ram Krishna Kunwar, 5 Aswin Badi 1829 ( September 
1772), published in N. Pant et.al. (eds.), Sri Pane Prithvinarayan 
Shahko Upades (Kathmandu: Jagadamba Prakasan 2025 VS (1968/9)),
Vol.3, p.1095.
8. Vide supra, p.63..
9. Ramsay to Lord Dalhousie, 14 April 1852, GD/45/6/154 (Dalhousie 
Muniments). The story is repeated by the Rana family historians 
(Ramlal, op.cit., p.46; Rudma Rana, op.cit., pp.8-9; Phalendra 
Rana, Nepali Rana-gharanako Samksipta Vamsavali (Kathmandu: the 
author 2014 VS (1957/8)), p.15.
10. Bhimsen Thapa and Ranadhoj Thapa to Bhaktavar Singh Basnet, 18 Jeth 
1871 (? June 1814), in Mahesh Raj Pant, 'Nepal-Angreg Yuddhako Tayari', 
Purnima, 2 (1964), pp.68-76.
11. Mahesh Raj Pant, 'Vir Bhakti Thapa', Purnima, 18 (1967), pp.132-3.
12. Ramlal, op.cit., p.45 and Pudma Rana, op.cit., p.8; Molaram, 
Gadhrajvamsa, quoted in Mahesh Raj Pant, 'Bhakti Thapa', op.cit., 
p.137. Molaram1s connection with Bir Bhadra Kunwar is shown by 
verses in his Girvana luddha Prakasa [ibid., pp.139-41).
13. Pudma Rana, op.cit., p.18.
14. Atkinson, Himalayan Gazetteer3 op.cit., Vol.li, Part 2, p.640.
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APPENDIX 2 : LETTERS OF JANG BAHADUR WRITTEN FROM EUROPE 
Letter 1
We have heard the news of the mahita saheb 's death and this has 
distressed us all very much.^
I cannot now give you precise instructions. It is not possible 
for me to say what troubles will arise before my return. You must act 
as you think fit.
It is a fine thing that Sri Krishna Sahi has been made a captain 
because he paid court to you, and a fine thing that Indrabir Khatri and 
Sanman Khatri have been made lieutenants! [It is fine that] the 
Singhdal Company have been given 40 rupees! The four kaji-S, the three 
lieutenants and the subbas with me are very happy to see these promotions. 
They say that Bam Bahadur and Badri Nar Singh are as wise as Bharat and 
Chaturghan, for they reckon that since you have shown so much kindness 
to people of little account, they themselves, after working like younger 
brothers, sons or slaves, will certainly be allowed to keep their 
positions. The people here have said that my brother the minister 
(i.e., Bam Bahadur) used to tell us he would only dismiss an office-holder 
for an offence and that he would only promote a man if he was able to 
increase the area of land under cultivation or was energetic in support 
of the King's throne or the minister's life. [In practice,] they say, 
you are more liberal than that. Surely the minister cannot have made 
promotions on the principle that we are all members of one family who 
should promote outsiders with care and must fill the army with our own 
sons and nephews! People are saying that 'Bharat' and 'Chaturghan's 1 
intelligence has led them to promote flatterers and to divert to 
brothers and sons money that should have gone to the treasury.
When the council recommended the death penalty for Chandrabir Basnet 
for disobeying your orders you spared his life but exiled him beyond 
the Trisuli Ganga. A fine decision! You put him in irons, had him 
beaten and then turned him loose [to go into exile!]. Dhir Shamsher 
said to me that it was wrong for you to become angry with a dependant 
of his just on the word of a Newar, and to put him in fetters and punish 
him, and that, if punishment there had to be, at least you ought not to 
have cashiered him. I replied: 'If after pushing so severely one
whose only offence was to assist the foolish mahila saheb? Bam Bahadur 
was equally harsh with a worthless man, who failed to submit his accounts,
embezzled money and violated my laws and regulations, if Bam refused a
jag-iv to a man who failed to submit his accounts, then he acted in 
accordance with the law. But if Bam dealt thus only with Chandrabir, 
then you may assume that he acted merely out of anger against a dependant 
of his brother; that he is incapable of performing the role of minister; 
that he pays heed to the word of worthless people. If on the other hand 
he has treated everyone equally then you can assume that the people will 
regard your brother as a very intelligent and capable minister'. That
is the reply I gave to Dhir Shamsher.
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Ram Ale killed a man with two shots, but when this came before the 
council you reckoned it only a misdemeanour, fined him 2 , 0 0 0  rupees and 
then reappointed him. A fine act! If you follow the advice of those 
counsellors of yours, then deserving people who give noteworthy service 
will find themselves in irons! How well these counsellors have spoken! 
Chandrabir's capital offence has been punished by loss of his position, 
imprisonment and abuse, Ram Ale's by a two-thousand rupee fine and 
reinstatement. Just think what that means. What will the people say? 
What will God say? How can the state endure if all the peasants are 
to be killed? Bha'Lvab (demon) Singh Kharka's services were no less than 
Ram Ale's, yet you know I ordered Satram to execute him.
Write to me about Badri Nar Singh1s intent to double Laksmipati's 
jagi-V. What does Badri mean by 'On consultation with my second eldest 
brother (i.e., Bam Bahadur) I dismissed the khardar who had arrested 
Laksmipati'? If any soldiers talk angrily about myself they are to be 
dismissed. If your astonishing behaviour is at an end and things now 
go on properly, it will be alright. If I had hankered after the office 
of premier, then even though I gave you the routine work, I should not 
have given you the right to make appointments to the kampu. Your 
actions do not please me, your eldest brother, nor your two other brothers 
with me. How can they please the common people?
Give Parsa district to bhairab Lai Jha at a commission of 900 rupees 
and take a share (sc. of the revenue) of 400,000 rupees. If there are 
problems then dismiss him on the ground that he has shown no regard for 
his own honour or for the king's territory, and that he has deprived 
children of their portion.
I asked you before how the people could expect justice if, after 
dismissing Muktinath for being responsible for peasants' deaths, you then 
appointed as subba a man without a penny to his name [literally, 'without 
any warm ashes in his house']. You should realise that when the 
cultivators saw that he had been given the position in violation of your 
elder brother's arrangements, they must have suspected that you have been 
bribed to make the appointment, or that if you yourself were innocent 
that it was the man who recommended the appointment who was corrupt.
If you were both guiltless, and hadn't, as the saying goes, 'tasted 
forbidden fruit', then why did you put a basket of shit on your head 
[vdz., act in a way to arouse suspicion]?
When a cultivator's complain against Shiva Nidhi was received you 
dismissed it on the grounds that the petitioners would not accept the 
tat mohar ordering an enquiry. Bir Bhadra Majhi was dismissed before 
his time had expired? What was his offence? How can you entrust work 
to a man without a penny to his name, to someone who is just a face in 
the crowd? Who should take the blame now that things have gone wrong?
You extended the appointment of Balbhadra Majhi after he had 
remained at home for three months claiming to be ill, yet you dismissed 
Birbhanjan Majhi who worked among the cultivators night and day.
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Sometimes order is threatened by the failure to punish, and 
sometimes it is imperilled by punishing in error. For example,
Rajendra Bikram Shah punished Bhimsen Thapa in error while he pardoned 
the men who had contrived his own grandfather's exile. After 
inflicting such punishment on Bhimsen the mighty king lost his throne 
and had to sit wiping flies from his face. Now he knows what we 
gadflies can do he no longer retains the delusion that ruining Bhimsen 
was a solution for his problems. (DELETED: Whether it concerns a
worthless brother like mine, or the common people or the king, I 
understand what is going on, even though I am far away.)
A man who aims to make a name for himself must renounce greed and 
adopt compassion. He should not accept flattery from a man without resources, 
but deeds.only. If it will please1 the people he should even 
have his own son killed. He should do whatever makes the majority 
happy, overcoming his anger and love of wealth. He should try to form 
a council of good persons of high status, but should not be concerned 
with his own status. He should give the people the impression that he 
regards everyone's problems as his own. Since lying is sometimes 
necessary in politics, if you are able to keep the people happy by 
deluding them it is easy to be a minister; if not, the task is very 
difficult. Acts which displease the people will soon produce a 
dangerous situation. You will say I have written too much, but I have 
described things as I see them. Act as seems best to you. You write 
that you have carried out the padand of the army. If you have dismissed 
men with an eye to making savings on salaries you will earn the same bad 
reputation as Badri Nar Singh has already done. If you have made 
dismissals for faults committed then you have strengthened your position.
If you dismiss Kamds^ Savkds^ Damai-s or KaTmds3 then your capabilities 
will be undermined, and the arsenals will be ruined. Do not dismiss 
koteSj pipasj jamadarsj khalasd jamadars or pipa khalasis. Dismissing 
them is folly as they do a lot of work at little cost.
LETTER 2
If an officer challenges your orders to the army, remove his 
insignia at once and place him in irons. If four (sc. or more) persons 
gather in anyone's house, arrest the man at once. If anyone, whether 
out of or in-service, Brahman or India, pays court to His Highness the 
Mahdla Saheb without your permission, then if he is a pavbate put him 
across the Trisuli, and if he is a desWala [i.e. an Indian] put him 
beyond Sisa Gadhi [a fortress controlling the main route from the plains 
to Kathmandu].
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LETTER 3
Jang Bahadur sends greetings to Sri Bam Bahadur: Ram Ale's
killing a man is not a 'misdemeanour'. You heard me order the
execution of bhadrab Singh Kharka for just such an offence. Remove
Ale's badges of rank and put him in irons. Murder should not be 
readily forgiven. If you pardon this man what you would do if your 
own brother or son committed murder? Give him a reward? Cancel his 
gagdv. I will decide his case after my return. Although you have
already fined him, put him in irons.
LETTER 4
Srimadrajkumar Kumaratmaj Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief 
General Jang Bahadur Kunwar Ranaji sends greeting to his brother the 
most auspicious, thousand times blessed and long-lived Srimadrajkumar 
Kumaratmaj Commander-in-Chief General Bam Bahadur Kunwar Ranaji.
All is well here and I hope it is the same with you. Your letters of 
Jestha Badi - and of Friday, Jestha Sudi 5 [6 June 1850] reached me on 
Sravan Sudi 12 [19 August] and on Friday, Bhadra Badi 1 [23 August] 
respectively, and I have noted the contents. After taking leave of 
Queen Victoria I embarked for Paris on Tuesday, Sravan Sudi 13 
[20 August] at seven ghadds before sunset, and arrived there on 
Wednesday, Sravan Sudi 14 [21 August] at eight ghadds before sunset. 
Paris is situated 157 kos south-east of London. I have met the Paris 
minister [i.e., the French premier] and will now leave for Bombay after 
seeing the President.
(Sc. You write that) Khardar Lilanath Pande's daughter has been 
defiled, and his wife has been refused a certificate of purification 
on the grounds that she was aware of the offence. I have learnt 
from someone else's letter that troops going into Mahottari district to 
collect the revenue shot and killed a peasant. A mother conceals the 
fact if a daughter loses her purity, but a mother-in-law will not do 
the same for a daughter-in-law. Pande1s wife should therefore be 
allowed the certificate of purification. If the soldiers who killed 
the peasant in Mahottari did so on the orders of Suba Girjadatta Mishra, 
then confiscate his property. If he did not issue any order and the 
troops acted on their own initiative, then submit a report to the king, 
and have the men responsible hanged on the spot where the murder took 
place.
Khardars Deva Padhya, Manohar Padhya and Laksmibhakta Padhya are 
sending me regular reports of all happenings at home, great and small. 
Therefore at the next tuladan Khardar Deva Padhya is to receive two 
or three hundred rupees, Manohar two hundred, and Laksmibhakta one 
hundred.
After you have written that Her Majesty the Queen has fallen ill, 
what does it matter if you have completed hundreds of tasks or if 
you have struck gold! If anything happens to Her Majesty then I 
was wrong to come away leaving you as minister. As long as you are 
able to claim that you have made the Queen well again, I shall be 
perfectly happy for you to ransack the treasury or to surrender the 
country to foreigners!
(?) You have done good work in Nepal: I knew what I was doing
when I came away leaving you as minister. The Resident has asked for 
800 Gurkha troops - Magars and Gurungs. [Tell him that] your elder 
brother will return in Paus (December-January) and the matter can be 
dealt with then: say that a summons to the off-roll men has gone out,
but that grain stored for the Mangsir (November-December) harvest will 
last them until Paus (i.e., they will have no incentive to enlist until 
then); say that you will give facilities to anyone who does want to 
enlist; [point out that] troops have to be paid even if they remain at 
home all month, and prove this by showing him the three categories of 
certificate issued to the Letar and Sri Nath regiments. Make promises 
to the Resident, but do not actually provide any troops.
You need not write to me about [other] happenings in Nepal, but 
write daily with news of Her Majesty's health - you should not include 
other trifles. You do not know the meaning of 'politics'. Everyone 
else has mentioned her condition openly in their letters whilst yours 
contained nothing on the subject. If anything happens to the Queen and 
I find you allowed it to happen - if anything happens to her while you 
are acting as minister, I will hold you to blame. (?) Your clothes, 
your deeds and your stomach are all black and of no use. Understand 
this, then employ vaddyas from anywhere in the world, jhankrds from 
all over the country. Use the resources of the treasury, put the army 
officers on the task, and make the Queen well. You people (sc. Bam 
and Badri Nar Singh) are descended from a line of three distinguished 
men and if you now do not show devotion to your benefactor (sc. the 
Queen) and I have to see misfortune come upon the sahdbjyus j  then you 
know what my anger will be like. I will never let you show your faces 
again. Paris, Saturday, Bhadra Badi 2, 1907 (24 August 1850).
Postscript (in Jang's own hand): I have been given a reply to the
King's khavdta. You will learn the contents from the Resident's report
to the King. The letter itself is with me.
LETTER 5
Carrying out the civil pajand is not like carrying out the 
military one. It should be done very carefully. If Hemdal Thapa, 
Ratnaman Singh Rajbhandari, Laksmapati Jaisi, Sivanidhi Jaisi, Balbhadra 
Josi and the rest had not .oppressed', the peasants, why would I have 
dismissed them? Everyone in the Nepal Valley ['the three cities'] 
knew they were capable, (?) intelligent men. If they had been worthless
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why would I have appointed them in the first place? You may say that 
your giving a post to Sivaniddhi was no different from my reappointing 
an old subba like Tara. [In fact] I gave the position to Tara because 
in 1905 (1848/9) he had not molested the peasants, whereas when 500 
peasants by God's will came to the Valley to put their complaints to 
Sivanidhi, Ramanta shot one of them with his rifle. Ratnaman sent a 
company of troops from Bhiksakhor to arrest and turn back peasants who 
were coming to present a list of grievances. Hemdal Thapa has not yet 
submitted his accounts and was dismissed for irregularities. So that 
the peasants should be prosperous, even if the king's revenue declined,
I entrusted administration in the districts to an insignificant man with 
not a stick of furniture [literally, 'a pot'] in his house. I am most 
happy that you have given Butwal to Sivanidhi. The credit for the 
suffering of the peasants there and for the King's loss of revenue 
belongs to you and to Badri Nar Singh.
Reappoint all the old officials in the area east of Udiya. I 
agree with your putting Kesab in charge of Morang. You have done well. 
Kaji Hemdal Thapa and Amin Suba Siddiman Singh Rajbhandari told me that 
if I gave them a five-year revenue contract for the seven districts 
between Udiya and the Mechi they would raise 52,000 rupees to cover 
the cost of the journey to Europe and run the finances in a way that 
would maintain good relations with the English and keep the peasants 
happy. I replied: 'As long as you have not submitted your accounts
and have not obtained clearance certificates, and after you forcibly 
turned back the peasants with troops brought from Bhiksakhor, it is 
wrong to entrust districts to old rogues like you'. Now, if Hemdal 
Thapa earned even two paisa [i.e., even the smallest amount of money] 
it would not be Thapa himself but the children of our own little sister 
and daughter who would get the benefit of it. As for Siddhiman, you 
know that up to now he has always served me well. You know also that 
Ratnaman Singh did similar good service at Aulai [i.e., Alau?]. After 
refusing appointments to men who have always been so dear to me, I could 
not have given them to other former subbas until after they had presented 
their accounts and received their clearance certificates.
God put us where we are so that we could protect the common people. 
It is right to find some work or other for old subbas so as provide a 
living for them, but it is also necessary to protect the people. God 
will not tolerate a man who knowingly unleashes a starving tiger on the 
peasants, his flock. God did not tolerate Mathbar Singh's unleashing 
the tiger Hira Lai, whom he made his personal retainer. Bhimsen Thapa 
was induced by greed to unleash the tiger Kulanand on the peasant
flock, and God did not tolerate it. Nor did he tolerate Abhiman's
making Ratnaman and Lachimapati his agents and unleashing those tigers
on the block. Nor did God tolerate Gagan Singh's making Siddhiman his
agent and setting that tiger on the peasant flock. Because I seized 
those tigers, placed them in a cage and fed them meat, the good wishes 
of hundreds and thousands of peasants prevented any harm coming to me 
from my having killed hundreds of men in various ways. Thus I reached 
this splendid position.
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If the peasants see that you are confirming the arrangements your 
elder brother made, your task will be easy. If a man has not rendered 
his accounts he should be dismissed, be he umvao [i.e. district governor] 
general or pi-pa. Whether he is the King's man, my man or your man, 
and even if he possesses thirty-two virtues and can carry out seventeen 
functions he should still be dismissed. You may ask how you can carry 
on administration if you dismiss such capable men. For military work 
you should select a cowherd or moti-tar belonging to a caste eligible 
for army service. You will ask who should be the replacement on the 
clerical side for a man who does not submit his accounts. As clerks 
in the Kumari Cauk you should find and appoint sturdy men, of fair 
complexion, good-looking and with broadforeheads. Have nothing to do 
with men who cheat and lie and embezzle government funds. Carry on the 
administration with true and honest men.
When you carry out the pajani- of district administrators for the 
west and east, and of civil officials for the Nepal valley, do so with 
integrity and without regard for self-interest. As for the army, you 
should dismiss anyone, general or private, who does not wear uniform, 
fails to perform drill or guard duty, evades work, speaks deceptively, 
or who cheats and murders (?) hundreds, even if the man is your own 
brother. Appoint others in their place. There is no need to take 
action with anyone else. As for men whom I myself have appointed in 
the army, whatever their rank, you are to confirm the appointments.
As you suggest, after my return in Paus I shall be able to confirm 
appointments myself on the spot. If khalas'is3 jemadar or huda khatas,isJ) 
pipas3 jemadar pipas3 sarkesj kamiSj karmisj, dakarmisj or bajrakarmis 
fall ill, after they have been away from duty three months and have had 
one month's home leave they are all to be reappointed. Do not dismiss 
anyone. Confirm their positions.
Postscript (in Jang's own hand): If you enlist under-age, infirm or
cowardly soldiers, their salaries will be deducted from yours. You may 
ask where you should put your off-roll men, ranging from jemadar to 
private, who have gone to Pachalighat. See to the Kathmandu garrison 
and find recruits for that. The less sturdy off-roll men [?whom you 
accept] in your usual way on the advice of your companions, should be 
put in the Sher regiment. If anyone unsuitable is put in the Riphal, 
Letar, Rajdal, Sunath, Mahidal, Kali Bakas or Purana Gorkha companies, 
you will be in trouble.
NOTES
1. Originals published in Kamal Diksit, Jang-Gita (Lalitpur, Nepal: 
Jagadamba Prakasan, 2040 VS (1983/4)), pp.3-58.
2. This possibly refers to a (otherwise unknown) second son of King 
Surendra who died in infancy. Diksit, op.c,it.s pp.14-5.
3. Surendra's brother, Upendra.
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APPENDIX 3 ; FAMILY TREES
These tables are not fully comprehensive, but designed only to show 
the connections between individuals mentioned in the text. Principal 
sources are the tables in Stiller, S'Ltent Cry (op.eit.) , Bhim Bahadur 
Pande, Rastrabhakt'iko JaKlak (op.ei.t.) , and the Hodgson Papers.
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